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[Sec p. 174 



FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY 

From a painting by J. W. Ehninger, 1872 



THE STORY OF 

OUR NAVY 



BY 



WILLIAM 0. STEVENS, Ph.D. 



PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH 
U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY 



WITH ILLUSTRATIONS 
AND MAPS 




HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 

NEW YORK AND LONDON 

M C M X I V 






OCT l7l3t4- ; 



COPYRIGHT. 191 4. BY HARPE R a BROTHERS 

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

PUBLISHED OCTOBER. 1914 

K-0 



CU38093 



CONTENTS 



CHAP. PAGE 

Introduction ix 

I. How We Came to Have a Navy . i 

II. The "Bonhomme Richard" and the "Serapis" . 16 

III. A Naval War with France : 

IV. War with Tripoli 5S 

V. The Beginning of the War of 1S12 53 

VI. The Captures of the "Frolic," the "Macedonian." 

and the "Java" 67 

VII. James Lawrence -g 

VIII. Lake Erie and the Cruise of the "Essex" . . 90 

IX. Lake Champlain and the End of the War . . . 104 

X. 1812 to the Civil War 118 

XI. The Beginning of the Civil War, the Ironclads 151 

XII. The Upper Mississippi 147 

XIII. The Lower Mississippi 161 

XIV. The Battle of Mobile Bay 174 

XV. Torpedoes and the '•Albemarle" 187 

XVI. Confederate Cruisers 201 

XVII. Blockade-runners and Fort Fisher 21S 

XVIII. Thirty Years of Peace 231 

XIX. The Spanish-American War 246 

XX. The Santiago Campaign 202 

XXI. Events from the Spanish War to Vera Cruz . . 277 

XXII. The Modern Navy 287 

A Naval Chronology 300 

Index 313 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY Frontispiece 

A Frigate p age 3 

A Ship of the Line " 4 

Long Gun 



1 



Carronade l 

Uniform of a Captain, Revolutionary War ... " 12 

The "Ranger" and the "Drake" in Action . . Facing p. 14 
The Fight between the "Bonhomme Richard" and 

the "vSerapis" " 18 

The Fight between the "Enterprise" and the 

Barbary Corsair "Tripoli" " 40 

The Harbor of Tripoli p age 44 

The Burning of the Frigate "Philadelphia" . . Facing p. 46 

Uniform of a Captain, Tripolitan War .... Page 50 

Escape of the "Constitution" " 61 

The Surrender of the "Guerriere" Facing p. 64 

Uniform of a Sailor, War of 181 2 Page 84 

Uniform of a Captain, War of 1 812 " 85 

Uniform of a Marine, War of 1812 " 86 

States and Territories in the South and W t est — 

1812 " 91 

The "Niagara" Raking the "Detroit" and the 

"Queen Charlotte" Facing p. 96 

The "Essex" being Cut to Pieces " 102 

v 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



Map of Lake Champlain Region 

Plattsburgh Bay, Lake Champlain 

Typical Privateer of War of 1812 

Visit of the Japanese Officials to Commodore Perry 

Captain of the Fifties in Full Dress 

Midshipman of the Fifties in Full Dress . . . 
Midshipman of the Fifties in Service Dress . . 

Capture of Port Royal Forts 

Burning of the Ships, Norfolk Navy Yard . . . 
The Steam-frigate "Merrimac" in i860 . . . . 

Hampton Roads 

The "Monitor" and the "Merrimac" 

U. S. Gunboat "Lexington," a Wooden River-boat 

Made Over for Fighting 

The "Benton," the Most Powerful of the Union 

Gunboats 

Map of the Mississippi River, Cairo to the Gulf of 

Mexico 

Map of Island Number 10 

The Mississippi Below New Orleans 

U. S. Sloop of War "Hartford" 

Farragut's Victory in Mobile Bay — the Capture of 

the Ram "Tennessee" 

The Barrel Torpedo 

A Modern Submarine 

Confederate "David" 

Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds 

Launch Used by Lieutenant Cushing . - . . . . 

Section of Torpedo Used by Cushing 

The "Alabama" 

The Path of the "Wyoming" at Shimonoseki . . 

vi 



Page 



Facing p. 



Page 



I05 
IO9 
114 

125 
128 
129 
I30 
134 
135 
138 
140 
144 

I48 

149 







151 


1 ' 


155 


' ' 


164 


" 


166 


Facing p 


182 


Page 


188 


' 




189 


' 




I 9 I 


' 




I94 


1 




I98 


' 




199 


1 




205 


' 




208 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

The "Kearsarge" p age 211 

Movements of the ' ' Alabama ' ' and the ' ' Kearsarge " " 213 

Sinking of the "Alabama" " 217 

A Blockade-runner " 219 

Map of Charleston Harbor " 222 

Chase of a Blockade-runner Facing p. 224 

Fort Fisher p age 226 

Harbor of Apia " 242 

Dewey's Entrance into Manila Bay " 254 

Battle of Manila, May i, 1898 " 257 

The Battle of Manila Bay Facing p. 258 

The Last of Cervera's Fleet " 270 

The United States Battle-ship Fleet on Its Cruise 

around the world " 280 

Sea-fighters on Their Way to Mexican Waters . " 284 

The U. S. S. "Wyoming" " 288 



INTRODUCTION 

THE purpose of this book is to tell the story of our 
navy from the modern point of view. It is an inspir- 
ing history, and its tales of individual prowess against 
great odds and of devotion to country and to duty in the 
face of death are emphasized, as they should be. But 
the author believes that the reader of to-day is interested 
in something more than a mere eulogy of our naval heroes; 
that he would like to know the real reasons for successes 
and failures, the importance of "sea power" in war, the 
changes brought about by steam, electricity, and armor, 
and the less familiar services rendered by the navy in the 
years of peace. 

In these days, when "efficiency" is demanded in every 
occupation, young readers can readily understand that, 
where forces are even, victories in war come about, as 
a rule, not because one side is so much braver or more 
patriotic than the other, but because one side does better 
thinking and better shooting. Now the modern historical 
spirit is based upon research and guided by impartial 
inquiry, and the application of modern methods gives 
a broader view than the older naval histories which 
emphasized blood and smoke and victory, and exalted 
one side at the expense of the other. 

The modern view-point adds much to the picture, for 
it shows not only the pre-eminent influence of brains, 
science, discipline, and target practice, but also the vital 
importance of freedom from political influence, and the 
high part which "sea power" plays in general history. 
It is certain that the splendid record of our navy will 
gain in brilliancy when set against the larger background. 

W. 0. s. 

Annapolis, August, 191 4. 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



HOW WE CAME TO HAVE A NAVY 

Beginnings in ship-building, commerce, and sea-fighting in the colonies 
— Types of ships and guns in the sailing-ship days — Causes of the 
Revolutionary War — Early naval attempts against Great Britain — 
Paul Jones and the Ranger — Capture of the Drake. 

IN modern times the United States exports quantities of 
farm products and still greater amounts of manu- 
factured articles. But notwithstanding all the exports 
which are to be carried abroad the American flag is rarely 
seen on the high seas. Before the Revolution it was dif- 
ferent. Crops were raised chiefly to satisfy the needs of 
the settlers themselves and there were no manufactures 
worth mentioning, but there was a large and constantly 
increasing carrying- trade. In fact, as late as the Civil War 
a large number of the American people followed the sea, 
and our flag was known in every port in the world. 

The conditions of life in colonial days developed the 
seafaring habit. In the first place, the early settlements 
were naturally made along the coast within reach of ships 
from the home country. Secondly, the sea was the nat- 
ural highway for travel and trade between the colonists, 
because roads through the wilderness could be cut only 
by the greatest labor and expense, and were much more 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

exposed to attack from Indians. Thirdly, one of the natural 
means of livelihood was fishing, and that meant not only- 
catching mackerel or bluefish along the coast, but long 
cruises to the Grand Banks for cod and still longer voyages 
hunting the whale. 

Even when the settlements were thin and poor the 
colonists began building ships for themselves out of the 
forests that grew to the water's edge, and by the time 
trouble broke out with Great Britain the Americans had 
whole fleets of vessels, big and little, busy in the fisheries 
and commerce. Indeed, the American carrying - trade 
grew so large as to rival in the Atlantic that of England 
herself, and the mother country laid severe restrictions on 
American ships. 

The colonists had experience in sea-fighting also. In 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there were 
pirates from the Barbary states or the Spanish Main 
hunting the seas for defenseless merchantmen, and some 
of these rovers were bold enough to pick up their victims 
on the American coast within sight of land. This state 
of things meant that every ship had to go armed and 
every sailor had to know how to handle a cannon and shoot 
a musket. During the wars with the French the colonists 
fitted out fleets to attack towns in Canada like Port Royal, 
Quebec, and Louisburg, sometimes acting with British 
men-of-war, sometimes operating by themselves. 

Before going a step further let us see what ships and 
guns were like in the days of wood and canvas. From 
the time of Paul Jones to that of David Farragut there 
were three main classes of ships in the navies of the world — 
the ship of the line, the frigate, and the sloop of war. 
All three types were ship-rigged — that is, they had three 
masts, square-rigged, called the fore, the main, and the 
mizzen, respectively. The topmost deck of a ship was 
called the spar-deck. The after part of the spar-deck, 
between the stern-rail and the mainmast, was the quarter- 

2 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

deck, which was sacred to the commissioned officers. The 
forward part of the spar-deck, between the foremast and 
the bow, was the forecastle, the territory of the enlisted 
men. Between the mainmast and the foremast was usu- 




A FRIGATE 



ally an open space revealing the deck below, with gangways 
along the sides connecting the quarter-deck with the fore- 
castle. 

The ship of the line was the battle-ship of those days. 
A ship of the line was distinguished by having two or more 
gun-decks below her spar-deck. Gun-decks were indicated 
by broad bands of white along the sides of the ship. It 
was the custom to grade ships according to the number 
of guns they carried, and ships of the line varied from 
" 74's" to " 120's." As a matter of fact, ships always car- 
ried more guns than their actual rating. 

The frigate was the cruiser of the period. A frigate was 
distinguished by the fact that she had only one gun-deck 

3 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

below her spar-deck. Frigates were rated from "28's" to 
"44's." 

The sloop of war, or corvette, as she was sometimes 
called, had all her guns mounted on her spar-deck. She 
was the smallest type, and corresponded to the gun-boat 
of to-day. Smaller vessels of this class were called brigs, 
schooners, etc., according to the rig. The largest sloop of 
war carried about twenty guns. 

The cannon mounted on these ships were cast-iron 
tubes set on wooden carriages. They were all muzzle- 
loaders, and were fired by means of a vent near the 
breech. Some had flintlocks, but these were so un- 
reliable that usually a quill filled with powder was thrust 
down the vent. A slow match touched off the powder in 
the quill, and that in turn set off the charge in the gun. 
The cartridge of those days was a woolen bag holding pow- 
der. About the time of the War of 18 12 the Americans 
invented a better type of cartridge, which was a case of 




A SHIP OF THE LINE 
4 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

thin sheet lead. Just before inserting the quill, or primer, 
as it was called, the gunner ran a wire down the vent to 
prick through the cartridge casing, so as to make sure that 
the priming charge would explode the powder in the car- 
tridge. 

When the gun was discharged a heavy hawser, run 
through the ring in the breech of the gun, checked the 




LONG GUN 



recoil. Then the gun crew swabbed out the piece, loaded 
it, and ran it out again by hauling on side-tackles. There 
were, as a rule, no sights at all, and all the aiming was 
done by jacking up the breech with a handspike and pushing 
in or out a wooden wedge, called a quoin, until the gun was 
tilted at the right angle. 

Shortly after the Revolution a short, wide-mouthed gun, 
the carronade, became popular for use on the spar-deck. 
The value of this type lay 
in its deadly splintering ef- 
fect at close quarters, but 
it had no range. The ' ' long 
gun" was relied upon for 
shooting at a distance, and 
the gun -deck batteries of 
ships were usually composed 
of long guns. The heaviest long guns on our frigates threw 
a ball weighing about twenty-four pounds. In the year 
1812 a gun cast in 1700 would have been just as useful as 

5 




CARRONADE 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

any other. Imagine the cannon of 1812 on a battle-ship of 
to-day! The combined broadsides of all of Perry's fleet 
on Lake Erie scarcely weighed as much as a single shell 
from one of our big turret-guns! And in accuracy, range, 
and rapidity of fire there can be no comparison at all. 

The crew of an old-time man-of-war was divided, as it is 
to-day, into two classes — sailors and marines. This 
division came from the fact that in early naval warfare 
ships were crowded with soldiers for fighting purposes, 
but carried only enough seamen to handle sails and steer. 
In the course of time the number of sailors increased r 
and they were used to work the guns as well as the yards, 
but down to the present day a force of marines, or sea- 
soldiers, is also kept. Of their services to-day we shall say 
more in the concluding chapter. In the days of which we 
are speaking marines were used in battle chiefly for mus- 
ketry. Since the sailors were brutally treated in those days, 
particularly in the British navy, tyrannical captains used 
to foster a bad feeling between sailors and marines so that 
they should not join forces in mutiny. The life of an 
ordinary sailor on board a British man-of-war in Nelson's 
day was the most degraded form of slavery. Flogging, 
even for petty offenses, was horribly brutal. In the 
American navy the sailor's life was no bed of roses, but 
twelve lashes was the limit any captain could inflict. In 
the English fleets men were sometimes flogged to death. 

Thus we see that the sailing man-of-war of one 
hundred years ago, compared with the battle-ship of to- 
day, was a clumsy and crude affair; so much so, in fact, 
that a stout merchantman could be transformed into a 
fair man-of-war simply by putting a battery of cannon 
on board. That fact was a great help to the colonies in 
their fight for independence. To-day a makeshift navy 
would be impossible on account of the tremendous dif- 
ference between ships of war and ships of peace. On the 
other hand, as the Americans manufactured neither can- 
non nor powder, guns and ammunition for the ships were 

6 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

hard to get, and, what was equally important, the Con- 
tinental navy lacked organization and discipline, as we 
shall see. In that respect an armed ship is not a real man- 
of-war any more than a mob with guns is an army. 

Now let us consider why it was that the American 
colonies should have found it necessary to equip men-of- 
war against the mother country. 

As late as the French and Indian War the American 
colonists showed themselves loyal Englishmen by freely 
contributing ships and men. Why was it that soon 
afterward the feeling against England became so bitter 
that the same men were willing to lay down their lives for 
independence? The cause of the trouble goes back a long 
way. In the early years of the American colonies the 
mother country naturally left the settlers unhindered be- 
cause they were unproductive and they had trouble enough 
as it was. In the later years, when the tiny settlements 
had grown to prosperous colonies, the same " let-alone' ' 
policy went on with few interruptions, and Americans 
learned to govern themselves without help or hindrance 
from England. At the end of one hundred and fifty years 
they had managed their own affairs so long that they had 
developed a very independent spirit about what they con- 
sidered their rights. In fact, they had gone far ahead of 
their brothers in England along the road of democracy 
and self-government, and they were unwilling to turn 
back for any Parliament or king with old-fashioned ideas. 

After 1760 this independent spirit of the colonists was 
interfered with by two things. For years there had been 
heavy trade restrictions on American commerce, but these 
had seldom been enforced. When, under George III. and 
the Tory party, these laws were enforced and others were 
added to prevent the Americans from manufacturing any- 
thing that might rival British products, the colonists of 
the seacoast towns became angry. They felt that these 
laws were unreasonable and unfair, and the more the king's 

7 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

officers tried to enforce them the more Americans hated 
the very uniform of the king. 

In the frontier settlements of the West the colonists also 
felt that they were being meddled with. Their eyes turned 
longingly to the fertile plains on the other side of the 
Alleghanies, but the king, by a proclamation of 1763, 
forbade them to buy any of that land from the Indians or 
settle there in any way whatsoever. The frontiersmen 
felt that they had a natural right to spread westward, 
and any king or Parliament that tried to stop them had 
no claim on their loyalty. 

These were the deep-seated causes of the trouble. They 
caused a smoldering resentment that needed only the 
stamp and tea taxes to set it afire. 

And yet all this growth of feeling had been so gradual that 
Englishmen in America and Englishmen in England did not 
realize how differently they felt about these things until 
Parliament in 1765 tried to lay a small stamp tax on the 
colonies. Many Englishmen, realizing that Great Britain 
was becoming a great empire, especially after Clive's con- 
quest of India, asked that the prosperous American colonies 
do their share in bearing the heavy burden of taxes. The 
Americans answered that they were loyal, but that they 
would not submit to paying a tax ordered by a Parliament 
in which they had no representation. 

"This is impudent talk!" exclaimed the Ministry. 
"Isn't that just what colonies are for, to pay taxes for the 
home government ? Who ever heard of a colony being rep- 
resented in Parliament?" 

At that time the civilized world was ringing with new 
ideas about the "rights of man," and the great Whig 
statesmen of England agreed with the American patriots 
that the attitude of the Tory government was tyrannical. 
But the king and his Parliament refused to recognize the 
principle involved. Where a little tact and statesmanship 
could easily have smoothed things over, they took to 
persecution instead. The result was that the refusal to 

8 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

pay a tax grew into an insurrection, and then into a success- 
ful war for independence. 

When fighting began Great Britain was the greatest 
sea-power in Europe, while the American colonists had not 
a single man-of-war. But, as we have seen, they had a 
large number of merchant vessels which could be trans- 
formed into passable fighting-ships by mounting a row 
of cannon along their decks and cutting a corresponding 
row of ports along the sides. Of course such a ship could 
not stand up against a three-decker, but if skilfully handled 
she might hold her own against the smaller men-of-war 
and could become a formidable commerce-destroyer. 

We need only touch on the well-known story of the 
beginnings of the Revolution. By 1775 the people of 
Boston had grown so rebellious that as a punishment the 
British government had closed the port and quartered on 
the citizens a force of redcoats under General Gage. But 
these tactics did not make the Massachusetts colonists love 
King George any the better; and the other colonies, in- 
stead of taking warning, sent the Massachusetts patriots 
encouragement and help. 

On the night of April 18, 1775, General Gage sent a 
detachment of soldiers to Lexington and Concord for the 
double purpose of capturing the two arch rebels, John 
Hancock and Samuel Adams, and destroying the military 
supplies which the patriots had collected. The result the 
following day was the battle of Lexington and Concord, 
the first armed conflict between the British troops and the 
American colonists. The news of the day's fighting spread 
like wildfire, and the patriots sprang to arms. 

Although the Revolutionary War had to be fought out 
chiefly on land, the people of the coast towns were quick 
to take the sea against England, and before the end of the 
war they had destroyed or captured about eight hundred 
ships. The first naval encounter of the war was brought 
on by some lumbermen of Machias, Maine, a few weeks 
after the battle of Lexington. In May, 1775, General 

9 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Gage sent to Machias two sloops and an armed schooner 
in order to get some lumber that he needed for the British 
troops in Boston. When they arrived Jeremiah O'Brien, 
with about forty of his fellow-citizens of Machias, decided 
that the lumber must not be delivered to the redcoats in 
Boston, and called on the midshipman in command of the 
schooner to surrender. But he only laughed and sailed 
away. At this O'Brien and his men seized one of the 
sloops lying at the wharf, already loaded with pine, and 
made sail in pursuit of the British schooner. As the latter 
was very slow, it was not long before she was over- 
hauled. 

Among the Americans there were a good many more 
axes and pitchforks than muskets, but they piled up 
breastworks of the pine boards, and as soon as they came 
within musket-shot of the schooner fired away, with such 
guns as they had, to good effect. The English were full 
of fight, too, and the two little vessels banged away at each 
other, hammer and tongs, for over half an hour, at the 
entrance of Machias harbor. By the end of that time the 
English middy lay mortally wounded and the schooner 
surrendered. 

When you realize that the latter had three 3 -pounder 
cannon and 4 light swivels to use against the lumber-sloop, 
with nothing better than its few muskets, O'Brien's cap- 
ture was something to be proud of. The victory must 
have been due to the backwoods marksmanship behind 
those pine breastworks. Shortly afterward O'Brien refitted 
his prize, raised the pine-tree flag over her, and made a 
very successful cruise against British commerce. 

O'Brien's example was quickly followed by others, and 
swarms of little vessels darted out from New England 
ports, intent on plunder. It was easy enough to get a 
" letter of marque," as the privateer's warrant was called, 
and a good many did not even bother themselves about a 
trifle like that. In the earlier months, before English ship- 
masters knew about the breaking out of war, these priva- 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

teers did a good deal of damage, but most of them were 
afterward captured by the British blockading squadrons. 

It was not so easy to collect a Continental navy, be- 
cause there was a great difference between the hard disci- 
pline and small pay of a man-of-war and the happy-go- 
lucky ways of a privateer with its tempting chances of 
booty. This is a point to be remembered when we read 
later on of the poor class of men who formed the crew of 
the Ranger. Another difficulty was the jealousy of the 
colonies toward one another, which time and time again 
would have wrecked the cause of independence had it not 
been for the genius and patience of Washington. Several 
of the colonies organized navies of their own and kept their 
ships and men in home waters for selfish reasons. So it 
was that those who toiled to build up a Continental 
navy had to make the best of materials that were left 
by the privateers and the colonies. 

But the Revolutionary leaders saw from the first that a 
Continental navy was indispensable, and early in 1776 
a fleet of eight small vessels was put together under the 
command of an old sea-captain named Esek Hopkins. 
Great things were hoped of this force, but it made a cruise 
to the Bahamas and back again much after the style of 
the King of France and his four thousand men, "who 
marched up the hill and then marched down again." In 
short, the whole expedition was a fizzle. 

This was very discouraging, but the men who guided our 
affairs during the Revolution were not the kind to give up 
at the first failure. They went doggedly to work again, 
scraping together money, ships, men, and supplies as best 
they could. Many a timely capture of arms, clothing, 
and powder was made by these little vessels, especially in 
the early months of the war, that enabled Washington's 
army to keep on fighting. 

Besides the difficulties already hinted at there was the 
greatest confusion in the management of the Continental 
navy. For example, there was no proper record kept, and 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



if an officer lost his commission there was nothing to prove 
his claim for pay after the war. Gustavus Conyngham, 
one of the most daring of American sailors, one day had to 
turn over his commission to Ben Franklin in Paris. Some- 
how it got lost there, and after the war Conyngham never 
got any recognition of his rank or full payment of the 
money due him from the government. 
The missing document turned up in a 
Paris book-shop nearly a hundred years 
after the poor old hero had gone bro- 
ken-hearted to his grave. 

There was no organization. Almost 
any official could make out a commis- 
sion for a naval officer. At the same 
time there was no method of promo- 
tion. For instance, Paul Jones was the 
senior lieutenant in Hopkins's fleet, 
and from the first showed so much 
ability that the old commodore became 
very jealous of him. Thirteen men 
were promoted over Jones's head simply 
because they had political influence be- 
hind them. 

Notwithstanding all its drawbacks, 

the little Continental navy had no lack 

of heroic commanders. Men like Barry, 

Biddle, Wickes, and Conyngham left in 

their deeds a fine tradition for the American navy to follow. 

But one man stands above all — John Paul Jones — and his 

wonderful story should be known by every American. 

Of his career before the Revolution only one point need 
be touched on here — namely, that while he was a young- 
ster, long before he emigrated to America, he served some 
time as acting midshipman in the royal navy. When he 
realized that there was no chance for a poor boy in the 
British navy he left to enter the merchant marine, but his 
experience with the organization and discipline of an 

12 




UNIFORM OF A CAP- 
TAIN, REVOLUTION- 
ARY WAR 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

English man-of-war must have been worth a good deal 
to him when he was fighting under the Stars and 
Stripes. 

At the outbreak of the war he threw himself into the 
cause of his adopted country, and from the first dis- 
tinguished himself by his courage and skill. The enmity 
of old Hopkins kept him more than once from receiving the 
command that he deserved, and when in the summer of 
1777 he at last obtained command of the Ranger it was 
the first pleasant experience after a long period of injustice. 
He was glad, too, to receive general orders to attack the 
enemy in foreign waters, where he could use his own 
judgment without the meddling of politicians. It is said 
that he was the first to raise the Stars and Stripes over a 
man-of-war when he hoisted the colors of the Ranger , and it 
is certain that he was the first to obtain a salute for that 
young flag from a foreign power. Early in 1778 a secret 
treaty was made between America and France; and Jones, 
after much argument with the commander of a French 
man-of-war in Quiberon Bay, succeeded in getting the first 
formal salute of guns to the American flag. 

In April, 1778, Jones started out from France on the first 
of his two cruises around the British Isles, and proceeded 
to take ships and even make landings on the coast right 
under the nose of King George. On one of these expedi- 
tions Jones tried to capture the Earl of Selkirk, whom he 
wished to hold as a hostage for the better treatment of 
American prisoners. The earl was not at home, and the 
sailors consoled themselves by taking all his silverware in- 
stead. This was in keeping with the practice of the British 
in their raids in America, with a difference that the English 
and Hessians usually burned the house down as well. But 
stealing silver was not to Paul Jones's taste, and he bought 
it back from his men out of his own purse and returned it 
to Lady Selkirk with elaborate apologies. There in the 
castle to-day the American visitor may still see the silver 
service, and in the bottom of the tea-urn lie the very same 
2 13 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

tea-leaves that were left in it when the sailors of the Ranger 
earned it off. 

This piratical feat of the Ranger's crew was only the 
least of their offenses during this cruise. Officers and 
men were inspired simply with the idea of booty. They 
were inefficient, mutinous, and cowardly. One exception 
was a Swedish officer who had entered the American 
service, and showed more patriotism and decency than 
these Americans themselves. It was he who revealed to 
Jones the dastardly plot to kill him, put a craven lieutenant 
in his place, and run back to America. In fact, things were 
so bad on the Ranger that her commander scarcely slept at 
all during the entire cruise, and two or three bold attempts 
that he made against the shipping of the enemy were ruined 
by the cowardice and treachery of his crew. 

Two days after one of these daring attacks, April 24, 
1778, the Ranger appeared off Carrickfergus, Ireland, and 
lured the English sloop of war Drake into coming out to 
fight. Not long before Captain Jones had sighted this 
vessel in a harbor on the English coast and would have 
captured her by a surprise attack had it not been for the 
bungling of a drunken quartermaster on the Ranger. 
As it was, the crew wanted to avoid fighting the Drake and 
were almost on the point of mutiny when the Drake came 
on the scene offering battle. 

But the English captain had made the fatal mistake 
of underestimating his enemy. He hurried out to catch 
' 'that pirate Jones," but neglected to make the proper 
preparations for battle, and from the first he was out- 
manceuvered by the American commander. Jones deftly 
threw his ship athwart the Drake's bows for a raking 
position, kept her there, and shot his enemy to pieces. 
The English fought stubbornly, but at the end of an hour 
and a quarter the Drake lay helpless, with forty of her 
crew dead or wounded. Both the captain and the first 
lieutenant died of their wounds shortly after the surrender. 
On the American side only two were killed and six wounded. 

14 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

It was a square, stand-up fight, for the Ranger and the 
Drake were well matched in point of size ; but the important 
thing about the victory is the fact that Jones was able 
to accomplish it with his contemptible crew. After the 
battle the lieutenant who was put in charge of the cap- 
tured Drake tried to run off to America with her and had 
to be hunted down and caught like an enemy. 

In spite of his mutinous company Paul Jones succeeded 
by this cruise of the Ranger in bringing about the chief 
thing on which he had set his heart — namely, compelling 
Great Britain to exchange prisoners. Up to this time 
American prisoners had sickened in horrible prisons or 
prison-ships, with no hope of being exchanged, but when 
the Ranger carried off hundreds of Englishmen to France it 
put another face on the matter. The first exchange gave 
Paul Jones the backbone of his crew on the Bonhomme 
Richard the following year, as we shall see in the next 
chapter. 



II 

THE "BONHOMME RICHARD " AND THE "SERAPIS" 

Fitting out the Richard— Cruising around the British Isles— Battle 
with the Serapis— Assistance of France and French sea power in the 
Revolutionary War— Yorktown campaign. 

WHEN Paul Jones returned to France with the cap- 
tured Drake he became the hero of the hour. 
Everybody had a compliment for him; and, as France was 
just then on the verge of war with Great Britain, the 
French Minister of Marine promised him a fine squadron. 
Just how much these promises and fine speeches amounted 
to he had to learn during a whole year of dreary waiting 
in France. 

At last he took the hint from Franklin's Poor Richard s 
Almanac— "If you want a thing done, do it yourself; 
if not, send." Acting on this advice, Jones went di- 
rectly to the king in person and told him his story 
of broken promises and hope deferred. The result was 
that the king pledged his royal word that Paul Jones 
should have a command at once. The Ministry obeyed the 
king's order, but managed to give Jones an old hulk of a 
merchantman, named the Duras. By that time the 
American commander was thankful to get anything, and 
he renamed the ship Bonhomme Richard, in honor of 
Franklin's Poor Richard. Then he made long and ex- 
hausting journeys from one end of France to the other, 
collecting cannon for his ship. At last, when he thought 
all was ready, instead of receiving the guns he had worked 
so hard to get together, he was sent a lot of wretched 

16 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

pieces that, as he afterward discovered, the government 
had already condemned. 

In addition to the Richard he obtained four other ships, 
the Alliance, the Pallas, the Vengeance, and the Cerf, all 
under French captains. The Alliance was a fine new 
frigate built in America and turned over by Congress to 
the command of one Pierre Landais, whose only claim to 
distinction lay in the fact that he had already been kicked 
out of the French navy. During a little preliminary cruise 
that Paul Jones made with this squadron in June, 1779, 
he had a taste of the clumsiness of his own ship and the 
insubordination of Pierre Landais. Once this rascal 
actually smashed the Alliance into the Richard, badly 
injuring both ships, because he preferred a collision to 
obeying a signal from an upstart American. 

On August 14th the squadron put out from l'Orient on a 
longer cruise around the British Isles. Just before sailing 
the American commander was forced by the French 
government to sign a paper that practically took away all 
his authority over his squadron and left the French cap- 
tains to do about as they pleased. As Jones walked his 
quarter-deck that day his thoughts must have been bitter 
indeed. He had just been robbed of his proper authority, 
his commanders were jealous and insubordinate, his own 
ship was a lumbering old tub that was slower than any 
other vessel in the squadron, and so rotten and worm- 
eaten that it was impossible to repair her. His crew 
were the sweepings of a seaport town, including Malays, 
Portuguese, raw French peasants, and even a lot of Brit- 
ish prisoners, some of whom were already in irons as the 
result of an attempt to take the ship. The only men 
he could rely on were about eighty Americans — mostly 
exchanged prisoners — out of a crew of two hundred and 
twenty-seven officers and men. One of these American 
prisoners was the gallant young Richard Dale, whom Jones 
made his first lieutenant. 

Nothing of great importance happened during the earlier 

17 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

weeks of the cruise. The squadron rounded the British 
Isles from the south, taking prizes on the way. An attack 
that Jones planned on the shipping of Leith, Scotland, was 
spoiled by the inefficiency of two of the French captains, 
and all of them had shown insubordination during the 
entire voyage. One of them, the captain of the Cerf, had 
taken advantage of a fog to run away. 

Early on the morning of September 23, 1779, the 
Americans sighted a fleet of forty merchantmen heading 
northeast from Flamborough Head on the English coast. 
These ships proved to be under the convoy of two men-of- 
war, one, the Serapis, a brand-new frigate of fifty guns, 
the other, the Countess of Scarborough, of twenty. The 
merchantmen promptly turned about and scurried back to 
port like a flock of frightened birds, while the two fighting- 
ships waited for the allied squadron to come up. Paul Jones, 
heading the Richard for the Serapis, signaled his captains 
to form line of battle; but Landais, taking advantage of 
the speed of his ship, sailed ahead till he could judge just 
how strong the English ships were, then turned about and 
ran away to a safe distance ! The other ships held off also. 

As the wind was very light, it was not till evening that the 
Serapis and the Richard came within striking-distance of 
each other; and meanwhile the English cliffs were black 
with people who had gathered from far and near to watch 
the battle. 

"What ship is that?" cried Captain Pearson of the 
Serapis, as the Richard loomed near. 

"I can't hear what you say!" answered Jones, hoping 
to drift a little nearer his enemy before the firing began. 
Again the Serapis hailed, and a moment later both ships 
thundered their broadsides into each other. At the same 
instant a red jet of flame shot up through the Richard's 
deck. Two of the rotten old cannon in her main-deck 
battery had burst at the first discharge, killing nearly every 
man stationed at them. After that the crews of the other 
guns in the battery refused to serve them. 

18 




THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE " BONHOMME RICHARD" AND THE 

From a painting by Howard Pyle 



SERAPIS 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

What a disaster for the American captain! Before that 
first broadside the Serapis was a far stronger ship in guns 
as well as in every other respect. Now, at the very first 
blow, all of the big guns in the Richard were silenced, 
leaving only a few light cannon on the upper deck to 
answer the full broadsides of the enemy. 

Each side now tried to rake the other, and the Serapis, 
being able to sail two feet to the Richard's one, had all 
the advantage. She repeatedly got a position across the 
Richard's stern and raked the Americans with deadly 
effect. This went on for an hour, at the end of which the 
poor old Richard was a thoroughly beaten ship. There 
was a great chasm in her deck and sides where the explosion 
had torn its way and where, also, a number of British 
broadsides had smashed through. If there had been any 
sea running, the old hulk would have been swamped in a 
minute, but, fortunately, the water was as smooth as a 
pond. The slaughter on the Richard's decks had been 
terrible as well, and any officer would have been honorably 
excused for surrendering his ship then and there. 

But Paul Jones was one officer in a million. There was 
no idea of surrender in his mind. He was watching his 
enemy like a skilled fencer, tense and alert to thrust hard 
at the first opening. The only chance left — and that a 
desperate one — lay in grappling with the Serapis. On that 
Jones set his heart. Once he almost succeeded, but the 
grappling-irons broke loose and dropped into the water. 
A few minutes later he succeeded in swinging his ship 
across his enemy's bow. As the jib boom of the Serapis 
ran between the shrouds of the Richard's mizzenmast 
Jones sprang to the place with the shout: 

"Well done, my brave lads. We have her now!" 

At the same instant with a few deft turns he had lashed 
the bowsprit so fast that when Pearson dropped his anchor 
to drift free the hawser held like a vise. Then the two 
ships swung together bow to stern, and the roar of battle 
went on at such close quarters that there was hardly 

J 9 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

room enough between the ships to use a rammer in load- 
ing the guns. 

Meanwhile Captain Jones had called up his men from the 
useless gun-deck to fight on the upper deck, or in the rigging, 
but the gunners of the Serapis kept thundering away at the 
sides of the Richard till they had shot away great wide 
holes, through which after a while the shot passed harm- 
lessly and splashed into the sea beyond. Luckily some of 
the stanchions were out of the reach of these guns, other- 
wise the whole upper deck would have crashed down upon 
the wreck of the lower. 

Jones had now only three little cannon available — 
o-pounders — but he made wonderful use of them. One 
he aimed himself against the mainmast of the Serapis, the 
other two, filled with grape and canister, swept her upper 
deck. Meanwhile he had sent the pick of his crew, Amer- 
ican marksmen, into the rigging and tops, and their 
musketry fire, combined with the grape and canister of 
the 9-pounders, succeeded in driving the English sailors 
below. 

Things were looking hopeful for the Americans, and it is 
said that Pearson was about to yield when the master-at- 
arms, a gunner, and the carpenter of the Richard suddenly 
ran up from below in a panic and bellowed, ''Surrender!" 
Jones promptly knocked down one with the butt of his 
pistol and sent the other two scampering down the hatch 
faster than they had come up; but Pearson, having heard 
the cry, took heart and shouted to Jones to know if he 
had surrendered. And Jones answered with the immortal 
words, "I have not yet begun to fight!" 

The battle roared on; from the Serapis came the heavy 
thunder of her big guns, and from the Richard the sharp 
crackle of musketry. Once both sides had to stop fighting 
at the same moment because both ships were on fire. 
This was put out only by desperate efforts on both sides, 
and then the din of battle broke out anew. And all the 
while Paul Jones seemed to be everywhere on the shattered 

20 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

deck of the Richard, shouting encouragement here, directing 
a gun there, laughing and cheering, inspiring every one 
with his unconquerable courage. 

Suddenly a ship loomed up in the moonlight. It was the 
Alliance. Exhausted, powder-blackened men straightened 
up to draw breath. Surely the battle was over now ! But 
to the horror of the Americans, the dastardly Landais 
fired right into the Richard. A great cry of rage went up 
from the stricken ship, but the villain coolly sailed off again, 
having done all the damage he could with one broadside. 
There was no possibility of mistake, for the full moon made 
the difference between the black hull of the Richard and 
the yellow one of the Serapis plain enough. 

Here was a fresh disaster, but it was quickly followed by 
a worse. The treacherous master-at-arms, shouting that 
the Richard was sinking, had released the English prisoners, 
and they suddenly came tumbling up in a mad panic, five 
hundred of them ! Instantly Jones sprang to the hatch and 
with a loaded pistol drove them back, telling them at the 
same time that their only chance of life lay in keeping the 
Richard afloat by working the pumps, because the Serapis 
was sinking. Richard Dale was right at his captain's 
elbow in this moment of peril, and he held the prisoners 
to the pumps for the rest of the battle. By this stroke 
Paul Jones turned a disaster into a real benefit, for as the 
prisoners bent their backs to the pumps the gang of Amer- 
icans who had been struggling there were released for 
fighting up on deck, where they were sorely needed. 

One of the prisoners, however, had succeeded in escaping 
to the Serapis, and there he encouraged Pearson to keep on 
fighting by describing the desperate condition of the 
Richard. For a few minutes the English redoubled their 
fire. But by this time the American sailors had climbed 
even to the enemy's rigging and had cleared the upper 
deck of the English ship of almost everybody but Captain 
Pearson himself, who escaped by a miracle. One of them, 
sitting astride the end of the Richard's mainyard, was 

21 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

tossing grenades at an open hatchway of the Serapis. At 
last he dropped one fairly, and it disappeared hissing and 
smoking down the hatch. The next instant there was a 
terrific explosion. The grenade had touched off a pile of 
cartridges, ripping up a good part of the quarter-deck and 
blowing a score of. men to atoms. 

At this the British defense broke down. But suddenly 
the Alliance returned, and again Landais fired on the help- 
less Richard — two broadsides this time — killing and wound- 
ing many of her crew. At this point several officers ad- 
vised Jones to give up, saying there was no use trying to 
fight the Serapis and the Alliance too. Surrender? Jones 
laughed at the idea. 

Meanwhile, some of the shot from the Alliance had 
fallen aboard the Serapis, and Pearson, not realizing 
Landais's treachery and discouraged at the prospect of 
fighting a fresh ship, hauled down his flag with his own 
hands. 

The surrender took place at ten-thirty. Meanwhile, the 
commander of the Pallas, shamed into bravery by Jones's 
example, had attacked the Countess of Scarborough and 
taken her after an hour's fight. The Vengeance had done 
nothing but look on, and the conduct of the Alliance we 
already know. 

All the following day and night the Richard was kept 
afloat only with the greatest difficulty, until the wounded 
and the prisoners were removed to the Serapis. On the 
morning of the twenty-fourth the battered old hulk sank, 
carrying down with her the flag she had so gallantly de- 
fended. The damage to the Serapis during the battle 
had been chiefly in the slaughter of the crew by musketry 
and grape; her hull had never been struck after that first 
broadside which silenced the Richard's main battery. So 
it did not take much repairing to get the captured ship 
into condition to square away for the Dutch coast. Jones 
skilfully avoided the British squadron that was hunting for 
him and arrived safely in the Texel. Again he watched 

22 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

his chance and, although British ships were waiting for 
him, he dashed through the Channel and arrived safely in 
the shelter of a French port. 

For this brilliant victory over the Serapis Paul Jones was 
knighted by the King of France and presented with a 
sword, and Congress gave him a vote of thanks, which 
was about all that Congress could give in those days. 
Landais was dismissed for his conduct, and would have 
fared worse but for the general opinion that the fellow was 
more than half insane. However, he always boasted that 
it was he, not Jones, who was the real hero of the 
battle. 

After the Revolution Paul Jones had a brief and un- 
happy experience in the Russian navy. He died in Paris 
in 1792. In 1905 his ashes were brought to this country 
and they lie in the crypt of the chapel of the Naval Academy 
at Annapolis. 

Little remains to be said about the Continental navy, 
because after 1779 there was practically none of it left. 
After that the French navy came to the rescue. But we 
must remember that, tiny as it was, the Continental navy 
rendered very important services in the early years of the 
war : first, by capturing supplies for the army, and, secondly, 
by keeping open the line of communication with France, 
the source from which most of our military supplies had to 
come. 

The more we read about Monsieur Landais the blacker 
appear his cowardice, jealousy, and treachery. But we 
must not let our feelings about that particular Frenchman 
blind us to what his country did for us during the Revolu- 
tionary War. True, the French government cared little 
for America or Americans, but the. fact remains that as a 
nation we owe France far more than we are accustomed to 
think. We are used to the idea that the Revolution was a 
war between the thirteen colonies and Great Britain, and 
that "we beat the British." But the truth is that after 
the battle of Saratoga the Revolution developed into a 

23 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

European war. In this it was chiefly the French who "beat 
the British," and we got the benefits. 

This is the way it came about. In 1763, at the end of a 
war in which the French had lost everywhere, the French 
government had to submit to a treaty of peace which 
every patriotic Frenchman felt was an insult to his nation. 
Some of these men would not rest till they had got revenge, 
and in the growing troubles between England and her 
American colonies they saw their opportunity. Two of 
these Frenchmen really did more to bring about American 
independence than any one else except George Washing- 
ton and Benjamin Franklin. We honor, and always have 
honored, the memory of another Frenchman, Lafayette, 
because he came personally to help us in the war. He was 
a very agreeable and warm-hearted gentleman, but he 
never really did anything. Yet these other two com- 
patriots of his who accomplished so much for us are as 
unknown to Americans as if they had been Zulu chiefs. 
And we must not shut our eyes to their services simply 
because we know that they were moved by a hatred of 
England rather than by any love for America. 

One of these men was Beaumarchais, a very clever man, 
who was a wit, a writer, a musician, a merchant, a dip- 
lomat — whatever he did he did well. During the first two 
years of the war this man poured quantities of military 
supplies into America. In the years 1776-77 he shipped 
thirty thousand rifles and two hundred cannon, together 
with a large amount of equipments, tents, and provisions, 
all of which were absolutely necessary to Washington in 
order to make his raw volunteers something like an army. 
Besides investing his own money Beaumarchais handled 
a secret fund contributed by France and Spain, at first 
amounting to two million francs and later still more. This 
money he spent with great skill and foresight. 

It is scarcely too much to say that the skill, courage, and 
resourcefulness of this man Beaumarchais kept the Revolu- 
tionary War going during the first two years when the 

24 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Americans had to stand alone. America owed more to 
him than she could ever repay, but years afterward, when 
he and his daughter applied for help in his old age, the 
country he had done so much for was so taken up with its 
own troubles that it had no further use for him, and he 
died miserably poor. 

The other Frenchman, who perhaps did even more for us, 
was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vergennes. His work 
was in diplomacy. He had been watching and waiting for 
a chance to get revenge for that treaty of 1763, and as 
soon as the rebellion broke out in the American colonies 
he began quiet talks with the ministers of other nations to 
get their agreement to his plan of making another war on 
Great Britain. The other countries of Europe, jealous of 
England's growing position, were only too glad to see her 
lose those rich colonies in the west. Accordingly France 
declared war against England in 1778, Spain followed in 
1779, and Holland in 1780. 

With Spain, Holland, and France attacking British 
possessions and British commerce from Jamaica to Cal- 
cutta, it was clear that England could never subdue her 
rebellious colonies in America. This war alliance with 
Spain and Holland, which had been so craftily engineered 
by Vergennes, proved disastrous to England. 

Let us see how it worked out in America. At first the 
English fleets enjoyed full sea-control. After 1778 they 
had to reckon with the French in their operations on the 
American coast, and later with the Dutch and Spanish 
fleets in European waters. In this way the sea-power that 
had at first threatened to make short work of the rebellion 
became seriously weakened. 

The campaign that practically ended the war was, as we 
all know, the capture of Cornwallis at Yorktown. The 
most important part of this story we hear little about. It 
was a loose, running sea-fight of five or six days in Sep- 
tember, 1 78 1, between the French fleet under De Grasse 
and a British fleet under Graves off Cape Henry. The 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

French fleet had taken a position in Lynn Haven Bay just 
inside Cape Henry, in order to control the entrance to 
Chesapeake Bay. On the morning of September 5th the 
British squadron under Graves stood in to attack the 
French. De Grasse sailed out to meet the enemy, and at 
four in the afternoon a sharp action began which lasted till 
sundown. Both sides suffered considerably; and, though 
the fleets continued to manceuver within sight of each other 
for five days, it was evident that neither side was anxious 
to force the fighting. At last Graves took his ships north 
again, leaving De Grasse master of Chesapeake Bay. 

As far as actual damage to ships and men is concerned, 
this was a drawn battle, but considered in regard to pur- 
pose and results it was a decisive victory for the French. 
De Grasse had succeeded in his aim — namely, to keep the 
British fleet from making a juncture with Cornwallis. 

Meanwhile Washington was making his famous dash 
southward. On the 28th of September the allied French 
and American army moved upon the English army en- 
trenched at Yorktown and began a spirited siege. The 
allies drew their lines steadily closer and poured in a fire 
that the British found increasingly hard to withstand. 
Finally, as Cornwallis was unable to retreat or to get 
relief, as long as the French fleet controlled the bay, he was 
forced to sue for terms of surrender. The capitulation 
took place on the 19th of October, 1781, and, although two 
more years dragged by before the treaty of peace was 
actually signed, Yorktown is rightly considered as the 
conclusion of the war. 

As we have seen, the colonists during the Revolution 
had the greatest difficulties in building up a naval force. 
With their ill-organized, makeshift vessels the Americans 
were able to do little but attack the transports or the 
commerce of the enemy, and the record of Paul Jones in 
capturing two British men-of-war was a brilliant exception 
to the rule. Fortunately, when our ships were nearly all 
taken or destroyed in the unequal contest with the British 

26 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

navy, the French fleets arrived to challenge British con- 
trol of the sea. Meanwhile, however, there had been 
plenty of experience to develop veteran sea-fighters of 
proved courage and ability, and therefore, when the nation 
had to revive the navy to fight the French in the West 
Indies — as we shall see in the next chapter — there was no 
lack of experienced officers to place in command. 



Ill 

A NAVAL WAR WITH FRANCE 

Extinction of the Revolutionary navy — Building of new navy to 
protect commerce from Algerian pirates — Treaty with Algiers — 
Difficulties with England and France — Squadron sent to West 
Indies — The Baltimore incident — The Constellation and the In- 
surgente — The Constellation and the Vengeance. 

AFTER the capture of the Serapis the best command in 
. America was none too good for Paul Jones, and on his 
return he was appointed to the new ship of the line America, 
which was then being built. 

As it happened, peace came before the vessel was quite 
finished; and then, out of gratitude to France, Congress 
turned her over as a present to the King of France. There 
were at that time three other men-of-war left in the Amer- 
ican navy — the Alliance, the Deane, and the Washington — 
but they were all sold in the two years after the treaty of 
peace, so that by 1785 the United States had no navy at all. 

The country was so burdened with its war debts and 
other troubles in the years between the close of the Revolu- 
tion and the election of George Washington as the first 
President that a navy was felt to be an unnecessary 
luxury. Most people honestly believed, too, that the very 
existence of a navy was dangerous to the liberties of a free 
country, and for years many prominent Americans always 
opposed a navy on this principle. 

But in such questions facts are far better than theories, 
and it was not long before the need of a navy began to be 
felt. The people of the Barbary States, living along the 

28 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

African coast of the Mediterranean, had for centuries been 
carrying on the business of piracy. Sometimes the Euro- 
pean nations fought them, at other times they bribed them 
to hold off, but these pirates always remained the pest of 
the Mediterranean. 

In 1785 Spain opened the Strait of Gibraltar to the 
Algerians, and their corsairs were soon roving the Atlantic. 
In a short time they had taken two American ships and sold 
their crews into slavery. 

Instead of despatching a squadron with loaded guns to 
treat with the Dey of Algiers, all that the United States 
could do was to send an envoy. Naturally, the Dey 
thought the United States a wholly contemptible little 
country and gave our envoy nothing but insults for his 
pains. At this time England was "paying tribute" to the 
Barbary countries, especially Algiers, but the policy really 
amounted to hiring them to prey on the ships of rival 
nations. In 1793 the English consul-general at Lisbon 
arranged a treaty between Portugal and Algiers which 
opened still wider the road for the pirates into the North 
Atlantic. During the next thirty days the freebooters 
captured eleven American ships and imprisoned all their 
crews. 

This was too much to stand, and in the spring of 1794 
Congress authorized the building of six frigates to chastise 
the Algerians. The law made it very clear that it did not 
mean the organization of a permanent navy, because, if 
in the mean time a treaty were concluded with Algiers, 
work on these frigates was to stop. Fortunately, the 
design of these frigates was left to the ablest ship-builder 
in the country, Joshua Humphreys. Not content to copy 
the frigates of the English navy, he went ahead with new 
ideas. He made his frigates with cleaner lines and thicker 
sides, he gave them heavier batteries and longer and thicker 
spars than could be found in any frigate of the royal navy. 
These "Yankee" frigates were the subject of endless chaff 
from British naval officers up to the time of the War of 
3 29 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1812, but directly after that war England built frigates 
exactly like them. 

Toward the end of the year 1795 the Senate ratified a 
humiliating treaty with Algiers, by which the United 
States pledged itself to pay $21,600 every year in ship 
supplies, and agreed to give a large ransom for all Americans 
then in captivity besides. The cost of ratifying that 
treaty the first year, including the ransom, amounted to 
over a million dollars. The same amount of money put 
into frigates would have been enough to dictate an honor- 
able peace at the cannon's mouth. Fortunately, three of 
the new frigates were so far under way in their construction 
that Congress ordered that they should be completed. 
In 1797 these three frigates were launched: the United 
States, 44 guns, July 10th, at Philadelphia; the Constella- 
tion, 36 guns, September 7th, at Baltimore; and the 
Constitution, 44 guns, September 20th, at Boston. These 
fine old ships, each famous for its victories, mark the real 
beginning of the American navy. 

Although Congress had ordered work on the other ships 
discontinued, more troubles soon arose which set the 
hammers ringing on them again with all speed. Long 
before our quarrel was settled with Algiers Congress had 
worse difficulties on its hands. England and France were 
fighting each other, and war-vessels of each side took and 
plundered American ships with scarcely a word of excuse. 
In 1795 Jay's treaty with England relieved the pressure 
from that country, but only increased the enmity of 
France. French cruisers regarded American merchant- 
men as lawful plunder, and finally French privateers had 
the impudence to make captures in American harbors. 

The country was stung into resistance. During the 
spring of 1798 Congress passed several acts authorizing a 
naval force not only to protect American shipping in the 
West Indies, where most of the trouble lay, but also to 
attack the French privateers and men-of-war. On April 
30th the first Secretary of the Navy was appointed. 

30 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Most of this new American fleet were hastily converted 
merchantmen, for the other three frigates were not finished 
in time, but they served the purpose well. Their chief 
service was in cleaning out the nests of privateers — really 
pirates — in dozens of little harbors in the West Indies, and 
the smaller and lighter merchant vessel could go where a 
heavy frigate could not. 

All this while the American and English were supposed 
to be working hand-in-glove against France, but the follow- 
ing incident will show the contemptuous attitude of the 
English toward the United States and the new-born 
American navy. In November, 1798, Captain Phillips in 
the twenty-gun sloop Baltimore was accompanying a fleet 
of American merchantmen from Charleston to Havana. 
On nearing Havana he ran into a British squadron. Know- 
ing the way English captains had with American ships, he 
signaled his convoy to scatter and make port as fast as they 
could. At the same time he changed his course to meet 
the British squadron, intending to divert attention from 
his merchantmen. 

Captain Phillips was invited on board the British flagship, 
and there he was curtly told by the English commodore 
that he was going to impress into the English service 
every American on the Baltimore who did not have "pro- 
tection papers." Now, "protection papers" were not 
considered necessary on men-of-war. Phillips protested 
vehemently, but he was helpless. He had been ordered 
to avoid any hostile act toward the English even if they 
were seizing an American ship, and he lay under the guns 
of the whole fleet. So he felt that he had to submit; 
fifty-five men were taken off the American ship, though 
fifty of these were afterward returned. 

When Phillips returned to the United States and re- 
ported the affair he was promptly dismissed from the 
service for not resisting. And yet the American govern- 
ment itself was in much the same plight as poor Phillips 
whom it had dismissed, because it did not dare to show 

3i 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

fight for the insult to an American man-of-war, and meekly 
ate humble pie. But the Baltimore incident was one of 
those things that rankled in the minds of Americans and 
made the War of 1812 unavoidable. 

Meanwhile, the fine new frigate Constellation was bowling 
over the seas looking for bigger game than the little French 
corsairs. Her captain was Thomas Truxtun, a bluff old 
sea-dog of Revolutionary days and a born fighter. About 
noon of February 9, 1799, when the Constellation was off 
one of the Leeward Islands, the lookout reported a sail 
to the southland Truxtun put about in chase. Soon she 
was made out to be a ship very much like the Constellation. 
At first the stranger hoisted American colors, but when 
Truxtun showed the private signal of the American fleet 
there was no answer. Soon he was delighted to see the 
French tricolor go up in place of the Stars and Stripes. 
At last he had what he'd been looking for, a French 
frigate for a square, stand-up fight. 

Truxtun piled on all the canvas the Constellation could 
stagger under for fear the Frenchman might yet get away 
from him, and the good ship came rushing on, looking like 
a great white cloud and tossing sheets of foam from her 
bows. Shortly after three the two vessels were close 
enough for Truxtun to hail; but, getting no answer, he took 
a position across the stern of the French frigate and gave 
her a staggering broadside. But she had lost her main- 
topmast during a squall that afternoon, and when she 
tried to manceuver to lay alongside the Constellation the 
latter ran ahead and crossed her bows. Truxtun managed 
to hold an advantageous position off the starboard bow of 
the enemy during the rest of the fight. 

During this time a shot struck the foretopmast of the 
Constellation. The blow so shattered the mast that under 
the press of sail it was carrying it threatened to go crash- 
ing down. Young Midshipman David Porter, famous as 
captain of the Essex in the War of 181 2, was stationed with 
some men in the foretop. Seeing the danger, he hailed 

32 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the deck, but the thunder of the broadsides drowned his 
voice. Something must be done, and done at once, and the 
youngster was equal to it. He promptly climbed aloft, 
though greatly exposed to the musket fire of the enemy, 
and coolly cut away the halyards that supported the huge 
foretopsail-yard, which then, with its flapping sail, settled 
down to its resting-place. By relieving the strain on 
the topmast Porter removed the danger and saved the 
mast. 

In an hour th2 battle was over. The French frigate 
proved to be the 36-gun Insurgente, Captain Barreaut. 
Barreaut had put up a brave fight, for the American 
broadside was heavier than his by about one-third, and the 
unlucky loss of his maintopmast had given the Constellation 
a great advantage in manceuvering. 

As soon as the surrender had been received Lieut. John 
Rodgers and Midshipman David Porter were sent on 
board the prize with a squad of eleven men. The rest 
of the prize crew were to follow later, but the wind had 
now increased to a gale, and it was found impossible to put 
out any more boats. The two young officers found them- 
selves in a perilous situation. Night came on with a roar- 
ing sea. The masts and rigging of the Insurgente were 
so badly shattered by the Constellation's fire that it was 
very dangerous to try to make any sail in such a heavy 
wind. The decks were still littered with fallen spars, dis- 
mounted guns, and the bodies of the dead, and one hundred 
and seventy- three prisoners had to be kept under control. 
To make matters worse, the hatch-coverings had been flung 
overboard before the surrender, so there was no way 
of battening the hatches down on the prisoners, and there 
were no irons to be found. But Rodgers was a big fellow, 
and by putting on a fierce swagger behind a loaded pistol 
he managed to rush all the prisoners into the lower hold. 
Then the Americans loaded a cannon with grape and 
lashed it with the muzzle pointing down the hatch. They 
also hung a bag of cannon-balls just over the hatch so that 

33 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

a single stroke of a cutlass would send it crashing down on 
any one who tried to come up. 

At dawn, after a sleepless night, Rodgers and Porter 
looked anxiously for help from the Constellation, but not a 
stick of her could they see. The ships had been separated 
by the gale. There was nothing for it but that two young 
and inexperienced officers with eleven men should try to 
bring a disabled ship to- port in spite of the gale and the 
presence of one hundred and seventy-three prisoners 
watching for a single careless instant to make a rush and 
retake the ship. Both Rodgers and Porter rose high in 
the American navy later on and became famous, but 
never did they have to go through such an ordeal again. 

For two nights and days more that little squad stood 
uninterrupted watch, some navigating the ship, others 
watching the hatch, with loaded muskets and pistols piled 
about ready for the first attempt at mutiny. There was 
no sleep for anybody, but on the afternoon of the third day 
the Insurgente limped into the harbor of St. Kitts. Their 
troubles were over then, for in the very same harbor lay the 
Constellation, with Captain Truxtun anxiously awaiting their 
arrival. 

The Insurgente was repaired and taken into the service of 
the United States, but the following year she was lost at 
sea with all hands. 

The work of the navy in the West Indies was interrupted 
by the fact that, since the enlistments had been only for 
one year, all the ships had to come home for fresh crews. 
But the French privateers did not gain much except a short 
breathing-space. The American squadron was soon on 
their trail again. 

On the morning of February i, 1800, Captain Truxtun 
in the Constellation was again in the neighborhood of the 
Leeward Islands, some miles to the south of the place where 
he had captured the Insurgente. A large sail was reported, 
and he immediately gave chase. There was only a little 
air stirring this time, and, try as he might with every 

34 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

stitch of canvas set, he could not close with the stranger 
till eight o'clock on the evening of the following day. By 
this time she was made out to be a large French frigate, and 
without waiting to hail or be hailed she opened fire on the 
Constellation with her stern guns. 

" Don't throw away a single charge of powder and shot!" 
cried Truxtun, as he saw his men impatient to begin firing. 
"Take good aim and fire into the hull of the enemy." 

For a few minutes the Constellation endured the enemy's 
fire in silence; then when Truxtun got the position he 
wanted he shouted, "Fire!" and the American broadside 
roared in reply. From eight o'clock till one the battle 
went on with the greatest fury, the two ships sailing along 
together before a fresh wind, wrapped in smoke, and the 
darkness relieved only by the flare of the guns and the 
dim flicker of the battle lanterns. As Truxtun had com- 
manded, the American gunners aimed at the hull of the 
enemy — that was the English style of fighting. On the 
other hand, the Frenchmen aimed, as was their custom, to 
disable the rigging. 

At one o'clock the French ship ceased firing and sheered 
off as if trying to run away. Truxtun immediately trimmed 
sail so as to come alongside and get her surrender, when 
suddenly his mainmast went crashing over the side. 
With the mast were lost Midshipman Jarvis and several 
men. One of the men had warned him that the mast was 
badly weakened by the Frenchman's shot, but Jarvis had 
replied that he could not leave his post without orders. 

The French ship took quick advantage of the accident to 
the Constellation by running away as fast as she could. 
It turned out later that she was the Vengeance, a much 
larger frigate than the Constellation. Her first lieutenant 
said afterward that several times during the battle the 
Vengeance struck her colors, but in the darkness and 
smoke the fact was not discovered by the officers of the 
Constellation. At any rate, the Vengeance was a thoroughly 
beaten ship. She lost 50 killed and no wounded, compared 

35 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

with 14 killed and 25 wounded on the Constellation, and her 
hull was badly riddled. The escape of the French ship was 
due entirely to the fall of the Constellation 1 s mainmast. 
Although Truxtun did not succeed in taking the Vengeance 
as a prize, the trouncing he gave her is a finer tribute to his 
ability than the capture of the Insurgente. 

These two victories of .the Constellation were the only 
important frigate actions of the war. The real hard work 
of this war — without much glory to it — fell to the smaller 
vessels, who followed the French corsairs right into their 
lairs among the many islands of the West Indies. There 
was plenty of hard fighting, too. One little schooner, the 
Enterprise, under Lieut. John Shaw, captured six privateers 
and rescued eleven American merchantmen. The Enter- 
prise became still more famous in the wars that followed. 
She still bears the record of being in more "fights than any 
other ship in the American navy, and she won every time 
she fought. 

On one occasion Lieut. Isaac Hull — later famous as cap- 
tain of the Constitution — sailed into Puerto Plata (Santo 
Domingo), which was a favorite resort for these privateers. 
There, in broad daylight, he landed, made a dash on the 
fort, coolly spiked all the guns before the garrison woke up 
to what was happening, and then captured one of the most 
notorious of the privateers as she lay at anchor under the 
fort. 

Although war had never been declared against France, 
fighting went on for two years and a half. About this time 
Napoleon became the real ruler of France, and, foreseeing a 
long war with England, he did not want to be annoyed by 
another war with America at the same time. So he opened 
negotiations for a treaty of peace which put an end to the 
campaign. 

Short as it was, the war was of the greatest benefit to the 
United States. By cleaning out the French privateers of 
the West Indies the American navy made the commerce 
of the United States in those waters far safer, and our 

36 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

export trade increased enormously. This service, com- 
bined with the brilliant successes in battle, gave the new- 
born navy a popularity that it needed very much in those 
days when a man-of-war was looked upon as "a ready tool 
for tyranny." And to the officers and men of the navy it 
gave the most practical training and experience. Many of 
the heroes of the war with Tripoli and the War of 1812 — 
like Decatur, Porter, Hull, Perry — learned how to sail and 
fight in this war with France. At this time, too, the Ameri- 
can officers did an excellent thing by adopting, with some 
modifications, the regulations which governed the greatest 
navy in the world, that of Great Britain, for these regu- 
lations gave the American navy the right start in the fine 
English ideals of duty and discipline aboard a man-of-war. 



IV 

WAR WITH TRIPOLI 

Reduction of the navy — Causes of war with Tripoli — Early operations 
— Loss of the Philadelphia — The burning of the Philadelphia — 
Gunboat attacks — Intrepid disaster — Eaton's expedition — Con- 
clusion of the war — Commodore Preble. 

ON February 17, 1801, Thomas Jefferson was elected 
President of the United States. When the news 
came to the officers of the navy they felt very gloomy, 
because the President-elect belonged to the Republican 
party — the ancestor of the Democratic party of to-day — 
and he, as well as that party, was known to be hostile to 
any standing navy. 

"It's all over with us!" growled the old sea-dogs over 
their Madeira; and the more they talked about it, and the 
more Madeira they drank, the angrier they got. Young 
and old throughout the service banged the mess-tables 
with their fists and swore that the country was going 
straight to the dogs. 

But even while Jefferson was being notified of his election 
to the Presidency the Bey of Tripoli was making it very 
clear to him that the country could not possibly get along 
without a navy. After buying a peace with Algiers, as 
described in the preceding chapter, the United States had 
to bribe the other Barbary States as well. These were 
Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli. The Bey of Tripoli took 
it into his head that he hadn't driven as good a bargain as 
some of the others when he ratified his treaty with the 
United States in 1796. He became more and more insolent 

38 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

in his demands, and at last, in February, 1801, he tore up 
his treaty with America and threatened war. 

Soon after the President came into office he undertook 
reducing the navy to a peace basis, as was expected. But 
what nobody expected was the fact that Jefferson simply 
dropped all the makeshift vessels that had been hurriedly 
pressed into service for the war against France and kept 
the real fighting strength of the navy intact. Not even a 
thoroughgoing Federalist President could have done much 
better than this Republican, with all his hostility to a navy ! 

It was well that he did so, for just then the country 
needed a navy very badly to show the pirates of Tripoli 
that there was some spunk in America and to protect our 
merchantmen. In May, 1801, the Bey of Tripoli ordered 
the flagstaff of the American consulate chopped down, 
dismissed the consul, and bade his corsairs capture all the 
Americans they could find. Fortunately, the trouble with 
Tripoli had been dragging on so long that the merchantmen 
had been well warned of what they might expect in the 
Mediterranean. 

Meanwhile, the United States government had been 
fitting out a squadron for the Mediterranean. This con- 
sisted of the frigates President, 44 guns; the Philadelphia, 
36 guns; and the Essex, 32 guns; and the schooner Enter- 
prise, 12 guns. The squadron was commanded by Commo- 
dore Richard Dale, famous as Paul Jones's lieutenant in 
the great fight with the Serapis. Dale set out from Hamp- 
ton Roads and learned of Tripoli's declaration of war only 
when he reached Gibraltar. 

Not long after the arrival of the American fleet in the 
Mediterranean the little Enterprise, under Lieutenant 
Sterrett, came off handsomely in a fight with a Tripoli tan 
corsair called the Tripoli. The two vessels were evenly 
matched, but the action was very one-sided, thanks to the 
fine seamanship of the young American commander and the 
good gunnery of his crew. At the end of three hours of 
fighting the Tripoli had lost her mizzenmast, and out of a 

39 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

crew of eighty twenty were killed and thirty wounded. 
On the Enterprise not a man was wounded. 

Unfortunately, that was the only bright spot in the 
story of a whole year of operations against Tripoli. There 
was a blockade that grew more and more lax, with nothing 
accomplished, and at the end of the year all the ships had 
to go back to the United States on account of the fact 
that the enlistments were made for only one year. Then 
another squadron was sent out with two-year enlistments. 
This was offered to Commodore Truxtun, but the Navy 
Department quarreled with him over a foolish point, and 
Truxtun resigned just when a man of his sort was most 
needed. Commodore Morris, who was sent in his place, 
accomplished so little that at the end of the second year of 
the war he was ordered home to a court-martial and 
dismissed. 

In short, by the end of two years and a half of nominal 
warfare the Bey of Tripoli had become more insolent than 
ever, and practically nothing had been done to assert the 
dignity of the United States. What was worse, the other 
Barbary powers were threatening trouble, too. Such was 
the situation when a new commodore was sent to the scene 
of operations. This was Edward Preble, who, like his 
predecessors, was a veteran of the Revolution, but not 
well known to his brother officers. Most of the naval 
officers of that day hailed from the Southern or the Middle 
states, and Preble was a New Hampshire Yankee. More- 
over, he had a fierce temper, which bad health did not 
make sweeter, and he was a stern disciplinarian. He growled 
that he was given "a lot of school-boys" for officers, be- 
cause all of his ship commanders were under thirty. But 
after a few months of campaigning together the doughty 
old commodore and his "school-boys" had not only re- 
spect for one another, but a real affection. 

The squadron that Preble commanded had one important 
advantage over the squadrons sent before; it contained 
besides the frigates Constitution and Philadelphia five 

40 




*4\ 



>\j: 



/ : : 



/ 



r 




THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE "ENTERPRISE" AND THE BARBARY 
CORSAIR "TRIPOLI" 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

small brigs and schooners. There were four new ones — 
the Nautilus, the Vixen, the Siren, and the Argus — besides 
the already famous little Enterprise. Previous operations 
had shown that the frigates were too heavy to move among 
the dangerous shoals around Tripoli and were unfit to 
pursue the light-draught corsairs which ran the blockade. 

Preble stopped at Tangiers to read the riot act to the 
governor of Morocco for permitting one of his vessels to 
seize an American brig. Meanwhile, he sent the Phila- 
delphia and the Vixen to begin at once the blockade of 
Tripoli. About two weeks afterward, October 31, 1803, the 
Philadelphia was working her way back to her station 
after having been driven off by one of the heavy gales for 
which that coast is famous. The Vixen had gone off in 
chase of two Tripolitan corsairs that had got away. About 
nine o'clock in the morning the Philadelphia sighted a 
vessel making for the harbor of Tripoli and promptly gave 
chase. For some time the American frigate held on in 
pursuit, the two vessels running near the shore and heading 
westward for the entrance to the harbor. 

Those were the days before there were charts of the 
African coast; and Captain Bainbridge, knowing the dan- 
ger of shoals, kept a leadsman in the eyes of the ship, 
sounding constantly. It was soon evident that the corsair 
would reach port in safety, and the cry of the leadsman 
showed that the water was shoaling rapidly. Accordingly, 
Bainbridge braced his yards, put his helm over, and swung 
his bow directly out to sea. The next moment the frigate 
crashed upon a reef and reeled over to one side. In looking 
for deep water Bainbridge had driven his ship squarely 
upon a hidden reef which runs for several miles parallel 
to the coast. 

The corsair carried the news of the disaster to the city, 
and soon a swarm of Tripolitan gunboats came out, opening 
fire on the stranded ship, but not daring to come to close 
quarters. The list of the vessel made it impossible to 
use any of her guns effectively on the enemy, and officers 

41 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

and men bent all their energies to getting the ship free. 
They backed the sails, threw overboard the cannon, except 
for a few in the stern to be used against the enemy, hove 
the bow anchors over, then pumped out the water in the 
hold, and as a last resort cut away the foremast. When 
all this failed the carpenter was sent below to bore holes 
in the frigate's sides, and the gunner was ordered to drench 
the magazine. Then everything else was destroyed that 
could possibly be of any use to the Tripolitans. 

Meanwhile, the latter's gunboats were sneaking closer 
and firing heavily. Fortunately, they directed their shot 
at the masts of the Philadelphia; otherwise there would 
have been much bloodshed on the helpless ship. At last, 
after four hours of resistance, when Bainbridge discovered 
that he could not bring a single gun to bear on the gun- 
boats, he surrendered. 

The Tripolitans clambered on board in high glee, pillaged 
the ship of everything — not even respecting the pockets 
of the officers — and carried off the prisoners to the city. 
The Bey was delighted, as he had every reason to be. 
Here were three hundred prisoners to be held for ransom; 
not only common seamen, but officers, who, he well knew, 
would have powerful friends to argue for peace and ransom 
on any terms the Bey might dictate. The next day he sent 
his men to see what they could do toward saving the 
Philadelphia, and a few days later, helped by an unusually 
high tide, they succeeded in getting her off the rocks unhurt. 
Having plugged the holes in her bottom, they dredged up 
the cannon, and in a short time anchored the Philadelphia 
in the harbor of Tripoli as good as new, the largest vessel 
ever owned by any Barbary potentate. 

The Bey thanked Allah and stroked his beard with many 
a chuckle. These Americans had come in their ships to 
humble him, and, lo, they were delivered into his hands! 
For Commodore Preble the news was correspondingly 
discouraging. Before he had even arrived at Tripoli he 
had lost one of his frigates with all her officers and men. 

42 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Yet it is interesting to note that the hot-tempered com- 
modore, knowing well how distressed Captain Bainbridge 
must be, wrote him a comforting letter in which there was 
no hint of blame for the disaster. (It was through the 
kindness of the Danish consul, Mr. Nissen, that Bainbridge 
was able to exchange communications with Commodore 
Preble.) And it may be added that Bainbridge's officers 
were hardly in their prison quarters when they drew up a 
memorial assuring their unfortunate captain that, in their 
opinion, he was blameless in every particular for the loss 
of his ship. 

Scarcely had the news of the Philadelphia reached the 
squadron when Preble began plans for destroying her at 
her moorings. Young Stephen Decatur, commander of the 
Enterprise, happened to be on hand to offer himself first 
for the proposed expedition, and thereby won the distinc- 
tion. Luckily for the purpose, the Americans had captured 
a Tripolitan merchant vessel, the Mastico. The success of 
such an attempt as the destruction of the Philadelphia de- 
pended on its being a complete surprise, and of course the 
Mastico 's Tripolitan rig would not excite the suspicion that 
the Enterprise would create. So it was decided to man the 
Mastico — renamed the Intrepid — and take her into the 
harbor of Tripoli in disguise. 

When Decatur called for volunteers from his ship every- 
body on board stepped forward. From these he selected 
sixty-two men and five officers. Five more officers — all 
midshipmen — were added from the Constitution, and a 
Sicilian pilot named Catalano. The brig Siren was ordered 
to accompany the Intrepid in order to stand by and rescue 
the crew if she were destroyed before accomplishing her 
purpose. The Siren was given this share in the expedition 
because her commander, Lieutenant Stewart, had offered 
to cut out the Philadelphia himself just after the commodore 
had promised the honor to Decatur. 

The Intrepid left Syracuse — the American base of opera- 
tions — for Tripoli February 3, 1804, attended by the Siren. 

43 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

They arrived before the city a week later, but a heavy gale 
was rising which made the attempt impossible that night 
and forced the two little vessels out to sea. They tossed 
about for four or five days, laboring to keep off the rocks on 
the treacherous coast, and in miserable discomfort. It 




THE HARBOR OF TRIPOLI 

A — Position of the Philadelphia when attacked by Decatur. Dot-and-dash 
lines represent course of the Intrepid on entering and leaving the harbor, Feb- 
ruary 16, 1804. Heavy dotted lines indicate the Philadelphia's course as she 
drifted after being fired. B — Present position of the wreck of the Philadelphia. 
X — Position of the wreck of the Intrepid after she blew up, September 4, 1804, 
in attempt to enter the harbor, under Captain Somers, as a bomb-vessel. 



turned out that the two weeks' provisions were bad, so that 
there was little on board fit to eat. The accommodations 
were very cramped, and the previous occupants of the 

44 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Intrepid had left behind them swarms of vermin which had 
no respect for birth or rank. At last the morning of the 
1 6th brought back a clear sky and an easy sea, and the 
two vessels headed once more for Tripoli. The rig of the 
Siren was changed as much as possible to conceal the fact 
that she was a man-of-war, and she remained well out to 
sea when the harbor was reached. Under the light wind 
the Intrepid headed toward the city boldly, but Decatur 
hung drags astern to keep her from reaching the Philadelphia 
till after dark. 

As the wind was dropping rapidly Decatur decided that 
it was not wise to wait for the boats from the Siren to join 
his force, as was the original plan. One boat's crew of the 
Siren had already come aboard and remained on the In- 
trepid, with their boat trailing astern. 

"The fewer the number, the greater the honor!" Decatur 
laughed boyishly, and headed directly for the familiar sides 
of the Philadelphia. The wind had dropped so much now 
that it was dark while the Intrepid was still two miles 
distant. Accordingly, the drags were taken in and the 
vessel slipped gently along before the light breeze. Only 
six or eight men were to be seen on the deck besides her 
commander, and these were dressed like Maltese sailors. 
All the rest lay concealed in the shadows, gripping their 
cutlasses and impatient to hear the order, "Board!" 

Decatur had given the order for absolute silence, and 
there was not a whisper. A pale crescent moon hung over 
the city, and lights began to gleam from the white walls and 
twinkle from the masts of the shipping. One battery was 
safely passed without challenge. Slowly and more slowly 
crept the little vessel before the failing breeze. Would it 
never reach the frigate? thought the anxious figures lying 
crouched in the shadows. 

At last the tense silence was broken by a hail from the 

Philadelphia. There was an eager movement among the 

hidden figures. The pilot, Catalano, answered coolly that 

his ship had lost her anchors in the gale — which was per- 

4 45 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

fectly true — and he wanted permission to tie up for the 
night to the Philadelphia's cable. Just then the wind 
shifted and forced the Intrepid away from the frigate, till 
she lay directly under her broadside. It was a ticklish 
situation, but there was no flurry on the decks. The 
sailors in Maltese costume manned the boat that swung 
astern, took the end of a hawser and rowed to meet a boat 
from the Philadelphia. The two boats' crews joined the 
rope from the Intrepid to another from the frigate and 
rejoined their respective ships without arousing any sus- 
picion on the part of the Tripoli tans. Then the Amer- 
icans hauled on the rope, bringing the bow of the Intrepid 
up to the anchor-chain of the frigate. 

Meanwhile some one leaning over the rail of the Phila- 
delphia caught sight of the armed men lying in the shadows 
on the Intrepid' s deck. 

11 Americano ! Americano /" he shouted. 

No more hiding after that! The entire crew sprang to 
the hawser and hauled the Intrepid alongside with a will. 
Then, with a rush, Decatur and his men swarmed up the 
sides of the frigate, expecting a bloody hand-to-hand con- 
flict on her decks. But panic had followed the surprise, 
and the Tripolitans ran in all directions. Several were 
killed, but the rest dived over the side and swam for their 
lives. 

As soon as the ship was clear the various details hurried 
with their combustibles to the different parts of the ship. 
Decatur longed to try to bring her out of the harbor, but he 
was under strict orders from Preble not to attempt it. The 
firing-squads did their work rapidly, and in a few minutes 
the frigate was ablaze from stem to stern. In fact, the 
flames spread so fast that several men had difficulty in 
getting back to the Intrepid. In less than twenty minutes 
the Americans had boarded the Philadelphia, driven off her 
crew, and returned to their ship. 

Now came the greatest danger of all, for the blazing 
frigate lighted up the whole harbor, and the Tripolitan 

46 




THE BURNING OF THE FRIGATE PHILADELPHIA 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

gunners were running to their batteries. As the wind was 
still light, the Americans had to bend to the sweeps, and 
made but slow progress. Luckily, the Tripolitans were 
either too much excited or very bad gunners, for, although 
the shot from one hundred guns splashed all about the little 
vessel for half an hour, not once was the Intrepid hit except 
for a random shot that went through one of her upper sails. 
Soon afterward she reached the entrance of the harbor, 
where she was met by the boats of the Siren. There the 
men rested on their oars and looked back until a thunder- 
ous explosion marked the end of the Philadelphia. 

The expedition had been completely successful, and what 
seemed at first a desperate undertaking had been carried 
through without a single American's being hurt. This 
brilliant exploit fired the enthusiasm of the entire fleet. 
Officers and men were ready to dare anything in order to 
measure up to the splendid example set by Decatur. 

All that winter and spring, in spite of tremendous gales, 
Preble kept a tight blockade on the harbor of Tripoli, 
leaving two vessels to scour the Mediterranean for any 
Tripolitan corsair that might still be at large. Finding 
that he needed gunboats of a still shallower draught, he bar- 
gained with the King of Sicily for six flat-bottomed gum 
boats and two mortar-boats. As soon as this force was 
ready and the weather permitted he sent them in for an 
attack on the Tripolitan gunboats at close quarters (August 
13, 1804). Under cover of a heavy fire from the mortars and 
the long guns of the Constitution the flotilla of six gunboats 
went into the harbor, and the enemy sallied out to meet 
them. Meanwhile the one hundred and fifteen guns in the 
defenses of the city opened fire, too, in answer to the 
Constitution, but fortunately did little harm. 

The Tripolitans were supposed to be invincible at close 
quarters, but the American gunboats attacked at once 
alongside, and officers and men sprang upon the enemy's 
decks with the most determined gallantry. In this hot 
scrimmage all the "school-boy" officers distinguished 

47 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

themselves. Unfortunately, James Decatur, the brother 
of Stephen, was treacherously shot and killed by the 
captain of a Tripolitan gunboat which had just surren- 
dered to him. His brother Stephen, having just captured 
a gunboat after a hot fight, left it as soon as he heard the 
news and dashed after another which he believed was the 
one that had caused his brother's death. He led his men 
upon her deck, and after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle 
he succeeded in killing her commander, though he very 
nearly lost his own life. 

The man who saved him in this scrimmage was a young 
sailor named Reuben James, who stuck close to his com- 
mander's side, warding off the attacks made on Decatur 
from behind. When his right arm was disabled with 
simitar cuts, he shifted his cutlass to the left and fought 
on. Soon that arm was useless, too, and the weapon 
dropped from his hand. At that moment he saw a Tripoli- 
tan lift his simitar to deliver a blow at Decatur's head as 
he lay on the deck locked in a death-struggle with the pirate 
captain. As both of Reuben's arms were useless, he 
deliberately put his own head in the way and caught the 
stroke aimed for Decatur. It was a terrible blow, but, 
strange to say, the hard-headed young sailor was back at 
his post in three weeks and lived to a green old age. A 
story of the navy must deal chiefly with the officers, because 
they are the ones in command, but the case of Reuben 
James is a fine example of the fact that the "jackies" 
were just as devoted and fearless. 

At another point in the line, during this gunboat attack, 
Lieutenant Trippe boarded one of the largest of the enemy's 
boats, followed by his men, but his own vessel swung off, 
leaving him on the enemy's deck with only a middy and 
nine men. Against these eleven Americans were thirty- 
six Tripolitans, but what the boarding party lacked in 
numbers they made up in dash. In a few minutes they had 
the deck cleared and the Tripolitan colors down, but at the 
end of that time Trippe bore eleven simitar wounds, some 

4 8 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of them very severe. No wonder Preble was Droud of his 
school-boys ! 

At the end of the fight three of the enemy's boats were 
sunk, three were captured, and the rest had retreated 
behind the rocks. Never again did they venture out to 
meet the American gunboats. 

Another young lieutenant who bore himself gallantly in 
this affair was Richard Somers, the chum of Decatur. 
With his single boat he had attacked five of the Tripolitan 
vessels and driven them to shelter. But he was burning to 
distinguish himself by an exploit like Decatur's, and when 
Commodore Preble selected him to take charge of another 
perilous enterprise against the enemy Somers was over- 
joyed. Briefly, the plan was this, to fit up the Intrepid as 
a floating mine, sail her in with only a handful of men, 
and, after bringing her into the midst of the enemy's ship- 
ping, to set off the fuses. The Americans were to escape 
in two swift rowboats. 

It was a desperate scheme, far more so than the destruc- 
tion of the Philadelphia, but every man in the fleet^ envied 
Somers the distinction of attempting it. At last all was 
ready, and at eight o'clock in the evening, September 4, 
1804, the Intrepid once more sailed alone toward the harbor 
entrance. Besides Somers there were Midshipmen Wads- 
worth — an uncle of the poet Longfellow — and Israels, with 
a crew of ten seamen. The story is that Israels hid himself 
on board at the last minute in order to be in the affair. 

Meanwhile the Argus, Vixen, and Nautilus stood by out- 
side the harbor to attend to picking up the survivors after 
the explosion. As before, the success of the little vessel 
depended on surprising the enemy. Would the Tripolitans 
be deceived again by the same ship ? The anxious watchers 
on the decks of the three sloops saw the Intrepid disappear 
in the evening mist. Suddenly, to their dismay, they 
heard the booming of cannon. Evidently the guns of the 
forts had opened fire on her as soon as she entered the har- 
bor. There followed several minutes of intense anxiety 

49 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



and suspense. Suddenly the darkness was torn by a great 
shaft of light, followed by a tremendous explosion. 

The three ships closed in, and all night long their boats' 
crews rowed back and forth in the harbor entrance, search- 
ing, shouting, but in vain. Somers had declared that 
sooner than allow all the powder on the Intrepid to fall 
into the hands of the Tripolitans he would blow her up 
himself, and it was the belief in the fleet that, being sur- 
rounded by gunboats, he had deliberately blown up the 
magazine rather than surrender. Others have thought 
that, since the explosion came too soon to do the Tripolitans 
any harm, it was caused by a hot shot from the batteries. 
At any rate, the navy lost some val- 
uable lives and gained nothing ex- 
cept the dare-anything ideal of cour- 
age which these men represent. 

Meanwhile, Preble had repeat- 
ed several times his bombardments 
and gunboat attacks, and kept, month 
in, month out, a relentless blockade 
on Tripoli. All this made the Bey 
very uneasy. For a long while he 
had not a single ship at sea, and the 
rain of cannon-balls and bombshells 
in the streets drove him from his 
palace to a safer place outside the 
city. So he came down off his high 
horse and began talking about peace 
in a far more modest fashion than 
ever before. 

Unfortunately, Commodore Sam- 
uel Barron was sent out to super- 
sede the energetic Preble, arriving on the scene shortly 
after the Intrepid disaster. The Secretary of the Navy 
tried to explain to Preble that this could not be helped, 
because Barron was superior to Preble in rank. But to be 
superseded just when he was putting the screws on the 

5o 




UNIFORM OF A CAPTAIN 
TRIPOLITAN WAR 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Bey of Tripoli was a bit of news that hurt Preble and made 
his officers indignant. Samuel Barron had given a good 
account of himself as a midshipman in the Revolutionary 
War, but his previous record in the Tripoli tan war had not 
been brilliant, and he was now failing in health of body and 
mind. Although the force Barron had now under his 
command was far larger than the one Preble had worked 
with, the navy accomplished nothing more under either 
Barron or Rodgers, who soon succeeded him in command. 
When Preble went home the naval glory of the Tripolitan 
war went with him. 

Unfortunately, the end of the war came in a way not 
wholly creditable to the navy. There was a peppery old 
consul at Tunis named Eaton, who had been very sharp in 
his criticism of the dilatory tactics of several officers of 
the navy during the early years of the war and won their 
hearty dislike. As he had fought well in the Revolutionary 
army, he managed to interest the government in a scheme 
he had for collecting a band of adventurers and attacking 
Tripoli by land. The plan sounds crazy enough, but, 
strange to say, he put it through. He started from Cairo 
with a horde of Arabs who joined him in the hope of plunder, 
and fairly drove them across the desert. He went through 
all sorts of hardships and dangers, but by sheer force of his 
iron will he compelled his mutinous army to follow him 
to the city of Derne on the frontiers of Tripoli. This he 
attacked and captured, leading the final charge in person. 

The way now lay open to the city of Tripoli itself, and 
the Bey's knees were quaking. Suddenly peace was con- 
cluded by our consul-general to the Barbary States, To- 
bias Lear, acting with the commodore of the fleet, John 
Rodgers. Lear, as well as many of the naval officers, 
disliked Eaton, and probably hated to see him carry off the 
glory of ending the war by a brilliant capture of Tripoli 
itself. The naval men, too, felt great sympathy for 
Bainbridge and the other captives from the Philadelphia, 
and, fearing that the Bey might take the notion to massacre 

5i 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

them, were glad to agree to almost anything. So Lear 
and Rodgers consented to pay sixty thousand dollars for 
ransoming the prisoners of the Philadelphia , and hastily 
signed the treaty. The chief comfort in that affair was 
that the terms of the treaty relieved the United States 
from paying any further tribute in the future. The con- 
clusion of peace took place June 10, 1805. 

The war had lasted four years and, except when Preble 
was in charge, had dragged dismally. But it accomplished 
its object, for it marked the first determined effort to shake 
off the yoke of the Barbary pirates. The greatest credit 
belongs to Commodore Preble. He did nothing spectacu- 
lar himself, but he did far more. He introduced strict 
discipline into a navy that needed it badly, and yet he 
was as careful of the reputations and success of his officers 
and men as of his own. Although he had the smallest 
force to work with, he accomplished more than all the other 
squadrons put together. There had been no lack of 
individual bravery before, but Preble gave his officers to 
understand that bravery was only the first of an officer's 
virtues. He gave them newer and sterner ideals in 
obedience and efficiency. 



V 

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR OP 1812 

Causes of the war — The Leopard affair — Comparison of navies — The 
chase of the Constitution — The Constitution and the Guerriere. 

IN 1793 England began to fight France, and with only 
an occasional truce the war went on until Napoleon's 
army was routed at Waterloo in 18 15. In other words, 
while we were fighting the French in the West Indies 
and the Tripolitans in the Mediterranean, England was in 
a long death-grapple with Napoleon. In this struggle 
England's chief defense was her fleet. It was necessary to 
the nation's existence to keep command of the sea, but 
this fleet, in order to control the sea and blockade the 
enemy's coast, had to be enormous. 

At one time during this war England spent four-fifths 
of her whole income on her navy. All those hundreds of 
ships needed many thousands of men to man them; and, 
as the life was one of cruel treatment and great hardships, 
men were not easy to get. Some were tempted to enlist by 
free drinks and a large bounty, but more were sent to the 
ships to save the country the expense of keeping them in 
jail, and many others were kidnapped in the streets and 
taverns of a seaport town by press-gangs from the ships. 
But in spite of everything the fleet never had enough men. 
Yet men must be found. So the captains of the British 
men-of-war very soon got the habit of holding up English 
merchant ships and taking off all their crew but a mere 
handful necessary to work the vessel into the nearest port. 
Next they overhauled American merchantmen and took 

53 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

off every one who had been born in the British Isles. From 
that it was an easy step to take any able-bodied seaman, 
no matter where he was born. 

This was the practice known as "impressment," or 
"pressing." Many an American sailor was taken against 
his will into the British navy, to a life of slavery from 
which he could escape only by desertion. Our govern- 
ment protested, but it might as well have begged the sun 
not to rise. We have already seen how a British com- 
modore impressed five Americans from the Baltimore, but 
the following incident shows an arrogance that was far 
worse. 

In 1805 Great Britain began a policy of telling us that 
any American ship carrying goods bound to a French port 
was liable to seizure. Again President Jefferson "pro- 
tested." Then, in order to enforce the English decrees, 
ships of war were actually sent to blockade several American 
ports. There was some more "protesting" done. In fact, 
during those days President Jefferson and his Secretary 
of State had splendid practice in protesting. 

One night in February, 1807, five of the crew of these 
English blockading-ships in Chesapeake Bay deserted and 
enlisted in the American 36-gun frigate Chesapeake. Later 
five more deserted from another British ship and went 
to the Chesapeake. The British minister demanded that 
they should be given up, but after an investigation he was 
informed that they were all Americans and would not be 
surrendered. At this the British admiral on the station 
ordered all his ships to stop the Chesapeake at sea and 
search her for deserters. 

As the Chesapeake left Hampton Roads June 22, 1807, 
the British ship Leopard, 50 guns, followed her to sea. 
As soon as the two ships were on the high sea the Britisher 
signaled the American to receive a boat. Capt. James 
Barron of the Chesapeake hove to, thinking that probably 
the captain of the Leopard wanted to send despatches to 
Europe. To his astonishment, the lieutenant of the 

54 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Leopard coolly read him the English admiral's order and 
announced that Barron must give up the deserters. Natu- 
rally, Barron refused. Shortly after the English lieutenant 
had returned to the Leopard the latter opened fire, first 
with a shot and then with a full broadside. 

Now it happened that the decks of the Chesapeake were 
piled high with all sorts of gear, from cables to chicken- 
coops, all of which her commander expected to stow during 
the first day or two at sea. It might be added that many 
a man-of-war has gone to sea in that condition before and 
since because of orders from Washington to sail on a 
certain date. 

Barron was not wholly to blame, but it seems that he 
rather lost his head in the crisis and stood irresolute and 
inactive after sending the lieutenant off the ship. He did 
nothing to get ready, and when the British shot began to 
crash into the sides of the Chesapeake it was found that the 
powder-horns were empty, nobody knew where the slow 
matches were, or the rammers, either, and most of the guns 
hadn't even been mounted. 

But a brave young lieutenant, William H. Allen, who had 
begged his captain in vain to prepare for battle with all 
possible speed, swore that the flag should not be struck 
without one gun being fired in its defense. Running to the 
galley, he picked out a live coal and, tossing it in his 
blistering hands, he ran back to one gun that stood loaded 
and ready. The coal was laid to the touch-hole and one 
gun boomed in reply to the English broadsides. By this 
time twenty-one shots had hulled the Chesapeake. Her 
foremast and mainmast had both been shot away, three 
men had been killed and eighteen wounded. Then Barron 
hauled down his flag. 

The Leopard sent another boat party aboard and it was 
found that only one of the deserters was in the Chesapeake's 
crew, for the rest had run away before the ship sailed. 
But just to rub the insult in more deeply, the English 
officer seized three others of the Chesapeake's crew — all 

55 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Americans — and carried them off to the Leopard. Then 
the British ship sailed off, leaving her almost helpless 
victim to limp back into Chesapeake Bay. 

Was there ever such an insult to a nation ? The country 
rang with indignation — and Jefferson protested again! 
Poor Barron was court-martialed and suspended for five 
years without pay. Four years after the Leopard affair 
the British government made a lame sort of apology and 
returned two of the impressed sailors. Of the others one 
had died and the other poor wretch had been hanged at 
the yard-arm for deserting. 

Strange to say, all this took place while Napoleon was 
doing even more damage to us than the English. As soon 
as the British government forbade American ships to go 
to any French port Napoleon answered back by saying 
that no American ship could go to an English port. In 
those days we were very largely a commercial nation, and 
between Napoleon and England our commerce was being 
rapidly squeezed to death. Then, to make matters worse, 
Jefferson and his Congress laid " embargoes" on our own 
trade to spite England and France. That is, they would 
not allow any American ships to leave port at all. This 
was like a man burning his barn down in the hope that the 
sparks might worry his neighbor. The embargoes did not 
hurt either England or France, but they did hurt our own 
country very seriously, and they made the New-Englanders, 
who were largely dependent on commerce, so bitter toward 
the Administration that they were disloyal in the war 
that followed. 

These restrictions on our own trade gave Napoleon an 
excuse, and he coolly seized ten million dollars' worth of 
American ships and cargoes that lay in French harbors. 
This was a more wholesale piece of robbery than the 
British had done, and we might well have gone to war with 
France, except that the British by the attack on the 
Chesapeake and their blockades on our own coast had done 
more to hurt our national pride. And there was that 

56 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

insolent practice of impressment going on all the time, 
which rankled sorely. 

The President who followed Jefferson — James Madison — 
was of the same party and equally slow to act. He took up 
"protesting" after Jefferson finished, as if nobody had 
ever tried it before. By that time the British officials 
would laugh when the American minister called with 
another long envelope. But in 1811 there were some fiery 
Westerners in Congress who demanded war with Great 
Britain, not only on account of her arrogant decrees and 
her practice of impressing American sailors, but because 
they believed that some terrible Indian massacres on the 
frontier had been secretly instigated by the British gov- 
ernment. Now we know that this idea was wrong, but 
at that time it was passionately believed in Ohio and 
Kentucky; and there still remained the hard facts that 
England had captured under her decrees nine hundred 
American vessels and impressed four thousand men. 

So finally the Administration stopped wabbling and 
"protesting" and declared war on June 19, 18 12. Great 
Britain did not want war, and at the last minute repealed 
her most objectionable decrees, but it was too late. It 
would have been far better for the United States to declare 
war immediately after the Leopard incident in 1807, for at 
that time Napoleon seemed invincible and England would 
probably have yielded on almost every point to avoid 
having an extra war on her hands. In the summer of 18 12 
it was clear that Napoleon's sun was setting, and his 
abdication in 1814 left Great Britain free, if she chose, 
to fling her enormous navy and her veteran army against 
the United States. 

For a long while it had been clear that we should soon 
have to fight either France or England, and, naturally, we 
should suppose that the government had been making 
rapid preparations for the coming struggle. But the fact is 
that nothing was done at all. There were no repairs on our 
tiny coast defenses, our army was small and untrained, our 

57 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

militia was laughable, and when, shortly before the war, 
a congressional committee urged that twelve ships of the 
line and twenty frigates be built to protect our coasts, 
Congress voted it down because "a large navy is dangerous 
to the liberties of a free people." 

When war was declared we had only sixteen fighting- 
ships. Besides these were 257 gunboats, contemptuously 
called "Jeffs" by the naval men because they were the idea 
of Jefferson. Instead of spending a naval appropriation on 
building one or two new frigates he put the money into these 
ridiculous little gunboats, because his idea was that one shot 
beneath the water-line might be enough to sink a whole frig- 
ate, while it would take 257 shots to sink all of these gun- 
boats. But when it came to using these "Jeffs" in battle 
it was found that the flimsy little tubs would hardly stand 
the kick of their own guns, and after one disastrous trial 
they were found only fit to break up into kindling-wood. 

In our little fleet we had not a single ship of the line, but 
our three 44-gun frigates were the best of their class in the 
world. And our officers had been raised to a high point of 
efficiency by the campaigns against the French and the 
Tripolitans. Opposed to our pygmy force Great Britain 
had seven times as large a fleet already on the Atlantic 
coast, and when Napoleon fell in 18 14 she had available 
her whole navy of 219 ships of the line and 296 frigates, not 
to mention the many sloops of war. 

The disproportion was so great that it was almost 
decided to keep the American ships of war tied up close 
in our ports and not let them risk fighting at sea. At the 
same time every American officer and enlisted man was 
anxious to prove his mettle in a square fight. The officers 
had borne too much ridicule from English officers in regard 
to American ships, which they called "a bunch of pine 
boards with a striped piece of bunting." Many of the 
jackies had been impressed by the British and bore on their 
backs long red scars left by the cat-o'-nine-tails; they had 
something more than ridicule to pay back. 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

On the afternoon of July 16, 1812, Capt. Isaac Hull, on 
the Constitution, was off Barnegat on the way to New 
York to join Commodore Rodgers' squadron. He discov- 
ered four ships at a great distance to the northwest, and a 
single ship to the northeast. He made for her, but the 
wind was so light that he did not get within hailing-distance 
till nearly midnight. The stranger was evidently a frigate, 
and at first Hull believed her to be a part of Rodgers' 
squadron. But when his signals were unanswered he sus- 
pected her to be an enemy. As his crew was green and 
undisciplined, he lay to till morning, for there would be 
less danger of confusion in fighting by daylight. Further- 
more, he was suspicious of the other four ships, whose 
character he could not make out. All hands lay at quar- 
ters, and next morning Hull discovered not only the 
frigate of the night before, but a ship of the line, three 
more frigates, a brig and a schooner, all flying the British 
ensign and all bearing down on the Constitution. Luckily, 
the nearest frigate, instead of opening fire, wasted ten 
minutes in tacking and coming around again in a stupid 
fashion that gave the American frigate a little start. 

Then began a famous chase. At sunrise a dead calm fell, 
and, except for intervals of breeze, the calm held all day. 
Hull drenched his sails with water the better to catch the 
wind, put out all his boats to tow, and then, as they were 
near enough shore for sounding, he bent all his hawsers 
together, making a line nearly a mile long, and sent out 
anchors ahead of the ship. The crew hauled first on one 
and then on another, thus warping the ship along. The 
English imitated every manceuver. Sometimes British 
shot splashed around and even beyond the Constitution, 
but every now and then a lucky puff of wind would swell the 
flapping sails and just carry her out of reach. The chase 
continued in this way for two days and nights of almost 
incessant labor for officers and men. Toward the close of 
the second day a squall came up. Hull immediately furled 
all sail, as if anticipating a tremendous blow, and the 

59 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

English captains hastily followed his example ; but scarcely 
had the curtain of rain shut down when Hull loosed his sail 
again, and when the squall cleared away he had gained so 
much on his pursuers that dawn of the following day 
showed them hopelessly astern of him, and they soon gave 
up the chase. 

Commodore Broke of the English squadron had been so 
sure of taking the Constitution that he had told off a prize 
crew for her. Hull's unexpected escape is one of the most 
skilful feats in the records of our navy. He missed no 
possible advantage and, though alternately towing, kedging, 
and sailing, he never lost a boat or a minute in swing- 
ing a boat on board. The English in their eagerness 
had cut many of their boats adrift and spent two or 
three days afterward cruising about to pick them up 
again. 

The nearness of Broke's squadron to New York made it 
impossible for Hull to obey his original orders, and accord- 
ingly he made for Boston. Having replenished his supplies 
there and learned that there were no orders for him from 
Rodgers, Hull coolly slipped out to sea with all possible 
speed on August 2d. He explained that he went to sea 
without orders because he was afraid of being blockaded 
in Boston by the enemy's squadron. What he probably 
feared still more was that the timid authorities in Wash- 
ington would order him not to stir for fear of being cap- 
tured. As it turned out, just such orders arrived for him 
the day after he got away. In doing this Hull risked his 
commission and even his life, but he staked them both for 
the sake of proving the efficiency of the service to which he 
belonged. 

After an uneventful cruise in the neighborhood of Halifax 
he turned south, and about noon on August 19, 181 2, he 
sighted a large frigate which, as he had good reason to 
expect, flew English colors. This was just the chance he 
had been aching for. Evidently the English captain was 
glad to fight, too, for, as Hull had the wind behind him, the 

60 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Britisher deliberately waited for him to come up till he was 
within three miles' distance. 

The British frigate was the Guerriere, Captain Dacres, 
oddly enough an old acquaintance of Hull's, with whom, 
the story goes, he had bet a hat the year before on the 
outcome of a possible duel between the Guerriere and an 
American ship like the Constitution. We shall soon find 
out who won the hat. 

Dacres saw that if the Constitution continued on her 
course she would run under the stern of the Guerriere and 
rake her, so he manceuvered to avoid this and to get the 
American under his broadside. He opened fire when 
within range, but Hull fired only occasionally, swinging the 
ship to match every movement of the enemy and all the 
while edging up astern of him. This went on for three- 
quarters of an hour; then Dacres, seeing he could not 
catch the Constitution at any disadvantage, allowed her to 
come to close quarters. Hull then overhauled the Guer- 
riere from astern, receiving the fire of her stern-chasers in 
silence, but ordering his guns double-shotted for close 
quarters. 

It was about six in the evening when he swung alongside 
at "half-pistol-shot" distance, and as soon as each gun 
came within range it poured its round shot and grape 
with smashing effect. As fast as possible the guns were 
reloaded and fired again. In ten minutes the Guerriere' s 
mizzenmast toppled over, smashing a great hole in her 
stern, and with all its tangle of sail and spars acting as a 
drag against which the rudder was helpless. 

"Huzza, my boys!" shouted Hull. "We've made a brig 
of her!" 

They had done more than that, they had made a wreck 
of her, for the Guerriere now lay with her nose up in the 
wind. Hull promptly crossed her bows and delivered 
raking broadsides which did terrible execution at that 
close range. Then the Guerriere lunged her bowsprit 
across the deck of the Constitution, and each side thought 

62 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of boarding, but the heavy sea made it impossible. At 
this point several were killed and wounded on both sides by 
musketry, including Captain Dacres, who was wounded 
in the back. 

In breaking loose again the Guerriere struck her bowsprit 
on the rail of the Constitution; the blow slackened the 
forest ay of the foremast, and, as most of the shrouds had 
already been shot away, down crashed the foremast. The 
jerk started the weakened mainmast, too, and that, with a 
great splintering crack, toppled overboard as well. 

As the Constitution drew up across her bows to rake 
again the Guerriere fired a gun to leeward in token of sur- 
render. By this time she had not a mast left, most of her 
batteries were blanketed under fallen spars and sails, and 
she wallowed helplessly in the heavy seas. A sail on the 
horizon suggested another enemy; and Hull, seeing that 
the Guerriere had no more fight left in her, drew off to 
repair damages to his rigging. The strange sail soon dis- 
appeared, and a half -hour was enough to make all necessary 
repairs. The Constitution then returned to the Guerriere 
and took her surrender. 

As Captain Dacres climbed up the side of the American 
frigate Hull went to meet him and gave his hand to his old 
acquaintance. 

"Dacres," he said, "give me your hand. I know you're 
hurt." 

And the story goes that when Dacres took off his sword 
to give it up Hull laughed as an old friend might : 

"Not your sword, Dacres, but I'll trouble you for your 
hat!" 

The look of astonishment on D acres 's face changed to a 
wry smile as he remembered that bet of the year before. 
Hull immediately sent over a surgeon's mate to help the 
English surgeon and his staff in caring for the wounded 
Englishmen. Later, before destroying the Guerriere, he 
asked Dacres if there was still anything on board that he 
would like to save, 

63 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

"Yes," he replied; "my mother's Bible, which I have 
carried with me for years." 

At that Hull promptly sent an officer to get it. This 
little courtesy seemed to bind the two men in a lasting 
personal friendship, for Dacres was a brave and generous 
enemy. He took special pains in his report to the Admiralty 
of the loss of the Guerriere to mention in warm terms Hull's 
consideration for the prisoners, especially the wounded. 
Twenty-five years later, when Dacres was an admiral and 
Hull was commodore of an American squadron, the two 
met again in Rome. There these old-time enemies were 
seen walking arm in arm, and Dacres showed Hull every 
courtesy in his power. 

The day after the battle Hull had tried to tow the 
Guerriere, but she was leaking so badly that there was no 
chance of saving her, so he set fire to her and blew her up. 
Ten days later, August 30th, the Constitution sailed proudly 
into Boston harbor, with guns booming and flags fluttering 
from every mast. When the news was told Boston went 
wild, and as the echoes of the victory spread bells rang and 
the people cheered everywhere throughout the land. 

So far everything else had gone wrong. Instead of a 
glorious invasion of Canada the American army had been 
beaten back at every point and British regulars were on 
American soil. Then, to crown the miserable story, 
General Hull — an uncle of Isaac Hull — had, in the very week 
of the Constitution's victory, surrendered our most im- 
portant outpost of Detroit to a far inferior force. Every 
despatch had told a story of failure and disaster. 

All this time nobody had expected that the little navy 
could do anything against the Mistress of the Seas, and 
when Hull brought the news of beating a British frigate in 
a stand-up fight the news was almost too good to be be- 
lieved. It was the first cheery news since the beginning 
of the war, and people went wild with enthusiasm. Per- 
haps we did some silly boasting, too, but that was only 
natural, A very popular ballad was composed about the 

64 




k,i 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

capture of the Guerriere which has this for its opening and 
most modest stanza: 

It ofttimes has been told that British seamen bold 
Could flog the tars of France so neat and handy, oh! 

But they never met their match till the Yankees did they catch. 
Oh, the Yankee boy for fighting is a dandy, oh! 

There was an important side to this hullabaloo over 
the victory. The Constitution was a Boston ship, and her 
victory set ablaze a feeling of patriotism in Boston. That 
was very much needed, because Boston was the heart of 
New England, and the section was bitterly opposed to a 
war against Great Britain, or, rather, to anything done by 
a Republican Administration. 

To the English the loss of a frigate was a trifle, but the 
fact that it had been captured by one of these despised 
Yankee frigates was a bitter pill indeed, and the London 
papers took it very hard. When we compare the arma- 
ment of the two ships we see at once that, with equally 
brave men and skilful captains on both sides, the Consti- 
tution ought to have won, for her strength was as three 
to the Guerriere' s two. But there was a far greater dif- 
ference between the vessels when the short duel was over. 
The Guerriere had 78 killed and wounded to the Constitu- 
tion's 14, and, while the former was so battered that she 
could not be even towed to port, the Constitution after a 
half-hour's repairs on her rigging was as fit as ever. For 
years the English had been accustomed to fighting and 
beating much bigger vessels than their own, and they be- 
lieved that any British ship was fit to beat an adversary 
of almost twice its size. 

It is interesting to note, too, that Captain Dacres, a few 
days before meeting the Constitution, had sent the following 
message to Commodore Rodgers in New York: 

Captain Dacres, Commander of his British Majesty's frigate 
Guerriere, of 44 guns, presents his compliments to Commodore 

65 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Rodgers of the frigate President, and will be very happy to meet 
him, or any other American frigate of equal force to the President, 
off Sandy Hook, for the purpose of having a few minutes' tete-a- 
tete. 

So when the Constitution — a sister ship of the President — 
came along, Captain Dacres got exactly what he had asked 
for, but not exactly what he had expected. 



VI 



THE CAPTURES OF THE FROLIC, THE MACEDONIAN, AND 
THE "JAVA" 

The Wasp and the Frolic — The United States and the Macedonian — 
The Constitution and the Java. 

THE first duel of the war was between frigates, the 
second was between sloops. In the frigate actions 
we must make allowance for the superiority of the 44-gun 
frigate designed by Humphreys to any frigates in the 
British navy in both size and guns. But there was little 
or no difference in the design of the sloops, which were 
built on English models; and in the sloop actions of 1812 
we usually find vessels as evenly matched as is possible in 
the chances of war. 

On October 18, 18 12, Master-Commandant Jacob Jones, 
commanding the sloop of war Wasp, sighted a British 
sloop of war which proved to be the Frolic, commanded by 
Captain Whinyates. The two vessels were about five 
hundred miles due east from the Chesapeake Capes. A 
few days before there had been a violent gale which did 
some damage to the rigging of both vessels, and there 
was still a heavy sea running when they fought each other. 
The Frolic was escorting two merchantmen, and when 
Whinyates saw the American ship heading for him he 
signaled the convoy to run away while he waited the attack. 

On account of the rough seas neither side tried firing till 
the vessels were within fifty yards of each other, and they 
ran alongside with little attempt at manceuvering. Mean- 
Vv T hile they blazed away at each other with cannon and 

67 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

musketry. The Wasp's spars and sails were soon badly 
cut up. Crack! Suddenly her maintopmast fell over into 
the fore rigging and made nearly all the head-sails useless. 
Jones looked anxiously at the Frolic, which seemed to be 
as fresh as ever. And yet his lads knew how to aim a 
gun — he had seen to that. 

As the two drew closer the Frolic's foreyards became dis- 
abled by the American fire, and she swung awkwardly into 
position with her bow toward the Wasp. Jones made the 
most of this by catching the Frolic's bowsprit between his 
own main and mizzen masts, and then pouring in a broad- 
side of grape-shot that swept the Frolic's deck fore and aft. 
The two ships were so close that the American ramrods 
were pushed against the bows of the Frolic. Jones was just 
giving an order for another raking broadside, but the ardor 
of his men could not be restrained. Seaman Jack Lang, 
who had once been impressed into the British navy, leaping 
on top of his gun, caught the lurching bowsprit of the enemy, 
clambered up, and was soon making his way, with cutlass 
in hand and blood in his eye, to the deck of the Frolic. 
Nobody could let Jack board the enemy all by himself, and 
at the next favorable swing of the ship Lieutenant Biddle 
with a party of boarders climbed up and was soon on the 
forecastle of the Frolic. 

There the Americans were shocked by a horrible spec- 
tacle. The deck was strewn with the dead and dying. As 
Biddle picked his way along the bloody deck he found only 
four men on their feet — the quartermaster, still clutching 
the wheel, and Captain Whinyates and two other officers, 
all wounded. The officers dropped their swords in surrender, 
and Biddle with his own hands lowered the British ensign. 

Scarcely had the Americans taken possession when the 
masts of the Frolic went down close to the deck. On in- 
vestigating her condition the Americans found, in the words 
of Captain Whinyates himself, that out of one hundred 
and ten men "not twenty were left unhurt." Every officer 
was either killed or wounded. 

68 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

On the American side there had been serious damage 
to the rigging, but there were only five killed and five 
wounded, a total of ten to the enemy's ninety. The ex- 
planation of the difference is that the Americans had fired 
on the downward roll of the ship and hulled the Frolic or 
cut her masts near the level of the deck, the English had 
fired on the upward roll and wounded only the upper rigging 
of the Wasp. 

Probably no other ship in a duel like this ever suffered 
such an enormous loss of life in proportion to her original 
crew; and, as her masts went overboard soon after her sur- 
render, the ship itself was nothing but a hulk. The Wasp 
and the Frolic were very evenly matched, the Frolic having 
a slight advantage in guns and the Wasp a slightly larger 
crew. The result was clearly due to the better gunnery of 
the Americans. 

The British Admiralty were so mortified by the facts 
as they came out in the testimony that poor Whinyates 
after his court-martial never got another command, and 
yet he had fought bravely and stubbornly, and the injuries 
he had done to the Wasp's rigging resulted finally in her 
capture. While Jones was busily trying to repair his in- 
juries aloft a British ship of the line hove in sight, picked 
up both antagonists, and took them to Jamaica. 

Meanwhile the United States, 44 guns, under Capt. 
Stephen Decatur, had gone to sea with Commodore 
Rodgers' squadron early in October, 181 2. He left the 
squadron three days later, and on the 25th of the month, 
while cruising near the Canary Islands, he sighted a large 
sail twelve miles away. It was the 38-gun frigate Mace- 
donian, Captain Carden, who was looking for the 32-gun 
frigate Essex which he had heard was somewhere in that 
neighborhood. So he made all speed to come up with the 
United States, and the impetuous Decatur was no less 
anxious to fight. 

When Dacres fought the Constitution he had generously 
sent the impressed Americans on the Guerriere down into 

69 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the hold, although he was short of men. There were seven 
impressed seamen on the Macedonian, and when they 
recognized the Stars and Strips on the United States one of 
them, Jack Cand, asked the captain that they might be 
regarded as prisoners of war. Carden, with an oath, or- 
dered him back to his gun. 

"You make that request again," he threatened, "and 
I'll shoot you on the spot!" 

Poor Jack was soon killed by a 24-pound shot from his 
own countrymen. 

Meanwhile the swift Macedonian was rushing toward her 
enemy. If she held her course she would pass under the 
stern of the American frigate and come immediately into 
close quarters. In so doing Carden would give up the 
"weather gage" — that is, the position to windward of the 
enemy. In those days British captains thought it a great 
advantage to hold the windward position, so Carden turned 
on a course nearly parallel with the United States, but 
keeping at a considerable distance. He still believed the 
American ship to be the Essex, and, knowing that the 
Essex was weak in long guns, he thought it would be easy 
to stay out of range of her carronades and shoot her up. 
But he had an unpleasant surprise. As soon as the two 
ships were within long range a 24-pound shot cut away the 
Macedonian's mizzentopmast, which fell into the rigging 
of the mainmast. Soon afterward the shots came crashing 
into the bulwarks and hull of the Macedonian, sending 
deadly splinters flying across the decks. While the two 
ships fought at long range Decatur kept sailing a little way 
ahead and then swinging his ship around to pour her full 
broadside on the Macedonian. 

Carden soon realized that the United States had the 
better of him at long range and headed toward the Ameri- 
can in order to come to close quarters. In doing this he 
exposed his bows to a diagonal fire from the United States, 
which Decatur was quick to take advantage of. In their 
position of sailing bows-on toward their enemy the English 

70 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

had only a few guns that could bear, while the Americans 
with their full broadside poured into the Macedonian a 
storm of iron that swept her decks and dismounted all her 
carronades on the starboard side. 

After half to three-quarters of an hour of this destructive 
work Decatur allowed his enemy to come to close quarters. 
But, as Carden's carronades were all dismounted on the side 
exposed to the American fire, and as the carronades of the 
United States were now thundering away with their big, 
smashing shot, the Macedonian was worse off at close 
quarters than before. Soon her topmasts were gone, and 
her mizzenmast followed, so that she rolled the muzzles 
of her guns under water with every wave. 

There was only a forlorn chance left for the Englishmen — 
namely, to take the United States by boarding, and the 
helm was put hard aport in order to foul the American 
frigate. Just then a shot sent the big foreyard of the 
Macedonian swinging round, and the ship pointed into 
the wind. 

Seeing that his enemy was done for, Decatur, like Hull, 
sailed off a short distance to repair his rigging. At this 
manceuver the British sailors, who had certainly been 
fighting as bravely as men could, broke into a loud cheer, 
for they supposed that the Americans had sighted another 
man-of-war and were running away. But in a few minutes 
the United States returned as fresh as ever and took up a 
raking position under the Macedonian 1 s stern. There was 
a hasty council of war among the English officers. Lieu- 
tenant Hope, the fiery first lieutenant, though twice 
wounded during the battle, pleaded that the Macedonian 
sink first but never surrender. More practical heads pre- 
vailed, and the ensign of England came flapping down to the 
deck. 

"Sir," said Decatur, when Carden offered his sword, "I 
cannot receive the sword of a man who has so bravely de- 
fended his ship!" 

It is true Carden had defended it bravely; but, as Preble 

7i 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

had taught, bravery is only the first of a commander's 
qualities. Brains and skill are quite as necessary, and 
Carden had not shown either. Hull, in his fight with the 
Guerriere, and Carden, in his with the United States, were 
in the same relative positions. Each was to windward, and 
each came down to attack a waiting enemy. Hull never 
allowed the Guerriere to get in a raking broadside, though 
she tried often. He manceuvered so that he came to 
close quarters from astern, where only a few of the ene- 
my's guns could reach him before he closed. So when the 
Constitution surged alongside at close quarters she had 
scarcely an injury. 

Carden had tried to come up to close quarters, too, but 
instead of manceuvering to avoid being raked he came almost 
bows-on, exposed to a terrible fire from the entire American 
broadside and unable to reply to any effect. Before the 
Macedonian could come to close quarters she was so badly 
shattered that she was already a beaten ship. All the 
while Decatur showed excellent judgment in handling 
his ship, so that he made the most of Carden's blun- 
ders. 

Like Hull and Dacres, Decatur and Carden had known 
each other before the war, and, oddly enough, just as 
Dacres had bet a hat with Hull on the superiority of the 
British frigates, Carden and Decatur had had a warm 
argument on the comparative value of British 18-pounders 
and the American 24-pounders. The battle settled this 
difference of opinion, too. 

The comparative strength of the two ships was about the 
same as in the case of the Constitution and the Guerriere — 
that is, three to two. But the difference in damage in- 
flicted was about nine to one. The British loss in killed 
and wounded was 104 to the American 12. In this case, 
where a good deal of the shooting was at long range, the 
Americans again showed great superiority in gunnery. 
After the surrender Decatur patched up the Macedonian, 
and the two ships got back safely to New York. The 

72 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

captured frigate served under the Stars and Stripes for 
many years afterward. 

After Hull returned victorious in the Constitution he 
gave up the command of her, of his own accord, in order 
that Captain Bainbridge might have a chance. This was 
a generous act, for after taking the Guerriere Hull could 
have stayed as long as he liked on the Constitution. The 
fine unselfishness of it adds to our respect for the man who 
is considered the ablest single-ship captain of the War of 
1812. Bainbridge must have appreciated the act, too, for it 
gave him a chance to clear his name of all the disasters that 
had clouded it during his naval career. In the French war 
his little vessel had been the only one captured by the 
French. In 1800 he had been forced to the humiliation of 
taking his ship on an errand for the Bey of Algiers, and in 
1803 he had been captain of the Philadelphia when she went 
aground off Tripoli. Sailors are famous for their super- 
stitions, and the crew of "Old Ironsides" felt that he was 
an "unlucky " captain. They were very much discontented 
at the idea of giving up their beloved Hull for Bainbridge, 
and after the Constitution put to sea under the new captain 
he was forced to discipline the crew severely. 

Captain Bainbridge had with him the sloop Hornet, 
and expected the Essex to join him later, but, as we shall 
see, the Essex never caught up with him. The Constitution 
and the Hornet went south to Bahia, Brazil. There in 
the harbor they found a British sloop of war, the Bonne 
Citoyenne, with a large amount of money on board. For a 
while the two American ships kept her blockaded. Then 
Lawrence, the commander of the Hornet, sent a challenge 
to the English captain to come out and fight, with a pledge 
from Bainbridge that he would not interfere. The English- 
man responded that he did not trust Bainbridge to keep his 
hands off. At this Bainbridge sailed off, hoping in that 
way to tempt the British sloop of war to come out. 

Three days later, on the morning of the 29th of December, 
181 2, Bainbridge sighted two sails. These turned out to 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

be the British frigate Java, Captain Lambert, in company 
with an American prize. As soon as Lambert sighted the 
Constitution he ordered his prize to run to Bahia, while he 
headed for the strange frigate. Bainbridge, seeing that the 
Englishman was ready to fight, headed southeast in order 
to get to a safe distance from neutral water. The Java 
came rushing on with all speed, and at about one-thirty 
the Constitution turned about and headed for her enemy. 
Then began a contest in seamanship between the rival cap- 
tains. The Java manceuvered to get a raking position, and 
the Constitution swung from one side to the other to avoid 
the danger. In this contest the Java had the better of it 
because she was the speedier of the two. The Java, like 
the Guerriere, was originally a French ship. The fastest 
ships in the British navy were those that the English had 
taken from the French. (Frenchmen in those days built 
ships far better than they fought them.) Besides, Captain 
Lambert was an expert seaman and took great pride in the 
art of handling a ship. So Bainbridge had his hands full 
in keeping the Java from gaining a raking position. 

As soon as the ships were within reach of each other 
their broadsides began booming, with an occasional sputter 
of musketry. Early in the battle a musket-ball struck 
Bainbridge in the hip. At two-thirty a round shot smashed 
the Constitution's wheel and drove a copper bolt deep into 
his thigh, but in spite of these painful wounds he refused 
to leave the deck. The loss of his wheel made the situation 
serious, because after that the rudder had to be swung by 
relieving tackles, two decks below, and every time the 
course was altered Bainbridge had to send some one scam- 
pering below to pass the order. 

With his wheel gone Bainbridge saw that there was only 
one thing left to do, and that was to close with his enemy, 
no matter what it cost. As the Constitution swung up the 
Java shot past under her stern, and everybody expected 
the dreaded raking broadside, but for some reason — 
perhaps the guns were not loaded just then — the Java 

74 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

fired only one little 9-pounder. Round the ships swung 
again; once more the nimble Java crossed the wake of the 
Constitution, but at too great a distance to harm her. 
Again Bainbridge headed for her, and at this moment the 
Java lost her jib-boom with the sails on it, and the sudden 
loss of head-sail made her come up into the wind. Bain- 
bridge made the most of his chance by swinging his ship 
about and raking the Java with terrible effect at close 
quarters. 

This was a staggering blow, and Lambert tried to settle 
things by boarding the American frigate. But just as he 
was laying the Java alongside, down came her foremast. 
At that the unlucky Java ran the stump of her bowsprit 
into the mizzen rigging of the Constitution in a position 
that gave the Americans a chance to pour in another 
dreadful raking fire at close quarters. 

From this time the Java was done for, although her 
brave defenders kept up a heroic fight. The Constitution 
circled about her and poured in a fire that riddled her and 
cut away every stick but her mainmast, and that went 
overboard a few minutes before the surrender. At the 
same time the American marines were busy with their 
muskets. It was a bullet from the maintop of the Con- 
stitution that gave Captain Lambert his mortal wound soon 
after the two ships fouled. 

Shortly after four the shattered Java lay a complete 
wreck, rolling heavily in the trough of the seas, with her 
batteries silent. As there was no flag flying, Bainbridge 
decided that she had surrendered, so he sailed off for an 
hour to splice his badly cut rigging. On his return he 
found that the British frigate had hoisted her colors again, 
but as the Constitution forged across her bows, ready for 
another raking broadside, the flag was pulled down in a 
hurry. 

The Constitution had the same advantage in strength 
over the Java that she had had over the Guerriere, but again 
there was no comparison in the damage done. The Java 

75 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

was so shattered that Bainbridge had to blow her up, while 
the Constitution was perfectly fit for a long cruise back to 
the United States. As for killed and wounded, British ac- 
counts of the Java vary all the way from 124 to 230. The 
Constitution's total loss was 34. 

The Constitution put into Bahia again, and Bainbridge, 
though in great pain from his wounds, had himself carried 
before the dying Lambert in order to return the English- 
man's sword and to say how earnestly he hoped that 
Lambert might recover. It is pleasant to read that our 
victorious commanders distinguished themselves by their 
chivalry as well as their courage and skill. Among the 
prisoners taken from the Java was General Hyslop, who was 
on board with a detachment of troops. The general was 
so much impressed by Bainbridge's courtesy that he not 
only wrote him his thanks after leaving the ship, but 
later sent him a gold-mounted sword. 

For Captain Bainbridge, with all his hard-luck record, 
this victory meant everything. It cleared his name and 
proved his worth. In fact, the enemy's ship in this case 
was handled much more cleverly than the Guerriere, the 
Frolic, or the Macedonian, for Lambert was a splendid 
seaman. Where he failed was in gunnery. He belonged 
to that large class of English captains of those days who 
had no use for target practice. As the battle went on 
the Java's shooting grew wilder, while that of the Consti- 
tution grew more and more deadly. During the six weeks 
Lambert had commanded the Java only once had he held 
gun drill, and that was with blank cartridges. 

In all the wild hurrahs over the continued victories of 
the little American navy Americans began to talk as if 
there were some magic stuff in our sailors which made 
them braver and better than any men in the world — no- 
tably the English. (At that time our army was getting 
so badly whipped along the Canadian line that it was very 
comforting to be able to boast about our navy.) The 
truth of the matter was that the British navy had been 

76 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

so long accustomed to beating the French — even at great 
odds — that the officers had grown over-confident and care- 
less. Even Lord Nelson had pooh-poohed the idea of gun 
practice. "Get so close that you can't miss!" was his 
advice. Accordingly we find the crews of British ships 
untrained in gun-fire, while the men on our American 
frigates and sloops were drilled and trained to shoot straight. 
As between straight shooting and wild shooting, no matter 
how brave the men may be, there can be only one result. 
We have seen that result in the captures of the Guerriere, 
the Frolic, the Macedonian, and the Java. 



VII 

JAMES LAWRENCE 

The Hornet and the Peacock — The Chesapeake and the Shannon — 
Reasons for the defeat. 

IN the last chapter we left the 18-gun sloop of war 
Hornet, Master-Commandant James Lawrence, vainly 
challenging the Bonne Citoyenne to come out of the harbor 
of Bahia and fight. Not long afterward a British ship of 
the line came in, and the little Hornet had to take to her 
heels. Lawrence then sailed along the coast to British 
Guiana, which was a popular hunting-ground for American 
privateers, and on his way he captured an armed brig with 
a cargo of coffee and tea and the sum of $23,000 in coin 
on board. 

On February 24, 18 13, when off the mouth of the Deme- 
rara River, Lawrence sighted a British sloop of war and 
in making for her was pleased to see that her commander 
was just as ready to fight as he was. The English sloop 
was the Peacock, Captain Peake. She was a sister ship of 
the Frolic; but, as she had recently changed her 34-pound 
carronades for 24's, her broadside was lighter than that 
of the Frolic. The fight between these two may be said 
to have lasted scarcely one round. Hardly had they begun 
fighting when Lawrence caught his enemy at a disadvan- 
tage by a quick manceuver and held a deadly position close 
under his stern, pouring in a heavy fire. In eleven minutes 
from the first shot down came the British colors and up 
went a signal of distress. 

When Lieutenant Shubrick of the Hornet went aboard 

78 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

he found the captain of the Peacock killed and the ship 
settling fast. Then Lieutenant Connor, with a force of 
American sailors, was sent aboard to try to keep the little 
vessel afloat till the prisoners could be transferred. They 
threw the cannon overboard, plugged holes, pumped, and 
baled, but the Peacock settled lower and lower till suddenly 
she dived under, carrying with her nine English and three 
American sailors. The sad story about these American 
tars is that they were rummaging below for some of the 
Peacock's rum, which they could not bear to see wasted. 

In this duel the Hornet had an advantage in men and 
weight of shot, but there was the same old story of wretched 
shooting against accurate shooting. The Peacock had lost 
five killed and thirty-three wounded, while the Hornet had 
one killed and four wounded. Two of the latter were hurt, 
not by the enemy's fire, but by an explosion of a cartridge 
on their own ship. The Peacock was so badly shattered 
in eleven minutes that she could not be kept afloat long 
enough to get all the prisoners off, while the Hornet had only 
a few injuries in her rigging, which were soon patched up. 

There were three impressed Americans on the Peacock 
who had been refused permission to go below as prisoners. 
Like Carden, Captain Peake threatened to shoot them. 
One of these men was killed. Another by a strange chance 
turned out to be a relative of Lawrence's wife. 

All the while the fight was going on the British sloop 
Espiegle, of the Hornet class, was lying at anchor in 
neutral water at the mouth of the river, in plain view. 
When the business with the Peacock was done Lawrence 
hastily spliced his rigging, to be ready for another set-to. 
To his astonishment, the Espiegle did not stir, and after 
waiting around invitingly with no result Lawrence trimmed 
his sails and went homeward. 

By this time the Hornet was crowded with prisoners 
whose cramped quarters were naturally very uncomfortable, 
but Lawrence's care for the English wounded and the 
consideration he showed his prisoners were so fine that as 

79 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

soon as the Englishmen arrived in the United States they 
published a letter expressing their gratitude to their 
chivalrous enemy. The seamen themselves caught their 
captain's spirit and made up from their own supplies 
an outfit for the British sailors, who had lost all they had 
by the sudden end of the Peacock. 

On the 24th of March, 18 13, Lawrence arrived safely at 
New York and discharged his prisoners. During his cruise 
of 145 days he had captured four rich merchantmen and 
destroyed a man-of-war of his own rate in brilliant style. 
There was not another officer, even in those days of rapid 
successes, who could quite match this record of Lawrence's 
in the Hornet. When he arrived in New York there were 
grand dinners and jollifications in his honor, and he became 
the popular toast. And, what was better still, he was so 
beloved in the navy .that there was not one of his less 
fortunate brother officers who was not delighted at the 
success of "Jim" Lawrence. 

He asked to be allowed to keep the command of the 
Hornet, but, as he had recently been promoted to the rank 
of captain, the Department slated him for a frigate. Law- 
rence then hoped for the Constitution, but they gave him the 
Chesapeake, then refitting in Boston. 

Late in May Lawrence took command of her, with orders 
to get to sea as soon as he could and, heading north, to 
destroy the British fisheries on the Grand Banks. On 
going aboard he reported to Washington that he found his 
ship ready for sea except for some men and a few supplies. 
Ten days later, May 30th, he left the wharf and moored 
out in the roads — to get "shaken down," as he called it, for 
a few days before trying to run the blockade. 

Meanwhile there had been since April two English 
frigates blockading the port. At first, in order to en- 
courage the well-known disloyalty of the New England 
States toward Madison and the war, the English had left 
the New England coast free. But early in 18 13 the 
British government decided to blockade the New England 

80 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

coast as well. Two other American frigates had run the 
blockade of Boston harbor in a fog, just before Lawrence 
arrived. This left the Constitution, undergoing repairs in 
the navy-yard, and the Chesapeake, which was almost ready 
for sea. 

The morning of June ist showed that instead of two 
frigates blockading the harbor there was only one, the 
Shannon, Captain Broke. This was the Captain Broke 
who had seen the Constitution escape from his squadron 
in that long chase off the Jersey coast. As soon as Law- 
rence heard that there was only one ship on blockade 
he hurried on board to go out and fight. Had he known 
that that very morning Broke was writing a challenge to 
him to come out to a single-ship duel, "wherever it is most 
convenient to you," he might perhaps have taken a little 
more time for his preparations. Broke sent the challenge 
ashore by a discharged prisoner, but the message never 
reached Lawrence. 

Here was the one chance he had been hoping for. The 
memory of the Bonne Citoyenne and the Espiegle, and the 
scornful things he had said about their commanders, made 
it impossible for him to sit tamely in Boston Roads with a 
solitary English ship the size of the Chesapeake coolly 
sailing back and forth at the very mouth of the harbor. 

But the Chesapeake was not in the best shape for battle. 
Next to the captain the first lieutenant is the most im- 
portant man on a ship. The Chesapeake' 's "first luff" was 
in the hospital ashore, dying of pneumonia. Two other 
officers were on leave, and to fill these vacancies Lieutenant 
Ludlow, only twenty-one years old, was made first lieuten- 
ant, and two midshipmen were moved up as acting lieu- 
tenants. Of course the crew was unorganized, officers and 
men did not know one another at all and were unfamiliar 
with their duties. 

On the other hand, the Shannon was manned by as 
finely disciplined a crew as could be found in the British 
navy. Her captain had been with that ship's company on 

81 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the Shannon for seven years, and made it "a crack ship." 
Strange to say, his hobby was gunnery, and most of his 
brother officers used to laugh at him as a crank. But he 
let them laugh. The Shannon was his ship, and he deter- 
mined to carry out his ideas. So at his own expense he 
fitted out his guns with the best sights known in that day. 
Behind each gun he cut an arc of a circle in the deck, with 
the degrees marked plainly, so that something like an ac- 
curate angle could be made in aiming. Twice a day, ex- 
cept on Saturdays and Sundays, he had gun drill, usually 
including practice in firing at a floating cask four or five 
hundred yards away. 

When Broke had preached gunnery to his brother officers 
they had pooh-poohed at him and repeated what Nelson 
had said about sights; but when one ship after another 
surrendered to the Americans during that first year of the 
war Broke knew well enough what the trouble was, and 
longed for a chance to show the difference between the firing 
of the Shannon and that of the Guerriere, the Macedonian, 
and the Java. 

Probably all that Lawrence knew about his opponent was 
that it was a British frigate, in size like his own, offering 
battle, and to this young and impetuous commander that 
was enough. Just before tripping his anchor he mustered 
his crew and made them a brief speech. At the end two 
sailors stepped forward and asked for prize money that had 
been due them for a long while and which naturally they 
wanted to their credit before going into action. This 
incident was the foundation for the story afterward of the 
"mutinous temper" of the crew. Lawrence went below, 
ordered the purser to make out the checks for the money, 
and then wrote to his wife and the Secretary of the Navy. 
In the letter to the Secretary he expressly says that his 
men were in "fine spirits." Having sent these letters 
ashore, he unmoored and made sail directly for the waiting 
Shannon. 

Captain Broke, seeing that Lawrence needed no chal- 

82 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

lenge to make him fight, turned about and headed to sea 
to lead his antagonist out to where there was plenty of 
sailing-room. Then he shortened sail and waited for the 
Chesapeake. In doing this he gave Lawrence the choice of 
any style of attack, and, as the Chesapeake came on, the 
American commander had a tempting chance to take a 
raking position under the stern of the Shannon. Broke 
expected this manceuver and ordered his men to lie down 
to avoid the storm of iron shot and splinters that would 
sweep the length of the deck. But, to his astonishment, 
Lawrence threw away the advantage, as if disdaining to use 
it, and instead rounded up to run close alongside. It was 
nearly six o'clock in the evening when the Chesapeake's 
bows forged past the stern of the Shannon and the British 
gunners opened fire. They struck first. Just as soon as a 
gun could be trained on the American frigate it was fired, 
then loaded with all speed and fired again. The effect of 
this accurately aimed fire was terrible at a distance of 
fifty yards, yet the American seamen stood to their guns 
bravely, and for five or six minutes the two frigates sailed 
almost parallel courses, pounding each other furiously with 
their broadsides. 

In his eagerness to close with his enemy Lawrence had 
allowed his ship to run up with considerable headway, 
while the Shannon had been hove to awaiting him. Be- 
sides this, the Chesapeake lay to windward and in passing 
the Shannon took the wind from the latter's sails. The 
result was that the Chesapeake forged past the Shannon, 
and Lawrence tried to "luff her" in order to check her 
headway. Just at this crucial moment several disasters 
happened all at once. The two men on whom the manceu- 
vering depended most were shot down, Captain Lawrence 
was wounded, and his sailing-master was killed. Then a 
shot brought down the foreyard with its sail, the wheel was 
broken, and sheets fore and aft were carried away, leaving 
their sails flapping idly. In consequence the unlucky ship 
came up helplessly into the wind with her stern exposed 

83 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



to the full broadside of her enemy, only seventy yards 
away. 

Broke took quick advantage of this position by pouring 
into the Chesapeake a terrible diagonal fire, while she 
drifted slowly, stern foremost, right upon the British guns. 
Lawrence, seeing that the two ships 
were going to foul, gave the order to 
call " boarders away." But there was 
confusion in getting the order because the 
negro bugler was so paralyzed with terror 
that he had hidden himself, and the or- 
der had to be shouted from man to man. 
Just before the two ships fouled Lawrence 
was wounded again, this time mortally. 
The American boarders gathered, cutlass 
and pike in hand, but they looked round 
in vain for leaders. At that moment 
Lawrence was being carried below, and 
every other officer on the spar-deck had 
received his death-wound except a few 
midshipmen — mere boys — most of whom 
were in the tops. 

The second lieutenant was off at the 
opposite end of the ship on the deck be- 
low, with not the faintest idea of what 
was going on above. The acting third lieutenant, Mid- 
shipman Cox, had responded to the call for boarders by 
leading his gun-crews on deck. But just as he reached the 
deck he saw his beloved commander fall mortally wounded. 
Lawrence was not merely the captain to young Cox; he was 
a friend and idol. The young man impulsively stopped in 
his tracks to help pick up his captain and carry him to the 
deck below. But as he ran up again he found the hatch 
already battened down by the boarders of the enemy. 

Meanwhile the American boarding party, thus left 
without leaders, were being cut down by a terrible raking 
fire at close quarters. It is small wonder that they soon 

84 




UNIFORM OF A 
SAILOR, WAR OF l8l2 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



became demoralized and ran below. The marines had lost 
their captain, but they were rallied by their sergeant, and 
made a defense which the marine corps may still boast of 
to-day. Out of a company of forty-four they lost twelve 
killed and twenty wounded before the survivors were 
finally swept away by the rush of the Shannon. 

In the British navy a captain is not supposed to lead a 
boarding party from his ship unless things are pretty 
desperate. Whatever Broke may have thought of the 
condition of his own ship, the fact remains that he was 
among the first to leap to the quarter-deck of the Chesa- 
peake. Not long after the British had seized the quarter- 
deck there came a golden opportunity for the Americans to 
rally and save the day, if 
they had had a single offi- 
cer to direct them. Dur- 
ing the confusion the Ches- 
apeake had fallen off enough 
to catch the wind and surge 
ahead. This broke the lash- 
ings that bound the two 
ships together, and Broke 
and his men found them- 
selves separated from their 
ship. About this time Sec- 
ond-Lieutenant Budd had 
rallied some defenders on 
the forecastle and was fight- 
ing desperately, but he was 
twice severely wounded and 
finally was thrown to the 
gun -deck unconscious. In 
this fighting Captain Broke 
himself received a terrible cutlass-stroke on the head that 
very nearly cost him his life and made him an invalid for 
the rest of his days. 

After Budd was wounded there was no more resistance. 

85 




UNIFORM OF A CAPTAIN, 
WAR OF 18 1 2 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



The first lieutenant of the Shannon, in his eagerness to show 
that the Chesapeake was captured, hauled down her flag and 
put on English colors. But in his nervous haste he attached 
the British ensign under instead of over the Stars and 
Stripes. At this a gun - crew on the 
Shannon, thinking that the Americans 
must have retaken the ship, fired their 
gun, killing the blundering lieutenant 
and four or five of his men. That 
was the last shot of the battle. 

In all this story so much happened 
that it is hard to realize that from the 
first shot to the last it was only fifteen 
minutes. The British swarmed over 
the captured ship and, unfortunately, 
their conduct showed nothing of Cap- 
tain Lawrence's generous spirit toward 
a beaten foe. After all resistance had 
ceased an English lieutenant directed 
his men to fire at the Americans in the 
rigging as if they were shooting at 
squirrels in a tree; and after the pris- 
oners were on board the Shannon there 
was small consideration shown them or 
their personal property. We may be sure nothing of the 
sort would have happened if the "brave Broke" had been 
in command, but he lay unconscious in his cabin, and 
his ship was in the hands of young subordinates. 

Poor Lawrence lingered in great agony for four days 
afterward, crying out in his delirium, "Don't give up the 
ship!" which, with "I haven't yet begun to fight!" are the 
favorite watchwords of our American navy. Lawrence's 
treatment of the prisoners from the Peacock had won him 
the kindliest feelings among the English, and the news of 
his death brought a genuine regret to his enemy. He was 
buried in Halifax with all the honors that could have been 
given to an Englishman of his rank, and British officers 

86 




UNIFORM OF A 
MARINE, WAR OF 1 8 1 2 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

walked bareheaded beside the coffin to pay their dead 
enemy the respect they felt for him. 

When news reached the House of Commons that the 
Shannon had taken the Chesapeake the whole House burst 
into cheers, and tremendous enthusiasm followed in the 
English newspapers. A year before, the capture of an 
enemy's frigate by an English frigate of the same rating 
would scarcely have been noticed, for it was always hap- 
pening with French ships, and the hullabaloo over the cap- 
ture of the Chesapeake was a fine tribute to the new respect 
Englishmen had for our ships. Broke became the nation's 
toast, and a popular ballad was sung about "brave Broke" 
for years. Boys who have read Tom Brown at Rugby will 
remember that the Rugby boys shouted it a whole genera- 
tion after the battle. 

On the other side of the Atlantic the news came as a 
sudden and terrible shock. After all the brilliant vic- 
tories of the preceding year Americans had come to think 
themselves able to "whip anybody" on the seas. National 
pride had been feeding on naval victories so long that the 
news of the Shannon s capture of the Chesapeake in fifteen 
minutes was a very bitter pill. 

When anything happens that people do not like or that 
hurts their pride they always get relief by finding somebody 
to blame. It was lucky for poor Lawrence's name that he 
did not live to face a court-martial. As it was, the blame 
was all shoved upon Acting-Lieutenant Cox. In his court- 
martial he had to face an array of thirteen charges to begin 
with, but everything fell to pieces except these facts — he 
had stopped to pick up Lawrence and help him down the 
ladder to the gun-deck. The poor boy did not know it, but 
at that moment he was the only officer left on the spar-deck. 
When he found that he could not get back up the same 
ladder, he ran forward only to find the panic-stricken crew 
tumbling down from above in a rush which he could not 
stop. Back he went to his gun and fired it, the last shot 
in the defense of the Chesapeake. It was a mistake in 

87 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

judgment to stop to help Lawrence at that moment, but not 
a very blameworthy one under the circumstances. For that 
the lad was expelled from the navy with all the blame of 
the loss of the ship on his shoulders. To show the fine 
stuff Cox was made of, when expelled from the navy he 
shouldered a musket and fought as a volunteer soldien 
through the rest of the war. 

We were not satisfied with a scapegoat, either; we had 
to find some other comforting reasons for the defeat. 
Sailormen explained it by saying that the Chesapeake was 
an "unlucky" ship — there was that miserable Leopard af- 
fair six years before — and nothing could have saved her in 
battle, anyway. Other people began to hunt for more 
probable excuses to explain the defeat, and where they 
could not find them they made them up. So, right down to 
our time Americans have been brought up on a patriotic 
fairy tale explaining the loss of the Chesapeake. According 
to this, her crew were both drunk and mutinous and com- 
posed of landlubbers, or "cowardly Portuguese," who re- 
fused to fight. All this nonsense has been thoroughly 
exploded. 

The truth is that the Shannon was a better ship than the 
Chesapeake for the same reason that veterans are better 
than recruits, but the American crew — and they were 
Americans — burst into cheers when they went into action 
and fought like tigers during those terrible minutes when 
the Chesapeake was a cloud of flying splinters from the 
enemy's fire and men were dropping everywhere. And we 
must remember in those five or six minutes when the two 
ships were running parallel the Shannon lost more in killed 
and wounded than the Guerriere or the Macedonian had at 
the time they surrendered. Luck played an important 
part in those ship duels at close quarters, and the Chesapeake 
had the worst possible luck in losing practically all her 
officers, her wheel, and her head-sails almost at the same 
instant. Yet much of that luck may be laid to the accuracy 
of Broke's trained gun-crews, after all. 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Some think that Lawrence was very headstrong to rush 
to sea when he did, but we must remember that it was his 
business to get to sea, and another day might have brought 
back that other British frigate, which would have made 
escape impossible. Where he did make a mistake was in 
throwing away the chance to rake the Shannon when he 
had it in his grasp. That kind of generosity in battle may 
be ''magnificent," as the French officer said of the charge 
of the Light Brigade, "but it is not war." 

However, we must not leave the brave Lawrence with a 
word of criticism. With his warm heart and his high 
ideals of chivalry he is perhaps the knightliest, the most 
lovable of the naval heroes of 1812. 



VIII 

LAKE ERIE AND THE CRUISE OF THE " ESSEX " 

Campaign on the Great Lakes — Building a fleet on Lake Erie — 
Battle of Lake Erie — Career of the Essex — Midshipman Farragut 
— Effect of commerce-destroying on the war. 

A GLANCE at the map will show how important the 
Great Lakes should have been to us in attacking 
England on her weak side — namely, Canada. But here, as 
everywhere else, no preparations had been made even toward 
the end of the negotiations, when everybody knew that war 
with England could not be avoided. Consequently, after 
the bad blunders of the army in the summer of 1812 we 
soon found ourselves in the position where Canada ought to 
have been. The surrender of Detroit and Mackinac (at 
the upper end of Lake Huron) left all our Northwest in the 
control of the British, Canadians, and their Indian friends, 
and there was hardly anything to hinder an army from 
invading New England, New York, or Pennsylvania. 

At this disgraceful and dangerous state of things the 
government finally woke up to the importance of the 
Lakes. So they sent Captain Isaac Chauncey to take 
command of Lakes Ontario and Erie. That is, he was to 
build a fleet there to regain control of those lakes. As soon 
as Chauncey arrived he sent Lieutenant Elliot to Black 
Rock (near Buffalo) to begin a naval base on Lake Erie, 
while he himself took charge of Lake Ontario. 

Captain Chauncey' s work on Lake Ontario we can sum 
up very easily by saying that for the rest of the war he and 
his British rival, Captain Yeo, played a kind of seesaw, 

90 




C\S Tlx ^ o*s 



STATES AND TERRITORIES IN THE SOUTH AND WEST — l8l2 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

No decisive action was fought, because as soon as one 
commander had more ships than the other the latter would 
draw to cover until he had built some more. Then he 
would sally out on the lake, and the other fellow would 
hide. 

The story of Lake Erie is very different. In the first 
place, young Elliot made a splendid beginning by a bold 
night attack in open boats against two British armed brigs 
that had anchored in fancied security near the British Fort 
Erie, on the Canadian shore. Elliot captured one and 
compelled the destruction of the other to prevent its 
capture. But the British still had a much larger vessel, 
the Detroit , which controlled the lake, besides others in the 
process of construction. 

That winter Master-Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry 
was ordered to take command at Lake Erie and construct 
a navy which should regain the lake for the United States. 
It was a new and hard task for a young officer used to the 
swaying 'deck of a frigate, the salt-spray, and the jolly 
friendships of the wardroom mess. The neighborhood of 
Lake Erie in those days was a wilderness, and he was to 
plunge into that wilderness and build out of the tall pines a 
fleet that should drive away an enemy already in control of 
the lake! Perhaps an officer who had not known Preble's 
stiff training in the Tripolitan war would have laughed at 
such orders, but Perry had been one of those "school-boys." 

Even his fine courage must have been dampened when in 
March, 1813, he arrived with his little band at Sackett's 
Harbor, on Lake Ontario, drenched to the skin with an icy 
March rain and a long tramp through slushy snow as he 
hurried to defend the little outpost against a threatened 
attack. From there he went to Buffalo, and thence over 
the ice to Presque Isle, now Erie, at that time a handful of 
cabins with a little tavern. Here he determined to establish 
his naval base, for a sailing-master and shipwright, with a 
gang of workmen, had been at work on several vessels, some 
of which were nearly ready for launching. The largest 

92 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

were two brigs, no feet in length, the Niagara and the 
Lawrence. The latter name was given by special order of 
the Navy Department on receipt of the news of Captain 
Lawrence's death. 

The British at their base, Maiden, were also building to 
increase their naval force, so there was no time for seasoning 
the timber. Many a tree that stood in the forest at sunrise 
found itself bolted to the sides of a vessel before sunset. 
Besides superintending the building of his flotilla Perry 
had to be on the watch against any sudden attack that might 
destroy everything. And as the work went on he found the 
difficulties piling up. He had to have rigging, sails, cannon, 
powder, and men for his vessels after he had built them, and 
all these were desperately hard to get where he lay, with a 
trackless forest behind and an enemy on the lake in front. 
Most of his mechanics and sailors had to be brought several 
hundred miles from New York, and for crews he had to 
depend largely on raw militia, negroes, half-breeds, Indians 
— anything he could find on two legs. And time and time 
again the men fell sick of the "lake fever" by the scores. 
When the battle of Lake Erie was fought over a hundred 
of the Americans lay sick with the malady ashore. 

In April the English were forced to abandon Fort Erie 
on the Niagara River, and Perry instantly jumped at the 
chance of getting the little flotilla that Elliot had collected 
away from Black Rock to Presque Isle. These vessels, the 
Caledonia — the captured brig — three schooners, purchased 
by Elliot, and a little sloop, were painfully warped up 
against the stiff current of the Niagara River by oxen on 
shore. After that they had to beat against head-winds on 
the lake till finally they just managed to reach Presque 
Isle before the British could intercept them. 

This was early in July, and by that time the British 
commander on Lake Erie, Captain Barclay, had his fleet all 
ready. Although he had just missed capturing the flotilla 
on its way from Black Rock, he settled down to blockade 
Perry at Presque Isle. The American commander now faced 
7 93 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

a new difficulty. After at last getting enough men for his 
ships he found that he could not get his ships out on the 
lake because the water had dropped so much during the 
early summer that the two largest vessels could not be taken 
over the bar. So Perry had to sit helpless for several weeks 
and see the British flag mocking him from the squadron 
lying out of gun-shot on the other side of the bar. 

But blockading is dull business, and when Barclay saw 
no sign of the Americans making any effort to get over the 
bar he sailed away, on August 2d, to accept, it is said, an 
invitation to dinner on the opposite shore of the lake. This 
was his fatal blunder, for the minute he was out of sight 
Perry and all his men worked with feverish energy for 
two days and nights to get the two brigs out on the lake. 
First they removed and beached all their guns. Still the 
brigs were much too deep in the water. Next they sank two 
large scows to the water's edge alongside each brig, fastened 
in such a way that when the water was pumped out of them 
they lifted the ship. As the first trial did not raise them 
enough, the work had to be done all over again. At last, 
after the greatest difficulty, the brigs were eased over the 
bar into deep water. On the morning of the fifth, as the 
Lawrence slipped into the outer lake, up came Barclay's 
squadron, again just too late. Seeing then that Perry had 
his force on the lake, Barclay went back to his base at 
Maiden, because he had left there his largest ship, the 
Detroit, at that time undergoing repairs. 

Perry followed him up and kept a blockade on him so that 
he could not get supplies, all of which had to come by 
water. Barclay needed a good deal of equipment for his 
flotilla, but the blockade soon made it necessary for the 
English to fight or starve. So at sunrise, September 10, 
18 13, the Americans saw the white gleam of the British 
sails coming out on the lake, and Perry hastened to meet 
them. As he well knew, on the outcome of that day's fight- 
ing hung not only the control of Lake Erie, but the fate of 
our Northwestern territory. 

94 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Both commanders arranged their battle-line with the larg- 
est ships in the center, and Perry intended that each of his 
larger vessels should fight a British ship of the same size. 
With two little schooners just ahead of him he bore down 
in the Lawrence to engage the Detroit, the British flag-ship. 
Behind the Lawrence came the Caledonia, the Niagara, and 
the rest of the schooners and sloops, all in a long line. Un- 
luckily, the wind dropped as Perry bore down. The slow 
little Caledonia kept all the rest so far back that when the 
fighting began there was already a wide gap between her 
and the Lawrence. Then, when the Lawrence came to closer 
quarters, she was left still farther from the rest of the 
American line. All the while at her masthead flew a blue 
flag, bearing the words of the dying Lawrence, "Don't 
give up the ship"; but it soon looked as if the Lawrence 
would follow the fate of the Chesapeake. With all the rest 
of the line out of effective shooting-distance, the Lawrence 
and the two schooners had to stand the combined broad- 
sides of practically the whole British squadron. 

Hoping every moment to see the rest of his ships closing 
up to help him, Perry continued the unequal fight with won- 
derful courage for two hours and forty-five minutes. At 
the end of that time the Lawrence was a wreck and the 
slaughter on her decks had been frightful. Perry and his 
thirteen-year-old brother James were among the handful 
left who were not wounded or killed, but their escape was 
a miracle, because their clothing was torn by bullets and 
splinters. 

The longed-for breeze at last came rippling over the 
water. As the Lawrence was drifting out of the fight Perry 
with his own hands fired one last gun at the enemy. Then, 
leaving a lieutenant in charge, and taking his commodore's 
pennant over his arm, he got into a boat with his brother 
and four seamen and rowed for the Niagara. The latter 
was now forging past the Caledonia in order to get into ac- 
tion. This famous passage in an open boat was made pos- 
sible only by the heavy curtain of powder-smoke that lay 

95 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

over the water, for the little gig was not discovered by the 
enemy till it was almost alongside the Niagara. Perry at 
once raised his pennant over the Niagara and sent her com- 
mander, Lieutenant Elliot, to hurry up the vessels in the 
rear. 

Up to this time the day had gone disastrously for Perry, 
but now he sailed the Niagara directly toward the group of 
British ships, and the Caledonia, with the smaller vessels, 
followed the example of the Niagara. These were all fresh 
ships, and the effect of their sudden attack was tremendous. 
To make things worse for the English, their two largest 
ships in trying to manceuver fouled and lay in such a 
position that Perry was able to rake them both at close 
quarters. He then rounded up alongside and shot across 
their decks. Meanwhile, his opposite broadside riddled the 
smaller English vessels clustered on the other side of him. 

The heroic defense of the Lawrence and the two schooners 
had not been for nothing, because it had injured the enemy 
so much that they were unable to stand up against this 
sudden attack of fresh ships at close quarters. In a few 
moments all the British colors were down and the battle 
was over. 

In justice to the brave men who had fought and died 
against great odds during those bloody hours at the begin- 
ning of the battle, Perry rowed back to the shattered Law- 
rence and there received the English captains as they came 
to surrender their swords. Then, writing in pencil on the 
back of an old letter, the victorious young commander sent 
the famous despatch to General Harrison, "We have met 
the enemy and they are ours — two ships, two brigs, one 
schooner, and one sloop." 

The results of this battle were of great importance, for 
all that area — Detroit and Michigan territory — which had 
been lost in the summer of 1812 by the army was thus won 
back by the navy in a single day. For this Perry deserves 
high honor; but we must remember that the victory was 
not due to any superior bravery or marksmanship of the 

96 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Americans, or to any genius in tactics, for Perry's method 
of attack was, in fact, very poor. Perry's fleet was much 
stronger than Barclay's and ought to have won, anyhow. 
Perry's greatness lay in his magnificent energy in building 
out of green timber a fleet that was superior to that of the 
British. He really won the battle of Lake Erie during those 
discouraging days at Presque Isle when he was working in 
the face of an enemy, in spite of sickness, hardships, and a 
hundred discouragements, to build, equip, and man a 
stronger fleet than that of the enemy. That kind of thing 
does not play to the galleries like crossing the line of fire 
in an open boat, but it counts far more. 

We must now go back to the time when Captain Bain- 
bridge sailed off with the Constitution and the Hornet on 
that southern cruise which ended with the captures of the 
Java and the Peacock. The little 32-gun frigate Essex was 
under orders to join Bainbridge, but, as she was delayed 
in getting ready, she was ordered to follow, while the 
other two vessels went on ahead. 

On board the Essex at that time was a little midshipman 
named David Farragut ; and, as we shall have a good deal 
to say about him later on as a man, it will be interesting 
to know something about him as a boy. So we shall follow 
the career of the Essex with an eye on Midshipman Far- 
ragut, and begin by going back to the very outset of his 
naval career. 

Captain David Porter had noticed the little fellow while 
visiting his parents in Louisiana, and liked him so well 
that he offered to make him his adopted son and start him 
in the navy in his own ship, the Essex. The offer was 
accepted, and the year 181 1 found young David, at the 
advanced age of nine years, standing very stiff and solemn 
in a cocked hat and tailed coat with a dirk by his side, 
holding up his right hand and promising, in a little piping 
voice, to "defend the United States against all their 
enemies, foreign and domestic." After that David was 

97 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

"David" no more. He was "Mr." Farragut; and Captain 
Porter, who had been so jolly and kind, was no longer 
"uncle," but "Captain." Then the little fellow began to 
learn what man-of-war discipline meant, and if there were 
homesick moments down in that stuffy cockpit of the Essex, 
where the middies swung their hammocks and where the big 
boys bullied the little ones, David said nothing about it. 

Not long after the war began the Essex captured the 
English sloop Alert (August 13, 18 12). As she had taken 
several merchantmen besides, there were many prisoners 
on board — so many that it would have been almost inhu- 
man to keep them cooped up under a hatch. So Captain 
Porter allowed them a good deal of liberty on deck. 

One night David awoke and saw a man bending over 
him, holding a pistol. He recognized the fellow as one of 
the British sailors from the Alert and realized with a sudden 
thumping of his heart that there was mutiny afoot. He 
kept perfectly still, shut his eyes, and, to his relief, the 
prisoner moved away. The boy did not know how far the 
ship was already swarming with armed mutineers, but he 
did know that Captain Porter must be told. Just as soon 
as the man left, David slipped noiselessly to the deck, 
scampered up the ladder, and burst full tilt into the cap- 
tain's cabin without so much as a knock. 

Captain Porter wasted precious little time after hearing 
David's story. "Fire! Fire!" he shouted, and the ship's 
bell began clanging the alarm. As fire-drill was nothing 
unusual at any time of night on board the Essex, the men 
came tumbling up, each with his blanket and cutlass. At 
this sudden appearance of the crew armed with cutlasses 
the mutineers were taken by surprise. They were quickly 
discovered and put in irons. Captain Porter then found 
out that some of the Englishmen had managed to break 
into an arms-chest and in that way supplied themselves with 
arms and ammunition. As the prisoners far outnumbered 
the crew, it was a narrow escape for Captain Porter and 
his ship. In fact, if it had not been for David Farragut 's 

98 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

quick work there would be no more story of the Essex to 
tell. 

Two days after Bainbridge set out on his cruise Porter 
made sail after him (October 28, 18 12), but his vessel was 
slow, the others had a start of him, and he missed them at 
one meeting-place after another. At last he had no idea 
at all where Bainbridge was. His provisions were getting 
short, and the expected arrival of a British squadron would 
at best have kept him blockaded in a Brazilian port. So 
he had to choose between going home without having done 
anything and making a cruise against the enemy's commerce, 
relying on the captured ships for supplies. The latter and 
more adventurous plan was adopted, much to the delight 
of everybody, most of all "Mr." Farragut. So the Essex 
cruised down the coast of South America, battled for three 
weeks against the storms of Cape Horn, and finally slipped 
into port at Valparaiso, Chile, in March, 18 13. 

Chile was then in rebellion against Spain, and was the 
only colony Porter could rely on to let him have fresh 
water and provisions. Spain was at that time allied with 
England in the Napoleonic war, and the other Spanish 
colonies of South America would have given the Essex a 
very frowning reception. For example, Peru went so far 
as to send out privateers to catch American whalers on 
their homeward voyage. 

From Valparaiso the Essex began her operations. First 
she recaptured some American ships from the Peruvians, 
and then in a business-like fashion went after every English 
ship in the south Pacific. Before she finished she had them 
all, except a few that had managed to get shelter in a 
friendly harbor. 

With such a flock of prizes as he had on hand, Captain 
Porter had to draw on even his midshipmen as prize- 
masters, and one day David Farragut was ordered to com- 
mand the Barclay, one of the recaptured American ships. 
Porter also put aboard a prize-crew from the Essex, and 
the Barclay's original captain to help David navigate her. 

99 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

It was to be a long trip from Tumbez in Ecuador, where 
Porter had landed his prisoners, all the way south to Val- 
paraiso. The appointment of little David as captain of a 
ship must have raised many a laugh, for he was not quite 
twelve years old, and rather small for that! 

David was still asleep when early the next morning the 
signal flew from the Essex to make sail. His quartermaster 
came to his cabin and woke him. 

"You'd better go on deck, sir. I'm afraid there'll be 
trouble." 

When the young captain got on deck he found the other 
ships well on their way to sea, but not an anchor-chain of 
the Barclay had been started. The old skipper stood on the 
quarter-deck looking very surly indeed; moreover, he 
stood six feet four. 

"Captain Randall," said David, bravely, looking up into 
the face of the big man, "order all sail and follow the fleet!" 

"You monkey," sneered the other. "You'd give me 
orders, would you?" 

"Captain Porter's orders," retorted David. 

"Well, this is my ship, and I'll take her to New Zealand," 
was the response. Meanwhile the crew had edged forward 
to hear this curious quarrel between the big skipper and 
the little middy. 

David's voice shook, but he had no idea of yielding. 
"Then I'll give the orders myself. Men" — he turned to 
the crew — "up anchor, and be lively about it." 

"Ay, ay, sir," the loyal quartermaster responded; and 
the crew, tickled at the little middy's spunk, went to the 
capstan with a will. When David went on piping orders to 
make sail, the astonished skipper roared that he'd shoot 
the first man who touched a rope, and went stamping down 
to the cabin for pistols. 

David called to his faithful quartermaster, and after a 
few words with him shouted down the ladder, "Mr. Ran- 
dall, you're under arrest! If you come up on deck you'll 
go overboard!" 

ioo 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

The skipper saw a group of muscular tars gathered at the 
head of the ladder and wisely decided to stay below. 
After that there was no doubt that Midshipman Farragut 
was the real captain of that ship, and he sailed her down to 
Valparaiso like an old salt. 

When Porter had captured everything within reach he 
decided to go westward to the Marquesas Islands, where he 
could overhaul the Essex without being disturbed. He 
had heard of three British ships being sent after him and 
wanted to wind up his cruise by capturing one of them. 
There at the islands there were novel adventures for young 
Farragut, swimming in the surf, catching great sea-turtles 
on the beach, and exploring the woods with the native boys. 
Then, after the work on the Essex was finished, it was 
"anchors aweigh," with bows pointing again toward 
Valparaiso. There the Essex arrived with her tender, a 
captured ship renamed the Essex Junior, on February 3, 
18 14. By this time Porter had rescued the American 
whaling industry, which was in danger of being destroyed, 
and turned the tables on the enemy by annihilating all 
British commerce in the south Pacific, a damage estimated 
at two and a half million dollars. What Porter wanted now 
was an English frigate like the Essex for a stand-up fight. 

Five days after the Essex entered the harbor of Val- 
paraiso two British ships came in, the frigate Phoebe and the 
sloop Cherub. The Phoebe at once attempted a surprise 
attack on the Essex, although both ships were in a neutral 
harbor. But as the Englishman surged close alongside 
the Essex he suddenly discovered that Porter had his men 
ready at the guns, so he promptly eased off with an excuse. 
Then followed a stubborn blockade. Porter challenged the 
captain of the Phoebe to a single-ship duel, but the English- 
man refused. Finally, during a gale, March 28, 18 14, 
Porter tried to get to sea past the two ships. He had almost 
succeeded when a squall carried away the maintopmast, and 
he turned back to a little harbor on the coast in order to 
regain neutral water while he repaired damages. 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

The rest is a sad story. The English, seeing that the 
Essex was badly disabled, and caring not a fig for neutrality, 
bore down and attacked the Essex as she lay at anchor. 
After suffering a good deal from a too-close encounter the 
two British ships took positions at a distance, out of reach 
of the Essex's carronades, and shot into her as at a target. 
During this part of the battle the Essex could not bring a 
single gun to reply. 

The slaughter among the Americans was horrible. Yet, 
while the least chance remained for getting his ship once 
more into close action, Porter would not surrender. But it 
was useless. After losing in dead, wounded, and missing 
more than any other American ship during the war — a 
frightful total of 155 — Porter surrendered. 

The Essex might have been taken, anyway, for the com- 
bined force of the two British ships was very much superior, 
but the reason that the enemy could pound the Essex at 
leisure was because the latter had a main-deck armament 
of nothing but carronades, the short-range guns. Why this 
great blunder was made no one knows. When Captain 
Porter protested against the carronade armament long be- 
fore, and asked for long guns, the authorities at Washing- 
ton had stubbornly denied his request without deigning to 
give a reason. This fact was the chief cause of the frightful 
slaughter and the loss of the ship. During all the terrible 
battle-scenes on the Essex David Farragut was coolly 
running errands for the captain, carrying orders here, get- 
ting primers there, helping _ a wounded man elsewhere. 
Once he was hurled to the foot of the ladder and knocked 
senseless by the body of a man mangled by a shot. David 
recovered his senses, picked himself up, and went on with 
his errand as if he had been a veteran of a score of battles. 

Then, when after the surrender the boy stood downcast 
among the British midshipmen on the Phoebe, the story is 
that he saw one enter with his own pet pig. 

''That's mine!" he exclaimed. 

"Fight for it, then!" said the others. They formed a 

102 




t X I f 










THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ring, and David and the new-comer pitched in with their 
fists. It is not necessary to add, perhaps, that David kept 
the pig. 

Even with these few glimpses that we have taken into his 
life in the Essex days it is easy to see in Farragut the 
middy of the war of 1812, a promise of the superb qualities 
of Farragut the admiral of the war of '61. And no better 
training-school for these qualities could have been found 
than in the little old Essex under Captain Porter. 

Commerce-destroying is not a very glorious kind of war — 
it preys on defenceless ships — but it was just the kind of 
warfare that did the most for our cause in 1812. The loss 
of a frigate like the Guerriere only stung England's pride 
into more fighting. In fact, she would hardly have missed 
a score of frigates from her great navy. But when the 
Essex, the little sloops of war, and the privateers ravaged 
English commerce, that touched John Bull on the pocket- 
book and made him roar for peace. So, although Porter 
was unable to capture a frigate as he had hoped, still he had 
accomplished much more toward bringing about a peace 
favorable to America than if he had taken half a dozen. 



IX 

LAKE CHAMPLAIN AND THE END OF THE WAR 

Battle of Lake Champlain — Credit due Macdonough — Effect of the 
battle on conclusion of peace — Work of sloops and privateers in 
War of 1 812 — Defense of the General Armstrong — Reasons for 
naval successes in the war. 

WE come now to the most important battle of the 
War of 1 8 1 2 . In spite of its importance most Amer- 
icans know less about it than about half a dozen other 
battles of the war, and they know still less about the 
fine young fellow who won the victory. 

In the previous chapter we noted the importance of 
Lakes Ontario and Erie. We saw how splendidly Perry 
Settled matters on Lake Erie, and how Chauncey, to the 
end of the war, only played a drawn game with his British 
opponent on Lake Ontario. There was another and at the 
time still more important waterway, Lake Champlain. 
If you look at the map of this region you will see that the 
lake, with the Richelieu River on the north and Lake 
George and the Hudson on the south, makes an almost 
continuous waterway between New York and Montreal. 

The British had realized its importance during the 
Revolutionary War, and in 18 12 it should have been the 
first line of attack for the Americans in their invasion of 
Canada. But our blundering government wasted its small 
army in several disastrous expeditions farther west and let 
slip the best opportunity of all. 

At the opening of the war we had two little sloops on the 
lake, carrying ten carronades each. In June, 18 13, while 

104 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



chasing an English gunboat, 
they got caught by a swift 
current in the narrows near 
Isle aux Noix and, being drawn 
under the guns of a British 
fort, were captured. This gave 
the British immediate control 
of Lake Champlain. 

Master-Commandant Thom- 
as Macdonough, who during 
the Tripolitan war had helped 
Decatur burn the Philadelphia, 
was then in charge of naval 
affairs on the lake. After the 
loss of the two sloops he be- 
gan work on some vessels in 
Otter Creek in order to recover 
control of the lake. A sample 
of the speed with which these 
vessels were.built is the schoon- 
er Eagle, which took the water 
just nineteen days after her 
keel was laid. The rest of the 
flotilla consisted of the ship 
Saratoga, the schooner Ticon- 
deroga, and the sloop Preble, 
and several galleys. While the 
work was in progress the Brit- 
ish came down the lake in 
their gunboats and attacked, 
but Macdonough, getting wind 
of their intentions, landed his 
guns and made such a strong 
battery of them that he beat 
the English off. 

After this Macdonough was 
able to finish his vessels un- 

105 




MAP OF LAKE CHAMPLAIN 
REGION 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

disturbed, but meanwhile the English had been greatly 
increasing their naval force. The ease with which naval 
supplies could reach them from Montreal was a great help 
to them, and certain unpatriotic farmers in Vermont 
cheerfully supplied all the timber and food-stuffs that the 
English wanted. 

The British authorities, realizing their great opportunity 
on Lake Champlain, made up their minds to strike at this 
point the decisive blow of the war. At Plattsburg were 
about three thousand Americans, consisting of two thousand 
militia and nearly one thousand invalided soldiers. To 
sweep away this small force Sir George Prevost, the Gov- 
ernor-General of Canada, was to bring an army of about 
twelve thousand of Wellington's veterans down the western 
shore of Lake Champlain. At the same time the English 
naval force under Captain Downie, a splendid officer of 
fighting experience, was to clear the lake of Macdonough's 
flotilla. When that was done there would be nothing to 
prevent the English from taking a pleasure trip down the 
Hudson to New York. It looked easy. The English 
found many of the New-Englanders very friendly, and 
they heard with satisfaction that the Governor of Ver- 
mont had flatly refused to obey the President's command 
to call out the militia for the nation's defense. 

By the end of August, 1814, Prevost had crossed the 
border with an army of over eleven thousand men to move 
on Plattsburg. To oppose him, Macomb, the American 
general, had a force amounting by this time to 2,500, in- 
cluding 1,500 regulars and the rest composed of volunteers 
and militia. In the mean time Macdonough had moved 
his squadron to Plattsburg Bay for a final stand. For 
some reason Prevost did not want to attack Plattsburg 
until he was sure that Captain Downie was fighting Mac- 
donough's force at the same time. He kept nagging 
Downie with orders to get under way till the latter sailed 
down the lake to give battle before his preparations were 
quite completed. Then, instead of a triumphant assault 

106 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

on Plattsburg, Prevost was checked by a spirited resist- 
ance from the Americans intrenched on the slopes above 
the Saranac River. He should have made the attack four 
days earlier, instead of idling in the woods waiting for 
Downie. As it turned out, the small force of Americans 
succeeded in keeping Prevost in check, thus protecting 
Macdonough's rear till the battle on the lake was over. 
There have been several occasions when the stupidity of 
a British commander has been most valuable to the Amer- 
ican cause, and this is one of them. 

Meanwhile Macdonough had made his preparations. He 
knew that his force was inferior to Downie's, particularly 
in long guns. Out on the lake the British flag-ship Con- 
fiance, with her long guns, could have beaten Macdonough's 
entire force single-handed. So the American commander 
drew up his line in the harbor before the town of Platts- 
burg, placing his ships between Cumberland Head and 
Crab Island in such a way that the shoals at each end of 
the line would prevent the British from turning his flanks. 
At the same time this formation compelled Captain Downie 
to begin his attack in a head-on position and to form his 
line of battle under fire. Then Macdonough saw to it that 
there was enough room astern of each ship so that if the 
guns on the exposed side were dismounted each vessel 
could trip her bow-anchors and swing around to present a 
fresh broadside. And to be prepared in case the rigging 
was too badly shattered, or the wind dropped too much to 
turn a vessel by sail, Macdonough put " springs" on his 
anchor-cables. These springs were hawsers made fast to 
the bow- cables under water, and leading back to the stern. 
By slipping the bow-cable and hauling on the spring a crew 
could "wind" a ship right around by bringing the stern to 
the place where the bow had been. In short, Macdonough 
provided for everything in advance just as far as a man 
could and made the best possible arrangement of his 
inferior force. 

The American line from northeast to southwest was as 

107 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

follows: the schooner Eagle, the flag-ship Saratoga, the 
schooner Ticonderoga, and the little sloop Preble. Forty 
yards to the rear lay the ten American galleys, which were 
large rowboats with a little howitzer in the bow. When all 
was ready Macdonough, who was as devout as he was 
brave, mustered the crew of the Saratoga for prayers. 

As the British squadron came down before the wind 
Downie saw across Cumberland Head exactly how Mac- 
donough had arranged his ships and quickly formed his 
plan. The Confiance, flag-ship, was to fire a broadside at 
the Eagle — at the northerly end — and then anchor across the 
bow of the Saratoga in a raking position. The brig Linnet 
and the sloop Chub were to engage the Eagle, while the 
sloop Finch and a dozen galleys were to attack the Ticon- 
deroga and the Preble at the southerly end. It was a 
splendid plan, but it had to reckon with the American 
broadsides first, as Macdonough had intended. 

The Confiance rounded Cumberland Head with flags 
flying and crews cheering. But as she turned her bows to 
the American line she got a hot reception. Just before the 
firing of the first shot a rooster on the Eagle suddenly flew 
to a gun, flapped his wings, and gave a lusty crow. At this 
the Americans cheered mightily, for it was a sign of victory. 

Macdonough aimed the first gun fired on the Saratoga, 
and the shot struck the British flag-ship near the hawse- 
pipe, flew the whole length of her deck, killing and wound- 
ing several men in its path, and shattered the wheel. 
Soon her two port-bow anchors were shot away, and this 
loss, combined with the baffling head wind, forced Downie 
to give up his idea of anchoring in a raking position. 
Instead he had to be content with mooring about five hun- 
dred yards to the east of the Saratoga. 

All this while Downie had not fired a shot. But as soon 
as he had anchored — about nine o'clock — he poured in a 
deadly broadside that killed or wounded one-fifth of the 
Saratoga's men. And then the battle was on in bitter 
earnest. About fifteen minutes afterward a shot struck 

1 08 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

a gun on the Confiance just as Downie was in the act of 
sighting it and killed him almost instantly. From that 
time the fight was continued with great spirit by Lieutenant 
Robertson, the second in command. At the northern end 
of the line the Eagle was being attacked by the Chub and 
the Linnet. A well-directed broadside from the Eagle 







PLATTSBURGH BAY, LAKE CHAMPLAIN 

Position of the ships at the close of the battle. 



killed or wounded nearly half the crew of the Chub and 
smashed the rigging so badly that she drifted helplessly 
toward the Saratoga. She promptly surrendered, and a 
young midshipman named Charles Piatt carried her to the 
rear. This youngster deserves to be remembered. Every- 
body knows that Perry went in a boat through the line of 

8 I09 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

fire to the Niagara once in the battle of Lake Erie, but few 
know that Midshipman Piatt carried orders from Mac- 
donough in an open boat through a much hotter line of 
fire three times in the battle of Lake Champlain. 

Although the little Chub had been quickly disposed of, 
the schooner Linnet got a very favorable position off the 
starboard bow of the Eagle, where the latter could bring 
few guns to bear, and poured in a deadly fire. Finding 
that he was in a bad place and his springs all shot away, 
Lieutenant Henley, of the Eagle, made sail and dropped 
down to a position astern of the Saratoga where he could 
pour a diagonal fire into the Confiance. But this gave the 
Linnet a chance to get a raking position on the Saratoga, 
and the American flag-ship was soon in a desperate con- 
dition, being caught between two fires. Most of the guns 
on the side toward the enemy had been dismounted, and 
there had been many killed and wounded. Macdonough 
himself fought with the superb gallantry of a Paul Jones. 
Twice he was hurled across the deck by huge splinters, 
once a piece of the spanker-boom fell on him and knocked 
him senseless. Once again he was thrown unconscious and 
bleeding to the deck. Fortunately, he recovered himself 
every time, and was back at his guns with a laugh and a 
shout of encouragement. 

Soon a shot from the Linnet dismounted the last effective 
carronade on the Saratoga's starboard side and sent it 
bumping down the hatch. Here was the crisis of the battle. 

At the southern end of the line the English sloop Finch 
had gone ashore in a battered condition on Crab Island 
and surrendered to some of the invalided soldiers who had 
mounted a little six-pounder there. The American sloop 
Preble had been so hotly pressed by the English galleys 
that she had been driven to the rear. That left the schooner 
Ticonderoga fighting with might and main against the 
galleys, which she finally succeeded in driving away. 

But, as everybody knew, the day depended on whether 
the Saratoga or the Confiance could hold out the longer. 

no 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Now, with the Saratoga's fire silenced, there was fear in 
the American line that the flag-ship was going to surrender 
and that the day was lost. 

True, not a gun could be fired on the Saratoga's starboard 
side, and the wind had died down, besides, but this was 
just the situation Macdonough had provided for by his 
" springs." He called away his men to the capstan, and 
in spite of a merciless fire the men slowly hauled the ship 
clear round till her bow pointed south instead of north and a 
fresh broadside faced the enemy. With a cheer of fresh 
hope the crew sprang to their guns and fired a double- 
shotted broadside. This unexpected fire was more than 
the Con fiance could stand. Since most of her guns on the 
engaged side were now useless, too, Lieutenant Robertson 
had tried to imitate Macdonough's manceuver. But the 
anchors he needed were gone, there was not enough wind 
for his sails, and he succeeded only in swinging his bow 
directly toward the Saratoga. There the Confiance hung 
while the Saratoga raked her. There was nothing for Lieu- 
tenant Robertson to do but surrender. After the flag of 
the Confiance went down, Macdonough hauled on his 
springs again and brought his broadside to bear on the 
Linnet, which, after a defense of fifteen minutes, surren- 
dered, too. At that moment the Ticonderoga was just driv- 
ing the galleys to the open lake. The American galleys 
had tried to help in the battle, but they proved too small 
and light to be of any use. 

The British galleys got away because there was not a 
vessel in the American squadron in condition to make sail 
after them, but the main part of the fleet fell into Macdon- 
ough's hands. The victorious young commander then sent 
this modest report to the Secretary of the Navy: "The 
Almighty has been pleased to grant us a signal victory on 
Lake Champlain, with the capture of one frigate, one brig, 
and two sloops of war of the enemy." 

Without taking away any of the glory that belongs to the 
other brave fellows who fought on the American side, it is 

in 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

not too much to say that the credit of this victory against 
a superior force belongs, first and last, to Macdonough him- 
self. The victory was due to his skill in choosing his position 
and to his shrewd forethought in providing for exactly 
what occurred. It was those "springs" on his cable that 
turned defeat into victory. This combination of brains 
with the finest kind of courage places Thomas Macdonough 
at the very top in our list of the heroes of 1812. 

Let us see what the results were. As soon as Prevost 
heard what had happened he took to his heels and retreated 
to Canada. In fact, he was in such a hurry that he left 
behind most of his stores and ammunition for the Ameri- 
cans! 

Still more important was the result on the peace nego- 
tiations then going on in Ghent, Belgium. The English 
commissioners had been standing out for the surrender of 
a part of the American territory — large slices of northern 
New York and Maine, and a broad tract in the northwest 
to be made into an Indian country under British govern- 
ment. But after the news of Champlain the English agents 
gave up this demand and yielded to the American position 
that the boundary lines should be just as they had been 
before the war. The capture of Downie's fleet, together 
with the retreat of Prevost, proved to be the decisive action 
of the war. Of course, on account of the slow means of 
communication, fighting went on many weeks after the 
treaty was signed in Ghent, on December 24, 18 14. But 
nothing that happened afterward made any difference with 
the terms of peace. 

Oddly enough, the treaty made no mention of impress- 
ment, the chief reason of the war. On this point the English 
commissioners refused to yield, but it was a matter that 
took care of itself. When Napoleon was done for there 
was no need for such a gigantic navy, and, therefore, no 
reason for impressing sailors into the fleet. 

Except for this point the Americans gained a great diplo- 
matic victory in that treaty. Although we do not like to 

112 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

admit the fact, in 1814 we were a pretty badly beaten 
nation. All our military expeditions had been failures, 
Washington had been sacked and burned, and a good deal 
of our territory was occupied by the British. Though our 
little navy had made a brilliant name for itself, the Atlantic 
coast was so tightly blockaded in 18 14 that those of our 
frigates which had not been captured were unable to get to 
sea. On the other hand, the peace in Europe left England 
free with a splendid army and her great navy to do about 
as she liked with us. Why, then, was she willing to sign 
a treaty of peace so favorable to the United States? 

These were two main reasons. First, although the great 
struggle with Napoleon was over, the other nations, espe- 
cially Austria, felt jealous of the great power and influence 
England had won in ending that war. Every one expected 
a new European war to break out at any moment, and the 
British government did not want to be hampered by a 
war in America. Secondly, although the blockade kept 
our frigates idle in the harbors of our coast, yet the smallex 1 
sloops, and especially the swift-sailing privateers, were able 
to run the blockade without much trouble, and these ves- 
sels, coupled with the Essex, harried the commerce of Eng- 
land till the rates of insurance on ships got so high that it 
did not pay to send a cargo out. So the merchants of Lon- 
don demanded peace. 

Nor were these sloops and privateers engaged only in 
capturing merchantmen. We have already spoken of the 
victories of the Wasp and the Hornet against British sloops 
of their own class. There were six other duels between 
sloops of war, and out of the total of eight seven were 
victories for the Americans. 

Of the privateers some were so brilliantly handled that 
they deserve special mention. There was the little Comet, 
of Baltimore, which fought, one moonlight night off the 
coast of Brazil, an action as gallant as any in the war. 
Captain Boyle of the Comet attacked three armed merchant- 
men, convoyed by a Portuguese sloop of war, the four 

113 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ships mounting a total of fifty-four guns to his fourteen. 
But he handled his ship and guns so cleverly that when the 
firing ceased the Portuguese sloop of war and two of the 
merchantmen were hurrying back to neutral water, badly 
hurt, while the third fell a prize to the Comet. 

Another and more famous exploit occurred in the fall 
of 1814. Nowadays many of the steamers plying between 
New York and the Mediterranean ports pass through a 
certain channel in the Azores. On one side rises the graceful 




TYPICAL PRIVATEER OF WAR OF 18 1 2 

"Topsail schooner," mounting carronades, and a "long Tom" 
amidships on a swivel 



cone of Mount Pico, and on the other lies the little town 
of Horta on the island of Fayal. Few Americans who look 
over a liner's rail at this little whitewashed city with its 
comical old fort realize that within a few rods of that fort 
a wonderful battle was fought by American sailors, and 
that there on the bottom still lies the hull of the most 
famous privateer in our history. 

On September 26, 18 14, the privateer General Armstrong, 
Captain Reid, arrived at Horta to put fresh water aboard. 

114 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

She had scarcely dropped anchor when a large British 
squadron under Commodore Lloyd came in. As soon as it 
was known that the little vessel was an American privateer 
the ships anchored in such positions as to make it impossible 
for her to escape to sea. Of course the port was neutral and 
the British had no right to attack, but Captain Reid was 
pretty sure that they would, and made his plans accord- 
ingly. He moved his vessel as close as he could under the 
guns of the fort and asked the Portuguese governor for 
protection. But the governor was mortally afraid of 
offending the English and did nothing more than make a 
feeble protest. 

At midnight the English attempted a surprise attack in 
a few boats, but they were beaten back with heavy losses. 
Angered by this unexpected repulse, Commodore Lloyd 
made another boat attack, using all the boats in the 
squadron and sending about four hundred men. There 
were only ninety in the privateer, but they had the advan- 
tage of position. They rigged boarding nettings along the 
sides of the vessel and loaded and collected arms. Then 
began a desperate hand-to-hand fight. The British swarmed 
over the sides of the privateer, but were obliged to hack 
through the boarding nettings before they could reach the 
deck, and were meanwhile exposed to the pike, pistol, and 
cutlass of the defenders, who fought, as an English eye- 
witness described it, "with the ferocity of savages." 

After an hour of the fiercest struggle the English were 
repulsed with great slaughter. According to some accounts 
upward of two hundred were killed or wounded. Strange 
to say, the American loss was only two killed and seven 
wounded. Infuriated by this severe and bloody defeat, 
Lloyd determined to open his broadsides on the Armstrong, 
regardless of what the shots might do to the houses of 
the town. A brig advanced to the attack, but the Arm- 
strong's well-directed fire beat her off. 

Captain Reid realized, however, that he could not hope 
to fight the whole squadron, so he quickly removed his dead 

ii5 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

and wounded to shore. Then, aiming his "long Tom" 
down the hatch, he shot a hole through the ship's bottom. 
In order to make sure that the British should not have 
her, he set the Armstrong on fire as well. Finally, with his 
flag on his arm, he rowed ashore, leaving only a blazing, 
sinking ship for the enemy to board. No naval officer 
could have given a better account of himself than this 
privateersman, and his gallantry was fittingly rewarded 
after the war by a captain's commission in the navy. 

Captain Reid did not know it at the time, but Lloyd's 
squadron was a part of the expedition against New Orleans. 
The Armstrong's crew had killed and wounded so many 
officers and men that the squadron was delayed an entire 
week at Horta. One of the ships had to be sent back to 
England, loaded with the wounded. The rest of the ships 
and transports at Jamaica had to wait a week for Lloyd's 
squadron, too, so that the attack on New Orleans was 
delayed just about seven days. As Andrew Jackson came 
on the scene only three days before the English arrived, it 
is not too much to say that the stubborn defense of the 
little privateer made possible the victory of New Orleans. 

In looking over the course of the War of 1812 we notice 
the contrast between our naval successes and our military 
failures. The reason of this is simply that the army had 
been allowed to fall into decay, with old and inefficient 
officers and only a small body of regular soldiers. There had 
been no trial by fire to burn out the poor material among 
the officers and temper the efficiency of the men. What 
was worse, most of the armies of 18 12 consisted of raw 
militia, fresh from the farm, who had to face veteran sol- 
diers of the Napoleonic war. 

The navy, on the other hand, had been through two 
campaigns, one against France, the other against Tripoli, 
and Preble had brought it up to a high ideal of duty and 
efficiency. While it was insignificant in size, it was never- 
theless a veteran navy and keyed up to the highest pitch. 
Every one of our heroes of the War of 1 8 1 2 had been through 

116 



, THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

fire at Tripoli, and many had smelt powder in the French 
war as well. 

The War of 1S12 had a good effect on the nation at large 
in that it inspired a new feeling of patriotism. Disgust 
at the selfish and disloyal conduct of many of the New- 
Englanders during the war resulted in a larger patriotism, 
even in New England itself. The feeling that the United 
States was a nation, not a bundle of jealous states, was 
strengthened by the common danger of the war, its vic- 
tories, and even its defeats. 



X 

l8l2 TO THE CIVIL WAR 

Campaign against Algiers — Suppressing the pirates in the Gulf 
and the Caribbean — Qualla Battoo — Opening Japan — Political 
corruption in the navy — Founding of the Naval Academy. 

IT is hard for us to understand now why the American 
people were willing to pay tribute to Algiers after 
they had settled the question with Tripoli, but the fact 
remains that between 1797 and 181 5 we were sending 
every year tribute of naval supplies to the Bey of Algiers. 

In 18 12 that potentate received a special envoy from 
England, bearing presents and messages of friendship from 
the Prince Regent. This encouraged the old pirate to make 
trouble for the Americans again, especially as the United 
States was soon deep in a war with Great Britain. So he 
hustled our consul out of the country and sent his corsairs 
abroad to catch American ships. Fortunately, on account 
of the impending war with England, there were few Amer- 
ican merchantmen in the Mediterranean, but the Algerians 
managed to catch one, the little brig Edwin, and sold her 
crew into slavery. 

During the war we had no time to attend to these 
pirates, but as soon as peace was made with England Con- 
gress declared war on Algiers, and ordered two squad- 
rons to proceed thither and get satisfaction. Bainbridge 
commanded one and Decatur the other. The latter got 
to sea first, May 20, 181 5, and he went about his business 
with his usual dash and thoroughness. 

He was scarcely in the Mediterranean before he caught 

118 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

a 44-gun frigate, the largest ship in the Algerian navy, with 
the admiral on board. The Algerian admiral was killed 
during the brief action before the frigate surrendered. 
Then, on arriving at Algiers, Decatur sent the terms of his 
treaty to the Bey and said that if they were not accepted 
at once he would sink every Algerian ship that tried to 
enter the harbor. Just as one of the Algerian cruisers 
appeared the Bey sent off a boat in hot haste, agreeing to 
the terms of peace. The chief points in Decatur's treaty 
provided for the immediate release of all Americans in 
slavery, the payment of $10,000 for the Edwin, and an 
end to all tribute-paying for the future. 

After settling with Algiers in this straight-from-the- 
shoulder fashion Decatur paid a visit to Tunis and Tripoli, 
both of which had allowed British men-of-war to recapture 
American prizes in their harbors. From Tunis he squeezed 
$46,000 — which he estimated to be what the prizes were 
worth — and from Algiers $25,000, with the liberation of 
ten Christian slaves besides. Two of these were Danes, 
whom he selected out of gratitude to the Danish consul, 
Nissen, who had been so kind to the American prisoners 
during the Tripolitan war. 

Captain Bainbridge, with his usual bad luck, arrived 
on the scene only in time to find that Decatur had finished 
the whole business. 

The Bey of Algiers was so mortified over his humiliation, 
and so angry because the English had not helped him, that 
he became very insolent toward them. As it did not pay 
the British government any longer to make presents to these 
pirates, the following year it sent to Algiers a large fleet 
which chastised the Bey very severely. After that there 
were no more Christian slaves and piracy in the Medi- 
terranean. 

In the chapter on the French war we saw that most of 
the French privateers in the Caribbean were really pirates. 
After 181 5 French, Spanish, and some American privateers 
went right on with their business, which they liked too 

119 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

well to give up just because peace had been declared. If 
you study a large map of the West Indies you will see that 
the Caribbean is naturally a paradise for buccaneers. The 
famous sea-rovers of the seventeenth century always 
made their headquarters there because, in the first place, 
it was the cross-roads of the Atlantic, and, in the second 
place, there are so many little islands where a pirate ship 
could retreat for hiding. After 1815 things became so 
bad in the Gulf and the Caribbean that hardly a merchant 
ship passed through without at least a brush with one of 
these buccaneers. When the United States tried to deal 
with the problem it turned out that many of the pirates 
carried a letter of marque issued by Venezuela, which was 
then in open revolt against Spain. Of course, this letter of 
marque was a farce, and in 18 19 Oliver H. Perry was sent 
on a mission to Venezuela to straighten out the difficulty. 
Unfortunately, the "hero of Erie" fell ill of yellow fever and 
died, and the expedition had no result. 

In 1821-22 Captain Biddle, the lieutenant of the 
Wasp in her famous duel with the Frolic, took a small 
squadron into the West Indies and made a good beginning 
against the pirates. In 1823 Captain Porter was sent 
with another squadron, and, as in the Essex days, David 
Farragut went along too. 

It was a hard and dangerous service. The pirates had 
to be hunted right to their island caves because most of 
them ran to hide as soon as they heard of Porter's coming. 
A greater danger than pirate bullets was yellow fever, 
which cost the squadron many good officers and men. 
Once the entire squadron had to go north to break up the 
epidemic, and for a time Porter himself lay at the point of 
death. 

But nothing short of death could stop him, and he 
went at his difficult task till it was done. By the close 
of 1824 there was not a black flag to be found in that whole 
region. Captain Porter is best known for his Essex cruise, 
but the service he performed in rooting out and destroying 

120 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the piracy of the Gulf and Caribbean was many times 
more difficult and dangerous. 

Another expedition against pirates took place in 1831. 
This time it was concerned with the Malays of Qualla 
Battoo, a town on the northwestern coast of Sumatra. 

The Friendship, a little Yankee merchantman, was 
treacherously seized by the natives, who killed the mate 
and several of her crew. To teach these Malay cut- 
throats a lesson for the benefit of our many merchantmen in 
these waters, the government sent the 44 -gun frigate 
Potomac to the scene. The Malays retired to their forts 
in the jungle village, and officers and men from the Potomac 
landed under cover of darkness and attacked and cap- 
tured one stronghold after another with splendid gallantry. 
The Malays fought with the most desperate courage, for 
they preferred death to surrender. The following day 
Captain Downes of the Potomac took his frigate up the 
river and opened his broadsides on an army of Malays that 
had collected at the rear of the town. The roar of those 
long 3 2 -pounders terrified the natives into the most abject 
submission. Yet it required another bombardment the 
following year by another American frigate to put a 
stop to the murderous tactics of these natives. There- 
after the Americans had little further concern with pi- 
rates. 

American naval officers found themselves again in the 
Gulf at the time of the Mexican War. But this war 
was almost wholly a military one, and the duties of the 
navy were chiefly to blockade Mexican ports, with an 
occasional brush with the enemy on shore. During the 
latter part of the campaign Captain Matthew C. Perry 
had charge of the naval operations before Vera Cruz. 
Matthew was a younger brother of the famous Oliver, and 
had made a name for himself in Biddle's expedition against 
the pirates by capturing five pirate craft with his little 
sloop, the Shark, and helping in the capture of a sixth. 
But Matthew Perry's fame rests on a peaceful rather than 

121 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

a warlike exploit — namely, the opening of Japan to the 
civilized world. 

In the middle of the sixteenth century Christian mission- 
aries had found a cordial welcome in Japan. But as more 
Christians arrived, belonging to unfriendly sects and 
nations, they began to squabble with one another in a 
very un-Christian spirit. At first this only amused the 
Japanese, but when they discovered that the Portuguese 
and the native Christians were joined in a plot to overthrow 
the government they rose in their wrath and banished the 
foreigners, bag and baggage. Thereafter for two hundred 
and fifty years no foreigner was permitted in Japan, except 
that the Dutch were allowed a few trading privileges at 
Nagasaki. 

When the Mexican War brought us California the ques- 
tion of trading with the East became important. There 
were already many American whalers in the Japanese 
Sea, and it was a great hardship for them to be shut out of 
all Japanese ports when in stress of storm or in need of 
fresh water. Further, wherever an American ship was 
wrecked on a Japanese coast the survivors were promptly 
led to prison, where they stayed indefinitely. 

Another very important reason for opening Japan was 
that we had in those days a large ''clipper" ship trade 
with China, and Japan lay most conveniently on the 
trade route. Steamers were beginning to cross the Pacific, 
too, and Japan had tempting deposits of coal. For a long 
while England, Russia, France, and Portugal had tried to 
get trading privileges with Japan, but they had all failed. 

In 1849 the sloop of war Preble, under Commander 
Glynn, went to Nagasaki and rescued some shipwrecked 
American sailors who were in prison for the crime of being 
foreigners. On his return he reported that the Japanese 
had heard of America's easy victory over Mexico and were 
much impressed. So he thought that the time was ripe 
for the United States to succeed in Japan where the other 
nations had failed. Acting on this suggestion, the gov- 

122 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ernment organized an expedition and gave the command 
of it to Commodore Matthew C. Perry. While the squad- 
ron was being fitted out Perry made a careful study of 
all the books on Japan that could be found, and, as the 
Dutch had the only existing charts of Japanese waters, 
the government had to buy a set from them. The thrifty 
Dutchmen, by the way, insisted on the tidy sum of thirty 
thousand dollars as the price. 

The expedition left Norfolk in the fall of 1852 and 
arrived in Yedo Bay in July, 1853. The appearance of the 
two steam -frigates Susquehanna and Mississippi towing 
the sailing -sloops of war Saratoga and Plymouth up the 
bay created a sensation among the natives, who had never 
before seen a steamship. Their boats clustered around 
the strange ships, but Perry not only refused to permit any 
one to come on board, but drove the boats away. He had 
decided that the best way to impress the Orientals was to 
outdo them in dignity and exclusiveness, and he refused 
to show himself or obey the orders of the Japanese that 
he move south to Nagasaki. Perry declared that he would 
deliver the President's letter there at Uraga, where he was, 
or more directly up the bay to the nation's capital, Yedo 
(Tokio) . He hinted at using force, too ; and, as the Japanese 
saw no way of stopping these armed steamships, they finally 
agreed to receive the President's letter at Uraga. 

Accordingly, on July 14th three hundred officers and 
men were landed, amid the booming of guns, and marched 
in a stately procession to the reception-house built for the 
occasion, where the Japanese princes were waiting. The 
letter and the credentials from the President, written on 
vellum and incased in rosewood boxes ornamented with 
gold, were given to the princes amid perfect silence. Then, 
after telling them, through the interpreter, that he would 
return in the spring for an answer, Perry took his leave. 

The American squadron wintered at Hongkong, but 
Perry heard rumors of the strange activity of French and 
Russian ships in the vicinity; and, fearing that they might 

123 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

get ahead of him, he returned to Japan in February, 1854. 
This time he anchored within twenty miles of Yedo. The 
Japanese told him to return to Uraga to transact business, 
but Perry's answer was to move on till he came within 
sight of Yedo itself, the sacred city. After this the Jap- 
anese agreed that the negotiations should be opened at 
Yokahama, about opposite where the squadron lay, and 
the palaver began. 

Three weeks of talk followed; but, while the Japanese 
officials said they wanted friendship with America, for a 
long while they would grant nothing. After some delay 
Perry decided to try what gifts would do. The Americans 
had brought along a curious lot of odds and ends as presents 
to impress the Japanese people. There were farming- tools, 
clocks, telegraph instruments, three life-boats, and a minia- 
ture railway. The last made a great hit. The cab of the 
engine was about big enough for a six-year-old child to crawl 
into, and the cars were in the same proportion. The train 
was made to whirl around a circular track at the rate of 
twenty miles an hour, and the dignified Japanese officials 
got astride of the roofs of the cars and made a merry-go- 
round of the train. It must have been hard for the 
Americans to keep their faces straight as they saw these 
stately officials whirling along, with their feet sticking out 
in front, their robes flying in the wind, hanging on for dear 
life, but grinning like Cheshire cats with the fun of the ride. 
When Sunday came around Perry mystified the Japanese 
by his solemn observance of "Lord's Day" and the sound 
of the "Doxology" as roared out across the water by lusty 
American tars. Shortly afterward seventy Japanese were 
entertained on board one of the ships, and, as usual, the 
Christian foreigner brought the white man's rum as well as 
his religion. The Japanese officials were soon made very 
happy and very noisy under the influence of huge quanti- 
ties of champagne, punch, and Madeira. 

Finally the Japanese yielded. On March 31, 1854, 
Commodore Perry and the four Japanese representatives 

124 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of the Mikado signed a treaty written in three languages — 
English, Dutch, and Chinese. The terms of this treaty 
provided for help and protection for shipwrecked American 
sailors, permission for ships in distress to enter any Japanese 
harbor, and the opening of the ports Simoda and Hakodadi, 
where the Americans could get wood, coal, and water and 
trade with the Japanese. Further privileges were added by 
the treaties of 1857 and 1858. 

The Americans did not enjoy their special advantage long, 
for that very year England and, later, Russia and Holland, 
obtained equal privileges. But the honor of opening to 
the world the "Hermit Nation" could not be taken away 
from the American commodore. 

There were reasons for Perry's success more effective 
than his steamships, his solemn pomp, his miniature rail- 
way, or his champagne. At that time the Japanese 
government was threatened with revolution, and it felt 
unable to bring a united resistance against any outside 
force whatever. Of this Perry knew nothing at the time. 

In the second place, there was a Japanese who, as a lad 
of fifteen, had been rescued from shipwreck by a New 
England skipper. The latter carried the boy back to 
Massachusetts and gave him a good education at his own 
expense. In 1849 the exile returned to Japan, where at 
first he was imprisoned as a foreigner and got his release 
only after translating Bowditch's Navigator into Japanese. 

This young man wrote the reply in English to Perry's 
letter, and during the negotiations he was kept hidden 
within hearing of the American officers, to discover from 
their conversation what their real intentions were toward 
Japan. His assurances that the Americans were genuinely 
friendly and honorable in their purpose did more than 
anything else to persuade the Japanese government to 
grant a treaty. 

The year 1858, when the final treaty with Japan was 
ratified, brings us very close to the Civil War. At this 
point let us look back and see how the navy had fared dur- 

126 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ing the years of peace. In the early days we saw that 
Congressmen used to make speeches against the navy on 
account of its "dangerous menace to liberty." Just before 
war broke out with England in 1812 a Congressman actually 
got up and made a motion that the navy be abolished. 

After that war the politicians changed their tune. The 
navy had become very popular through its victories, and 
the country would not hear of doing away with it. But, 
unfortunately, it was discovered that the navy could be 
used in the game of politics, and it is a sad day for any 
branch of the government when it becomes a grab-bag for 
politicians. 

Of course, commissions in the navy had always been a 
matter of a politician's favor, but now "graft" set its dirty 
fingers on the ships as well. Whenever a Congressman of the 
party in power needed to make himself popular with the 
voters in his home port he would work till he got an 
appropriation for building or repairing a ship there. Then 
the contract would be turned over to another grafter, 
and the money would be nearly all wasted. 

The frigates built by Humphreys in 1797 were the best 
of their class in the world; but the ships built after the 
War of 18 1 2 were perhaps the worst. One commodore 
reported that in his squadron he had scarcely a single ship 
that could make over five knots an hour! Some ships 
dragged along for years in the building, and then, after a 
fortune had been wasted on them, they proved to be 
worthless. Such a ship was the frigate Santee, which was 
thirty-six years getting built. Every time a fresh appro- 
priation was made for her the workmen had to take out 
much of the old work because the timbers had rotted from 
exposure. Then at the end it was found that she was 
top-heavy and not fit for anything but transport duty. 
And yet in those days we built the fastest and finest mer- 
chant ships in the world! 

A worse abuse was the matter of "repairs." Ships would 
be ordered to a navy-yard at the request of a politician, 

127 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



and then a bill of repairs would be paid by Uncle Sam 
which was often considerably more than the cost of building 
a new ship. The sloop St. Louis, which cost $75,000 to 
build, was "repaired" once in this fashion, and the bill 
was nearly $120,000. The little Shark, 
which cost $9,000, was repaired for the 
moderate sum of $27,000. The frigate 
United States, after having $80,000 spent 
on her in repairs, had scarcely gone to 
sea when the carpenter found the tim- 
bers so rotten that she had to turn about 
and retire to New York, where she was 
condemned. Some ships sent in a big 
bill for "repairs" before they were even 
launched ! 

With the officers matters were not 
much better. There was no grade in the 
navy above captain, though a captain in 
command of a squadron was called a 
"commodore" by courtesy. The result 
was a large number of captains, with 
very slow promotion for the officers be- 
low. These captains were allowed abso- 
lute power, and very little was asked of 
them except to keep their ships off the 
rocks. They bullied and insulted the younger officers and 
did exactly as they liked. Many of them were in liquor 
during the greater part of a cruise, and courts-martial had 
no terrors for a man of captain rank. 

There are many amusing instances of the power of 
these fierce old martinets. In the thirties it was the fashion 
to wear long and luxuriant whiskers, and young men spent 
loving hours curling, oiling, and perfuming these manly 
charms. A stern old commodore, who did not like the 
hairy style, issued the following cruel order as soon as he 
took command, "All officers in this squadron will shave 
off their whiskers at once." And they had to obey! 

128 




CAPTAIN OF THE 

FIFTIES IN FULL 

DRESS 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



Another captain was on duty off the coast of Africa, 
watching for slavers, when the rumor came that war was 
likely to break out with Spain over Cuba. Thinking that 
there would be a fine chance for prize-money in Cuban 
waters, he sailed back across the Atlantic, only to find that 
there was no war at all. Of course he had to be court- 
martialed for leaving his station without orders. The court 
found him guilty and sentenced him to "present this 
court with a bottle of good whisky." 

At the opposite end of the line the case was even worse 
with the midshipmen. There was practically no education 
for them, so that when they became captains they were 
almost as ignorant as the enlisted men. There was such 
slow promotion that in the forties young 
men were still midshipmen at twenty-five, 
an age when Stephen Decatur was captain 
of a frigate. It got to be a habit, too, to 
treat the navy as a sort of reform-school, 
and boys were given commissions as mid- 
shipmen because they made too much trou- 
ble at home. 

A good case of this sort was Midshipman 
Philip Spencer, the son of the Secretary of 
War. He had been dismissed from college, 
and had already been ousted from the navy 
for his "disgraceful and scandalous con- 
duct," but his father's influence put him 
back again. At last he was caught plotting 
to kill all the officers of the brig he was 
serving on and turn pirate. He finally 
confessed his guilt, and with two other con- 
spirators from the crew was hanged at the 
yard-arm. This occurred in 1842. 

The execution of a midshipman, the 
son of a powerful politician, aroused the 
greatest excitement throughout the country and helped 
a project that had been urged for a long while — namely, 

129 




MIDSHIPMAN OF 

THE FIFTIES IN 

FULL DRESS 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



the formation of a naval school. The country began 
to feel that it wanted some one better than a mere 
scapegrace to wear its uniform. The growing importance 
of steam meant that a new science had to be mas- 
tered by naval officers which 
could not be picked up, like 
seamanship, by a few cruises. 
Gunnery was getting to be 
more of a science, too, and 
both these things demanded 
careful study at a profession- 
al school. In March, 1845, 
George Bancroft, the histo- 
rian, accepted the position of 
Secretary of the Navy with the 
understanding that he might 
go ahead with the founding 
of a naval school. The old- 
timers sneered at the idea of 
"teaching sailors ashore," but 
Bancroft went about his work 
with great tact and succeeded 
in making a start in a little 
army post at Annapolis. It 
was a small beginning, but there were some splendid teach- 
ers selected for the work, and the school quickly won the 
favor of the entire navy. The birth of the Naval Academy 
attracted little notice at the time, but in its influence on 
the service it was really the most important event between 
1815 and 1861. 




MIDSHIPMAN OF THE FIFTIES 
IN SERVICE DRESS 



XI 

THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR, THE IRONCLADS 

Three lines of operation for the Union navy — Capture of Port Royal 
— Surrender of the Norfolk Navy Yard — Changes in ships since 
1 8 12; steam, guns, armor — Ironclads — Construction of the Merri- 
mac — Destruction of Union ships in Hampton Roads — The Monitor 
— Battle between ironclads. 

FOR many years North and South had been growing 
apart on the subject of slavery. During this time the 
South had won all the battles on the question in Congress ; 
but some of them, like the fugitive-slave law, had been 
costly victories because they had awakened a strong anti- 
slavery sentiment in the North. Toward the last there 
was much talk about the "constitutionality of secession" 
and "the rights of sovereign states," but at the bottom of it 
all lay the institution of slavery. On this subject both 
sections developed an intense spirit in the course of one 
generation. In the North about 1820 there was little or 
no abolition sentiment, but by 1855 it was uppermost. 
In the South about 1820 there were many who were op- 
posed to slavery, and there were even societies in the South 
for freeing the slaves, but by 1855 Southerners were united 
not only in defending slavery as a " God-given institution," 
but also in demanding that it be extended and strengthened 
by act of Congress. Then, when the new Republican party 
won the election of i860 on a platform that opposed the 
further extension of slavery, the "fire-eaters" of the 
slavery party determined to get out of the Union. The 
North did not want war or disunion, and for the sake of 

131 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

peace tried all sorts of ways to meet the cotton states half- 
way, but it failed. As the North yielded the South only 
became more pugnacious, and on December 20, i860, South 
Carolina led the way by seceding from the Union. 

In 1832 Andrew Jackson had stamped out the spark of 
secession in that state by sending the Constitution to 
Charleston with loaded guns. Another Democrat was Pres- 
ident in i860, but a man of a very different sort. His 
lifelong friends and many of his Cabinet were of the 
secession party and, though a Union man himself, he did 
not know what to do. So he did nothing at all. Six 
other states followed the example of South Carolina 
undisturbed, and when Lincoln became President he had 
to face the greatest crisis in the history of the country. 
A large part of the South had already formed a separate 
government, and four other slave states needed only 
Lincoln's call to arms, after the firing on Sumter, to join 
the Confederacy. 

In the previous chapter we noted the slimy trail of the 
politician through the history of the navy between 181 5 and 
1 86 1. When the Civil War began there were in service 
forty-two vessels of all sizes from a tug to a ship of the 
line — but only twenty-three of these were propelled by 
steam and fit to be considered. Of the " Home Squadron" 
only four were in American waters. The rest were scat- 
tered everywhere. This fact was partly due to the thought- 
fulness of Mr. Toucey, President Buchanan's Secretary of 
the Navy, who, though a native of Connecticut, was a 
strong secessionist, and did not want the Southern states to 
be embarrassed by United States war-vessels. One-fifth of 
all the naval officers immediately resigned and joined the 
Confederacy, but those who commanded ships in foreign 
waters brought them back to the federal government, as 
a point of honor, before they resigned. 

As soon as war began the Navy Department made plans 
for a naval campaign, and shipyards and foundries were set 
to working day and night. The work of the navy was 

13 2 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

divided into three general plans: first, to blockade the 
Southern coast; secondly, to open the Mississippi and 
capture Confederate ports; thirdly, to hunt down Con- 
federate cruisers and privateers. 

The first of these, the blockade, would have been hard 
for a navy many times the size of the Union fleet in 1861, 
for the coast line to be guarded was 3,549 miles long. But 
after getting control of the Potomac the government began 
stringing out the ships down the coast, and adding to them 
as fast as possible. At first the blockade was a good deal of 
a joke to the Confederates, but in three years it had grown 
so powerful that blockade-running became very dangerous, 
and in the end, as we shall see, the blockade crushed the 
Confederacy. 

A good stroke at the beginning was the capture of Port 
Royal, South Carolina, by Captain DuPont. This was the 
finest harbor on the Southern coast. Besides his vessels 
of war DuPont took with him army transports with nearly 
thirteen thousand troops under General Sherman. Off 
Hatteras the expedition was struck by a violent gale. Two 
of the transports were sunk, and the men were rescued 
only with the greatest difficulty. Another vessel had to 
throw all her cannon overboard to keep from sinking. 

On November 4, 1861, DuPont arrived with his storm- 
beaten squadron off Port Royal. He had to spend some 
time in getting the channel surveyed and marked, for the 
Confederates had removed the buoys. In fact, the Con- 
federate government had known all about the intended 
attack on Port Royal before most of the officers in the 
Union fleet. This was true of most of the Union plans, 
for throughout the war there were some very bad leaks 
leading from Washington to Richmond. 

At eight o'clock on the morning of November 7th DuPont 
got under way in two columns to attack the Confederate 
fortifications. These were two strong forts on opposite 
sides of the bay, about two and a half miles apart, Fort 
Beauregard on Bay Point to the north and Fort Walker 

133. 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



on Hilton Head to the south. DuPont decided not to use 
the troops at all because many of the boats needed for land- 
ing them had been carried away by the gale. 

The previous afternoon DuPont had called his captains 
together on the Wabash and explained his plan. This was 
very skilfully thought out, and the fleet carried it through 
like a well-oiled machine. The flag-ship Wabash led the 
way at the head of a column of ten steamships, about 

midway between the two 
forts. On his right steamed 
a parallel line of five gun- 
boats. As soon as the Union 
ships came within range they 
received and returned the fire 
of both forts. Steadily the 
main line steamed on for 
about two and a half miles 
into the harbor, then the Wa- 
bash turned to the south and 
led the line slowly back, about 
eight hundred yards distant 
from Fort Walker. The gun- 
boats protected this turning 
movement from a little Con- 
federate flotilla of four gun- 
boats, which they drove up a 
creek. Again the Wabash swung round and passed between 
the forts, returning as before, only this second time coming 
to within six hundred yards of Fort Walker. By the time 
DuPont was ready for another "circle of fire" the Confed- 
erate forts were silent and deserted. 

The victory had been surprisingly easy. The Union 
losses in the whole fleet were only eight killed and twenty- 
three wounded, and hardly a single ship was seriously 
hurt. On the other hand, the Confederate fortifications 
had been torn to pieces. The credit is due to Captain 
DuPont for his plan of attack. In the first place, he made 

i34 




CAPTURE OF PORT ROYAL FORTS 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

his ships a moving rather than a standing target ; secondly, 
he shifted his distance each time round so that the gunners 
of the fort had to find the range all over again ; thirdly, he 
got at the forts from inside the harbor, where the Con- 
federates had not expected an attack. The forts were 
very weak on this side, and the cross-fire that DuPont's 
line of battle kept up from the land side and the front at 
the same time was too much for the gunners of the forts to 
stand. 

This victory was of great value because it gave the 
blockading fleet a good base to work from, right in the 
heart of the Confederacy. 

Most of the heavy guns the Confederates had mounted 
at Port Royal had come from the Norfolk Navy Yard. 
The capture of that yard was the greatest disaster the 
navy suffered in the war, and it was due to the blunders 
of some well-meaning but incompetent naval officers. At 
the time Virginia was on the point of secession the com- 
mandant, Commodore McCauley, did not know whether 
to send the ships out of the yard or not. He changed his 
mind several times. Then toward the last he scuttled 
four vessels, including the new steam-frigate Merrimac. 
At that time Commodore Paulding was coming with a 
thousand soldiers to protect the yard, and against the tri- 
fling force the Confederates had mustered Paulding could 
easily have done so. But he got panicky, too, and he had 
scarcely arrived when he began trying to destroy every- 
thing in the yard preparatory to running off and leav- 
ing it. 

But little was really destroyed. As soon as the frightened 
officers were gone with their forces the Confederates rushed 
into the yard and saved almost everything of value. By 
this stupid performance of McCauley and Paulding the 
Union lost ten ships, besides one that was half built, and 
nearly 3,000 cannon, 300 of them being heavy guns of the 
most modern type, the " Dahlgrens." The capture of these 
guns was of the greatest importance to the Confederacy, 

136 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

for the Southerners had no gun-factories and it would have 
taken some time to import cannon from Europe. 

At the Pensacola Navy Yard in Florida another spineless 
officer had surrendered without a blow, so that the Con- 
federacy got a good many cannon from there, too. 

One of the vessels scuttled and set on fire at Norfolk was 
the Merrimac. The Confederates had tried to buy an iron- 
clad ship, but, failing in this, decided to raise the Merrimac 
and use her for the purpose. At this point let us stop a 
moment to consider how ships had developed since the 
War of 1812. 

The great change, of course, was steam. But there was 
so much dislike among the older officers to the "kettle- 
boiling" type of ship that steam made slow headway. 
This seems strange when we remember that our navy 
was the first to build a steamship, the Fulton, launched as 
early as 18 14. A real objection to steam was the fact that 
the big side- wheels of the earlier steamers could be so 
easily smashed by cannon-shot. But after Ericsson had 
invented the screw-propeller, which lay safe under water, the 
far-sighted officers saw that there was no further use for 
the sailing-ship. The United States navy had the first 
screw-propeller man-of-war, too, the Princeton, launched in 
1843 ; and the newer ships like the Merrimac, the Hartford, 
and the Wabash were built with screw-propellers. Yet even 
then steam was not trusted to act alone, and these steamers 
were all rigged with a complete outfit of sails. And more 
than half of the American fleet still depended on sails 
entirely. 

Another and newer idea was armor. Cannon had been 
very much improved since 18 15, especially with the inven- 
tion of the rifled gun; and naval men, the world over, 
began looking about for some means of protecting a ship 
against these heavy guns. During the Crimean War in 
1855 the French sent three floating batteries to attack a 
fort. These batteries were coated with four inches of iron, 
and, though they got a fearful pounding from the fort, 

i37 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

they were not hurt at all. This fact aroused much interest; 
but, while naval constructors were talking about the use 
of armor in i860, as yet there was no ironclad in the Amer- 
ican navy. 

As soon as the war broke out the Confederates organized 
a board to draw up plans for an armored ship, and the 
capture of the Norfolk Yard gave them the material they 
needed. The Merrimac was raised and put in dry dock. 




THE STEAM-FRIGATE " MERRIMAC " IN i860 

Her hull was sound, for she had sunk before the flames 
had got very far. Then the Confederates went to work 
transferring her into a ship the like of which had never been 
seen before. A casemate was built on her deck with slanting 
sides and covered on the top with an iron grating. These 
sides had a thickness of twenty-two inches of timber over- 
laid with four inches of iron. The ends of the deck, not cov- 
ered by the casemate, were supposed to be under water, and 
propeller and rudder were shielded by a heavy "fan-tail." 
In the bow was a heavy cast-iron beak for ramming. Ten 
guns were mounted on her, two of them rifled pivot-guns, 
one at each end. The reconstructed Merrimac was renamed 
the Virginia; but, as she is far better known by her old 
name, we shall stick to that. 

138 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

About noon of March 8, 1862, she steamed down the 
Elizabeth River with some of the men still putting the 
finishing touches to her. The Norfolk people thought that 
she was simply going to make a short trial spin to turn 
over her engines. But two small gunboats joined her, and 
she steamed out of the river directly toward the two 
Union ships near the opposite shore of Hampton Roads, off 
Newport News. These were the sloop Cumberland, of 
twenty-four guns, and the frigate Congress, of fifty. The 
two ships hurriedly cleared for action on the appearance 
of the strange monster steaming toward them, flying the 
Stars and Bars. The Union officers had heard of the build- 
ing of an ironclad in Norfolk, but they had not expected 
anything like this. It looked more like a floating barn 
than a ship. 

On she came slowly, for she was very heavy and her 
engines had been condemned as worn out the year before. 
The men of the Cumberland and the Congress had plenty 
of time to make ready for battle, but, as there was not a 
breath of air stirring, neither of these old sailing-ships could 
move an inch. 

The Union guns opened fire on the Merrimac when she 
was three-quarters of a mile distant. The heavy shot 
struck their target fairly, but bounced off the sloping 
casemate like so many peas. The Merrimac did not reply 
till she came within close range. Then a shell from her 
forward pivot-gun killed or wounded every man in the 
after pivot-gun crew of the Cumberland. A moment later 
she poured into the Congress her starboard broadside, which 
ripped through the wooden sides of the old frigate as if 
they had been paper. 

Leaving the Congress for the moment, the Merrimac 
rammed the Cumberland, smashing a great hole beneath 
the water-line. As the Merrimac backed away her ram 
broke off. All this time the Union guns were pounding 
harmless broadsides at the ironclad, and the Confederate 
gunners were answering with terrible effect. 

i39 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



£ 









The captain of the Cumberland was absent on a court of 
inquiry, but the vessel was nobly defended by Lieutenant 
Morris. After the ramming the Cumberland began to 
settle rapidly, but Morris stuck to his guns. As the men 
were driven by the water from the lower decks, they helped 
to fight the guns on the spar-deck, and they did not stop 
firing till the water was lapping about these guns as well, 
and that was three-quarters of an hour after the Merrimac 
had rammed. Then the Cumberland reeled and sank, but 
as she settled on the shallow bottom her masts stood out 
of water; and when her captain came galloping back from 
Fortress Monroe at the sound of the firing he found his 

ship done for, but 
he saw the old flag 
still flying from her 
masthead. 

Not a shot from 
the Cumberlandhad 
penetrated the ar- 
mor of the Merri- 
mac. But the fir- 
ing had not been 
wholly wasted, for 
the Merrimac' s 
smoke - stack had 
been badly riddled 
and the muzzles of 
two of her guns 
were smashed by 
solid shot. The 
ramming, too, had 
cost the Merrimac 
her beak, twisted her bow, and made a leak that gave her 
trouble afterward. 

Having settled the Cumberland, the Merrimac turned 
slowly — she was hopelessly clumsy — and headed for the 
Congress. The commander of the Merrimac was Captain 

140 




HAMPTON ROADS 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Buchanan, who had been the first superintendent at the 
Naval Academy, and previous to the war had been com- 
mandant of the Washington Navy Yard. He was a 
Marylander, and the tragic way in which the families 
of the border states were divided by the war is shown by the 
fact that as Buchanan turned his great guns on the Congress 
he knew that on her decks stood his favorite brother. 

To avoid being rammed the commander of the Congress 
made sail, and with the help of a tug ran in under the 
Union batteries of Newport News. But the frigate soon 
went aground and stuck. The Merrimac then chose an 
easy raking position and riddled her without mercy, while 
the Congress had only two stern guns that could be used 
against the Merrimac. Soon both were disabled, leaving 
the frigate perfectly helpless. 

Meanwhile, the rest of the Union squadron — two steam- 
ships and a frigate — had left their anchorage off Fortress 
Monroe to come to the assistance of the Cumberland and 
the Congress. All these ran aground before they could 
reach the scene. The commander of the Congress, Lieut. 
Joseph Smith, had been killed early in the action, and when 
Lieutenant Prendergast, the second in command, saw that 
the other Union vessels were powerless to help him, he 
hauled down his flag. 

But when one of the small gunooats came alongside to 
take off the prisoners she met such a hot fire from the shore 
batteries that she had to retreat. Captain Buchanan was 
very indignant, because he thought that some of the 
firing came from the surrendered Congress, and, snatching 
a musket from one of his men, he climbed out on the 
casemate to fire at what he called the "treacherous Yan- 
kees." A sharp-shooter from the battery promptly put a 
bullet through Buchanan's thigh-bone, and he had to yield 
the command of the Merrimac to his lieutenant, Catesby 
Jones. 

Finding that they could not take possession of the Con- 
gress, the Confederates set fire to her with red-hot shot. 

10 141 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

The old frigate continued to burn far into the night, and 
finally blew up. About half past six the tide had dropped 
so .much that the pilots of the Merrimac insisted that unless 
the ironclad returned to deep water she would stick in the 
mud all night. So, leaving the other helpless Union ships to 
be destroyed the next morning, the victorious Merrimac 
steamed back to Sewell's Point to anchor for the night. 

It had been an overwhelming victory for the South, and 
the news spread like wildfire in all direction. The Mer- 
rimac had destroyed two wooden ships and in turn had 
scarcely a dent in her armor. In contrast to the terrible 
loss of life on the Union ships the Confederates had lost 
only two killed. Nothing but the dropping of the tide had 
saved the rest of the Union fleet from destruction that 
evening, and their doom was only postponed till the next 
morning. The South, on hearing the news of the day's 
fighting, believed that nothing could stop the Merrimac 
from going up the Potomac and shelling Washington and 
then breaking the Union blockade. Joyous Confederate 
newspapers prophesied that the Merrimac would end the 
war at once. Not only would she have Washington help- 
less under her guns, but she would put New York under 
ransom as well. Then all Europe would recognize the 
independence of the Confederacy. As a matter of fact, 
with her weak engines the Merrimac could not have lasted 
half an hour in an ordinary seaway, but nobody realized 
that at the time. 

All these predictions were gloomily believed by the 
friends of the Union, too. The next morning, when a 
Cabinet meeting was hurriedly called in Washington, no 
one had a single hopeful word. The cause of the North 
seemed doomed by the sudden appearance of this invincible 
ironclad. 

But that very night a still stranger-looking ship might 
have been seen by the glare of the blazing Congress. It 
was Ericsson's Monitor, which had come on the scene in the 
nick of time, like the hero of a melodrama. This queer 

142 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

craft, though so different from the Merrimac, was quite as 
ingenious and novel. Her inventor, John Ericsson, had 
designed her for the shallow rivers and bays of the Southern 
states. She drew only ten and one-half feet, her armored 
deck was only two feet above the water-line, offering no 
target to the enemy, and her revolving-turret gave her the 
power of firing in any direction without turning the ship 
itself. This iron turret was nine feet in height, twenty 
feet in diameter, and eight inches thick. Two eleven- 
inch guns, pointing in the same direction, formed her 
armament. This design had been submitted to the French 
by Ericsson some time before, but they had rejected it. 
And we must take off our hats to the Union officers who 
risked their reputations by approving it, because the Navy 
Department was flooded with all sorts of protests from 
naval experts against building any such "crazy con- 
traption." 

The Monitor was a marvelous invention, and well de- 
signed for rivers and harbors, but she was not a sea-going 
vessel at all. In the trip from Greenpoint, Long Island, 
where she had been built, the little craft very nearly 
foundered. The chief trouble was that in a heavy sea the 
waves poured right down smoke-stack and blowers, and 
the deck -hatches, being under water practically all the 
time, leaked badly. 

Lieut. J. L. Worden, her commander, and every man of 
his crew had to work their hardest all of two days and a 
night to keep their ship afloat during the storm they ran 
into off the coast. The following day they reached Chesa- 
peake Bay, and arrived at Fortress Monroe shortly after 
the Merrimac had left the Roads. Worden had orders to 
report at Washington, but after that day's disasters the 
captain of the Roanoke, who was senior officer present, or- 
dered Worden to remain in Hampton Roads to protect the 
wooden ships against the Merrimac. 

The officers and crew of the Monitor were worn out with 
their struggle against the storm, and they had had no sleep 

143 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the night before, but for the greater part of the night 
of the eighth they worked like beavers preparing their ves- 
sel for battle. 

Early Sunday morning, March o, 1862, the Merrimac 
steamed out again into the Roads to finish her work of 
destruction. When still a mile away she put a shell into 
the stranded Minnesota, but before the second shot could 
be fired, out stepped the "cheese-box on a raft " to challenge 
the iron giant to battle. 

The combat that followed was one of the strangest in 
naval history. The two vessels passed and repassed each 
other, the Merrimac firing often, the Monitor replying only 
every seven or eight minutes. The Confederates used 
shells, and the Union gunners replied with solid shot, but 
neither could penetrate the armor of the other. 

Once the Monitor tried to disable the propeller of the 
Merrimac by ramming, although she was not well adapted 
for ramming because of an anchor-well in her bow. The 
Monitor missed her aim by a few feet, and the Merrimac 
tried to ram, but the more nimble Monitor received only 
a glancing blow. This collision opened up the leak in 
the Merrimac's bow, which had only temporarily been 
patched up, and gave trouble for the remainder of the fight. 
Just as the two ships came together the Monitor slammed 
a solid 180-pound shot into the Merrimac, which bent in 
the iron and timber and very nearly penetrated the case- 
mate. Then the two ships swung apart and continued 
their harmless bombardment of each other. 

After two hours of battle the Monitor's ammunition gave 
out, and she had to retreat to shallow water for the process 
of getting the shot up into the turret from below. As this 
took fifteen minutes, the Merrimac began firing on the 
Minnesota. But before the Merrimac had fired a third shell 
the Monitor was back in the ring again, and the pounding 
of heavy shot against armored sides went on as before. 

Both ships had their troubles. The Merrimac drew 
twenty-two feet of water and was in constant danger of 

144 






% 



K 1 








THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

going aground. Her smoke-stack had been so badly dam- 
aged that she could scarcely keep any steam up, and the 
engines were bad to begin with. The Monitor had trouble 
starting her turret and more trouble in stopping it, so after 
a few trials the men fired their guns "on the fly." All the 
view the gunners had of their enemy was through the nar- 
row opening in the turret around the muzzle of the gun, 
so they simply pulled the lanyard when the dark casemate 
loomed through the smoke. One of the worries of Lieuten- 
ant Greene, who was in charge of the turret, was that h? 
might fire by mistake into the Monitor's own pilot-house. 
At the suggestion of the Monitor's chief engineer all subse- 
quent vessels of this type were built with the pilot-house 
on top of the turret. 

About eleven-thirty Lieutenant Jones of the Merrimac 
turned his guns on the Monitor s pilot-house instead of the 
turret, and a shell struck it fair, partly lifting the iron 
roof and for the time blinding Worden, who was peering 
through the sight-hole at that moment. He gave the 
order to sheer off, for he was afraid the pilot-house had 
been wrecked, and the Monitor retired for fifteen or twenty 
minutes to shallow water. But after taking a survey of 
damages Lieutenant Greene, who was now in command, 
saw that the Monitor had received no serious wound. 
Accordingly he headed the Monitor again toward the Con- 
federate ram and fired a few shots as a challenge to renew 
the battle. 

But the Merrimac was steaming back to Norfolk and 
would not turn. The next day Lieutenant Jones was bit- 
terly criticized by the Southern papers for leaving the field 
to the Monitor y but he explained that the leak in his bow 
was causing much trouble, and the pilots had informed him 
that unless he returned to Norfolk then he would have 
to spend the night in the Roads on account of the dropping 
tide. 

So far as any harm they did to each other is concerned 
the Monitor and Merrimac affair was a drawn battle, but 

145 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

in its results it was an important victory for the Union. 
The Monitor had saved from destruction three Union 
ships, she had prevented the Merrimac from attacking 
Washington or breaking the blockade, and she had re- 
stored hope and confidence in the Union cause. In other 
ways it was one of the most important battles in naval 
history ; for, taken in connection with the Merrimac' s easy 
victory of the day before, it showed that the wooden ships 
of the old navies were of no further use and the navy of 
the future would have to be ironclad. 

The Merrimac came out twice into Hampton Roads 
afterward, but did not attack the Union fleet. Her com- 
mander had formed plans for destroying the Monitor with 
solid shot, but the presence of each was so important to 
North and South that both vessels were held in leash by 
their governments, and there was no second fight between 
them. When Norfolk had to be abandoned the following 
May, the Merrimac was burned at her moorings because she 
had no way of escape. In December of the same year the 
Monitor went to sea and again ran into a storm. This 
time she went down, so both these famous ships had very 
brief lives. But the two types lasted throughout the war. 
The Confederacy built "rams" like the Merrimac, and 
the Union built "monitors." In this ship-building race 
the North had a great advantage in ship-yards, engine- 
works, rolling-mills, and skilled workmen. The South had 
practically none of these things, because of its dependence 
on slave labor. Thus the very cause the South was fighting 
for proved its greatest weakness in naval warfare. 



XII 

THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 

Construction of the gunboats— Services of Foote— Capture of Fort 
Henry— Attack on Fort Donelson — Island No. 10— Running past 
the batteries — Union successes in the West. 

IN this chapter we turn to the second line of operations 
for the Union navy — the opening of the Mississippi. 
Both sides realized the importance of this "Father of 
Waters" in the great struggle. If the Confederates could 
keep the Mississippi in their hands they would have the 
commerce of the Northern central states in their power, 
they could carry on a campaign against these states by 
the same waterway, and they could get all the food-supplies 
needed by the Confederate armies from the states of Arkan- 
sas, Texas, and Louisiana, which were practically untouched 
by the war. 

On the other hand, if the North could get control of the 
river it would split the Confederacy in two, cut off those 
supplies from the Western states, and by means of all the 
rivers that flow into the Mississippi could send gunboats 
right into the heart of Arkansas, Tennessee, Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana. 

From the beginning of the war the Confederates worked 
hard to fortify the river and some of its tributaries. They 
selected the best places for defense and built strong forts 
from Columbus, Kentucky, down to New Orleans. The 
most powerful of these was at Vicksburg. 

In order to capture such forts, or even get past them, 
the Union needed a fleet of ironclad gunboats drawing 

i47 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

little water, but carrying heavy guns. James B. Eads, the 
famous engineer, designed a type to meet these require- 
ments, and in August, 1861, the government gave him the 
contract to build seven of them. So these river ironclads 
were being built in the West at the same time that the 
hammers were ringing on the Monitor and the Merrimac 
in the East, and were finished some months sooner. These 
river gunboats were ready for duty in January, 1862. 

In size and armament they were all alike. They were 
flat-bottomed boats, 175 feet long, drawing six feet of water, 
and carrying thirteen guns. They had a casemate with 
the forward end protected by twenty-four inches of oak 
covered by two and a half inches of iron. The engines 




U. S. GUNBOAT 



LEXINGTON, A WOODEN RIVER-BOAT MADE OVER 
FOR FIGHTING 



were shielded by two and a half inches of iron alone. The 
lack of armor was the chief weakness of these boats, espe- 
cially about the pilot-house, but more would have meant a 
deeper draught. Just forward of the stern was a paddle- 
wheel, which was protected by the casemate. Besides 
these seven gunboats was a big snag-boat, the Benton, which 
was made into an ironclad, too, and was larger and more 

148 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

powerful than the rest. These eight vessels formed the 
main strength of the "river-fleet." 

A great deal of the credit of building these gunboats 
belongs to Capt. Andrew H. Foote, who was detailed 
to superintend the work. This was a good deal like sending 




THE " BENTON," THE MOST POWERFUL OF THE UNION GUNBOATS 



Oliver Perry to Lake Erie in the War of 18 12, for Foote was 
a "blue- water" sailor, and river work was not much to his 
taste. Where Perry had troubles in lack of supplies Foote 
was annoyed by the frequent meddling of army officers. 
The river-fleet was put under the War Department, and 
wise brigadier-generals who didn't know one end of a boat 
from another wanted to show Foote just how these boats 
ought to be made. And sometimes, even in St. Louis, 
Captain Foote found himself short of materials that he 
needed. At other times he had difficulty in getting the 
money that the government owed for the work already 
done. There always was a good deal of "red tape" to be 
untangled at every step, but Foote went ahead in spite 
of everything and got his fleet ready. This work he rightly 
considered the most important of his career, but, like 

149 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Perry's building a flotilla on Lake Erie, it was too dull and 
prosaic to win the popular admiration it deserved. 

As soon as his boats were ready Foote made his base 
at Cairo, Illinois, an important place for the Union to hold, 
on account of its position. It is at the junction of the Mis- 
sissippi and the Ohio, at the point where Illinois, Missouri, 
and Kentucky meet. Previous to this time, on the very 
day of DuPont's victory at Port Royal, three other unar- 
mored river-boats, which had been bought and made over 
for fighting purposes, did good service in saving Grant's 
army from capture at Belmont. 

With his river-fleet Captain Foote now planned to attack 
Forts Henry and Donelson. The Confederate works at 
Columbus, Kentucky, were very strong, but Henry and 
Donelson were not nearly so powerful. By capturing these 
two the Union forces could get in the rear of Columbus, 
and that would mean that the Confederates would have 
to surrender or leave. On February 2 , 1862, Foote took four 
of his armored fleet and the three wooden gunboats to 
make the attack on Fort Henry. At the same time Grant's 
army came up the river and landed a few miles from the 
fort in order to march around to the rear while the fleet 
attacked the front. 

The boats had to go up the Tennessee slowly on account 
of the torpedoes that had to be fished out of the channel. 
About noon on February 6th, as according to the plan 
arranged with Grant, Foote steamed slowly toward the 
batteries, with his four armored gunboats in front and the 
three wooden ones in the rear. By advancing bows on, 
Foote kept the strongest part of his boats toward the enemy, 
and at the same time he was forcing the Confederates 
to shift their range with every shot. A hot battle followed, 
and as the Union fleet came to close quarters both sides hit 
each other hard and often. A single shot from the fort 
ripped through the casemate of the gunboat Essex — 
named after the old Essex and commanded by a son of 
Commodore Porter. The shot flew back, exploded the 

ISO 




C ^ \» ^ o^ U^l \ C Q 



MAP OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, CAIRO TO THE GULF OF MEXICO 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

boiler, and left the boat a drifting wreck. Foote's own 
boat, the Cincinnati, had her casemate penetrated, too. 
In fact, she was very roughly handled from smoke-stack to 
water-line, but was not disabled. 

Meanwhile the Union fire had plowed the Confederate 
earthworks and dismounted several of the guns. About 
an hour and a quarter after the first shot the Confederate 
flag came down. Grant's army had been so delayed by 
swollen streams and boggy roads that it arrived only 
in time to take charge of the prisoners, though the main 
force escaped before Grant arrived. The captured work 
was fittingly renamed Fort Foote. 

After this success the three wooden gunboats went on 
up the Tennessee River and caused the destruction of many 
military stores and took as a prize a large steamer which was 
being rebuilt as a gunboat. 

These boats returned in time to join the attack on Fort 
Donelson, which lay twelve miles to the east on the Cum- 
berland River. Here the Confederates had collected an 
army of 18,000 men, including those who had escaped 
from Fort Henry. Fort Donelson was built on a high bluff 
on the west bank of the river, and was stronger than Fort 
Henry. There were powerful batteries near the water-level, 
and still heavier guns on the edge of the bluff. When Foote 
advanced to the attack, on February 14, 1862, with four 
armored and two wooden gunboats, he soon found that 
he had " caught a Tartar." His guns could not be elevated 
enough to answer the batteries on the bluff, and all the 
advantage gained by the sloping casemate on his boats 
was lost because the plunging shot from the cannon on 
the bluff took the slope at right angles. Instead of bounc- 
ing off the casemate the heavy projectiles went through. 
The Union gunboats stuck to the attack bravely, but one 
after another was disabled, and went drifting out of action 
till at last, after an hour and a half, all six were in retreat. 
Two days later the fort surrendered to General Grant. 

The plan of making the Confederates move out of Colum- 

152 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

bus by capturing Forts Henry and Donelson succeeded. 
The Confederates, however, managed to slip away with all 
their supplies, and rallied their forces at the next line of 
the river strongholds — at Island No. 10. This was so 
named because it was the tenth island south of Cairo. 
It was fifty-five miles from Cairo and near the Missouri 
shore, just about on the line separating Kentucky and 
Tennessee. 

In spite of its size and dignity the " Father of Waters" 
has always had such freakish and unreliable ways that it 
is no wonder that the Indians looked on it with superstition. 
On a map the Mississippi between Cairo and New Orleans 
wriggles so much that it looks as if it had a fit of the malarial 
"shivers" for which the valley is famous. As the crow 
flies, it is only four hundred and eighty miles from Cairo to 
the Gulf, but as the river winds it is eleven hundred miles ! 
One of the queerest of these snaky turns was in the neigh- 
borhood of Island No. 10. As you can see by the diagram, 
the river took a notion to go northwest, then changed its 
mind and turned southward. Next it seemed to prefer to 
go back toward Canada, and went due north for a while. 
It had not gone more than a few miles in that direction when 
it turned about face again and decided that the Gulf was 
the best place, after all. In twelve miles of flow the Mis- 
sissippi gained here only three miles to the south. In the 
middle bend lay Island No. 10, two miles long and two- 
thirds of a mile wide. To-day the course of the river is 
very different, and the island has long since been washed 
away. 

The Confederates had fortified this island because it 
was well fitted for defense. It was protected on the east 
by the impassable swamps of Reelfoot Lake, and on the 
shore opposite the island, to the south, lay six protected 
batteries. The channel to the north of the island was choked 
by a line of sunken hulks, so that any vessel that passed 
the point by the south channel would have to run the 
gauntlet of the four island batteries on one side and the 

i53 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

six shore batteries on the other. Besides these there was a 
large floating battery of ten nine-inch guns moored near 
the middle of the island. 

The weakness of the Confederate defense at Island No. 
10 was that all their supplies had to come from the south, 
chiefly by river, and if that line were cut off they would 
be helpless. To this end General Pope occupied New 
Madrid, on the upper bend, and planted artillery to keep 
Confederate gunboats from coming up. What he needed 
now was the protection of Union gunboats so that he could 
get troops across the river into Tennessee and strike the 
defenses of the island in the rear. 

The Confederate defenses were too powerful for a gun- 
boat fleet of three times the size of Foote's squadron to 
make a direct attack, as they had done at Forts Henry 
and Donelson. And in those bombardments on the Ten- 
nessee and Cumberland Rivers, if a Union vessel were 
disabled she would drift out of action away from the enemy. 
Here, if a boat lost control of her steering-gear or of her 
engines, she would be carried down by the current directly 
into the hands of the Confederates. So Foote contented 
himself with a long-distance bombardment (March 16 and 
17, 1862) aided by mortars, but he was unable to do much 
harm to the Confederate works. 

Meanwhile General Pope had been digging a canal from 
the Mississippi to a stream that entered the river near 
New Madrid. His idea was to avoid going past the island by 
cutting off the loop. By April 4th he had the canal ready 
and floated the lighter transports loaded with troops across 
and around to New Madrid, but the gunboats drew too 
much water to follow. He had now all the troops he needed, 
but still no gunboat. 

About two weeks before, Foote had called a council of 
war to talk over the possibility of running past the island 
with some of the gunboats, but all the officers, with the 
exception of Commander Walke, of the Carondelet, voted 
against the idea. Yet every day the necessity of getting 

i54 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

a boat down there grew plainer, and on the 30th of March 
Foote told Walke to "go ahead and get ready." 

While Walke was busy preparing the Carondelet for her 
dangerous run, fifty men from the army made a brilliant 




MAP OF ISLAND NUMBER 10 



capture of the nearest Confederate battery on the shore. 
They spiked all the guns and got back without losing a 
man. Three days later a lucky shot cut the cable of the 
floating battery and the swift current carried it down- 

i55 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

stream three miles before the Confederates could moor it 
again. That, too, was a big obstacle removed. 

Still, many officers, naval and military, wagged their 
heads solemnly as they saw Walke at work on his gunboat, 
and prophesied that the Carondelet could not live three min- 
utes under a cross-fire from those heavy guns. "Nothing 
but suicide," they said, "and throwing away a good 
gunboat at that." 

On April 4th — the day Pope took the army over the canal 
to New Madrid — Walke reported to Foote that everything 
was ready for the dash. Walke had done everything he 
could think of to protect the vessel against the fire of heavy 
guns. Engine-room and boiler he had barricaded with 
heavy timbers and loose iron. Round the parts that had 
no armor at all he piled bales of hay, more timbers, and 
heavy chains. The upper decks he covered with wood, 
coal, cables, and chains — almost anything that would 
deaden the blow of a solid shot. Round the pilot-house, that 
most vulnerable part of these boats, he wound hawsers 
and cables to the thickness of about eighteen inches. To 
the stern was lashed a coal-barge to protect the wheel and 
the magazines. 

About ten o'clock that night, when Walke got under way, 
the weather came to his help by rolling up a black thunder- 
storm. The Carondelet slipped out into the current with 
lights covered and running silently. For the first half- 
mile she ran without discovery. Suddenly, as ill luck 
would have it, just as she came under the guns of the 
first battery, her flues caught fire and blazed. Boom! 
Zi-i-ip ! A gun and a rocket in the second fort gave warning 
that a Union gunboat was trying to run the gauntlet. 

Now that Walke was discovered, there was nothing to 
do but crowd on the steam, and he sent the Carondelet 
rocking and careering down-stream through the darkness 
at a dangerous rate. Meanwhile the thunder-storm burst 
with torrents of rain and tremendous thunder and lightning. 
Going as she was at this full speed down the swift current, 

156 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the Carondelet proved hard to keep on her course on account 
of the coal-barge astern, which slewed the gunboat time 
and again out of the channel. Once, luckily, a flash of 
lightning showed the pilot that she was heading for a shoal 
right under a Confederate battery. 

"Hard aport!" he yelled, and the Carondelet swung over, 
bumped, and slid into deep water again. It was a wildly 
exciting trip. The Confederates were soon firing on the 
gunboat with musket and cannon, and to the tremendous 
thunder-claps were added the roar of heavy guns and bang 
of bursting shells. But in the excitement and darkness 
the Confederates were unable to hit her at all ! As Walke 
had expected a very severe fire, he kept all his men under 
cover except the two heroic leadsmen, who had to stay in 
the bow, and his chief pilot and himself, who kept the deck. 
Fortunately, not one of the four suffered anything worse 
than a drenching. 

For half an hour more the Carondelet rushed by the boom- 
ing guns on the Tennessee shore, all firing at her as fast as 
they could be loaded. Still she was not hit. Then she 
had the floating battery to run past, but that proved 
no more dangerous than the rest, and about midnight she 
arrived at New Madrid, welcomed by the loud hurrahs of 
the Union soldiers. The Carondelet had run past six forts 
and over fifty guns. Instead of being sunk by their fire, 
she had not been hurt in the least. It was a very brilliant 
exploit in the face of all the belief, Union and Confederate, 
that no vessel could possibly get past. To show that it was 
not mere luck, two nights later the Pittsburg repeated the 
run of the Carondelet. 

After that Island No. 10 was done for. The Union army 
crossed to the Tennessee shore and found that the greater 
part of the Confederates had already abandoned the works, 
leaving only one hundred men, who surrendered to Foote. 
But Pope, knowing what line of retreat the Confederates 
would have to take, went after them and bagged the 
whole army. Meanwhile the two wooden boats, Tyler and 
11 157 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Lexington, were helping the army on the Tennessee River 
and saved the day for Grant in the famous battle of Shiloh 
by checking the Confederate advance on the weakened 
left wing. 

After Island No. 10 had surrendered Foote took his 
gunboats down-river eighty miles to Fort Pillow without 
meeting any more opposition from the Confederates. On 
May 9th Foote was relieved of the command by Capt. 
C. H. Davis, and went North for a well-earned furlough. 
In the attack on Donelson he had received a wound which 
gave him much suffering and finally led to his death the 
following year. 

After Davis took charge the gunboats went on bom- 
barding Fort Pillow. The work had to be done at this time 
by the navy alone, for General Halleck had suddenly 
ordered away Pope's army just at the moment when Pillow 
could have been surrounded and forced to surrender, with 
all her defenders. General Halleck was one of those 
Union generals whose salary the Confederacy could well 
have afforded to pay. However, the gunboats kept pound- 
ing away, and on June 4th the Confederates deserted the 
fort. 

During this bombardment on May 10th the Confederate 
rams had made a dash on the Cincinnati. Only four of the 
Union boats got into the fray, on account of some blunder 
about signals, and before the Confederates returned they 
had rammed two of the gunboats so badly that they had 
to be run aground to save them from sinking. The day 
after Fort Pillow surrendered the Union squadron went 
down-river, hot on getting revenge. They caught the Con- 
federate rams near Memphis and completely routed them. 
Four out of the eight were sunk; the other four took to 
their heels, but only one was allowed to escape. The Union 
gunboats suffered very little. 

The chief trouble with this Confederate flotilla was that 
it was not well organized ; each boat was under a river-cap- 
tain who wanted to run it to please himself and refused to 

158 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

take orders from any Confederate officer, naval or military. 
So they acted in a hit-or-miss fashion, which turned out to 
be chiefly "miss." We shall see in the following chapter 
the same trouble spoiling the effectiveness of the Confed- 
erate naval force at New Orleans. 

After the rout of the Confederate rams the city of Mem- 
phis fell into the hands of the Union. This left the Mis- 
sissippi open all the way to the greatest stronghold of all — 
Vicksburg. And as Farragut by this time had entered 
the river at New Orleans and steamed north past Vicks- 
burg, the Northern and Southern divisions of the Missis- 
sippi campaign grasped hands at a point just above Vicks- 
burg. Of Farragut's great part in opening the mouth of 
the river we shall speak in the next chapter. 

In this combined naval and military campaign on the 
upper Mississippi we find the army and the navy working 
together, as Foote said, "like the two blades of a pair of 
shears." Steadily the Union forces hammered down one 
stronghold after another, with every step penetrating far- 
ther into the Confederacy. 

The success of these operations looms big when compared 
with the indecisive work of the Army of the Potomac in 
the East. But we must remember that one great advantage 
which Foote and Grant enjoyed was in being a long way 
from Washington. They were not being meddled with all 
the time, as was poor General McClellan. The Virginia 
campaign was at the very doors of Washington, and every 
Congressman, every post-office clerk, every newspaper cor- 
respondent, knew exactly what was the matter with the 
Union operations, and they were anxious to explain just 
what McClellan ought to do. These amateur war experts 
bombarded the War Department and the President with 
their wisdom, and even Lincoln himself interfered with his 
long-suffering general far too much. When Grant became 
chief of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln had learned his 
mistake and called "hands off" to the meddlers. 

The success of the army and the navy in the West went 

i59 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

far to keep up the sagging hopes of the North during thav 
discouraging year of 1862 when everything in the East 
seemed to go wrong. One great plan of campaign had suc- 
ceeded, anyway; and, though Vicksburg had not fallen, 
the Mississippi was patrolled from Cairo to New Orleans 
by Union forces. 



XIII 

THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI 

Career of David G. Farragut — Southerners on Union side — Passing 
the New Orleans forts — Importance of the capture of New Orleans. 

TO begin the story of the operations on the lower 
Mississippi we must go back to David Farragut. 
The year 1862 was nearly a half-century after that March 
day in a Chilean harbor when we saw the little middy 
Farragut running across the blood-stained decks of the 
Essex with a bundle of primers under his jacket. Between 
that time and the outbreak of the Civil War he had found 
small chance to make a name for himself. He served well 
in the campaign against the pirates in the twenties, but 
it was a thankless kind of work, with far more hardship 
than glory. When the Mexican War took the fleet to 
Vera Cruz, Farragut came forward with plans to reduce 
the Mexican fort there by bombardment or by an assault. 
He backed his suggestion by a carefully prepared set of 
observations and soundings that he had made twenty years 
before when the French fleet was attacking the place. At 
that time he had gone about measuring the depth of pene- 
tration of every shell in the masonry and ticketed the infor- 
mation away, with the idea that some day the facts would 
be useful to his country. But neither the Department 
nor Commodore Matthew Perry cared to be advised by any 
subordinate, and when Farragut was at last given a little 
vessel to command Perry sent him off to blockade Tuxpan, 
where the only possible way a commander could distinguish 
himself was to die of yellow-fever. This Farragut almost 
succeeded in doing. 

161 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

In the War of 1812 we saw the brilliant promise of the 
fearless and resourceful little midshipman Farragut, and 
yet the long years of peace after that war had given him no 
chance to show his real worth. In 1861 he was sixty years 
old — an age which to-day finds an officer on the verge 
of retirement — and still he was wholly unknown. 

Farragut was born in Tennessee, and during the forty 
years before 1861 he had made Norfolk, Virginia, his home; 
so that in all his ties of birth, kin, and friendships he was a 
Southerner; but there seems to have been no question 
in his mind about where his sword belonged, and when 
Virginia seceded he left Norfolk and asked for active duty 
under the flag he had sworn to serve. 

That was a trying time for many Southern officers — like 
General Lee, for example — who were opposed to secession, 
but who felt that their duty lay with their state when it 
joined the Confederacy. We have never done full justice 
to those who, in spite of everything, remained loyal to the 
Union. By that act such men cut themselves off from 
friends, family, and home. Coming from states in the 
Confederacy, these men had no political friends to help 
them and no local newspapers to shout their praise. Yet 
this class of Union officers furnished some of the best 
ability displayed on the Union side. Farragut had no 
equal. Another Union officer from Virginia was that 
splendid soldier General Thomas, "the Rock of Chicka- 
mauga," whose achievements historians have been slow to 
appreciate. Others, and younger men, not in such high 
places of command sacrificed just as much, but came in for 
little or no recognition. From the rank of captain to mid- 
shipman there was many a Southern man in the Union 
navy whose loyalty was not shaken by the fact that his 
father, uncles, and brothers were all on the other side. 

At first, in the confusion following the resignation of so 
many officers who "went South," the Navy Department 
hesitated to give any command to a Southerner. But 
Farragut 's prompt action in leaving Norfolk at the time 

162 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Virginia seceded, and his immediate request for active duty, 
had made an impression on Gustavus Fox, the able Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. So in December, 1861, when the 
Department planned an expedition to capture New Orleans 
and open the lower Mississippi, Fox picked Farragut as the 
man to carry it out. 

Meanwhile, Farragut had been kept at the dull duty of 
weeding out the decrepit old officers who clogged the navy 
list at the top. Of course, this had to be done by somebody, 
but Farragut was aching for active work. When he was 
called to Washington and informed that he was to command 
the expedition he was overjoyed. The Confederates were 
sure that no fleet whatever could get by their forts below 
New Orleans, and expected all Union attacks to come from 
up-river. Many Union advisers, too, said that it was 
impossible to enter the river from the Gulf with wooden 
ships, but Farragut answered that it could be done, and he 
was eager to prove it. 

Accordingly, a fleet was collected, consisting of seven 
screw sloops of war, one side-wheeler, and nine gunboats, 
besides a mortar flotilla. These ships arrived off the 
Mississippi delta toward the end of February, 1862. Then 
followed two months of tedious preparation. The heavy 
steamers had to be slowly worried and dragged over the 
mud at the mouth of the river in order to get them into 
deep water above the bar. It took two weeks to perform 
this operation for the Pensacola alone. By April 7th 
Farragut had his ships inside the bar and was ready to 
move upon the enemy. 

From the first the Southerners had known of the in- 
tended attack on New Orleans, and these two months of 
hauling and tugging, besides, had given them plenty of 
time to develop a powerful defense. But, in spite of re- 
peated warnings and urgent requests to Richmond for 
means of defense, the authorities were slow in making any 
preparations. They replied that the forts below New 
Orleans could not be passed, and calmly repeated that 

163 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Union forces would probably come from the North rather 
than from the Gulf, anyway. And yet New Orleans was 
the largest city in the South at that time, and in a position 
of great strategic importance. The careless attitude of the 
Richmond government, especially of the Secretary of the 
Navy, Mr. Mallory, made those officers who understood the 
situation — like the gallant young Beverly Kennon — boil 
over with indignation. 

The two forts in which the Confederates had the utmost 
faith were situated eighty miles below New Orleans. 
Fort St. Philip, with forty-two guns, was on the east bank 
of the river; and Fort Jackson, with fifty-eight guns, was 
lower down on the west bank. While the latter was 




^ **. \ s, ^ 



*/,ssi$s» ? 



THE MISSISSIPPI BELOW NEW ORLEANS 
164 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

stronger, the former had a better position, because, being 
on a bend of the river, its guns could rake an approaching 
line of ships. But in the case of ships and forts it is not so 
much the number of guns as the quality of them, and the 
quality of "the man behind the gun." Many of these 
cannon were old-fashioned 24-pounders which had no 
business to be in a defense of such importance as this, and 
the garrison seems to have been not very well trained or 
disciplined, for a mutiny broke out the day Farragut 
reached New Orleans. 

One of the Union admiral's famous sayings was, "The 
best protection against an enemy's fire is a well-sustained 
fire from your own guns." To that end he put as many 
cannon on his ships as they could stand. The Hartford, 
his famous flag-ship, was called a "screw sloop of war." 
Under Farragut she carried twenty-two nine-inch Dahl- 
grens, about twice as many as several other cruisers of her 
rating. 

In passing these forts Farragut had a problem much more 
difficult than that of DuPont at Port Royal. The latter had 
a wide channel for his "circle of fire," and he could shift 
his range at will. Here the Union fleet had to go through 
a narrow river-channel, of which the Confederates had 
the range long beforehand, and one fort, at least, could 
pour in a raking fire. When we stop to think that all 
these ships were wooden and that naval expert opinion was 
largely of the opinion that they would all be sunk in the 
channel, we can realize that Farragut had some iron in his 
backbone. 

Nor was he a reckless, slap-dash kind of fighter. He 
realized the dangers as well as anybody. But he felt that 
it was his business to overcome those dangers just so far as 
human foresight could. After the mortar flotilla had 
bombarded the forts for three days without doing a 
particle of damage — Farragut had little use for mortars — 
he decided to go ahead with his steamships. The Con- 
federates had drawn a barrier across the river consisting 

16s 



f^j. ^^^s 








MmLi^^^^^^._^^_^_^ 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of sunken schooners chained together and great booms of 
logs. He sent two gunboats to clear a passageway, and 
made the mortars of real use by keeping so many shells 
dropping on the forts that their fire was lessened and so 
did not stop the work of the men on the gunboats. For 
these it was a tough problem to chop away an opening 
under fire, and once one of the gunboats went aground. 
But they stuck to it like heroes, and before they retired 
they had opened a space wide enough for the largest ves- 
sel to pass through. 

The next step was to make the ships ready for run- 
ning the gauntlet of the two forts and to meet the rams 
above the forts. Terrifying accounts of these rams had 
come out to the fleet, and nobody knew just what to expect 
after reading the accounts about the Merrimac only a few 
weeks before. 

Farragut spent two days in making sure that his ships 
were prepared for the run. Each was loaded down at the 
bow a few inches so that if she ran into the mud she would 
keep pointing up-stream. The ships were all wooden, 
but there were ways of protecting even a wooden ship 
against cannon fire. Farragut ordered the heavy sheet- 
anchor cables fastened alongside in such a way as to make 
a sort of "chain armor" for the engines and boilers. And 
to protect these parts from raking shot — forward and aft— 
bags of coal and sand were piled in heaps in stern and bow. 
To make sure that everything was just right he made an 
inspection of every ship in the line on the afternoon before 
the attack. 

After a careful survey of the forts Farragut had deter- 
mined on a night advance. At two o'clock on the morning 
of April 24, 1862, two red lights from the Hartford gave the 
signal to get under way. There was some delay in pulling 
up anchors, so that it was three-thirty when the Union 
line steamed through the darkness for the opening in the 
barrier. The fleet had been divided into first, second, and 
third divisions. After getting through the barrier the first 

167 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

division was to hold to the right and engage Fort St. 
Philip. The second division, led by Farragut in the 
Hartford, was to follow, swing a little to the left and attack 
Fort Jackson. Farragut had intended at first to run the 
two divisions side by side, but there was so much danger 
of confusion, if not collision, in getting through the barrier 
that he changed his plan. A third division, consisting 
chiefly of gunboats, was to bring up the rear. 

The black line of ships steamed slowly through the 
barrier, but not a shot came from the forts till the leading 
ship of the first division, the Cayuga, was just about abreast 
of Fort St. Philip. Then the pitch darkness was torn by 
the flashes of artillery, and the Confederates opened fire on 
her with a vengeance. The Cayuga was too light to with- 
stand a bombardment or reply to it ; her business was to run 
by as fast as she could before she was sunk. So she rippled 
up-stream with the sparks pouring out of her smoke-stack. 

The next in the line was the heavy Pensacola with twenty- 
three big guns. She slowed up and gave the fort the 
benefit of her broadside, and several times she stopped her 
engines to continue her set-to with the fort. The idea was 
that the heavy ships of this class would take the heat 
of the Confederate fire and, if possible, silence their guns for 
the benefit of the weaker vessels in the rear of the line. 

But the stopping of the Pensacola left the Cayuga tear- 
ing up-stream all by herself. Suddenly her captain realized, 
as he peered astern through the darkness and the smoke, 
that there was not another Union ship in sight. His first 
thought was that they must all have been sunk by the forts. 
And as he looked forward he counted eleven Confederate 
rams and gunboats looming out of the darkness and head- 
ing straight for him. No wonder that Lieutenant Perkins, 
who was acting as pilot, wrote afterward, "It seemed as 
if we were gone, sure." 

But some well-directed shots drove off or disabled the 
nearest Confederate ships. The famous ram Manassas, of 
which alarming reports had been spread, suddenly appeared 

168 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

alongside and tried to ram the Cayuga's stern. So wretched 
were the ironclad's engines that she missed entirely. So 
she slipped astern and drifted down the stream to try again 
on some other ship. 

Just then some Union gunboats came up, and for a few 
minutes there was a wild time. In the pitch-darkness and 
smoke and the confusion of vessels no one could tell friend 
from foe. Suddenly the Union gunboat Varuna fired a 
broadside by mistake into the Cayuga, and there were 
shouts and frantic signals amid a grand uproar of banging 
guns and bursting shells. But in about twenty minutes 
things straightened out, and the weak Confederate flotilla 
were all scattered and sunk except the Gov. Moore. This 
was one of the gunboats that had attacked the Cayuga 
but had been driven off by her heavier guns. The com- 
mander of the Gov. Moore, Lieut. Beverly Kennon, realizing 
that he could do nothing against ships like the Cayuga, went 
in chase of the Varuna, which had gone on up the river.' 
Kennon raised signal-lanterns like those he had noticed on 
the Union ships, and he was not recognized as an enemy till 
he was close astern. Then he pumped two huge shells into 
the Varuna, and as she swung about to meet her opponent 
Kennon rammed her, firing another shell through his own 
bow into her. Shortly afterward another gunboat, the 
Stonewall Jackson, rammed her, too, and she headed for the 
bank, filling rapidly, and settled in shallow water. But as 
she settled she still used her guns on the Gov. Moore; and, 
as the latter had been badly hurt by the fire of the Cayuga 
as well, she soon dropped out of the fight and surrendered. 
The Gov. Moore had been handled with great gallantry and 
skill — Kennon had been in the navy before the war — and 
was the only Confederate vessel in this battle that deserves 
such praise. After the Gov. Moore had surrendered there 
was little resistance left. But before Kennon surrendered 
he had done more than both forts — he had sunk one of the 
enemy's fleet. 

These Confederate rams and gunboats had no organiza- 

169 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

tion. Some belonged to the state of Louisiana and some to 
the Confederacy, and some just "acted on their own hook." 
As an example of the way authority was mixed up, Kennon 
was a lieutenant in the Confederate navy, but his vessel 
belonged to the navy of Louisiana. 

Let us turn back to see how the second division fared. 
About half an hour after the Cayuga drew the fire of Fort St. 
Philip the Hartford led the way for the second line and 
played her bow-guns on Fort Jackson. By this time the 
darkness was made worse by the stifling clouds of powder- 
smoke. A dull glare was made out just ahead of the Hart- 
ford, and the next minute a blazing fire raft came down 
directly upon the flag-ship. 

Round spun the wheel to avoid this dangerous and un- 
expected enemy, but the jerk of the helm only laid the bow 
of the Hartford in the mud near Fort St. Philip. At that 
moment it was discovered that the raft was not drifting, but 
being shoved down upon the Hartford by a Confederate tug. 
In another moment there was the hot breath of flames, and 
the fire leaped on the sides of the ship and went crackling 
and roaring up the tarred rigging. Here was a crisis 
indeed. The flag-ship was aground under the enemy's 
forts and afire at the same time. But as the officers and 
men looked at their leader they saw him as cool and self- 
possessed as if he were arriving in a home port and giving 
orders to anchor. His quick commands snapped out with 
decision but without excitement, and there was no hint of 
panic in his well-disciplined crew. While the guns drove 
off the tug and answered the redoubled fire of the forts 
a section of the crew soon had the hose playing on the 
blazing sides and shrouds. Meanwhile the screw was 
churning a reverse under full pressure, and after some 
nerve-racking suspense it finally pulled the Hartford's 
nose off the mud. Then she steamed serenely up the 
river without further trouble. 

Next in line to the Hartford was the Brooklyn. The 
smoke and darkness were so thick that she immediately 

170 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

lost sight of the flag-ship and was steering blindly, without 
even a lantern to guide her. The result was that the 
Brooklyn missed the opening and soon found herself 
bumping on one of the sunken hulks in the barrier. She 
got badly fouled in the wreckage and swung across stream, 
with her bow touching the mud on the east bank. While 
she lay in this disagreeable position she got a very hot fire 
from Fort St. Philip. 

At last, after all kinds of difficulty, she, too, was pulled 
loose and headed up-stream again. At that moment the 
ram Manassas suddenly appeared alongside. The latter 
was going so slowly that she was able to give only a gentle 
bump to the Union ship, and the chains alongside pre- 
vented any serious damage. After this the career of the 
Brooklyn was concerned chiefly with destroying the Con- 
federate gunboats and pouring in such a tremendous fire 
on Fort St. Philip that it was silenced for several 
minutes. 

Although the Confederates were driven to cover by the 
heavy broadsides of the big steam-sloops like the Hartford, 
the Pensacola, and the Brooklyn, they opened fire again 
when these ships were past. So they succeeded in keeping 
the third division, composed chiefly of light gunboats, 
from getting by. But Farragut had thirteen vessels past 
the forts, and with these he advanced to New Orleans the 
following day. 

Panic seized the city when news came that the "Yankee " 
ships had actually gone by those forts. And as the Union 
fleet steamed up the river Farragut had his hands full to 
keep clear of the ships and steamers loaded with the 
precious cotton, but burning like bonfires, that came 
drifting down from the city. 

The fleet was soon anchored at New Orleans, and Farra- 
gut sent Captain Bailey ashore to get the formal surrender 
of the city. Captain Bailey was accompanied by Lieu- 
tenant Perkins of the Cayuga, and these two officers had 
an experience to try their nerve. As they marched up the 

171 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

streets to the City Hall they were surrounded by a cursing, 
yelling mob, who brandished fists, clubs, and pistols in the 
faces of the two "men in blue." "Kill 'em! Kill 'em!" 
shouted the crowd; but Captain Bailey and his aide, very 
stiff and erect, looking neither to the right nor the left, 
marched calmly and steadily to the City Hall and delivered 
Farragut's message to the mayor. A Confederate eye- 
witness described the incident afterward as "one of the 
bravest deeds I ever saw done." 

After a good deal of delay the flag of Louisiana came 
down, and the Stars and Stripes took its place. On the 
29th news came that the two forts had surrendered. From 
New Orleans Farragut moved north to Vicksburg. This 
was according to the orders of the Department, and 
Farragut obeyed like a true sailor. But he knew and said 
that nothing could be gained simply by bombarding and 
passing Vicksburg with his fleet as long as the Confederates 
kept their communications open in the rear. Meanwhile, 
the Union fleet suffered far more from the snags in the 
river and the malaria in the swamps than from the bullets 
of the enemy. 

At last the Department realized that Farragut was right 
about Vicksburg, and ordered him back to New Orleans. 
In the fall of 1862 David D. Porter, a son of the old com- 
modore, and a foster brother of Farragut, was given com- 
mand of the upper Mississippi squadron and did splendid 
work. When Grant settled down to the famous siege of 
Vicksburg he had invaluable help from Porter's fleet, as he 
gratefully acknowledged. With the surrender of Vicksburg 
to Grant .on July 4, 1863, fell the last important stronghold 
of the river. In the autumn of 1863 the Union forces had 
the Mississippi and its tributaries completely in their grip. 

Thereafter all help from the Western states of the 
Confederacy was cut off from the armies in the East. In 
fact, the Mississippi squadron was really a part of the 
blockade which every month was drawing more tightly 
around the Confederacy. 

172 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

At the very time Farragut was inspecting his fleet for 
the attack on the forts defending New Orleans, Emperor 
Napoleon III. was urging England to join France in break- 
ing the blockade in order to recognize the Confederacy 
and get cotton. Englishmen and Frenchmen of wealth 
and influence had bought up a large number of Con- 
federate bonds, and, naturally, they were anxious to have 
their governments do something to make sure that those 
bonds were a good investment. 

But after the story of the Monitor's fight in Hampton 
Roads the French and English governments suddenly 
realized that they had practically nothing in their navies 
that could fight her — or the sister monitors that the Union 
navy-yards were turning out as fast as men could work. 
And the capture of the largest cotton port in the Con- 
federacy took away the excuse that Europe must have a 
port in which to buy cotton. Uncle Sam was perfectly 
willing to "swap" cotton for European goods as long as it 
was his cotton; so after April, 1862, Confederate hopes 
of intervention grew steadily fainter. 



XIV 



THE BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY 

Importance of Mobile — Its defenses — The Tennessee — Passing the 
forts — Loss of the Tecumseh — Conduct of the Brooklyn — Farragut's 
manoeuver — Attack of the Tennessee — Friendly reunion between 
enemies — Honors for Farragut. 

AFTER getting control of the Mississippi the Union 
i\ Navy Department turned its attention toward cap- 
turing Confederate strongholds on the Gulf and Atlantic 
coasts. If there had been an efficient fleet in home waters 
at the outbreak of secession, and some other man in the 
White House than Buchanan, every one of these places 
that cost' so much in blood and treasure afterward might 
have been seized with scarcely a blow. Even as it was, if 
Farragut had been allowed, as he wished, to take his fleet 
against Mobile in 1862 instead of making a useless demon- 
stration before Vicksburg, he would not have had the grim 
experience which came so near being a Union disaster. 

The fall of Port Royal and New Orleans awoke the 
South to the need of stouter forts, better guns, more 
torpedoes, and ironclads. So the defenses of Mobile Bay, 
which Farragut could easily have captured in 1862, had 
been by 1864 so strengthened that the problem was many 
times more difficult. In the summer of 1863 Farragut 
turned over the command of the whole Mississippi squad- 
ron above New Orleans to Porter and went north for a 
much-needed rest. Also, his heavy steam-sloops were in 
such a condition that they needed a thorough overhauling 
before beginning a new campaign. The following January 

174 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Farragut and his ships were both back again with the 
blockading squadron in the Gulf. 

After examining the defenses of Mobile Farragut wrote 
the Department, saying that ironclads were absolutely 
necessary, and asking for some of the monitors that were 
with the blockaders off Charleston. Instead, the authori- 
ties kept him waiting till the following August before send- 
ing him four monitors from elsewhere. Meanwhile the Con- 
federates made good use of this long delay by strengthening 
the defenses of the bay still further. When at last the mon- 
itors arrived Farragut went right ahead with his attack. 

After the fall of New Orleans Mobile became the chief 
port through which the Confederates could get their cotton 
out and their supplies in. Railroad lines ran into Mobile, 
and two large rivers emptied into the bay as well, so that 
military supplies brought to Mobile could be quickly 
shipped to those points in the Confederacy where they 
were most needed. And in spite of all the blockading- 
ships could do, time and again the daring little blockade- 
runners would dart past them, carrying on the trade that 
was so necessary to the South. 

Mobile Bay is thirty miles long, but in those days it was 
for the most part too shallow for steamers of heavy draught. 
Only one narrow channel was deep enough to admit vessels 
like the Hartford, and that led directly under the strongest 
of the Confederate defenses, Fort Morgan. There were 
two other works — Fort Powell, at the western mouth of the 
bay, and Fort Gaines, on an island about midway between — 
but these two had no share in the battle. Fort Morgan, 
which guarded the ship entrance, was, for those days, a 
very strong fortification, having three tiers of cannon. 
Its brick wall was nearly five feet thick and in addition the 
whole front was protected by great heaps of sand-bags. 
At that time it was commanded by Gen. R. L. Page. 

Besides the fort the Confederates had a squadron con- 
sisting of the ram Tennessee and three gunboats. To get 
a naval force together in Mobile Bay the Confederate Navy 

i75 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Department sent Admiral Buchanan, of Merrimac fame, 
and gathered the best engineers in Dixie to help him. 
Several gunboats were soon building, but the hopes of the 
Confederates were pinned to the Tennessee. All these 
vessels were built at Selma, one hundred and fifty miles 
up the Alabama River, at that time the largest navy-yard 
controlled by the South. 

The Tennessee was practically an improved Merrimac. 
Her casemate was not so long as that of the Merrimac, 
and she mounted six guns instead of ten; but the armor 
— with a thickness of twenty-five inches of wood and 
five to six inches of iron — was even more solid, and 
she drew only thirteen feet of water instead of the Mer- 
rimac'? twenty-two. Further, as a protection from ram- 
ming, her casemate sloped two feet under water and then 
bent again at the same angle, joining the hull about seven 
feet under water. The same "knuckle" effect was carried 
fore and aft, too, and in the bow — with its iron plating 
— made a beak that would not break off. 

When she was launched the Confederates said proudly 
that she was the "most powerful ship afloat," and that was 
no idle boast. There were only two drawbacks, one — the 
usual one with all Confederate rams — the engines were too 
light to drive such a heavy craft; the other, that the 
steering-chains were left exposed on deck. 

Buchanan's work in building the Tennessee was much like 
Oliver H. Perry's with the Lawrence or the Niagara. Both 
were built from standing timber, and the Tennessee had to 
be raised five feet in order to float her over the Dog River 
bar. Buchanan did not have an enemy hovering close at 
hand, as Perry did, but he had his troubles. To raise the 
ram, floats had to be constructed. These cost immense 
labor, because the very boards had to be sawed out from 
green logs ; and when one set had been finished the boards 
took fire and burned up, so that the whole slow labor had 
to be done all over again. Meanwhile the Southern 
newspaper men, who could not realize one-tenth of all 

176 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

this trouble, were saying disagreeable things about Bu- 
chanan. 

At last the ram was afloat in Mobile Bay, and on May 
1 8th Buchanan took her down for a surprise attack on the 
blockading-ships. After dark she was towed down by two 
steamers to a point in the channel where there was supposed 
to be enough water for her, but when the floats were taken 
away it was found that the tide had dropped so low that the 
ram was stuck in the mud. Before she could be floated 
it was broad daylight, and all hope of a surprise was gone. 
So Buchanan took his ram under the shelter of Fort Mor- 
gan and waited there, drilling his raw crew at the guns. 

In addition to the squadron and the forts the Con- 
federates had planted obstructions across the flats to pre- 
vent any boats of shallow draught crossing in the space 
between the forts. In the ship-channel itself they planted a 
double row of torpedoes, stretching from the western side 
of the channel to a point within three hundred feet of the 
water-battery under Fort Morgan. The end of the tor- 
pedo line was marked by a red buoy, and the remainder 
of the channel was left open for the blockade-runners. 

As before, Farragut made the most careful preparations 
to protect his fleet for the attack. As a large number of 
his ships were light gunboats, he planned his advance to 
shelter them as much as possible. To do this he had his 
ships steam in pairs, on the right — the side toward the fort 
— a heavy sloop of war, on the left one of the gunboats 
lashed alongside. Besides protecting the thin sides of the 
gunboats this formation made it possible for one ship with 
a disabled engine to keep on with the help of the other. 
All these ships were protected, as in the New Orleans fight, 
with chains and bags of sand. 

Farragut wanted a flood-tide and a westerly wind to 
roll the battle-smoke back upon the fort. On August 4th 
the last of two of the expected monitors arrived. At 
five-thirty the next morning, when Farragut saw that both 
conditions — flood-tide and wind — were just as he wanted 

177 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

them, he said quietly to his fleet captain, "Well, Drayton, 
we might as well get under way." 

At the head of the column was the Brooklyn, with the 
Octorara lashed alongside, and next came the Hartford 
with the Metacomet. Farragut had wanted to lead the 
column with the Hartford, but the other officers, knowing 
that all the fire would be concentrated on the flag-ship, 
persuaded him to come second. Afterward he had bitter 
reason to regret his change of plan. 

As Fort Morgan was able to rake the approaching ships 
before they could use their broadsides, Farragut sent the four 
monitors ahead to engage the fort and cover the advance 
of the fleet. Two of these monitors were of the later pat- 
tern, with two turrets, but all four were clumsy and always 
made slow headway. 

Meanwhile the roll of drums from the fort, calling the 
defenders to their guns, showed that the Confederates 
were not to be taken by surprise. At the same time the 
Tennessee slipped out from the shadow of the fort and lay 
athwart the channel in such a position that her guns could 
rake the advancing line of ships. The three gunboats took 
similar positions, so that all the broadsides of the Con- 
federate squadron as well as the guns of the fort were con- 
centrated on the narrow channel through which the Union 
fleet had to pass, bows on. 

Commander T. A. M. Craven was leading the line of 
monitors with the Tecumseh. For nearly half an hour the 
advancing ships had to bear a cruel fire, unable to reply 
except with the bow-chasers of the leading pair of ships 
and such of the monitors' guns as would bear. As the 
larger ships caught up with the slow line of monitors it 
was not long before the Brooklyn and the Hartford were 
both thundering full broadsides at the fort and clearing the 
men out of the water-batteries. Farragut had told Craven 
that he wanted the Tecumseh to engage the Tennessee, and 
Craven steered eagerly for the big ironclad. He had been 
ordered to keep to the eastward of the red buoy on account 

178 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of the double line of torpedoes. What followed no one can 
be perfectly sure of, because the accounts differ. Farragut 
said that the monitor swerved to the west of the buoy. 
But Confederate eye-witnesses said that she kept well to 
the east of the buoy, and one hesitates to think that Craven 
disobeyed a clear order when there was no necessity for 
doing so. It is quite possible that a torpedo got adrift in 
the channel. At any rate, while Farragut, from the rigging 
of the Hartford, was watching with satisfaction the effect 
of his grape and shrapnel on the Confederate batteries, 
suddenly everything went wrong. A smothered boom drew 
his eye to the Tecumseh. A great jet of water shot up, fell 
back with a splash, and the monitor heeled over and went 
down. In two minutes there was only a whirling eddy 
where the Tecumseh had been. Out of 135 men 113 were 
lost, including her brave captain. 

Commander Craven had had an enviable record. The 
Queen of Spain, for instance, had presented him a gold 
medal for his gallantry in rescuing the crew of a Spanish 
ship. But the last act of his life stamps the man. At 
the moment of the explosion Craven and his pilot instinc- 
tively rushed for the ladder of the pilot-house, the only 
means of escape, and there was just one chance. As they 
met at the foot of the ladder Craven stepped back. " After 
you, pilot," he said, quietly, but as the pilot gained the air 
the monitor sank under his feet. 

Farragut immediately ordered Jouett, who commanded 
the Metacomet, to put out a boat to rescue the survivors, and 
a young ensign with a boat's crew rowed through that 
storm of bursting shells and coolly picked up the men who 
were struggling in the water. A Confederate gunner 
trained his piece on the boat. "Don't fire on him!" cried 
General Page. "He's saving drowning men!" And the 
ensign returned to his ship unhurt. 

Captain Alden of the Brooklyn, who was leading the line, 
had seen the Tecumseh go down, and suddenly became 
panic-stricken. His lookout told him that there were 

179 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

torpedo-buoys almost under his bows. What they saw 
was a number of empty shell-boxes floating about the 
channel where they had been dropped overboard from the 
gunboats. But Alden was so sure that they were torpedo- 
buoys that he backed his engines and stopped. 

"Go forward 1 " signaled Farragut, realizing that a fresh 
disaster would soon occur if the Brooklyn did not go on 
ahead, but she still hung motionless right in the channel. 
Meanwhile the other ships were steaming up, the other 
monitors were also in the channel, and the whole column 
in a few minutes would have been a mass of collisions, all 
on account of Captain Alden's fright. The Brooklyn, with 
the Octorara. now swung athwart the channel, suffering a 
terrible raking fire from Fort Morgan herself and making it 
impossible for a single Union vessel to get by her. The con- 
fusion was getting worse with every tick of the watch. 
The Confederates, seeing the plight of the Union fleet, re- 
doubled their fire. 

"Go ahead!" signaled Farragut again. It was, as he 
said afterward, the supreme moment of his life. All his 
plans seemed wrecked, and his ships lay in confusion at the 
mercy of the Confederates. So he breathed a prayer for 
help, and he felt that the answer was "Go on." The 
Brooklyn still lay like a log across the channel, making it 
impossible to pass her to the right. There was only one 
other way — to cross to the left. But to go that way 
meant to run across that deadly line of torpedoes — and 
there was the fate of the Tecumseh. 

Better lose the Hartford and the Metacomet than the 
whole fleet. Farragut gave the order, and the two ships 
turned short around and steamed for Mobile Bay, clearing 
the Brooklyn to the left. 

"Torpedoes ahead!" came the warning cry from the 
Brooklyn. 

1 ' Damn the^torpedoes !" shouted Farragut. ' ' Four bells ! 
Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!" 

The men on board those ships would have gone anywhere 

180 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

with Farragut, but they caught their breath when the cut- 
waters went foaming across the torpedo line. Hadn't they 
just seen the Tecumseh go down? The two vessels surged 
along at full speed, the engines thumping till the decks 
quivered, and it is no disgrace to anybody if there were 
some hearts thumping, too. In another minute the ships 
were safe in the bay. 

Afterward men below decks on both ships swore that 
they heard the torpedoes bump on the sides and even the 
snap of the primers. Probably the torpedoes had been 
carelessly made and had become useless after some time 
in the water. At any rate, no more exploded, and Farra- 
gut's daring manceuver saved the day for the Union. 

The tangled line straightened out, the Richmond and 
the Port Royal, the next pair of ships astern of the Hart- 
ford, followed the latter across the torpedo line, and the 
whole fleet steamed ahead. But during those moments 
of confusion the Union forces suffered heavily from the 
cross-fire. Shells from the Tennessee and the gunboats 
plunged into the bows of the ships, sweeping away whole 
gun-crews at a time, while from the right came the deadly 
fire of Fort Morgan at close range. In fact, the ships were 
so near the fort that, in a lull of the firing, the Union men 
could hear the Confederate officers giving orders to their 
men. It is hard to understand why none of the wooden 
vessels were sunk under the terrific pounding, but they 
had received few injuries near the water-line. Although 
there had been a good many killed and wounded, especially 
on the Brooklyn and the Hartford, the only one of the ships 
badly hurt in passing the fort was the Oneida, which was 
disabled by a shot that went through her boilers. Here the 
wisdom of Farragut's plan was shown, because, though the 
Oneida was helpless, the gunboat Galena, which was lashed 
to her port side, carried her safely past. 

Buchanan now attempted to repeat the story of the Cum- 
berland. As the Hartford came forging up the channel he 
tried to ram her. but the Tennessee was clumsy and slow, 

181 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

and a twist of the Hartford's wheel was all that was neces- 
sary to avoid her beak. The Tennessee went on trying 
vainly to ram the others, but Buchanan found that to hit 
a vessel under full steam was a very different thing from 
running into a motionless sailing-ship. As the dreaded 
ram went down the approaching line, the Hartford kept 
on into the bay till she could swing around safely. Then 
she turned her broadsides on the three gunboats that had 
done her so much harm and drove them away. One was 
nearly sunk, another was chased and captured by the 
Metacomet. 

Soon all the Union ships were in the upper bay, and the 
order was given to anchor. Breakfast was prepared and 
the decks cleaned of their blood-stains. The Tennessee had 
retired to the shelter of Fort Morgan ; and Farragut, as he 
saw her there, began planning to attack her with his 
monitors by night. He judged that in the darkness the 
gunners of Fort Morgan would hesitate to fire, because they 
would not be able to distinguish friend from foe. 

Scarcely had he settled on this plan when he saw the 
Tennessee deliberately leave her berth and head for the 
Union fleet. 

"Old Buck's coming out!" was shouted from ship to 
ship, and in a hurry the mess-gear was stowed and the gun- 
crews formed to give "old Buck" the fight he was evidently 
looking for. It makes anybody's blood tingle with admira- 
tion at the thought of that solitary Tennessee sallying out 
to fight the entire fleet. But it was another one of those 
things that are "magnificent, but not war." By so doing 
Buchanan threw away every advantage he had. His guns 
were of longer range than most of those in the Union fleet, 
and, lying snug under the shelter of the fort, or out in the 
shallows where the Union ships could not follow, he could 
have given Farragut 's wooden fleet a great deal of trouble. 
Instead of that he came to close quarters in deep water, 
exactly where his enemy wanted him. 

Farragut passed the order to attack the Tennessee "bows 

182 



\ 







THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

on," and one after another of the wooden ships crashed 
into the ironclad, wrenching their own bows and doing very- 
little apparent damage. As in the battle between the 
Cumberland and the Merrimac, their broadsides at close 
quarters glanced harmlessly off the ram's casemate, while 
every now and then the Tennessee sent a shell that tore 
through the sides of the ships. 

Once she tried to ram the Hartford, but struck only a 
glancing blow and went scraping along the side of her 
enemy. At that moment Farragut sprang into the mizzen 
shrouds and stood almost over the ram. For the third time 
that day one of his devoted shipmates passed a rope around 
him and fastened him to the shrouds so that no sudden 
shock might hurl him out. The Hartford's guns thundered 
away, but even at ten feet the heavy broadsides glanced 
off the heavy casemate. All this while at close quarters 
the Tennessee was able to fire only one shell, for her gun- 
primers refused to work properly. 

Two of the Union monitors had troubles with their 
engines, guns, or turrets, and were not in condition to give 
much help, but the third, the Chickasaw, was still in good 
shape. She was commanded by the youngest of Farragut's 
captains, George Perkins, the same young man who piloted 
the Cayuga past Fort St. Philip, and with Captain Bailey 
marched through a yelling mob in New Orleans. Perkins 
took his ship close under the Tennessee's stern and smashed 
fifty-two of his eleven-inch steel shot into her after case- 
mate, shattering the iron plates and letting daylight through 
the woodwork. 

This sort of pounding changed the looks of things for 
Buchanan. Already the ramming had broken off the 
smoke-stack of the Tennessee under the casemate, and the 
stifling coal-smoke made it almost impossible to breathe. 
Three of the shutters on the port side were jammed by 
shot. The Chickasaw had closed the stern port in the same 
way, and the steering-chains had been cut through, so Bu- 
chanan ordered the ram to be headed back to Fort Morgan. 

183 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Just at that time a shot from the Chickasaw jammed 
another port. While a machinist was at work trying to 
loosen it another shot struck the port fairly, killing the man 
and sending a nut with such force across the deck that it 
broke Buchanan's leg above the knee. It was almost the 
same kind of injury that he had received in Hampton 
Roads, and in the same leg. 

Captain Johnson, who now took command of the ram, 
found her in a desperate condition. She could not be 
steered — there was hardly enough steam to move her, 
anyway — scarcely a gun could be fired, and it was only a 
question of minutes before the after part of the casemate 
would be broken down under the terrific hammering of 
the Chickasaw. After twenty minutes of playing target 
for the whole fleet, and being unable to bring a single gun 
to bear in reply, Johnson surrendered. 

It happened that Johnson was a warm friend of Com- 
mander LeRoy of the ship Ossipee, which just at the mo- 
ment of surrender came bumping into the Tennessee. The 
next moment there was a friendly shout: "Hello, Johnson! 
This is LeRoy. I'll send a boat for you!" And, by an odd 
coincidence, LeRoy had been one of those who had fought 
on the Cumberland in Hampton Roads on that March 
morning two years before. So when he went aboard the 
Tennessee to take Buchanan's surrender, he told the Con- 
federate admiral with a smile that they had "met before." 

The pleasantest feature about the naval story of the 
Civil War is the fact that the very men who fought each 
other like tigers as long as the flag was flying were friends 
again immediately after the surrender. These Confederate 
and Union officers had served together on shipboard in the 
"old navy," and many of them were personally great friends. 
As the wounded officers of both sides lay on the deck of the 
Metacomet after the battle they were soon swapping stories 
of the "old days." 

There had been a pleasant reunion between the com- 
manding officers when the Metacomet captured the Selma 

184 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

shortly before the Tennessee came out. Jouett, of the 
Metacomet, had served before the war as a midshipman 
under Murphy, of the Selma, who had been very kind to 
him. Jouett had set his heart on capturing Commander 
Murphy and had taken great pains to prepare all sorts of 
good things to eat in order to please his old friend, who was 
fond of a good table. When the Selma's flag was down 
Murphy came aboard the Metacomet to give up his sword, 
looking very stern and dignified with his erect figure and 
long white hair and beard. Jouett had sent every one 
forward, to spare the old gentleman's feelings, and before 
Murphy could begin his stiff little speech of surrender 
Jouett hooked one arm confidentially into his and re- 
marked: "Come on, Murphy. I have had breakfast wait- 
ing some time." 

Then when the Confederate officer sat down to a break- 
fast of the sort he delighted in but had not tasted for many 
a month the old warrior's eyes began to twinkle. ' ' Jouett, ' ' 
he laughed, "why didn't you tell me you had all these good 
things? I would have surrendered to you long ago!" 

It was a little over three hours from the first shot of the 
battle to the moment when the whole Union fleet burst 
into cheers over the surrender of the Tennessee. Besides 
those drowned in the Tecumseh the Union loss was 52 
killed and 170 wounded, in comparison with which the 
Confederate casualties were trifling. But the great object 
had been attained. A few days later, after a heavy bom- 
bardment from the fleet, Fort Morgan surrendered, and 
Mobile Bay was in the hands of the Union. 

"It was the most desperate fight I ever saw since the 
days of the old Essex," remarked Farragut, grimly, and 
unquestionably it was the greatest naval battle of the 
Civil War. Moreover, it came perilously near being an 
overwhelming defeat for the Union cause. That the 
threatened defeat became a victory was due to the superb 
courage and quick decision of Farragut himself. To use 
the words of the Confederate General Page, who took in the 

185 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

whole situation from Fort Morgan, "Farragut's coolness 
and quick perception saved the Union fleet from a great 
disaster and probably from destruction." 

The capture of Mobile was the crowning achievement 
of the hero's career. Worn out by responsibility and 
fighting, he went north in December, 1864, and received 
the honors that the grateful nation was eager to shower 
upon him. In 1866 he was created Admiral of the Navy, 
the first in our history, and there have been but two others 
since who bore that honor. In 1867 he commanded a 
squadron which visited European waters and was every- 
where received with enthusiasm and honors. 

Farragut's career connected the Civil War and the War 
of 18 1 2. In him we find every fine characteristic of that 
splendid set of officers who brought us honor in 18 12, and 
to these qualities he added something still finer of his own. 
In the list of American naval heroes the name of David 
Glasgow Farragut stands first. 



XV 

TORPEDOES AND THE " ALBEMARLE " 

History of torpedoes and submarines — The Confederate "Davids" — 
Sinking the Housatonic — Construction of the Albemarle — Attack on 
Union gunboats — Cushing's torpedo attack on the Albemarle — His 
escape. 

THE torpedo that sank the Tecumsek was probably one 
of a kind the Confederates used a great deal in their 
river and harbor defenses. This was a beer-barrel with a 
cone of wood at each end to steady it, a large quantity 
of gunpowder, and at the top a device for setting it off — 
sometimes a trigger that exploded a cap, sometimes a tube 
of sulphuric acid which would spill on a bit of metal and 
start combustion. The word " torpedo" during the Civil 
War covered all explosives under water; there was no dis- 
tinction as there is to-day between a "torpedo," which is 
fired from a torpedo-tube, and the "mine," which is 
stationary. 

As far back as the Revolutionary War a Connecticut 
inventor named Bushnell invented a submarine called the 
Turtle, in which he planned to go out and place a torpedo 
against the side of a British ship and blow it up. Although 
his invention never sank any ships of the enemy, it came 
near doing so, and the British were fearfully indignant at 
such "infernal means of warfare." In the War of 1812 
Robert Fulton came forward with a better type of torpedo, 
but his ideas were coldly received. Commodore Rodgers — 
like the British commodores in the time of Bushnell — spoke 
of torpedo and submarine warfare as "dastardly." Poor 

187 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Fulton came in for some very unpleasant names; the 
epithets could not have been more cruel if he had been 
caught blowing up his grandmother with one of his 
torpedoes. 

It is interesting to see how closely the submarine is 
associated with the torpedo. The submarine idea is much 




THE BARREL TORPEDO 

older. We know that the Dutch physician to King James I. 
invented a submarine and once gave his royal patient an 
hour's cruise under the Thames. Between that time and 
the day of Robert Fulton the submarine idea would pop 
up every now and then, but without any real success. 

We are accustomed to think of Fulton as the man of 
the steamboat, but the fact is that he was much more 
interested in his submarine. Before the War of 1812 
Fulton tried to sell his invention to the French. His sub- 
marine had the fish, or "cigar," shape which all the other 
submarines since then have adopted, and it was called the 
Nautilus. (Those who remember Captain Nemo's sub- 
marine Nautilus in Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea 
will know where Jules Verne got the name.) In 1807 
Fulton was given a chance to show what he could do in the 
harbor of Brest. In the presence of a large crowd he 
stayed under water for three hours and blew up an old 
hulk in the harbor with a torpedo. Fulton had been 

188 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

perfectly successful, but the old fellows in the French 
Marine wagged their heads solemnly. They said that they 
were afraid that anybody caught using a submarine 
would be treated as a pirate, and while they were en- 
chanted by the marvelous ingenuity of Monsieur Fulton, 
etc., etc., they could not buy the Nautilus for the French 
government. 

Fulton then went to England and gave another per- 
fect exhibition in the Thames. He blew up an old 
Danish ship put there for the purpose. But the wise ones 
of the British Admiralty, in discussing the matter over 
their port, decided that as long as Britain's strength lay 
in her i( wooden walls " it would not do to encourage an in- 
vention that would smash those wooden walls from beneath. 
So they rejected Fulton's invention then just as a genera- 
tion later the British Admiralty rejected Ericsson's inven- 
tions of the screw-propeller and the revolving iron turret. 




A MODERN SUBMARINE 



When the poor inventor turned back in despair to his 
own country all the appreciation he got was to be called a 
"low ruffian" by Commodore Rodgers, the senior officer 

13 189 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of the United States navy. But to the day of his death 
Fulton kept pottering over his submarine and its torpedoes. 

Another American inventor who got interested in tor- 
pedo warfare was Colt, famous for his invention of the 
revolver. He applied electricity instead of clockwork to 
the torpedo, and blew up an old ship in the James River 
to show Congress how easy it was. But, as usual, the 
old-timers would not have it. 

When the Civil War began, the South, as we have already 
said, found itself compelled to adopt the newest "wrinkles" 
in warfare in order to oppose the fleets of the North. So 
the torpedo and the submarine were accepted as well as the 
iron-plated casemate. At first there was much opposition 
to these means of fighting, even among the leaders of the 
South. Such weapons were described as "unchivalrous," 
"ruffianly," and "dastardly." When it was discovered 
how useful the torpedo was, North and South got bravely 
over that fine sentiment. During the war twenty-eight 
ships were sunk or damaged by torpedoes. 

In torpedo work the South led the way, thanks largely to 
the genius of Matthew F. Maury, the great scientist of the 
old navy. The North was compelled to follow in self- 
defense. In the use of submarines the Southerners had no 
imitators in the Northern navy. But, realizing what suc- 
cessful submarines might do against the blockading ships, 
the Confederate naval constructors went doggedly to work. 
What they managed to put together was a queer little boat 
which they called a David because they hoped that it 
would sink some of the Goliaths out in the blockading 
fleet. 

One of these Davids deserves a special mention. It was 
a very simple craft. The propeller - shaft was turned 
round by the crew of eight men with their hands. The 
captain sat forward at the wheel, and handled the ropes 
controlling a spar that projected several feet from the nose 
of the boat and held a torpedo at the end. She was de- 
signed to "dive under water," but she did it entirely too 

190 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

well. On her trial trip she went down to stay, and the ten 
men on board were all suffocated. She was raised, but 
time and again afterward she carried all or most of her crew 
to the bottom. 

Submarine warfare was called "cowardly," even by some 
of the Confederate naval officers. But what shall be 
said of those five men and two officers who volunteered to 
go out in this little death-trap and blow up the Housatonic 
off Charleston harbor? When those men stepped into that 
David she had already sunk five times and caused the 
death of about thirty-five men! 

On this occasion they attempted no diving, but went on 
the surface with the hatch standing out of water. It was 
about nine o'clock on the evening of February 17, 1864, 




CONFEDERATE " DAVID " 

when the watch on the steam-sloop Housatonic noticed a 
strange-looking thing rippling toward the ship. He gave 
the alarm, but before the steamer could move or fire a gun 
there was a muffled roar alongside, and the big ship lurched 
and went down. Fortunately, the water was so shallow 
there that as the Housatonic sank she settled on the bot- 
tom, with her masts well above the surface, so all the crew 
but one ensign and four men saved themselves by scamper- 
ing up the shrouds. 

Nothing was seen of the David after the Housatonic went 
down, and no one knew what had become of her. After 
the war, when the wrecks were being cleared out of Charles- 
ton Harbor, the ^divers discovered the little submarine 
wedged in the hole made by the torpedo. As the hatch 
was found open it is thought that it was probably left open 
when the attack was made — perhaps the men felt safer 

191 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

that way — and the waves from the torpedo explosion 
swamped her. Then she was sucked into the very wound 
she had made in the side of the Housatonic. 

Crude as that little David was, she still holds the record 
of having been the only submarine that has ever sunk a 
vessel in time of war. And it is not likely that any other 
submarine will be manned by a braver crew. 

The most daring and dramatic torpedo exploit has to do 
with the story of Union operations in those landlocked 
waters off the coast of North Carolina known as Albe- 
marle and Pamlico sounds. These were important for the 
Union to control because, if left in Confederate hands, they 
would be a paradise for blockade-runners. They were also 
the key to many navigable rivers, four canals, and two 
railroad lines. The Union fleet got control before the 
Confederates had made much preparation for defense, but 
this fleet was a queer collection of old junk in the way of 
broken-down ferry-boats, little river-steamers, and tugs. 
They were not armored ; in fact, their wooden sides were so 
flimsy that they were well named the "pasteboard fleet." 
The Confederates believed that they needed only to put 
together another ironclad ram to shoot this pasteboard 
fleet into splinters and regain control of the sounds. Of 
course it was the business of the Union vessels to prevent 
the building of such a ram, and the little steamers darted 
up this river and that, destroying military supplies wherever 
they found them. 

In spite of the active work of the Union flotilla and the 
presence of Union troops in the neighborhood, too, the 
Confederates cleverly managed to get a ram built up the 
Roanoke River. How they succeeded in constructing any 
kind of ship at all is a mystery. Their ship-building plant 
consisted of a blacksmith shop, and the keel of the vessel 
was laid in a corn-field. One of the greatest difficulties in 
the work was the lack of iron, and Captain Cooke, the tire- 
less builder of the ram, ransacked the country for miles in 
every direction to gather up every stray nut, bolt, or 

192 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

coupling-pin, till he became known as the "ironmonger 
captain." 

The new ram was called the Albemarle. Chief -Con- 
structor John L. Porter, to whom most of the credit for the 
Merrimac is generally given, made the plans for the Albe- 
marle, too, and she showed a strong family resemblance to 
the Merrimac. Still she had peculiarities of her own. Her 
casemate — sixty feet in length — was octagonal in shape, 
with four inches of iron laid over pine timbers and planking 
with the usual sloping sides. She mounted only two guns, 
but these were rifled hundred-pounders, and the casemate 
was so pierced that these powerful guns could be used on a 
broadside as well as fore and aft. A very important point 
was that she drew only eight feet of water. 

In April, 1864, the Albemarle was practically finished. 
On learning of the existence of the ram the Union officers 
placed obstructions and torpedoes in the Roanoke River, 
above the town of Plymouth, to keep her from entering 
the sound. But unusually high water in the river gave 
Captain Cooke his chance, and on the night of April 18th 
he succeeded in getting the Albemarle over the obstructions. 
As the ram steamed down-river the workmen were still 
driving bolts into her, and at the same time her captain was 
drilling his crew at the big guns. One instant he was giving 
an order to his workmen, the next he was shouting to the 
gun-crew, but he was not going to lose a moment's time 
in getting the Albemarle out into the sound. 

It was after midnight when she was discovered by the 
two Union picket boats stationed in the river below Plym- 
outh. Lieutenant Flusser, who was in command of the 
Miami, had provided chains and spars connecting the two 
gunboats Miami and Southfield, so that in case the ram did 
get over the obstructions the gunboats might catch her 
between them and hold her till they could pound a hole in 
her casemate. 

But Cooke saw what was expected of him, and when 
the two gunboats came on toward him he sheered off and 

i93 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 




O *& & ^ 



ALBEMARLE AND PAMLICO SOUNDS 

hugged the shore. Then, turning suddenly, he passed the 
bow of the Miami and rammed the Southfield, which went 
down like a stone. Both gunboats had already poured a 
heavy shell fire on the Albemarle, but had done no harm at 
all. Lieutenant Flusser fired a shell when the ram came 

194 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

to close quarters, but the pieces of the shell, bursting on 
the casemate only a few feet away, killed Flusser himself 
and wounded eight of his men. In the death of the "lion- 
hearted Flusser" the Union lost one of its finest young 
officers. 

Realizing the hopelessness of fighting the ram single- 
handed, the Miami then fled down-river and out into the 
sound. 

On May 5th the Albemarle sallied out from the mouth of 
the Roanoke River, followed by two small vessels carrying 
troops. Captain Cooke was to escort these transports to 
the Alligator River, and then he intended to cruise up and 
down the sounds. He hoped to destroy or frighten away 
the "pasteboard fleet" and, on those waters at least, to 
recover the "sea control" for the Confederacy. 

As soon as the Albemarle appeared the Union gunboats 
promptly made for her, and an exciting time followed. 
One of the flimsy gunboats boldly rammed the ram itself, 
and received a hundred-pound shell in her boiler in payment. 
But the Albemarle, though she found it easy to send a shell 
tearing through the thin wooden sides of the Union gun- 
boats, could not manceuver fast enough to ram them in 
the open water of the sound. For some reason none of 
her hundred-pound shells struck at or near the water-line of 
any of the Union flotilla, so at a time when careful gunnery 
could have sunk almost the entire fleet, the Albemarle 
failed to sink or destroy a single one of these unprotected 
ships. Meanwhile, as was. to be expected, the gunboats 
had failed to penetrate the casemate of the Albemarle. 
But they did injure the tiller, riddle the smoke-stack, and 
crack the muzzle of one of those two big Armstrongs. 
They also captured one of the transports. As night came 
on the Albemarle retreated up the Roanoke River, leaving 
the field to the "pasteboard fleet." 

The Albemarle was quickly repaired, but she did not try 
to attack the Union gunboats again. Once she came down 
to the mouth of the river to drag for torpedoes, but retired 

195 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

when one of the gunboats opened fire on her. From that 
time on she stayed tied up to a wharf at Plymouth, doing 
nothing at all except to prevent the Union vessels from 
going any farther up the Roanoke River. 

But as the Union officers out in the sound were expecting 
her to come out at any minute, they had to keep a close 
watch. When the rumor came to Washington that the 
Confederates had a sister ship to the Albemarle almost 
completed on the Roanoke River, the Navy Department 
decided that the ram must be destroyed at once. 

The plan decided on was to run a light steam-launch up 
the river some dark night, take the Confederates by sur- 
prise, and blow up the Albemarle by means of a "spar 
torpedo. " As it was with most ' ' secret ' ' plans of the Union 
in those days, every detail about the intended attack was 
soon made known to Captain Warley, who had become 
commander of the ram on the illness of Captain Cooke. 

The man selected for the daring enterprise was Lieutenant 
Cushing, then only twenty-one years old, but already fa- 
mous for his coolness and daredevil bravery in the opera- 
tions about the Roanoke River. Cushing left the fleet and 
went to New York to superintend the building of the two 
launches that he wanted for the attack. One of these was 
lost in Chesapeake Bay on the way south. 

With the other he made his way through the canal from 
Norfolk to the sounds and reported to the commanding 
officer in October, 1864. 

Meanwhile the Confederates were going ahead with 
their preparations as well. They intended to make it 
absolutely impossible to reach the side of the Albemarle 
with a torpedo. In the first place, the ram lay controlling 
the bend in the river round which her enemies must come, 
and her big forward gun was loaded with grape and canister. 
There were also one thousand soldiers on shore in Plymouth, 
and a double set of sentries along the river. A squad was 
placed on the wreck of the Southfield, too, so that nothing 
might come up-river without challenge and discovery. In 

196 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

addition, a boom of cypress logs surrounding the Albemarle 
was laid well out from the side of the ram to make it 
impossible for any boat to get within striking-distance. 
And yet the Navy Department had counted on Cushing 's 
attack being a complete surprise for the Confederates ! 

The night of October 27, 1864, turned out to be dark and 
drizzly, just the conditions that Cushing desired. So he 
slipped out from the flotilla and headed his little launch up 
the Roanoke River. Astern of the launch trailed a cutter 
filled with armed men, for Cushing thought that if he 
succeeded in taking the Albemarle by surprise he would 
board and capture her instead of blowing her up. 

All went well for a while. The sentries had been waiting 
a good many nights for nothing, and wet weather helped 
to dampen their watchfulness. So the launch slipped 
silently up the river past all the guards without discovery 
till Cushing could see the Albemarle herself lying at her 
wharf, eight miles from ;the mouth of the river. He was 
just about to land his men at the lower wharf and make a 
rush to board the ram from the shore when a hail came from 
the Albemarle herself. At that Cushing turned loose the cut- 
ter, with orders for the men to go down-river and seize the 
Confederate guard on the Southfield. Meanwhile the crew 
of the ram had begun a musketry fire, and the bullets 
splashed all about the launch. A sentry on shore gave the 
alarm and set a huge bonfire ablaze. Then for the first 
time Cushing suddenly discovered the boom of logs which 
lay between him and the Albemarle. This was a dis- 
concerting thing to find out at such a time as that, but 
Cushing had no idea of giving up. He decided that, as the 
logs probably had been some time in the water, they 
would be slippery ; and he decided on a bold move. Making 
a wide circle across the river in order to get up headway, he 
came about and charged down directly upon the logs. 
There was a bump and a lurch, but the launch "hurdled" 
the boom successfully and shot directly for the side of the 
ram. All this while the little vessel was under a musket 

197 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

fire from the ram and from the soldiers on the bank, but 
no one was seriously hurt. 

As soon as the launch got over the boom Cushing choked 
off steam and let the headway carry him alongside. Then he 
coolly stood up in the bow of his boat and adjusted his spar 
torpedo. Ten feet in front of his face was the muzzle of 
the huge forward gun of the ram, and he could hear the 
officer giving orders to the gun-crew. But Cushing went 
ahead as coolly as if there were no enemy in sight. He 
carefully lowered the spar with the torpedo on the end of it 
till he could feel that it was under the overhang of the ram. 
Then he pulled the line that released the torpedo, and after 
waiting an instant till it had floated snug up beneath the 
bottom of the ship, Cushing pulled another line. This re- 
leased a bullet in the top of the torpedo, which fell on a 
percussion-cap in the powder at the bottom, and set off a 
tremendous explosion. At almost the same moment — but 
just a trifle later — the big gun went off, and only the lurch 
of the torpedo's explosion saved the entire launch crew 
from being blown to pieces. The Albemarle promptly 
sank. 

As the great column of water caused by the explosion fell 
back and swamped the launch, the next minute found all of 




LAUNCH USED BY LIEUTENANT CUSHING 



Cushing's party in the water. Most of these men sur- 
rendered to the Confederates, and two or three were 
drowned trying to escape. Cushing himself had no inten- 
tion of being captured, and swam down-stream. For a 

198 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



while he helped keep afloat a poor swimmer and after the 
latter sank, exhausted, Cushing kept on, though he was 
himself very nearly spent. At last he succeeded in touch- 
ing bottom on the edge of a swamp at some distance below 
the town. There he lay, half frozen, till daylight, when he 
found himself within forty yards of a Confederate fort. 
After a narrow escape from being discovered by a sentinel 
he hid himself all day in the swamp. There 
he found an old negro who went to the town 
to ask about the ram for him and brought 
back the cheerful news that the Albemarle 
"sho am done for!" 

Then Cushing plunged on through the swamp 
till by good luck he found a little dugout left 
by some Confederate sentries. Taking this, 
while the owners were eating their supper, he 
paddled for dear life down-river, and kept at 
it till he reached the sound, eight miles away. 
Fortunately, the sea was perfectly calm, so 
that he was able to keep the cranky little 
skiff afloat and going ahead. That evening 
the fleet lay scattered some miles from the 
mouth of the Roanoke, and it was only after 
long, back - breaking work, steering by the 
stars, that Cushing discovered one of the 
vessels. After his feeble "Ship ahoy!" he dropped, ut- 
terly exhausted, in the bottom of his boat. 

Finally he was once more in the hands of his friends, who 
had long before given him up for dead. As soon as the 
good news about the Albemarle was told, rockets shot up 
into the darkness to pass the word on to other ships of the 
fleet. With the Albemarle lying in the mud at her moor- 
ings, the Union fleet at once took possession of Plymouth, 
and the entire Albemarle district fell into the hands of the 
Union. 

For his exploit in sinking the ram Cushing was honored 
by the thanks of Congress and immediate promotion to the 

199 




SECTION OF 
TORPEDO 
USED BY 
CUSHING 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

rank of lieutenant-commander. It is hard to be generous 
to a successful enemy; and Captain Warley, of the Albe- 
marle, honored himself as well as Cushing when he de- 
scribed the latter's feat in these words, "A more gallant 
thing was not done during the war." 



XVI 

CONFEDERATE CRUISERS 

English sentiment for the South — Building ships for the Confederacy 
— Career of the Alabama — McDougal in Japan — The Alabama and 
the Kearsarge — Disappearance of American shipping. 

ONE of the three lines of operation laid down for the 
Union navy was the pursuit of Confederate com- 
merce-destroyers. At the outbreak of the war the South 
found itself somewhat in the position of the United States 
in the Revolution and the War of 1812. That is, the 
North had the sea-power, and the South had to buy or 
build ships as best it could. And, like England in those 
wars, the North had a large commerce open to attack on 
the high seas. But, whereas in the earlier wars Americans 
had a large carrying-trade and transformed many of their 
merchantmen into privateers, the Confederate States had 
almost no shipping at all. That meant that there was no 
Confederate commerce for the Union fleet to destroy, but 
it also meant that there were no ships to be turned into 
privateers. 

In order to get vessels which could prey on the commerce 
of the Northern states the Confederates turned to England. 
To-day we rejoice in the fact that England is our best 
friend in the family of nations; and it is, or should be, 
our national policy to make that friendship stronger. But 
in 1 86 1 it was very different. At that time the United 
States was England's greatest rival in the carrying-trade, 
and when the war broke out the English had the pleasant 
satisfaction of seeing their upstart rival in trouble. The 

201 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

"upper classes" in England also were enthusiastic for the 
Confederacy, because it was based on the slave system, 
which was the very opposite of democracy. The fine 
gentry of that time felt that democratic ideas were getting 
entirely too strong, and the smash-up of the United States 
would be a very fitting rebuke to people who held danger- 
ous notions about a government "of the people, by the 
people, and for the people. " So there was a good sale for 
Confederate bonds in London, and throughout the war 
heavy pressure was laid on the British Ministry to intervene 
in the great struggle, or at least to recognize the inde- 
pendence of the South. 

The day after DuPont captured Port Royal, November 
8, 1 86 1, Captain Wilkes, of the San Jacinto, overhauled 
the Trent, a British steamer, and took off the Confederate 
agents, Mason and Slidell, who were going to England and 
France to plead the cause of the South. This was exactly 
the sort of thing that Great Britain had been doing before 
the War of 1812, except that in this case the persons 
1 ' impressed ' ' were undoubtedly American subjects. Though 
she had dropped the practice, England had never yielded 
the right to search a neutral ship and take off any English- 
men she wanted. But when the shoe went on the other foot 
it pinched horribly. Without waiting for an explanation or 
an apology the British government collected arms and 
rushed troops to Canada, threatening to make war if the 
United States did not give up those men within seven days. 

Captain Wilkes was in the wrong, and the agents were 
turned over to England, but the incident gave Lincoln a 
chance to remark to the British Ministry that this point, 
which England had made such a great fuss over, was just 
the principle the United States had been trying to make 
her admit for fifty years. 

From that time till the news of Appomattox the senti- 
ment in England and in all the English colonies was over- 
whelmingly in favor of the Confederacy. The very news- 
papers, which for years had been sneering at America on 

202 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

account of slavery — always picturing Uncle Sam as a 
brutal slave-driver — in 1861 began quoting Bible verses 
to prove that slavery was inspired from heaven and printed 
hideous caricatures of Lincoln. During the war Confed- 
erate cruisers were welcomed in every British port and 
allowed to do just as they pleased without worrying about 
the rules of neutrality. And, what was of most impor- 
tance, the English shipyards built the cruisers that the 
Confederates needed. 

While any one of these was on the ways the shipwrights 
would give it out that the new vessel was designed for the 
"Turkish navy," the "Swiss navy," or something equally 
probable. When the ship was completed she would put 
out to sea, followed by another steamer loaded with "hard- 
ware." Then the two steamers would meet at sea and the 
cargo of "hardware," consisting of cannon and small arms, 
would be transferred to the cruiser. The British flag 
would go down, up would go the Stars and Bars, and the 
Confederacy would have another man-of-war. 

This story was repeated again and again; for, although 
the American minister, Mr. Adams, was untiring in his 
efforts to collect evidence about these Confederate cruisers 
and present it to the British government, the latter was 
reluctant to take any action. In fact, it was only Mr. 
Adams' quiet reply to Lord Russell, "My lord, it is 
superfluous for me to tell you that this means war," that 
kept a great double-turreted ironclad from going to the 
Confederates in 1864. According to international law, it is 
a very serious breach of neutrality for a neutral nation to 
allow her own citizens to build fighting-ships for either 
party in the war, and Mr. Adams was always reminding 
the British Ministry of this annoying fact. 

The most famous of these English-built cruisers was the 
Alabama. She was simply called "No. 290" while she lay 
in the Lairds' shipyards at Liverpool, because she was the 
290th ship turned out by that firm. Mr. Adams collected 
plenty of evidence to prove that the vessel was being built 

203 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

for the Confederacy, and he would not let the British 
authorities rest till they reluctantly ordered the ship to be 
held in port. But a kind friend in the office passed the 
tip by wire, and the cruiser slipped from her moorings for 
a trial spin in the Mersey. She never came back from 
that trial trip, but steamed on to Praya, a port in Terceira, 
one of the islands of the Azores. There she was met by 
a ship from London containing the "hardware," and a 
steamer from Liverpool followed with the future officers 
of the man-of-war, including Capt. Raphael Semmes. 

Every one at Praya knew exactly what was going on, and 
the feeble protests of the Portuguese officials did not pre- 
vent Captain Semmes from going right ahead with his prep- 
arations. On August 24, 1862, he took his ship out to sea, 
called his crew together, and told them of the commerce- 
destroying cruise he intended to make. Then he read 
aloud his commission as captain of the Confederate navy, 
hauled up the Confederate colors, and "No. 290" of the 
Lairds' shipyard became the Confederate cruiser Alabama. 

This famous ship is often spoken of as a "privateer," but 
this is a mistake. A privateer is a privately owned vessel 
carrying a "letter of marque," which is an official per- 
mission for the owner of the boat to go ahead and make all 
he can by plundering the ships of the enemy. But the 
Alabama belonged to the Confederate government and was 
captained by an officer in the Confederate service, so she 
was not a privateer at all. Moreover, she was not what 
Secretary Seward and the Northern newspapers called her — 
a "pirate ship." Semmes was no more a pirate than any 
other officer who has ever attacked the commerce of an 
enemy. The Alabama belongs in the same class as the old 
Essex in the War of 18 12. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to note that before the war Semmes himself had written a 
thumping denunciation of commerce-destroying as a means 
of warfare. 

After Semmes had told his crew of his intentions eighty-five 
of them stepped forward and signed their articles. Many 

204 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of these English sailors had served in the British navy and 
were accustomed to the discipline and duties of a man-of- 
war. There was a sprinkling of Southern coast pilots who 
had come with the officers, and the rest of the crew was 
made up by occasional enlistments from the crews of the 
prizes taken by the Alabama during her career. There 
were Englishmen among the officers as well. Master 's- 
Mate Fullam, Assistant-Surgeon Llewellyn, and Fourth - 
Lieutenant Low were Englishmen, Fullam and Low be- 
longing to the Royal Naval Reserve. The other officers 
came from the Confederate states. 

The Alabama was especially designed for her work, which 
necessitated long cruises and infrequent chances for coaling. 




THE ALABAMA 



She was completely rigged as a barken tine, and her screw 
could readily be detached from the shaft and hoisted so as 
not to hinder her progress under sail. She made good speed 
under canvas, and most of the time Semmes depended 
entirely on sails in order to save coal. 

After leaving Terceira he began capturing and burning 
prizes at once. He cruised slowly across the Atlantic 

14 205 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

toward the West Indies, picking up prizes as he went. 
At Martinique he took on coal and then continued his 
course to the Gulf. Off Galveston he lured away one of 
the blockading ships, the Hatter as, an old side- wheel river- 
boat, and sank her in a few minutes. From the Gulf 
Semmes cruised down the Brazilian coast, then headed 
across for the Cape of Good Hope. Leaving Cape Town, he 
turned to the East Indies, where he spent some months. 
At last, having done all the damage he could in those 
waters, he returned round the Cape and headed north. 
On June n, 1864, he entered the harbor of Cherbourg, 
France, to give the Alabama an overhauling and take on 
coal. By that time Semmes had been on a continuous 
cruise for nearly two years, having traveled seventy-five 
thousand miles, burned fifty-seven ships, and released a 
large number on bond or ransom. To the ships he had 
actually taken must be added the far greater number 
which were kept in port on account of his presence on the 
high seas. This meant, as the English had hoped, that 
the trade that had formerly gone in American bottoms 
was turned over to British ships. Many American vessels 
were sold in order that they might have the protection of 
the British flag. 

All this time Union cruisers were hunting the seas for the 
Alabama, but Semmes always managed to give them the 
slip. The reason that he had so much greater success than 
the other Confederate commerce-destroyers — and there 
were ten others — was not luck, but science. Semmes 
worked out the exact time it would take for the news of 
his whereabouts to reach the nearest Union cruiser, and 
how much time it would take that cruiser to make the 
distance. The result was that the Union ships were always 
just missing the Alabama. 

One of these cruisers was the Wyoming, under Com- 
mander David McDougal. The Wyoming trailed the Ala- 
bama to the east, but lost track of her in the East Indies. 
At Singapore Captain McDougal was astonished to re- 

206 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ceive flowers and files of late newspapers from English 
merchants. For Union officers, accustomed to sneers and 
thinly veiled insults at every British port, this was a 
pleasant surprise, but it soon turned out that the Wyoming 
had been mistaken for the Alabama. It was the first and 
last courtesy the Wyoming enjoyed during the cruise. 
As McDougal turned north to Japan Semmes doubled on 
his tracks and headed in the opposite direction. What 
McDougal did in Japanese waters has nothing to do with 
the Alabama, but it was too fine an exploit to be left out 
of this story. He was sadly disappointed to learn that 
nothing had been seen of the Alabama near Japan, but he 
soon had an urgent and unexpected call for his ship. 

On his arrival he learned that the opening of Japan to 
the foreigners by Commodore Perry had been hotly re- 
sented by the "patriotic" party in Japan, and a rebellion 
had broken out which the government was unable to put 
down. The rebel clans fortified the narrow strait of 
Shimonoseki and proceeded to fire on all foreign ships that 
tried to get through. One of these ships fired on was an 
American merchantman, and the rumor came to McDougal 
that she had been sunk. 

Realizing that it was the time for vigorous action, 
McDougal went to Shimonoseki by way of the Inland 
Sea, and on the 16th of July, 1863, steamed in to teach 
these Japanese rebels to respect the American flag. As 
he came to the narrows he noticed a line of stakes in 
mid-channel which he rightly guessed had been placed 
there for the Japanese gunners to use in gauging their 
aim, so he avoided them by steaming closer under 
the bluff, although he ran the risk of going aground. 
This manceuver saved the Wyoming, for the batteries 
opened a tremendous fire that tore through the rigging. 
Ahead of the Wyoming, where the straits widened, lay 
three ships, heavily armed and manned, their crews yelling 
defiance at the Americans. McDougal steamed alongside 
two of them, exchanging a very hot fire at close quarters, 

207 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

then swung around the bows of the third. All this while the 
Wyoming was under fire from the heavy shore batteries as 
well as the ships. Once the treacherous currents sent her 
aground so that for a while she lay helpless under a hot 
bombardment, but after a few minutes she pulled loose, and 
by accurate gun fire sank all three of the Japanese ships. 
Then McDougal turned his attention to the forts and com- 
pletely silenced them. Finally, having overcome the last 
trace of resistance, he took his ship out again by the same 
way that he had entered, only this time not a gun was fired. 

vSome months later the Japanese rebels repaired their 
forts and made a stubborn resistance, which the European 
powers had to help put down, but nothing impressed the 
Japanese imagination so much as the exploit of McDougal 
in the Wyoming. 

A Dutch steam-frigate had gone into the straits shortly 
before the Wyoming. She went on through into the In- 
land Sea with thirty-one shot-holes in her as souvenirs of 
Japanese marksmanship, and without accomplishing any- 
thing. On getting back to Holland the Dutch captain 
was knighted for his "gallantry," and all the crew were 
given medals. But McDougal, who, with a smaller ship, 
had gone into the straits and stayed till he had sunk the 
ships and silenced the forts, received from his countrymen 
nothing at all — scarcely a newspaper mention. So much 
was going on at home in that summer of 1863 that no one 
paid any attention to this brilliant exploit performed on 
the other side of the world. 

The Wyoming was not the only Union vessel which had 
been given the slip by the Alabama. There were several 
cruisers diligently scouring the seas ; but in the days when 
there were few cables, and when all the sentiment at 
foreign ports was in favor of the Confederate cruiser, it was 
the most difficult task to run her down. 

When the Alabama entered Cherbourg the United States 
minister to France telegraphed the news at once to Com- 
mander Winslow, of the U.S.S. Kearsarge, at that time 

209 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

lying off the little town of Flushing, Holland. The Kear- 
sarge promptly pulled up her "mud-hook" and steamed for 
Cherbourg. On approaching that port she steamed in 
close enough to enable Winslow to see the Alabama at her 
moorings, but he did not anchor, fearing that the twenty- 
four-hour rule would be applied by the French authorities. 
This means that if there are two hostile ships in a neutral 
harbor one must be detained till the other has been twenty- 
four hours at sea. So he steamed back and forth outside 
the breakwater, determined to wait all summer, if necessary, 
to make the Alabama fight. 

Meanwhile, Captain Semmes had the cool assurance to 
ask permission to use the government naval dock at 
Cherbourg for two months ; but that was going rather far, 
especially as the American minister made an indignant 
protest at once. So Semmes went ahead with the ordinary 
overhauling and coaling that he could attend to in any 
friendly port. Up to this time he had avoided fighting 
any of the Union cruisers because his business was destroy- 
ing commerce. But the French officers at Cherbourg, who 
were longing to see a fight, informed Semmes that the con- 
duct of the Kearsarge amounted to a "challenge," and that 
if he were a "man of honor" he could not avoid going out to 
fight. 

At the time of the war the dueling-code was still taken 
seriously in the Southern states, and this reference to 
"honor" touched Semmes on a tender spot, so he sent word 
out to Winslow that if he'd wait the Alabama would come 
out. In doing so Semmes had everything to lose and little 
to gain, because if he sank the Kearsarge there were many 
other Union cruisers to take her place, but the Confederacy 
had no other vessel to take the place of the Alabama. 
Probably Semmes counted on a victory, and hoped that a 
victory in European waters would raise the price of Con- 
federate bonds, which were beginning to sag on the market. 
He may have felt, too, like David Porter, of the Essex, 
that, since he had destroyed all the enemy's commerce he 

210 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

could reach, it would be a fine thing to wind up the cruise 
with the capture of a man-of-war. 

Meanwhile the Kearsarge steamed slowly back and forth 
off Cherbourg for five days. Shortly after ten o'clock on the 
morning of June 19, 1864, the Alabama left the harbor to 
meet the Kearsarge. As she came out she was accompanied 
by the French ironclad Couronne, whose business it was to 
see that the duel took place beyond the three-mile limit of 
French water along the coast. An English steam-yacht, 
the Deerhound, followed at a respectful distance in order 
for the owner and his family to enjoy the spectacle of a 
naval battle. Semmes had told of his intention to fight on 
Sunday — Sunday, by the way, was regarded by his crew as 
the Alabama's "lucky day" — so the enterprising railway 
managers ran excursion trains from Paris to bring the 
thousands who wanted to look on from the bluffs along the 
shore. 

The Kearsarge led the way out into the Channel. When 
both antagonists were well beyond the three-mile limit the 
Couronne returned to port, and when the Kearsarge had 
gone about eight miles off shore she turned about and 
headed for the Alabama. 

The battle opened at the range of about a mile, with the 
ships moving in circles about a common center, in order to 
prevent either side's gaining a raking position, and both 
using their starboard batteries. They continued this 
rotary movement to the end, while the tide carried them 
steadily westward. At long range the Alabama's huge 
rifled pivot-gun was much better than any of the smooth 
bores of the Kearsarge. In a few minutes a no-pound 
shell crashed into the Kearsarge' s stern-post near her screw, 
but, luckily for her, did not go off. This was the only 
serious wound received by the Union ship. 

As Semmes had shifted over an extra gun from the port 
side, the Alabama listed to starboard about two feet. This 
reduced her speed, and Winslow soon discovered that the 
Kearsarge could outsteam the Alabama. So he shortened 

212 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 










MOVEMENTS OF THE " ALABAMA " AND THE " KEARSARGE 



the distance to "point-blank" range, where his eleven- 
inch guns would be more effective, and the battle went on 
with heavy firing on both sides. 

At this shortened range the Kearsarge had the advantage, 
and the Alabama began to suffer badly. The lighter bat- 
teries of the Kearsarge were sweeping her spar-deck, while 
the heavy eleven-inch shells were exploding on her berth- 
deck and tearing great holes near the water-line. The firing 
of the Kearsarge from this stage of the fight to the end was 

213 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

one of the few instances of really good naval gunnery 
shown on either side during the Civil War. 

The fire of the Alabama seems to have been rather de- 
moralized by this severe punishment. Although the Con- 
federate officers themselves thought the poor effect of their 
shooting must have been due to damaged powder, yet the 
fact that the injuries received by the Kearsarge at this time 
were chiefly aloft — in the smoke-stack and the rigging — 
suggests that the aim was wild and high. The Alabama 
fired three broadsides to every one of the Kearsarge, but the 
deliberation of the Union gunners was well worth while. 

Realizing that he was beaten, Captain Semmes set sail to 
help him to reach the shelter of neutral waters, but Winslow 
checked that move by steaming between him and the coast. 
The Alabama was already filling, but an eleven-inch shell 
about this time gave her the death-blow. It exploded in the 
engine-room, let in a flood of water, and the Alabama 
settled rapidly. 

Semmes then struck his colors and passed the word for 
all hands to save themselves. The wounded were then 
despatched to the Kearsarge in one of the two serviceable 
boats. To the surprise of the Alabama' 's officers, the Kear- 
sarge fired again shortly after the colors were struck. At 
this Semmes was furiously indignant. At the same time 
Winslow and his officers were just as angry because they 
insisted that two of the Alabama's guns were fired after 
the flag came down, and backed up their statement by 
testimony from some of the prisoners. As Semmes con- 
tradicted this afterward, all one can say is that each captain 
honestly believed the other was guilty of bad faith. 

Meanwhile the yacht Deerhound came on the scene, and 
Winslow asked the owner to do what he could to help save 
life. Suddenly the Alabama's nose shot upward, and she 
plunged to the bottom, stern first, leaving most of her 
company, including Captain Semmes, struggling in the 
water. As only two of the Kearsarge' s boats were service- 
able after the battle — and those two stowed where they 

214 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

took some time to get overboard-Captain Window took 
every other means of saving the drowning men. He al- 
lowed Master's-Mate Fullam, who had come alongside with 
the Alabama's wounded, to go back and help rescue the 
survivors, on his word of honor to return to the Kearsarge^ 
Fullam promptly broke his word by taking his boat, with 
those whom he had picked up, to the Deerhound instead. 
Finally, with forty-two of the Alabama's officers and men 
on board, including Captain Semmes, the yacht edged away 
from the Kearsarge and then put on full speed for South- 
ampton. One officer alone, refusing to escape on the 
Deerhound, surrendered his sword to Captain Winslow as 
a point of honor. This was Second - Lieutenant Joseph 
Wilson; and Captain Winslow arranged for his immediate 
exchange, as a mark of his appreciation. 

Captain Semmes, after surrendering to the Kearsarge, had 
no right to escape on the Deerhound except for his firm 
belief that Captain Winslow had deliberately fired oil a 
surrendered ship, and had therefore forfeited all rights^ 
The Union captain was criticized at home because he had 
not fired on the Deerhound and taken off the prisoners by 
force, but that would have been another bad blunder like 
the case of the Trent. This Deerhound incident led to a 
new rule in international law. To-day in the same circum- 
stances a neutral vessel would be forced to surrender the 
rescued prisoners to the victor. 

After the battle of Mobile Bay we saw the pleasant re- 
union of Confederate and Union naval officers who had 
been friends before the war and were friends again in spite 
of the war. Captain Semmes had served many years ; in 
the navy before the war, but he had none of that kindly 
feeling. Perhaps because it was that he was the best- 
hated man in the Confederate service and had been called 
a "black-hearted, cowardly pirate" so often that he felt 
very bitter. At any rate, he had scarcely landed m 
England before he wrote indignant letters to the papers 
about Captain Winslow, full of much overheated nonsense 

215 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

quite unworthy of him. These provoked equally hot re- 
plies from the officers of the Kearsarge, and a lively news- 
paper fight went on for some time. But we do not need to 
dig it all up again here. 

Sympathy in England was, of course, almost entirely 
with Captain Semmes, and he was received everywhere as 
a great hero. This was perfectly natural ; for, as we have 
seen, the Confederacy was the popular cause, and Semmes 
had paralyzed the only commerce in the world that rivaled 
that of England. From one point of view the Alabama can 
hardly be considered as a Confederate ship at all. She had 
been built, armed, and equipped by Englishmen, her crew 
were nearly all Englishmen, and so, too, were several of her 
officers. It might be said that the Kearsarge had sunk an 
English ship, under a Confederate captain and Confederate 
colors. 

But England had to pay for her fun. The "Geneva 
Tribunal," which met in 1872 to settle by arbitration the 
claims made by the United States against Great Britain 
for permitting Confederate cruisers to be built in her ports, 
awarded a verdict of $15,500,000 to the United States. 
This amounted, with interest, to about sixteen millions. 
The sum more than covered all the actual damage done, 
but our commerce never revived after the war. Strange to 
say, it was not the Alabama, but our own government, 
which destroyed the American carrying-trade. 

After the war the ships that had gone temporarily under 
foreign colors for safety we refused to allow to come back 
under the American flag. We also refused to allow ships 
built abroad to fly the Stars and Stripes. And, since we 
began laying a heavy duty on the things needed to build 
and equip a merchantman, it became impossible for Amer- 
ican-built ships to compete with the cheaper ships of 
Europe. So, although the Alabama destroyed much and 
drove whole fleets of ships to cover during the Civil War, 
it is due to our own short-sighted politicians that since that 
time the American carrying-trade has vanished from the seas. 

216 



~^~~T~~^'WIM rT ~ 




XVII 

BLOCKADE-RUNNERS AND FORT FISHER 

Description of typical blockade-runner — Blockade duty — Attempts 
against Charleston — Importance of Fort Fisher — First attack — 
Second attack, the naval assault — Importance of the naval blockade 
in the Civil War. 

THE Confederate cruisers, especially the Alabama, did 
the commerce of the North a great deal of harm. 
But it was not the sort of harm that had any effect on 
the outcome of the war. The only military result was to 
keep several Union men-of-war busy hunting for them 
abroad instead of doing blockade duty at home. And all 
the damage done by the Shenandoah, another one of the 
English-built, English-manned cruisers, was just a needless 
waste. She destroyed the whaling fleet in the north 
Pacific, but did it after the war was over. 

There was another class of Confederate vessels, also 
English-built, which were not famous individually like the 
Alabama, but were far more important to the South than 
all the commerce-destroyers taken together. These were 
the blockade-runners. 

In an earlier chapter on the Civil War we saw that the 
South was wholly a farming country based on slave labor, 
and that manufactured things of every sort had to be either 
captured from the North, like the cannon in the Norfolk 
Navy Yard, or bought from England. Since Lee's two 
attempts to invade the North had failed, one at Antietam 
and the other at Gettysburg, the South was forced to de- 
pend entirely on England for the things that the soldiers 

218 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

needed. To pay for them the Confederacy had little cash, 
but plenty of cotton, which was just as good. In those 
days cotton grew nowhere else but in the Southern states, 
and it was a staple needed by all the world. 

It was the business of the blockading fleet to stop this 
exchange of cotton for manufactured goods, but that was 
a slow and difficult task. Besides the long coast line, with 
its countless harbors, little and big, which had to be block- 
aded, there were the British island possessions, the Ber- 
mudas, the Bahamas, and Jamaica, which lay at the very 
door of the South. The nearest and most important town 
in these islands was Nassau, in the Bahamas. Here the 
British merchant steamers could land their cargoes for the 
Confederacy without interference from the North. Then 
these cargoes would be transferred to swift little steamers 
known as blockade-runners, which would dash through the 
long straggling line of Union ships to some port in the 
Confederate States. A few days later the same boats 
would come rushing back to Nassau, their decks stacked 
high with the precious cotton bales. 

As the business soon developed a special type of steamer 
we must pause to see what she was like. The typical 




A BLOCKADE-RUNNER 



blockade-runner was a small, side- wheel steamer capable 
of making great speed for those days. She had a shallow 
draught in order that she might slip over bars and shoals 

219 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

or hug the shore in waters where the blockading ships 
could not follow. 

In order that she might be as nearly invisible as possible 
she was painted a slaty gray; her raking masts had no 
yards — just a tiny crow's-nest for the lookout. As she 
swam low in the water, she had a "turtle-back" forward 
deck to enable her to weather heavy seas. Her smoke- 
stacks were so built that they could be "telescoped" or 
flattened almost to the deck. As smoke is the worst thing 
to betray a steamer, the blockade -runner burned only 
hard coal. The result was that these little vessels were 
very hard to see at a distance even in broad daylight, and 
they offered such a small target that they were very hard to 
hit as they dashed by at full speed. 

Naturally, the problem was still more difficult when the 
blockade-runners "ran" the blockading fleet at night, as 
they usually did. Then they showed no lights whatever, 
steam was blown off under water, and there was nothing 
but the faint splash of the paddle-wheels to betray them. 
The officers on these little craft had all sorts of clever tricks, 
too, for dodging and fooling the Union fleet. Of course, the 
blockade - runners were always helped by signal - lights 
displayed on shore. 

It was risky work, but many of these little craft made 
trips as regularly as if running on schedule, up to the last 
year of the war. There was so much dashing excitement 
in the work and such huge profits, besides, that many 
English naval officers got leave and went into blockade- 
running under assumed names. In those days it was not 
unusual for the captain of a blockade-runner to be paid as 
much as £1,000 for one round trip between Nassau and a 
Southern port. When cotton sold in the South at eight 
cents a pound and in Liverpool at fifty cents a pound it is 
easy to see that it needed only a few successful trips to 
make the owners of a blockade-runner rich. In fact, if one 
of these little vessels was chased ashore or sunk on its 
third venture the profits had been enough on the other two 

220 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

runs to leave the owners comfortably on the right side of 
the ledger. 

As the Union navy buckled down to the task of catching 
these nimble little enemies the forces were divided into two 
parts. Close about the ports and along the shore ranged 
the blockading ships proper, while well out to sea cruised 
a "flying squadron." The blockade-runner might pick the 
darkest night for slipping through the blockade in or out of 
port, but she had to reckon with these other ships in bright 
daylight somewhere near the paths to Nassau or Jamaica. 

For the blockading fleet the duty was very wearing. 
Month after month the vessels steamed back and forth on 
their "beats," the officers and men always on a strain of 
watching, and often without even the glimpse of a blockade- 
runner to break the monotony for weeks at a time. It was 
particularly bad during the hot summer months when 
nothing would keep fresh aboard ship and the heat was 
intolerable. Since those were the days before the scientific 
canning and refrigerating of food, officers and men had to 
live chiefly on salt meat, and scurvy became a far greater 
danger than the shore batteries or torpedoes of the enemy. 
There was little excitement and no glory in blockading, but 
in all the operations of the North there was no duty more 
important, and it was faithfully performed. By the end 
of the war the blockading squadrons had taken over 
eleven hundred and fifty ships, representing with their 
cargoes a value of thirty million dollars. 

Meanwhile, as the ships patrolled back and forth along the 
coast other squadrons were, as we have seen, attacking and 
capturing important seaports of the South, like Port Royal, 
New Orleans, and Mobile Bay. Charleston had been the 
starting-point of the Civil War, and the Northern people 
were very anxious to have that city surrender to the 
Union navy. 

Accordingly, after taking Port Royal DuPont was or- 
dered to capture Charleston, and he was sent a number of 
monitors to help as soon as they were put in commission. 
15 221 



THE STORY OF-OUR NAVY 

But he soon realized that he had a formidable task. Natu- 
rally, the Southerners had as much interest in holding 
Charleston as the Northerners had in capturing it. Be- 
sides the natural defenses of sand-bars and crooked chan- 
nels in Charleston harbor, the Confederates had at this 
point strong forts, aided by torpedoes, ironclads, and a 
large army. There was no chance to run by these de- 
fenses, as there had been at New Orleans and Mobile Bay, 
because the harbor was simply a pocket. 

After several tests DuPont discovered that it was hope- 
less to attempt to capture the port by naval bombardment. 
Accordingly, he reported that Charleston could be taken 




MAP OF CHARLESTON HARBOR 
222 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

only by an army operating in the rear. Meanwhile he had 
maintained a good blockade. He had destroyed the Con- 
federate ram Atlanta and the cruiser Nashville. The only 
vessel he had lost was a monitor which had been sunk by 
the fire of Fort Sumter during one of those useless naval 
bombardments which DuPont had been ordered to make 
contrary to his judgment. But the Northern newspapers 
berated him as a failure because he had not forced Charles- 
ton to surrender. So DuPont was recalled, and Dahlgren 
was sent to take his place. 

Rear- Admiral Dahlgren was famous as the inventor of the 
Dahlgren gun, the favorite type of smooth-bore cannon 
used on ships during the Civil War. As soon as Dahlgren 
arrived he saw that DuPont was right, that Charleston 
could not be taken by any naval force that the North could 
spare. In spite of the nagging he got from the arm-chair 
war experts in the North he very sensibly refused to repeat 
a useless bombardment. When Charleston fell, in Feb- 
ruary, 1865, the capture was brought about, just as DuPont 
had predicted, by a Union army attacking in the rear. 

There was another harbor which, toward the end of the 
war, was much more valuable to the Confederate armies 
than Charleston. This was the mouth of the Cape Fear 
River, the port of Wilmington, North Carolina. The many 
shoals off the river-mouth, which made the place dangerous 
of approach for the Northern men-of-war, offered no obstacle 
to the little blockade-runners. In 1864, as other ports were 
taken or tightly closed by the blockade, Wilmington be- 
came more and more important to the Confederacy. 
Blockade-runners brought in enormous quantities of food, 
clothing, ammunition, cannon, and rifles from Nassau and 
carried back bales of cotton in payment. Toward the end 
of the year Wilmington became the last source of supplies 
for Lee's army and did a tremendous business. It was 
therefore essential for the North to get control at that 
point. 

Naturally, the Confederates were just as alive to the 

223 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

necessity of holding Wilmington for the South. They had 
constructed at the mouth of the river a large earthwork 
called Fort Fisher. This lay at the end of a long peninsula, 
with one side facing the sea, and another side built at right 
angles and extending across the neck of land to the river 
in order to defend the fort from any approach by land. 
Nothing was spared to make it the strongest fort in the 
Confederacy. The walls were twenty-five feet thick and 
mounted forty-four guns. In front was a log palisade with 
loopholes for rifle fire, and beyond lay buried a quantity of 
torpedoes. To protect the gunners in the fort there were 
bomb-proof chambers. 

It was an immense fortification, well designed and care- 
fully built, but its defenders had their difficulties. There 
were less than two thousand soldiers to man the work, with 
only a small supply of ammunition for the guns. For their 
best gun, a 150-pounder rifle, they had only thirteen shells. 
Furthermore, the very thickness of the walls made it neces- 
sary for the men to expose themselves on top of the parapet 
if they wanted to see anything within a hundred feet of the 
fort. 

On December 20, 1864, Admiral David D. Porter arrived 
off Fort Fisher with about sixty vessels — in fact, more men- 
of-war than had ever before been collected under the 
American flag. He was accompanied by General Butler, 
commanding sixty-five hundred soldiers. Three days 
later, to please General Butler, an old gunboat loaded with 
two hundred and thirty-five tons of powder was towed 
under the fort by a monitor, the idea being to blow a big 
hole in the fort by the explosion of the powder. The rest of 
the fleet retreated to a safe distance till the clockwork de- 
vice set off the charge. When that happened there was an 
explosion that shook earth and water, but all the damage 
it did to Fort Fisher was to crack a pane of glass or two in 
the barracks. 

If Butler's gunpowder plot proved a fizzle, it was no 
worse than his land attack which followed. All day on 

224 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the 24th the fleet rained projectiles on the fort without inter- 
ruption. The next day the troops were landed to attack 
the fort by the land face, but Butler only looked around the 
corner and came back, saying that "the place cannot be 
carried by assault." Meanwhile, during the bombardment, 
the Confederates had kept snugly in their bomb-proofs, so 
that nothing had been accomplished for the Union, after all. 

But Porter was not the man to be balked by one failure. 
He asked General Grant for a better type of military com- 
mander than Butler, and Grant responded by sending 
General Terry, a gallant and able ofhcer. Meanwhile the 
fleet retired to Beaufort for replenishing stores and repair- 
ing engines. In a fortnight the ships were back before Fort 
Fisher again. The Confederates made the most of the 
two weeks' respite by strengthening their defenses. 

The two commanders, Porter and Terry, decided that 
the army should attack the fort at the northwest angle, and 
at the same time, in order to divert the attention of the 
defenders, a naval brigade should make an assault on the 
sea face as well. This, as everybody knew, was going to be 
a very dangerous undertaking, and, instead of ordering 
officers and men for the duty, Porter called for volunteers. 
But as whole ship's companies came forward as volunteers, 
the members of the assaulting party had to be detailed, 
after all. 

All day on January 14th the fleet bombarded the fort 
again. On the following morning the naval brigade was 
landed about a mile and a half from the northeast angle of 
Fort Fisher. The landing was accomplished under cover 
of a fire from the ironclads, which moved close inshore for 
the purpose. All the while, since dawn, the rest of the 
fleet had kept up a merciless bombardment. This had 
permitted a detachment of men to dig rifle-pits near the 
fort, with the idea of filling them with marines, whose rifle 
fire was to keep the Confederates down from their parapets 
till the bluejackets were at close quarters. 

The fire of the fleet had done good service. Every gun 

225 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

on the sea face but one had been dismounted, the stockade 
had been wrecked, and the elaborate system of under- 
ground torpedoes cut to pieces. Early in the afternoon the 
divisions on shore formed into line and advanced to a point 
about half a mile from the fort. About three o'clock the 




NEW INLET 



FORT FISHER 

"Line of advance" indicates the march of the army. 



order to charge was signaled by the whistles of the fleet, 
and the men went forward on the run. When the brigade 
was about half-way toward the fort the fleet ceased firing, 
and instantly the garrison swarmed up on the parapet and 
poured a murderous rifle fire on the advancing columns. 

226 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

The officers, eager to set an example to their men, had all 
pressed forward in the lead, and the rear divisions of ma- 
rines, struck by the sudden hail of bullets before they 
reached the rifle-pits that had been dug for them, broke and 
retreated in disorder, with no officers to rally them. This 
left the bluejackets without the support of the rifle fire 
from the marines, and since by a great blunder the sailors 
had been armed only with the pistol and cutlass, they were 
helpless under the muskets of the Confederate garrison. 
Three times, however, they rallied and ran forward toward 
the parapet, but they were shot down like sheep. The 
officers especially showed splendid courage, rallying their 
men under fire and setting a good example by pressing on 
in advance till some of them actually got inside the stockade 
at the foot of the parapet. 

By a miracle Captain Breeze, the commander of the naval 
brigade, was unhurt, though he stood waving his sword in 
the very front of his men, trying in vain to rally his broken 
columns. The slaughter was very severe, and the attack 
faltered, crumpled up at the line of the stockade, and 
surged back. Those who were able to get back ran around 
and joined the columns of infantry which were charging 
the northwest salient at the same time. A few of the 
survivors crawled to the rifle-pits or flattened out behind 
some hillock of sand and kept up a sputtering fire on the 
fort. Among those who penetrated within the stockade 
at the head of the column was a young midshipman who 
lay badly wounded and helpless and a target for sharp- 
shooters in the fort. A marine named Wasmouth at the 
risk of his life picked up the midshipman and carried him 
to a place of comparative safety. A few minutes later the 
brave man was shot dead. The midshipman finally re- 
covered from his wounds and became famous later as 
"Fighting Bob Evans." 

There was another act of self-sacrifice that ought to be 
remembered. A young assistant surgeon named William 
Longshaw discovered a wounded sailor lying helpless in 

227 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the sand, with the incoming tide lapping about him and 
threatening to drown him in a few minutes. He sprang 
to his feet and, paying no attention to the bullets that sang 
past his head, dragged the sailor up to a place of safety and 
did what he could for his wounds. A wounded marine was 
lying with another group that still kept up a rifle fire from 
behind a hillock of sand. 

"Surgeon," he cried, "can you look at my wounds, sir?" 

Longshaw ran to him, and just as he was in the act of 
bandaging the man he was shot dead. That very day he 
had received his leave of absence, but had volunteered for 
the assault. 

The attack of the naval brigade had failed because it had 
been beaten back by a concentrated rifle fire to which the 
sailors were unable to reply. But it was successful in that 
it led the Confederates to believe that the naval brigade 
was making the main assault. 

This diversion made it possible for the army to get a 
foothold at the northwestern angle of the fort before the 
defenders could concentrate at that point. Although this 
is naval rather than military history, we must pause a 
moment to speak of the superb courage of those veterans 
of the Army of the Potomac as they slowly fought their way 
from one line of defense, from one gun to another, and the 
equally gallant and stubborn resistance of the Confederates, 
who contested every inch of the way. Some bastions were 
captured and recaptured five or six times before the men 
in blue poured over them in triumph. Darkness came on, 
but the battle raged only with sharper fury, and it was not 
till ten o'clock that evening that the brave defenders yielded. 
Then from the parapet flashed a signal-lantern, and as the 
waiting fleet spelled out, "The fort is ours," men cheered 
from ship to ship and guns of the whole fleet thundered a 
mighty salute. 

The fortress had been captured with a loss of nearly a 
thousand men in killed, wounded, and missing, but the cost 
was small compared with the result. Its capture meant 

228 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the speedy fall of Wilmington and the end of blockade- 
running for the Confederacy. Not even Richmond was so 
important to the South in the winter of '64-6$ as Wilming- 
ton. With Wilmington lost, there was no other source of 
supplies left open, and from that moment Lee's army was 
doomed. As we all know, the war was practically ended 
when Lee's ragged and hungry troops surrendered at 
Appomattox the following April. 

In this great conflict the Confederates had a real ad- 
vantage at the outset in military matters. They had 
trained and experienced officers in plenty. The men of the 
South were accustomed to the use of arms and an out-of- 
door life, they were fighting on their own soil, and the fact 
that there were slaves at home to work the plantations 
made it possible for almost every white man in the South 
to be conscripted into the Confederate armies. But in 
naval affairs the Confederates were at great disadvantage. 
They had brilliant naval officers, to be sure, but dependence 
on slave labor left the South without seamen, mechanics, 
shipyards, or engine-works. It is a tribute to the energy 
and resourcefulness of the Confederate naval officers that 
their famous "rams" did so well, in view of the enormous 
difficulties attending their construction. But it was hope- 
less to try to rival the resources of the North, backed by a 
determination to "see the war through." 

When the news of the downfall of the Confederacy 
reached England a cartoon came out in Punch depicting the 
end of a gladiatorial combat. The prostrate South was 
represented as the gladiator with the helmet and the 
short sword, the victorious North was the one with the 
trident and net. In this picture the trident and net stood 
for sea power. Only in later years have we come to realize 
the full truth of the cartoon — namely, that the deciding 
factor in that great struggle was the control of the sea held 
by the North. If the trade between cotton and supplies 
had gone on the South could have kept on fighting in- 
definitely. As this trade was steadily narrowed down by 

229 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

the Union fleet the Confederacy grew weaker, till the fall 
of Fort Fisher left the South helpless. Only once was the 
sea power of the North seriously threatened, and that was 
the day of the Merrimac s overwhelming victory over the 
wooden ships in Hampton Roads. For the rest of the war 
the story of the navy is one of an ever-increasing effective- 
ness, of one port taken after another, and of a more and 
more compact wall of ships between the Confederacy and 
the outside world. In 1865 the blockade held unchallenged 
sway from Cairo, Illinois — for the Mississippi River was an 
important part of the line — all the way round to Fortress 
Monroe. As we have seen, the work was dull and hard, 
with much sickness and little chance for glory, but we must 
remember that, after all, it was the naval blockade that 
counted most in saving the Union. 



XVIII 

THIRTY YEARS OF PEACE 

Decay of the navy after the war — Beginnings of the "new navy" — 
— Wreck and rescue of the Saginaw — Jeanne tte expedition — Samoan 
hurricane. 

THE long period of galleys — ships of war propelled by 
oars — came to an end about the time of the Great 
Armada. Then followed three hundred years in which the 
sail was supreme. The period of the sail gave way in turn 
to the era of steam at the time of our Civil War. The 
change from oars to canvas came gradually, but the 
transition from sail to steam was sudden and swift. And 
steam was not the only innovation. With it came the 
long-ranged rifle-gun, the armor, the ram, and the torpedo, 
so that ten years in the middle of the nineteenth century 
revolutionized naval warfare far more than the preceding 
three hundred years had done. 

During the Civil War the rivalry of North and South 
rapidly developed ironclads and torpedoes in advance of 
anything in European navies. But with the close of the 
great struggle the United States dropped back to the very 
end of the procession. The country was weary of the 
burden of war and its costly armaments, and reduced the 
army and navy at once to a peace footing. In the case of 
the navy there was good reason for cutting down the fleet. 
A great number of vessels carried on the naval list were old 
ferry-boats or river -steamers hastily transformed into 
gunboats. Others had been hurriedly built from unsea- 
soned timber, and still more were too badly designed to be 
worth keeping. 

231 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

But, while Congress weeded out the unfit, it neglected to 
replace them with vessels of a modern type. In this 
policy Congress only reflected the indifference of the whole 
country. People could not see why we should have an 
army or a navy in times of peace, and both were so reduced 
that Thomas Nast, the famous cartoonist of Harper's 
Weekly, used to represent these two arms of the service as 
skeletons. The sad story of Custer and his men would 
never have been told if our soldiers had been equipped 
with the modern repeating-rifles which the Indians owned, 
instead of the old-fashioned Sharp's rifle of Civil War 
days. 

No such tragedy as the Custer massacre befell the navy, 
because the navy was not called on to fight, but one hates 
to think what might have happened if war had suddenly 
broken out at any time during the twenty-five years that 
followed the Civil War. In the year 1 88 1 the United States 
navy was weaker than at any time in our history since the 
days when Barbary pirates demanded tribute as the price 
of peace. In 1881 the navy contained not one ironclad, and 
consisted mainly of worm-eaten relics from Civil War 
days or earlier. Our naval officers had to make cruises 
on ships like the Powhatan, a side-wheeler built in the forties, 
or the Constitution, a frigate of 1797, and bear the ridicule 
of the whole world. The guns on these old tubs were the 
muzzle-loading smooth-bores of the Civil War. 

But the year 1881 marks also the beginning of a change 
of public opinion about the navy. The weakness of our 
fleet was felt when we were on the verge of war with Spain 
in 1873, and again in 1880 when France went ahead to dig 
a canal in Panama without any respect for the Monroe 
Doctrine. When Vice-President Arthur became President 
he urged in strong terms the need of a modern navy; and, 
although he was hindered by the indifference of Congress, 
he finally succeeded in making a beginning. The act of 
March 3, 1883, provided for four steel ships, the cruisers 
Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, and the gunboat Dolphin. These 

232 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

were the first of the "White Squadron," and mark the 
beginning of the "new navy." 

When work on these vessels was begun it was realized 
that there were no facilities in the United States for mak- 
ing the necessary steel plates or manufacturing the guns. 
But in five years the prospect of building steel ships of war 
at home developed manufacturing-plants to supply every 
detail of construction needed. In 1885 four more vessels 
were ordered — the cruisers Charleston and Newark and the 
gunboats Petrel and Yorktown. The Charleston was the 
first of our navy to abandon the old-fashioned masts with 
yards and sails for the simple "military mast." Every 
succeeding year saw new ships ordered, and in 1890 Con- 
gress took a forward step by authorizing the construction 
of three first-class battle-ships — the Indiana, the Massa- 
chusetts, and the Oregon. Finally, our naval successes in 
the war with Spain in 1898 gave the navy such an impetus 
that we now rank among the foremost naval powers of the 
world. 

The period of over thirty years and more between the 
Civil War and the war with Spain is too long to cover in 
detail, but a few incidents can be selected to show that, 
miserable as were our ships and guns during that period 
of neglect, the phrase "naval decay" must not apply to 
the officers and men. The traditions of Jones, Macdon- 
ough, and Farragut were as scrupulously honored in the 
eighties, when nobody cared about the navy, as in the six- 
ties, when the nation depended on the navy to strangle the 
Confederacy. Before the Spanish War only as many 
graduates of the Naval Academy were commissioned as 
were needed to fill the vacancies in the list. These men, 
of course, were selected from the top of the class, and the 
rest were retired to civil life. The result was a navy 
personnel of picked men. 

- The three incidents told here cover this "period of 
neglect" at about ten-year intervals. The first is the 
story of the Saginaw. On October 29, 1870, the little 

233 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

steam-sloop Saginaw finished her appointed task of dredg- 
ing a channel for mail-steamers at Midway Island in the 
Pacific, and Captain Sicard turned her bows toward 
Ocean Island, sixty miles away, about which he had been 
ordered to make a report. During the night a strong 
ocean current drew the Saginaw out of her course, and 
about three in the morning a sudden crash sent all hands 
on deck with a rush. From the deck officers and men were 
driven into the rigging for safety, because huge breakers 
were curling and breaking right over the bulwarks. A 
few minutes of this pounding served to drive the ship 
higher up on the reef, so that men could return to the 
deck. 

It was a time to try the discipline of the ship. Nothing 
could be seen in the darkness, and every boat on the 
weather side was smashed. Suddenly the smoke-stack 
fell over, and a few minutes later the loosened mainmast 
went by the board. Dawn showed that the vessel had 
been driven on a reef of Ocean Island itself. By that time 
the ship had broken in two, with the forward half driven 
still higher on the reef, but the sight of the island gave hope 
to the crew, and they worked with a will to launch the 
undamaged boats. 

All that day officers and men toiled to save as much of 
the ship's provisions as they could, together with the car- 
penter's chest and the sailors' hammocks, which served 
as tents. When the shipwrecked men had time to examine 
the island they found it was simply a low sand-spit covered 
with bushes. There was no spring on the island, the 
water reached by digging proved to be brackish, and for a 
while it looked as if the seventy officers and men of the 
Saginaw had escaped death in the breakers only to face a 
more dreadful death from thirst. Here the trained mind 
of an officer came to the rescue. By means of the ship's 
boiler and some rubber hose he devised a condenser which 
was able to provide forty or fifty gallons a day. The fuel for 
the condenser was supplied by the bleached timbers of an 

234 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

old whaler that had been wrecked on the island many years 
before. For food, the supply rescued from the ship was 
carefully saved and doled out to officers and men at quarter 
rations. The rest had to be made up by fish and seal meat, 
both of which proved unwholesome. 

For the time being the shipwrecked men were safe, but 
the fuel supplied by the whaler could not last for ever, and 
the stock of provisions was scant. Moreover, Ocean Island 
was so far from the track of steamers that there was small 
chance of rescue. Something must be done to get help or 
all would perish together. So Captain Sicard decided to 
fit out one of the boats saved from the Saginaw and send 
her with a volunteer crew to the Hawaiian Islands, twelve 
hundred miles away, to get help. 

As soon as he proposed the plan volunteers pressed 
eagerly forward for the perilous undertaking. From these 
he selected Lieut. John Talbot and four sturdy seamen. 
The boat was only twenty-six feet long, but it was the 
best available. She was decked over with painted canvas, 
leaving only a little cockpit open. A few navigating-in- 
struments, twenty-five days' provisions, and ninety gallons 
of water were put aboard, and, just three weeks after the 
Saginaw struck the reef the little gig spread sail for the 
Hawaiian Islands. Scarcely had the boat been five days 
on its way when the heavy seas put out the little fire that 
was kept on board and drenched all the matches, so that 
thereafter there was no way of drying clothes or cooking 
food. For the rest of the voyage the food had to be eaten 
raw and soggy with salt-water, with the result that Lieuten- 
ant Talbot and his men were miserably sick for days and 
weeks at a time. Meanwhile the weather grew steadily 
worse. The pounding waves started leaks in the canvas 
decking, and soon there was not a dry spot in the boat. 
Twice the little cockle-shell had to lie to with an improvised 
sea-anchor to keep from swamping in the fearful seas. 
Twice this drag broke loose, leaving the sick crew battling 
for their lives to keep afloat. Three such gales were en- 

235 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

countered. Finally, at the end of thirty-eight days, during 
which the boat had covered a course of nearly sixteen 
hundred miles, one of the Hawaiian Islands was sighted. 
Even then the weather was so rough that the gig had to be 
kept offshore for three days before Talbot dared to risk 
a landing. On December 19th, about dawn, the boat was 
caught by just such a current as had wrecked the Saginaw 
herself and was sucked in among the breakers on the shore. 
Over and over they tossed and rolled the tiny craft, and the 
men were too weak with sickness and exhaustion to strug- 
gle long. Out of the five only one, Coxswain Halford, 
staggered ashore alive. In his arms he dragged one of his 
mates, but the man soon died after reaching the shore. As 
quickly as he could Halford sent the news of the Saginaiv's 
plight to Honolulu. Soon afterward the anxious watchers 
on Ocean Island caught a faint streak of smoke on the 
horizon, then with a great cheer they saw that a relief 
steamer was actually coming at last. 

The only lives lost in the wreck of the Saginaw were those 
of the four who perished in the little gig on its errand of 
rescue. The boat itself hangs now in the Seamanship 
Building at the Naval Academy; and in the Memorial Hall 
of the midshipmen's great dormitory stands a tablet, placed 
there by the officers of the Saginaw, to the memory of Lieut. 
John Talbot. The inscription ends with this fitting quo- 
tation: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man 
lay down his life for his friends." 

In the next story the scene shifts from the Pacific to the 
snowbound wilderness of northern Siberia. The navy had 
been engaged in polar exploration before the Civil War. 
Captain Wilkes, who very nearly got us into war with 
England over his seizure of the Trent, was the first to dis- 
cover the existence of the antarctic continent in 1840. In 
1850 two ships, under Lieutenant de Haven, joined in the 
vain search for Sir John Franklin's party. Both of these 
vessels were frozen in the arctic ice-pack and drifted with 

236 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

it eight months over a thousand miles before they got free 
under a midsummer sun. 

The Civil War interrupted exploration for the navy, 
but interest in finding the north pole revived after the war 
was over. In 1879 James Gordon Bennett, proprietor of 
the New York Herald, contributed funds to co-operate with 
the government in an expedition to discover the north 
pole The idea was to use a hitherto untried route. It 
was known that in Bering Straits the Japanese Current 
splits into two branches, one turning south along the 
western coast of North America, and the other veering 
northeast into the arctic circle. It was planned to follow 
this northerly current toward the pole. 

Accordingly, the steamer Jeannette left San Francisco in 
the summer of 1879, under the command of Lieutenant- 
Commander C. W. de Long, on a preliminary voyage of 
exploration before attempting the dash for the pole. But 
scarcely had the little vessel passed Bering Straits when she 
was met by huge ice-floes which forced her away to the west. 
De Long decided that he would winter on Wrangell Land, 
which in those days was supposed to be a huge arctic con- 
tinent, but before the end of the first week of September the 
Jeannette was frozen solid in the ice-floes. A steady- 
westerly drift carried her along past Wrangell Land, which 
then proved to be only a comparatively small island. Then 
the arctic-winter night shut down on the imprisoned ship^. 
Every day the grinding, cracking masses of ice threatened 
to crush the vessel like a nutshell, and there was no way of 
escape. Month after month of frightful cold, hardship, and 
peril dragged by. 

With the return of the sun and the long summer days the 
explorers confidently hoped that they should get free as 
Lieutenant de Haven's ships had done at the end of their 
long winter's drifting. But not even the July sunshine 
could release the Jeannette from her icy prison. To the 
despair of all, September came again with no escape. 
Another dreadful winter had to be lived through, and this 
16 2 37 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

time there was much sickness on board. Under the con- 
ditions it took all of a man's nerve to keep from giving way 
to despair. Again all hope was fixed on the prospect of 
better luck when another summer came. Meanwhile the 
men were confronted with the hourly danger of being ship- 
wrecked and stranded by the ice, but the stout little ship 
stood the strain throughout the winter. At last the long 
days of June brought thawing, the floes shrank and fell 
away, but instead of freeing the Jeannette on an even keel 
the shifting ice crushed her hull and sank her. The 
officers and crew had only time to escape to the ice with 
some provisions, sledges, and three boats. This disaster 
occurred on the 12th of June, 1881. 

The point where the Jeannette foundered was in the 
midst of the Arctic Ocean, north of Siberia. The nearest 
source of help was the scattered villages around the Lena 
Delta, five hundred miles away. There was nothing for 
the castaways to do but to try to reach that point by boat, 
wherever there was open water; otherwise, by marching 
over the ice, dragging the boats after them. It looked like 
a hopeless undertaking, but it offered the only chance of 
escape. The natural hardships were added to by the fact 
that when the Jeannette was wrecked two of the officers and 
three of the men were sick, their provisions were scanty, and 
their boots and clothing worn through. Then, as if these 
troubles were not enough, although the party tramped 
steadily southwest, the northerly drift of the ice-floes took 
them twenty-eight miles in the opposite direction before 
they could make a single mile southward. 

It was exactly three months after the shipwreck when 
the party reached the delta of the Lena River. There the 
three boats were separated by a gale. Chief-Engineer 
Melville, in command of the whale-boat, managed to enter 
one of the mouths of the river. After indescribable suffer- 
ings he and his nine men reached a little Siberian village on 
its banks. One of his men went insane from the effects of 
exhaustion, starvation, and cold. 

238 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

The second cutter must have foundered in the gale, for 
nothing more was ever heard of it. De Long, in the first 
cutter, containing the surgeon and twelve men, also suc- 
ceeded in entering the river, and continued southward. 
Unfortunately, no one of the party knew just where the 
Siberian villages were, and it was their misfortune not to 
encounter a single native. They landed, and then, as they 
were on the verge of starvation, De Long sent his two 
strongest men to go on up the river ahead and find help. 
The others plodded slowly after. 

By the end of October these two messengers, almost 
dead from starvation, tottered into a village. They gave a 
despatch scrawled in pencil to one of the natives to be 
carried to the nearest Russian official. But the man, 
having heard of Melville's arrival in a neighboring village, 
carried the message to him instead. At that time Melville 
was in such a condition from frost-bitten limbs and feet 
that he was unable to stand. By that time, too, the early 
Siberian winter had set in, but Melville knew only one line 
of duty, to try to rescue his shipmates. He made up a 
sledging party, had himself placed on a sledge, and started 
for the village where the two sailors were. With them as 
guides he started out to find De Long and his men. Here 
and there he discovered traces left by the party, but lost the 
clue because De Long had toward the end of his march 
crossed on the ice to the opposite bank. On November 
14th a blizzard overwhelmed the rescuers and came very 
near blotting out the lives of the entire party. 

As soon as conditions permitted the next spring Melville 
set out again, and on March 23, 1882, discovered the bodies 
of De Long and his men. The last entry in De Long's diary 
was October 30, 188 1. It told of the death from starvation 
of two and the dying condition of a third. Probably all 
were dead by the first of November. In order that the 
scientific observations and records of the Jeannette might 
not be lost De Long had put them in an inside pocket and 
used his last remaining strength to crawl to a little higher 

?39 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ground near the camp. Then he braced his arm upward in 
the snow, evidently so that his body might be more readily 
discovered. 

These records of the Jeannette — whatever their scien- 
tific value — were paid for at a dreadful price of brave men. 
But it is a proud thing for us to realize that during those 
years of suffering in the arctic, ending in slow death by cold 
and starvation, there was never a whimper. As men they 
worked together and sacrificed themselves for one another; 
as men they suffered, and as men they died. So the little 
Jeannette has taken her place in the honor list of the 
American navy. 

The third story brings us again to the Pacific. In 1888 
the German government interfered very seriously with 
affairs in the Samoan Islands. It deposed one king and 
set up another in his place. The natives refused to submit 
to this new king and showed fight. In December, 1888, 
German sailors landed under arms, but were met by such a 
determined resistance from the natives that they drew back 
to their ships with a loss of fifty killed and wounded. 
Then Germany declared war, and England and the United 
States sent ships to protect their interests in the islands. 

In March, 1889, there were ships representing these three 
nations in the harbor of Apia. This is a small semicircular 
bay opening on the north, with a coral reef extending in 
front from east to west. A break in the reef about a 
quarter of a mile wide serves as entrance and exit for the 
harbor. Within the harbor is scant anchoring - ground, 
because from the east shore there is a wide mud-shoal, and 
from the opposite side projects another reef that reaches 
out into the middle of the bay, as may be seen from the 
map. Here were collected three German men-of-war — 
the Olga, the Eber, the Adler; three American — the Tren- 
ton, the Vanaalia, the Nipsic ; one English^-the Calliope. 
Owing to the cramped space in the harbor, the Trenton 
and the Vandalia anchored in the harbor entrance. 

240 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

After several weeks of bad weather the wind rose on 
March 15 th to a heavy gale. As the day wore on the wind 
only increased in fury, and all the men-of-war made ready 
by housing their upper spars and getting up steam. By 
night the storm was a hurricane, with the war-ships pitch- 
ing and jerking at their anchor-cables. About midnight 
the Eber began dragging anchors, and an hour later the 
Vandalia was in the same condition, both using their 
steam to keep from drifting upon the inner reef or colliding 
with the other vessels. 

Daybreak found all the ships dragging anchors and 
drifting down upon the inner reef. The Eber seemed 
utterly helpless. Suddenly she was hurled upon the reef 
by the great combing breakers, rolled over on her side, 
and in a few minutes smashed to pieces. By this time the 
Samoans had gathered on the shore, and, though the Ger- 
mans were their enemies, the instant they saw the plight 
of the Eber they grasped hands and made a human life- 
line — standing far out in the surf where no white man 
could have lived — and hauled in the few survivors who 
came ashore. Only one officer and four men of the Eber 
were saved. 

The next ship to strike the reef was the Adler, but the 
hull was driven so high out of the water that all but twenty 
were saved by staying in the wreck out of the reach of the 
breakers. Meanwhile the Nipsic' s anchors were dragging 
badly; and just as her crew were sending over an eight-inch 
gun at the end of a hawser as an additional anchor, the 
Nip sic was struck by the 01 ga, which knocked the smoke- 
stack of the American vessel over and left her without 
sufficient steam to head the gale. The Nipsic then turned 
and, with what steam she had, sheered along the inner reef, 
cleared it successfully, and ran upon the beach. Then, at 
the greatest peril of their own lives, the Samoans managed 
to rescue the Americans from the forecastle of the Nipsic 
in the very teeth of the tremendous surf. 

For a while the four larger men-of-war — the Olga, the 

241 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 




HARBOR OF APIA 



Trenton, the Calliope ■, and the Vandalia — were still afloat 
and off the reef. The gale, however, was, if anything, more 
terrific than before, and the big vessels began to show 
distress. About ten in the morning the Trenton was help- 
less. Floating wreckage had knocked off her rudder and 
propellers, and she was drifting slowly upon the inner reef. 
At the same time the Vandalia and the Calliope were 
dragging, too. It looked as if all three vessels would soon 
be together in collision just on the very edge of the reef. 

In this crisis Captain Kane, of the Calliope, made a 
quick decision, on which depended his ship and the lives of 
all his men. He would let go his cables and try to steam 

242 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

out of the harbor in the teeth of the hurricane. It looked like 
a forlorn chance, but it was the one thing to do. Clouds of 
black smoke rolled out of the Calliope's stack as her engines 
were taxed for the supreme effort. For a few minutes the 
ship remained stationary, battling against the wind and 
sea. Then slowly she inched forward, gathering headway 
with every moment. To get to sea the English ship had to 
pass close between the helpless Trenton and the outer reef, 
and to accomplish the feat demanded superb seamanship. 
As the Calliope surged close to the Trenton the Americans, 
who seemed doomed to certain death that very hour, sud- 
denly forgot their own danger in admiration of the English 
captain's daring manceuver and the faultless way in which 
he executed it. 

"Three cheers for the Calliope 7" shouted some one, and 
the hurrahs were given with a will. 

Down the gale came the quick answering cheer of the 
British tars, and the Calliope, wreathed in black smoke, 
weathered the harbor mouth and fought her way trium- 
phantly to the open sea. 

Meanwhile the Vandalia, unable to steam against the 
wind, had been forced, like the Nipsic, to skirt the edge of 
the reef and run up on the beach, where she was soon 
pounding to pieces. Her entire company crowded on the 
wave-swept forecastle, but not for a moment was dis- 
cipline relaxed. One brave sailor volunteered to swim 
through the surf with a line, but he was scarcely overboard 
before he was dashed to death against the hull of the ship. 
Officers and men clung to whatever offered a hold, but one 
after another, weakened by the terrible strain, was swept 
overboard. Unfortunately, the ship was stranded too far 
out to be helped in any way by the life-savers ashore.^ 

At the same time that the Vandalia was in such distress 
the Trenton was drifting helplessly toward the reef. The 
Olga tried to steam away, and in doing so collided with the 
Trenton. The latter, now worse off than ever, with leaks 
gaining on the pumps and no means of steaming or steering, 

243 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

seemed doomed to perish like the Eber and the Adler in the 
smother of foaming breakers on the reef. As every one 
knew, from the anxious watchers on the shore to the 
American admiral on the Trenton's bridge, when that hap- 
pened there was small chance of a single man's reaching 
the shore alive. If only there were some way of moving 
away from that deadly reef! The Trenton had sails, but 
nothing larger than a tiny storm-sail would hold against the 
force of that hurricane. Meanwhile she was drifting, 
broadside on, directly toward the reef. 

Suddenly Lieutenant Brown had an inspiration. He 
proposed his idea to the admiral, and it was instantly ac- 
cepted. Hoarse orders were shouted up and down the 
length of the deck. There was a scurry of feet, and a mid- 
shipman led the way for the entire crew to clamber into 
the weather mizzen shrouds. These were soon black with 
men crowded together, beaten flat against the tarred ropes 
by the violence of the wind, and clinging for their very 
lives. Canvas would not hold against such a wind, but 
strong men could — and did. Lieutenant Brown's idea was 
to make a human sail. 

Under the pressure on the port shrouds the Trenton 
heeled over to port and pointed seaward again. By this 
time her stern was only a few feet from the line of leaping 
breakers that marked the reef, but slowly she began to 
forge ahead, sheering close alongside of the reef — so close 
that her people hardly dared hope to get by. Foot by foot 
the old ship edged along, just cleared the end of the reef, and 
then drove full before the gale toward the beach and the 
wreck of the Vandalia. Without a rudder it was impos- 
sible to steer, and as the big flag-ship came down on the 
latter it seemed as if a collision would knock overboard 
the battered survivors of the Vandalia who still clung to 
her rigging. Nevertheless, the brave men on the Vandalia 
raised a feeble cheer for the Trenton and her human sail. 
"Three cheers for the Vandalia!" was shouted on the flag- 
ship. Again men who expected death were cheering each 

244 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

others' gallantry. The Trenton's bandsmen were hur- 
riedly mustered, and the strains of the "Star-spangled 
Banner" were heard over the roar of the tempest. 

Now the Trenton's bow struck the beach, and she swung 
around; but, instead of crashing against the Vandalia and 
knocking her exhausted crew into the sea, the Trenton 
merely swung close aboard. Instead of bringing death 
the stranded Trenton actually brought rescue to the sur- 
vivors of the Vandalia, for the Trenton's men were now 
able to help them to drop off the yards of the Vandalia 
upon the deck of the flag-ship. As she drove high on the 
beach her deck rose far enough above the breakers for the 
crews to remain on board in safety throughout the rest of 
the hurricane. 

When the storm had subsided a muster was taken of the 
crews. It was found that ninety-one Germans and fifty- 
three Americans had been drowned. After ramming the 
Trenton the Olga had steamed ashore on the mud-flats at 
the opposite side of the bay from the reef and escaped ship- 
wreck. As we have seen, the Calliope got to sea, and all 
the rest of the ships were lying wrecked on the beach or 
on the inner reef. 

The three American vessels, Trenton, Vandalia, and 
Nipsic, were old-fashioned wooden ships such as our navy 
had to get along with in those days. As men-of-war they 
were not creditable to a country as rich as the United 
States, but no one can read the story of the Samoan hurri- 
cane, or, for that matter, of the Saginaw and the Jeannette, 
without realizing that the officers and men on these old 
ships showed as fine a standard of discipline, of cool re- 
sourcefulness, and superb heroism in the face of death as 
the navy had ever boasted in its proudest days. 



XIX 

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Causes of the Spanish -American War — Preparations of the United 
States — Comparison of navies — Dewey's preparations in the East — 
Entering Manila Bay — The battle — German interference — Impor- 
tance of the victory. 

THE island of Cuba figured in many a controversy 
before the United States freed it from the misrule of 
Spain. During the earlier years of the nineteenth century 
our government was afraid that England or France was 
going to acquire the island and establish a powerful colonial 
station at our very doors. But after the Mexican War the 
slavery party was anxious to annex Cuba, like Texas, in 
order to increase the slave-holding area of the country. 
As Spain refused even to consider the matter of selling 
Cuba, and the North was hostile to making another war 
simply to increase slave territory, the plan fell through. 

Meanwhile the bad government of Spanish officials 
provoked one rebellion after another, and, as Americans 
were always in sympathy with the rebels, there were many 
filibustering expeditions from our shores, carrying arms and 
ammunition to the insurgent Cubans. The "Ten Years' 
War," between 1868 and 1878, was waged with savage 
cruelty on both sides and wholesale destruction of property, 
most of which belonged to the Americans. President 
Grant threatened to intervene, but, as Spain promised to 
do better, the threat was never carried out. One incident 
of this war aroused the United States to such anger against 
Spain that the two countries nearly came to blows over 

246 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

it. The American schooner Virginius was seized by a 
Spanish gunboat and taken to Havana on the charge of 
carrying munitions of war to the rebels. The officers and 
crew of the vessel were brought to trial, with the result that 
most of them were lined up against a wall and shot. Among 
the victims were thirty Americans. Only full reparations 
and apologies for this barbarous act prevented war. 

In 1876 General Campos went to Cuba with a milder 
policy toward the insurgents, and succeeded in bringing 
to the unhappy island a peace which lasted from 1878 to 
1895. Then a new rebellion broke out which he could not 
put down. So he resigned and was replaced by General 
Weyler. This officer decided to crush the revolt with an 
iron hand. He shot people for small offenses, herded all 
the inhabitants he coald lay hands on into the cities, so 
that the fields were left uncultivated and there was soon 
nothing to eat. At that time Americans owned fifty 
million dollars' worth of property in Cuba, much of which 
was destroyed by Weyler's policy and the guerrilla warfare. 
But the suffering of the reconcentrados , the women and 
children huddled together in starvation camps, did much 
more to anger the American nation. President Cleveland 
offered to help Spain in bringing about peace in Cuba, but 
the offer was declined. Later President McKinley sent a 
polite protest against Weyler's barbarities, but Spain was 
indifferent to this also. Meanwhile the American Red 
Cross Society sent quantities of food, clothing, and medicine 
to relieve the distress of the reconcentrados, and especially 
for the five hundred to six hundred Americans who were 
among the sufferers. Finally, in 1897, Weyler was recalled, 
but General Blanco, who succeeded him, was unable to 
make matters much better. 

As the American newspapers were very sharp in their 
criticism of Spain and General Weyler, the Havana papers 
took an anti-American tone. Anti-American riots took 
place in Havana as well, so the battle-ship Maine wassent 
there as a reminder that the rights of American citizens 

247 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

must be respected. The Maine arrived in Havana in 
January, 1898. In February a private letter written from 
the Spanish minister in Washington to an editor in Madrid 
somehow fell into the hands of the insurgents, who pub- 
lished it. In this the minister described President McKin- 
ley as "weak and catering to the mob," and said some 
other unpleasant things besides. American anger over that 
incident had scarcely begun to find expression when the 
incident was forgotten in the horror caused by a tragedy 
that followed a few days later. 

At 9.45 on the evening of February 15, 1898, there was a 
sudden and frightful explosion in the harbor of Havana. 
A moment later a great jet of fire shot up from the maga- 
zines of the Maine, and the noble ship sank rapidly to the 
bottom All but two of her officers were saved, but of the 
crew of 353 men only 48 escaped unhurt. The Maine had 
been blown up in the harbor of Havana; the question was 
"How?" 

As soon as possible a naval court of inquiry made a care- 
ful survey and reported that the ship had been blown up by 
an external explosion. In the words of the report, she had 
been "destroyed by a submarine mine, which caused the 
partial explosion of two or more of her magazines." This 
fact was established beyond the shadow of a doubt by the 
careful examination of the wreck made in 19 12, when it was 
raised, towed out to sea, and sunk with military honors. 

The Spanish authorities made what they were pleased to 
call an investigation, too. They promptly reported that 
the blowing up of the Maine was due to an explosion from 
within the ship, but no one took their report very seriously. 
Popular feeling in the United States laid the atrocious 
crime at the door of Spanish officials in Cuba. The long 
simmering fires of indignation against Spain now burst into 
a flame of passion that swept the country from one end to 
the other. A few voices called for moderation, but they 
were drowned in the cry from all sides, "Remember the 
Maine!" Although diplomatic correspondence continued 

248 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

for a few weeks longer, intervention seemed more and more 
certain to come. Finally, on April 25, 1898, the United 
States declared war. 

A comparison of the two nations shows at once the great 
advantage of the United States. Spain was one of the 
poorest nations in the civilized world, while the United 
States ranked as one of the richest. But there was no such 
difference in the navies — at least, on paper. Some experts 
ranked the United States as sixth among the naval powers, 
and Spain eighth, but in Europe the Spanish navy was 
regarded by many as superior. There were 137 vessels 
of war on the Spanish list to 86 on the American. Besides 
this, the long, exposed coast-lines of the United States, 
with only a few weak coast defenses, offered tempting 
places for fleet attack on the great seaport cities. 

The fact is that the Department at Washington did 
not know just how strong the Spanish fleet was; further- 
more, such was the state of things in Madrid that many 
prominent Spanish officials did not know, either. Later, 
when all the paper pretense was broken down by the hard 
facts of the war, it was seen that, except for nine armored 
ships ranging from 6,840 to 9,900 tons, the Spanish navy 
was made up of old vessels of wood and iron that were 
unfit for modern warfare. There was not a single vessel 
under the Spanish flag equal to any one of our four 10,000- 
ton battle-ships Oregon, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Indiana. 
So far we have spoken only of the ships themselves. Of 
the comparative efficiency of the two navies we will let the 
events of the war tell their own story. 

In October, 1897, six months before the declaration of 
war, Commodore George Dewey was ordered to take com- 
mand of the Asiatic squadron. At that time few people 
believed that war was actually going to break out because 
of the Cuban situation, but Commodore Dewey made the 
most of the month left him before going west by studying all 
the books and charts he could find relating to the Philip- 
pine Islands. He well knew that if war did come it would be 

249 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

his duty to attack the Spanish in the Philippines. At the 
same time he cut a good deal of official red tape in order to 
get for his squadron the ammunition it would need in case 
of war. 

On April 24th Dewey was in the harbor of Hongkong 
when a cable message came to him announcing the declara- 
tion of war, and ordering him to proceed to the Philippines 
and capture or destroy the enemy's fleet. The news did 
not find him unprepared. For weeks he had been making 
ready for the conflict, secretly arranging for the purchase 
of coal, provisions, and tenders, and seeing that officers 
and men were drilled to the top notch of efficiency. As 
Hongkong was a British port, Dewey had to take his 
squadron away twenty-four hours after the declaration of 
war in order to conform with the laws of neutrality. These 
forbid ships of a nation engaged in war to stay longer than 
that time in the port of a neutral nation. As China had 
not yet announced its neutrality, Dewey took his squadron 
to Mirs Bay, about thirty miles north on the Chinese coast, 
partly to complete his preparations, but more to await the 
coming of our consul from Manila, from whom the com- 
modore expected to get definite news about the Spanish 
defenses. 

The consul arrived on the morning of the 27th. A 
council of war was held on the flag-ship immediately, and 
at two in the afternoon the American squadron set out for 
Manila, six hundred miles away. The squadron moved in 
two columns, the fighting-ships forming one and the auxil- 
iaries forming another, twelve hundred yards in the rear. 
The fighting-column consisted of the flag-ship Olympia, the 
Boston, the Raleigh, the Baltimore, the Concord, and the 
Petrel, four cruisers and two gunboats. The only armored 
vessel was the Olympia, which had a four-inch protection 
for the turret-guns. 

For weeks before the declaration of war the papers in 
Hongkong had laid great emphasis on the powerful 
fortifications and mine-fields which, in addition to the 

250 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Spanish fleet under Admiral Montojo, made Manila Bay 
" impregnable." In spite of the friendly feeling of the 
British officers Admiral Dewey writes in his autobiography 
that it was impossible for the American officers to get bets 
at the Hongkong club even at heavy odds that the Amer- 
icans could win. "A fine set of fellows," remarked the 
Englishmen after the American fleet started out, "but, 
unhappily, we shall never see them again." 

But we have already noted that this was just the way 
"war experts" — especially in Europe — talked and wrote 
about the defenses of New Orleans in 1862, and some of 
them took pains to inform Farragut that he was going to 
certain destruction. Dewey at the age of twenty-four had 
been the executive officer of the Mississippi during that hot 
night battle under Forts Jackson and St. Philip. It was 
there that he received his first taste of hard fighting, and 
during all that strenuous river campaign he was under the 
personal influence of Farragut. "Valuable as the training 
at Annapolis was," writes Admiral Dewey, "it was poor 
schooling beside that of serving under Farragut in time 
of war." 

Through all the days of planning and preparation the 
American commodore in 1898 took as his guiding principle, 
"What would Farragut do?" Like his hero, Dewey was 
now sixty years old at the outbreak of the war. Like him, 
too, he had the problem of forcing an entrance into a 
fortified and mined channel, with the gravest consequences 
hanging on his decisions. If the American fleet failed at 
Manila the entire Pacific coast of the United States would 
lie at the mercy of the Spanish ships. 

For Spain the issue of the coming battle was quite as 
important as it was for the United States, and the au- 
thorities at Manila had much to help them in the advan- 
tages of a defensive position. Admiral Montojo's fleet 
was much inferior in guns to Dewey's, but the Spaniards 
had torpedoes, mines, and the shore batteries, which in- 
cluded some modern rifled guns of a heavier caliber than 

251 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

any in Dewey's squadron. And accurate range -marks 
could have been prepared for any portion of the bay. 
Moreover, by occupying Subig Bay, about thirty miles 
north from the mouth of Manila Bay, Montojo could 
have made Dewey's task very difficult and dangerous, for 
Subig Bay offered a splendid strategic position. In fact, 
intelligent Spaniards had long before urged the fortification 
of Subig Bay; but, as it was a dull place for officers, too far 
from the pleasant social life of Manila, these suggestions 
had never been carried out. 

When war seemed certain Montojo gave orders to fortify 
Subig Bay, but when he took his ships there on April 27th 
he found the cannon lying in the grass where they had been 
dropped over a month before, and practically nothing done. 
Even then Montojo would have done far better to wait 
for Dewey in Subig Bay, but instead he turned about and 
steamed back to Cavite. 

The Spanish authorities in Manila seemed to be in a 
strange condition of self-sufficiency. A few days before 
the Americans arrived the Spanish captain-general issued 
a boastful proclamation, calling the Americans some very 
unpleasant names and declaring that they were too con- 
temptible to fight. And the Archbishop of Manila caused 
to be read in the churches a report that the United States 
had begged the Pope to intercede and save the Yankee 
nation from the terrible wrath of Spain. As soon as Dewey 
left Mirs Bay the Spanish consul at Hongkong cabled to 
Manila the fact that the American squadron was on its 
way, but the very afternoon that it was approaching the 
entrance to Manila Bay Admiral Montojo and his officers 
were attending an afternoon tea given by Senora Montojo 
herself in Manila, and many of his officers were still on shore 
when the battle began. In this careless fashion the 
Spaniards made ready to defend the Philippines and dis- 
pute with the Americans for the sea power of the Pacific. 
We shall see presently how they awaited the American 
attack. 

252 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

On the afternoon of April 30th the American squadron 
arrived at Subig Bay, but, to the commodore's relief, he 
found no Spanish ships. He knew then that he should 
find the Spanish squadron near Manila. There had been 
terrifying accounts of the submarine mines at the entrance 
of the bay, but there was no hesitation in the commodore's 
mind about entering. This was not mere recklessness. 
He had reasoned that the three-mile main channel was too 
wide and deep for successful mine-planting, and that the 
contact-mines which might have been moored there would 
deteriorate so rapidly in the warm water as to be useless 
within a few weeks of their being laid. In addition he 
felt sure of careless and ignorant work in laying them. 

But entering the bay proved far safer and easier than 
Dewey had anticipated. While his column was skirting 
the coast about ten miles from the entrance it had evidently 
been sighted, for signal-lights and rockets flashed on shore. 
Accordingly, Dewey expected to have to run a gauntlet of 
fire from the big guns on the islands of Corregidor, Caballo, 
and El Fraile, commanding the entrance, as well as a 
torpedo attack from the Spanish fleet. But when, about 
midnight, the squadron swung into the narrow waters past 
these islands, no searchlight was turned on them, no 
vessels disputed the entrance, no torpedo-boats dashed at 
them in the darkness; in fact, it seemed as if nobody was 
even awake. When all but the rear ships were past, the 
battery on El Fraile fired one shot, which passed between the 
Petrel and the Raleigh. The American ships answered with 
a few shots; and the Spanish battery, after firing two more 
shells, was silent. The modern rifled six-inch guns on 
Caballo were not fired once, and the fort on Corregidor was 
strangely silent. The garrison there saw the American 
ships plainly, but for some reason, never explained, the 
commanding officer could not make up his mind to give 
the order to fire. 

In a few minutes the squadron was safe inside the harbor. 
Then Dewey slowed down to four knots, as he did not wish 

17 253 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

to reach Manila till daylight showed him the position of the 
Spanish fleet. Meanwhile, the men were allowed to get a 
little sleep beside their guns. 

Dewey expected, as a matter of course, that Montojo 
would be found in the anchorage off Manila, where, in 
addition to his own guns, he would have the powerful 
batteries that defended the city. But, as daybreak showed 
only merchantmen, Dewey steamed toward Cavite, having 
first sent his auxiliaries to a harbor where they would be 




r v % 







CORREGlOOR 



DEWEY S ENTRANCE INTO MANILA BAY 

safe. As the American column passed within two miles of 
the shore the Manila batteries opened fire, but except for 
four shells fired by the Boston and the Concord the squadron 
reserved its limited supply of ammunition. All the Spanish 
shots went wild. To the American sailors crouched beside 
their guns the order was passed, "Hold your fire till the 
bugle sounds." 

At sunrise the Americans sighted Montojo's squadron of 
seven ships ranged in a crescent formation off Cavite, with 
its eastern flank, near Sangley Point, covered by the Cavite 

254 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

batteries, and the eastern end protected by a shoal and a 
shore battery. From east to west the line lay in the follow- 
ing order: Reina Cristina (flag-ship), Castilla, Don Juan de 
Austria, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, 
and Marques del Duero. The cruiser Castilla had protected 
her sides by heavy iron lighters loaded with stone. Two 
more ships lay off the southern extremity of Cavite Point, 
but took no part in the battle except to surrender when it 
was over. 

On sighting the enemy Dewey signaled his command to 
close up to a distance of two hundred yards, and headed the 
Olympia toward the enemy. The American line was as 
follows: the Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, 
Boston. The ships steamed on in silence, heading on 
a converging course toward the enemy's line. At 5.15, 
when the squadron was still at long range, the Spanish 
ships and the Cavite batteries boomed a challenge and 
thereafter rained shells at the advancing line. It was hard 
for the impatient jackies to wait, but Dewey held his fire 
for another half -hour. Then he turned to his captain with 
the quiet remark, "You may fire when you're ready, 
Gridley." 

The eight-inch gun from the forward turret thundered in 
answer, and at the signal the other ships opened fire, one 
after another, with every gun that bore. The Spanish 
ships were smothered in the smoke of a very rapid fire, but 
their aim was hopelessly bad. After concentrating his 
starboard guns on the eastern end of the Spanish line, as he 
bore down toward that end of their formation, Dewey 
turned westward and steamed the length of the enemy's 
line, pouring in a fire from his port batteries. On reaching 
the western end he led his ships back again, and repeated 
the manceuver, making in all three runs from the eastward 
and two runs from the westward. This manceuver was 
similar to that of DuPoint at Port Royal and had the same 
advantages. 

The Spanish fire, which was wild at best, was utterly 

2$$ 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

unable to find this moving, shifting target. On the other 
hand, the fire of the American ships in close formation, 
though rather inaccurate at first, became deadly. The two 
largest Spanish ships, which were at the eastern end of 
their line, got the brunt of the attack and suffered fearfully. 
These were the Reina Cristina (flag-ship) and the Castilla. 
In desperation the Spanish commanders resorted to the 
ramming tactics of the Civil War. The Don Juan de 
Austria first and then the Reina Cristina left their places 
in the line and made a brave attempt to ram the Olympia, 
but both were driven back by a staggering fire. One 
eight-inch shell alone raked the Spanish flag-ship, putting 
out of action twenty men and wrecking her steering-gear. 
Two more gallant sorties were made by little torpedo- 
launches against the Olympia; one was promptly sunk, the 
other was beached in a sinking condition. By seven o'clock 
the Reina Cristina had lost half her crew, her batteries were 
useless, and she was unmanageable, so Admiral Montojo 
abandoned her for the Isla de Cuba. In spite of her stone 
lighters the Castilla was almost as badly damaged as the 
flag-ship, and she, too, was abandoned. The other ships 
in the line were in a desperate condition also, yet so dense 
was the curtain of powder-smoke that the Americans could 
not make out what the effect of their shooting was. 

About 7.30 Captain Gridley reported to the commodore 
that there were only fifteen rounds of ammunition left for 
the five-inch battery. As this amount could be shot away 
in five minutes, it was a serious moment for the American 
commander, especially as at that time he could not see what 
injuries had been inflicted on the enemy. Accordingly, he 
decided to withdraw for a few minutes so that there could 
be a fresh distribution of ammunition. In a few minutes 
Commodore Dewey was relieved to learn that the report 
about the Olympiads ammunition was a mistake, that 
fifteen rounds was the amount that she had already fired. 
As the American ships steamed out of range the lifting 
smoke began to reveal the distress of the Spanish fleet. 

256 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Realizing that the Spaniards were thoroughly beaten, 
Dewey ordered breakfast, as the men had had nothing but 
a cup of coffee at four o'clock. During this breathing-spell 
the commodore summoned his captains aboard the Olympia. 
To the astonishment of all, the report from each ship was 



.•• 



w 



TRACK OF THE AMERICAN FLEET 



\ 



...\ 



SPANISH BATTERIES 



SPANISH FLEET 




SANGLEY PT. . I 



LAS PIN AS 



BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY I, 1 898 
257 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Thus the President's order to Dewey to "destroy the 
Spanish fleet at Manila" had been obeyed to the letter, and 
at one blow the Philippine Islands and the mastery of the 
Pacific passed to the hands of Commodore Dewey. 

Never in history had there been such a one-sided victory. 
The total loss on the American side was four men slightly 
wounded, and none of the ships had been seriously hurt. 
On the other hand, the Spaniards had lost about four 
hundred men, eleven vessels were destroyed, the Cavite 
batteries had been knocked to pieces, the arsenal was 
captured, and the city of Manila lay helpless under the guns 
of the American fleet. In view of the gloomy predictions 
made at home and abroad about Dewey's chances in at- 
tacking Manila, it is not to be wondered at if the American 
people went wild with pride and joy and said some ex- 
travagant things about their sailormen. 

But Dewey had another and more trying problem on his 
hands. Pending the arrival of troops he maintained a 
blockade of Manila. The German government had been 
hostile to the United States in this war, going to the extent, 
it is said, of asking the co-operation of Great Britain in 
intervention. Although England had signified a "hands- 
off " policy, the Germans seemed bent on showing hostility. 
The German Pacific squadron under Vice-Admiral Diede- 
richs soon appeared in Manila Bay. The presence of 
neutral men-of-war in a harbor controlled by one of the 
parties to a war is permitted only as a matter of inter- 
national courtesy. All the other men-of-war, representing 
England, France, and Japan, had complied with the cus- 
tomary regulations, such as reporting to Dewey and apply- 
ing to him for anchorage. But the German admiral paid 
no attention whatever to Dewey. Every day brought 
fresh instances of German arrogance and insolence which 
strained the patience of the Americans to the breaking- 
point. Finally, when word came that the Germans were 
actually landing supplies for the Spaniards Dewey sent an 
ultimatum to Diederichs. "And you may tell him," he 

259 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

concluded, instructing the lieutenant who carried the mes- 
sage, "that if he wants a fight he can have it right now." 
The German was furious, and cleared for action. There- 
upon the British admiral, Chichester, asked Dewey's 
permission to weigh anchor and take a new position, 
which was granted. Then the British squadron anchored 
between the lines of the German and the American ships, 
with the English bands playing " Star-spangled Banner." 
After this broad hint as to what might be expected from 
the British fleet, Diederichs decided that he did not want 
to fight after all, and came round to terms. 

In recognition of the victory at Manila Congress 
awarded Dewey a vote of thanks and a sword, and the 
President immediately promoted him to the rank of Rear- 
Admiral. Later the rank of Admiral of the Navy was 
revived and bestowed upon him. The same critics who 
said that the Spanish fleet was really quite the equal of the 
American and that Manila Bay was impregnable turned 
face about after the battle and began sneering at the 
Americans for being proud of Dewey because he destroyed 
a very inferior fleet. Unquestionably Montojo's ships were 
no match for the American squadron; but if Montojo had 
shown the least enterprise or strategic sense, or if the men 
in the ships or forts had shown a reasonable efficiency in 
handling the guns, the Spaniards could have held Subig 
Bay, or disputed the entrance of Dewey's fleet into Manila 
Bay, with excellent chance of success. But it never oc- 
curred to the Spaniards that anybody would have the 
audacity to enter the bay at night, with forts controlling 
the channel and the lighthouses extinguished. 

Dewey's fame rests, not on his annihilation of a weaker 
fleet, but on his long and careful preparation and planning, 
his clear reasoning-out of the whole situation, which cul- 
minated in his superb night entry into Manila Bay. No 
better answer than that could have been made to the 
question, "What would Farragut do?" 

At the time of the war the sympathy of continental Eu- 

260 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

rope was wholly with the Spanish — they were the "chival- 
rous" people — whatever that overworked word means — and 
we were dull, money-grabbing louts who couldn't fight. 
The news of the victory of Manila promptly stunned into 
silence all European talk of intervention. If "chivalry" 
means courage it is true that the Spaniards fought and died 
bravely enough at their guns, but the great lesson taught 
by Preble and magnificently emphasized by Farragut was 
that bravery in a naval man is taken for granted, that it is 
only the first of his virtues. To that must be added train- 
ing, discipline, resourcefulness, clear thinking, and decisive 
action; and it is evident that this essential truth had never 
been taught in the Spanish navy. 



XX 

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN 

Cuban blockade — Search for Cervera — Hobson and the Merrimac — 
Battle of Santiago — The controversy — Spanish inefficiency during 
the war — Treaty of peace — Effect of the war. 

WHILE Commodore Dewey was waiting and pre- 
paring at Hongkong, just before the declaration of 
war, the North Atlantic fleet was drilling at target practice 
off Key West, and a reserve fleet called the "Flying Squad- 
ron" was waiting orders at Hampton Roads. In spite of 
the strained feeling which followed the sinking of the Maine 
and pointed clearly to war the Spaniards had in West- 
Indian waters only a few light vessels and one old cruiser, 
the Reina Mercedes, and the engines of the Mercedes were 
in such bad condition that she could not get up steam. 
Just before the war broke out the Spaniards collected their 
Atlantic fleet under Admiral Cervera in the harbor of St. 
Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, and there they stayed for 
several days after war was declared, although the Cape 
Verde Islands belong to Portugal, which was supposed to 
be neutral. 

This squadron of Cervera's consisted of four armored 
cruisers, three torpedo-boat destroyers, and three small 
torpedo-boats, with an auxiliary ship which acted as tender 
for the torpedo squadron. The last four vessels were left 
behind when Cervera started across the Atlantic. The 
cruisers were fine modern ships, with an armored deck, 
protecting engines and magazine, and a six-inch armor belt. 
The newest of them, the Cristobal Colon, had been launched 

262 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

only two years before, but it was characteristic of Spanish 
procrastination that the new big guns for her forward and 
after turrets were not ready when they were needed and 
expected. As the old ones had already been taken out of 
the ship, it meant that the finest cruiser of the squadron had 
to go out to fight without her heaviest guns. The destroy- 
ers were of the most modern type, built in England and 
launched hardly more than a year before the declaration 
of war. 

Although there were no battle-ships in this squadron, 
it was capable of striking a very effective blow, and when 
it finally sailed westward on April 29th for parts unknown 
it made people on our own Atlantic seaboard very nervous. 
Unfortunately, certain "yellow" newspapers, which had 
done their best to force war, made as much exciting news 
as they could out of the approaching Spanish fleet. One of 
them, which earned for itself the name of the "one-cent 
liar" during the war, published as a Sunday "feature" a 
lurid story of a bloody battle in mid-Atlantic. 

Nobody knew where Cervera's squadron was for ten or 
twelve days, and during that time, if newspaper rumors 
could be believed, the whole Atlantic was black with 
Spanish ships. To quiet the fears in some of our seaport 
towns the government hastily organized a "northern 
patrol ' ' squadron to guard the coast north of the Delaware. 
Later, when the foolish panic was over, these vessels were 
sent south to join the blockade of Cuban ports. 

On Rear-Admiral Sampson, commander-in-chief of the 
Atlantic fleet, depended the responsibility of finding 
Cervera's squadron and destroying it. He had decided 
that the natural aim of the Spanish fleet would be some 
point in the West Indies near Cuba, and probably at Porto 
Rico. Accordingly, on the 8th of May he left Key West 
to intercept the enemy, reckoning the time of their arrival 
by the rate of speed the Spaniards ought to make. 

But they were so slow that it was not until four days 
later that the arrival of the Spanish squadron was re- 

263 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ported. The destroyer Furor had touched at St. Pierre, in 
Martinique, on the night of the nth. Here Cervera had 
to leave one of his destroyers on account of broken-down 
boilers. The rest of the squadron was sighted the following 
day, headed north. 

Acting on this news, Sampson sent off ships to watch the 
Windward and Mona passages and ordered Schley's 
"Flying Squadron" to patrol the southern coast of Cuba. 
As soon as Sampson had coaled his own battle-ships he took 
them to the north side of the island. For another week 
nothing more was heard of the Spaniards. On the 18th of 
May three ships of Schley's squadron came close to the en- 
trance of Santiago Harbor and exchanged shots with the 
fort. That very afternoon they steamed away again, and 
at sunrise next morning Cervera's squadron entered the 
harbor. It turned out that Cervera had gone to the Dutch 
island of Curacoa to meet the colliers he needed and had 
arranged for. Here again the officials in Madrid failed 
him. When he got to Curacoa he found, to his dismay, 
that there were no colliers awaiting him ; and, as the Dutch 
authorities held him to the twenty-four-hour rule, he had to 
steam away without getting more than six hundred tons of 
coal aboard. So he headed for Santiago for more coal and 
other supplies. 

Up to this time there had been so many false rumors 
about the whereabouts of the Spanish fleet that the De- 
partment at Washington were slow to believe that the 
enemy was really at Santiago, especially as Schley had seen 
smoke behind the forts at Cienfuegos and reported as a fact 
that the Spaniards had gone there instead. It was not 
till May 27 that Schley satisfied himself that he was mis- 
taken and that Cervera was in Santiago Harbor. Then he 
began a blockade, and when the news reached Sampson he 
brought his fleet round from the north to join forces and 
take command. 

Cervera's actions up to the time he entered the harbor 
had been creditable enough. But once inside the wooded 

264 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

headlands of Santiago he seemed to have been struck with 
the same paralysis that afflicted all Spanish officials and 
commanders during this strange war. He needed coal and 
was trying to get it aboard, yet he let his whole squadron 
lie idle while the American liner St. Paul captured, 
just off the port, a steamer that was bringing him three 
thousand tons of coal. Any one of his four cruisers could 
have gone out, rescued the coal, and taken the American 
ship as well. Furthermore, he allowed Schley to blockade 
him with an inferior force, remaining inactive in the harbor 
till Sampson's arrival made the odds against him over- 
whelming. 

Then followed a month of close blockade. Since the 
narrow entrance to the harbor made it impossible for the 
American fleet to attack the Spaniards inside, Sampson 
attempted to bottle up their squadron by sinking a hulk 
in the narrows. At 3.30 on the morning of June 3d Naval- 
Constructor Hobson, with seven volunteers, took the 
collier Merrimac directly into the narrows under cover of 
darkness. But there was still enough moonlight to make 
her a distinct target, and the batteries on each side at once 
opened a heavy cross-fire of rifle and cannon as soon as she 
entered the channel. To the anxious watchers in the fleet 
it seemed as if not one of the gallant handful on the ship 
could be left alive. And yet, so wretched was the Spanish 
marksmanship that, although this cross-fire killed fourteen 
and wounded thirty-seven of the Spanish gunners, not a 
man on the Merrimac was wounded. One shot, however, 
had cut away the rudder-chains so that Hobson was unable 
to steer the vessel to the point where she was to ground and 
swing across the channel. On reaching the best position he 
could make he set off the explosives in her hull, but she 
drifted farther in than was intended and went down at a 
spot where there was still room enough for ships to get 
safely by. So as far as its purpose was concerned Hobson's 
exploit was a failure, but the splendid daring of the act 
fired the nation with enthusiasm. "I venture to say," 

265 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

wrote Sampson to the Secretary of the Navy, "that a more 
brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing 
blew up the Albemarle.' " 

As the Merrimac settled, her crew clung to a raft and 
surrendered to a launch from the Spanish flag-ship. A 
pleasant incident of the war was the courteous act of 
Cervera in sending out his chief of staff with a flag of truce 
to the American fleet, telling Sampson of the safety of 
Hobson and his men and praising their courage. About 
a month later they were exchanged and welcomed back 
to the fleet. 

Meanwhile the troops under Shafter had been landed 
some miles to the east of Santiago and were attempting to 
capture the city by assault. Provisions were scarce in 
Santiago, especially as the presence of the fleet made a 
great drain on the store of supplies. But half starving as 
they were, the Spanish soldiers under General Linares 
fought with obstinate courage, and succeeded in defending 
the city with the loss of only two outposts. Sickness soon 
broke out among the American soldiers, chiefly because 
the most stupid mismanagement in the matter of food, 
medicines, and shelter hampered every step of the American 
army. General Shafter, ill himself and discouraged at his 
failure to capture Santiago, telegraphed a gloomy report to 
Washington, early on the morning of Sunday, July 3d, sug- 
gesting a retreat. 

The arrival of this message brought deep anxiety to 
President McKinley and his advisers, but that very evening 
another cablegram gave news of a wholly different kind. 
Shafter had also telegraphed to Sampson the day before to 
force the entrance with the fleet at all costs, and on Sunday 
morning, July 3d, about nine o'clock, Sampson left the 
blockading line in his flag-ship, the New York, accom- 
panied by the gunboat Hist, to go four miles east in order 
to confer with Shafter. The rest of the fleet, ranging in a 
wide half -circle, lay off the harbor in the following order 
from east to west: the battle-ships Indiana, Oregon, Iowa, 

266 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Texas, and the armored cruiser Brooklyn. The regular 
position of the New York had been between the Indiana 
and the Oregon. The Gloucester, formerly J. Pierpont 
Morgan's yacht Corsair, lay a little to the east of the 
Indiana and much nearer the harbor. Away to the western 
end of the line, near the Brooklyn, was a small gunboat, the 
Vixen. 

At 9.30 the bugles sounded the regular Sunday inspec- 
tion, and the officers and men of each ship were soon lined 
up for review on the quarter-deck. Suddenly a young 
sailor on the Iowa noticed an unusual amount of black 
smoke rising above the headlands that screened the harbor. 
A moment later the black prow of the Spanish flag-ship 
appeared in the narrows. Boom! a gun from the Iowa 
gave the alarm, but every other ship in the squadron caught 
sight of the enemy, too. The bugles shrilled the signal, 
"General Quarters," and in a flash the stiff lines of sailors 
and marines melted into scurrying groups as each man made 
at top speed for his battle station. 

The ships had kept up little steam as they rocked at their 
stations doing blockade duty ; but now, with forced draughts 
and the stokers shoveling like demons, each ship in the line 
worked its utmost to get up steam, close in on the Spanish 
cruisers, and destroy them before they could escape. The 
Spanish column left the harbor in the following order: 
Infanta Maria Teresa (flag-ship), Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, 
and Almirante Oquendo. As the American squadron headed 
toward them it was a question for a few moments whether 
the Spanish ships would scatter as soon as they got out 
or whether they would keep together on a single course. 
Officers and men on the distant New York prayed that 
the Maria Teresa would lead her column east, but as soon 
as' she was clear of shoal water she turned west, followed by 
the rest of the line. 

"I wish you a speedy victory," was the signal Cervera 
flew to encourage his captains, and as the bows of the flag- 
ship turned west her broadside opened on the American 

267 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

fleet. The next fifteen minutes were exciting indeed. 
Of the blockading fleet the stanch old Oregon, which had 
just arrived from a trip all the way round from the Pacific 
coast, bore off the honors in getting up speed. But soon the 
others came charging down upon the Spanish line, too, their 
guns flashing and booming and clouds of black smoke 
pouring out of their funnels. 

Each Spanish cruiser as well was wreathed in smoke 
from her own guns as she wheeled to the right and fled 
westward. But the concentrated fire was terrific, and the 
cruisers staggered under its effect almost as soon as they 
reached open water. Still they kept going at full speed, 
with their guns booming incessantly, and in the clouds of 
battle-smoke the Americans could not tell for some time 
whether any of their shots were taking effect. Since the 
Spanish fleet came out of the harbor under full steam, they 
got a good running start, while the American ships were 
working with might and main to get under way; con- 
sequently the battle soon became a chase, with all the 
American ships but the Brooklyn running westward on a 
course nearly parallel with the Spanish column. 

Cervera's plan had been to concentrate his attack on the 
Brooklyn at the western end of the American line, and by 
putting it out of the fight leave a free road to Cienfuegos. 
Besides the Brooklyn there was no other American ship but 
the New York which could make anything like the speed of 
which his four cruisers were capable. This plan was helped 
by the fact that the New York had gone four miles to the east 
on the very morning of the sortie. It was also helped by 
an amazing manceuver on the part of the Brooklyn herself. 
When the Teresa came out the Brooklyn steered in for her 
and was still on a northerly course when the rest of the 
fleet were heading westward. In the evident hope of run- 
ning down the Brooklyn Cervera turned the bows of his 
ship directly toward the Brooklyn, and the latter, instead 
of swerving to the northwest, made a wide turn to the east 
and south. In doing so she cut directly across the American 

268 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

line, and only a lucky lift of powder-smoke gave the captain 
of the Texas a chance to back his engines at full speed to 
avoid being rammed and sunk by the Brooklyn. 

By this movement the Texas was checked and the 
Brooklyn herself lost much headway before swerving once 
more to the west in pursuit. Had it not been for the wood- 
work on the Spanish flag-ship she might have escaped, 
after all, in spite of the terrible slaughter on her decks, for 
her armored hull was still sound. But the exploding shells 
set the woodwork afire and cut the water-main. In a few 
minutes the ship was all ablaze, and to save his surviving 
officers and men Cervera headed toward the beach, ran 
aground, and struck his colors. The concentration of fire 
on the flag-ship had spared the second and third ships in the 
line, the Vizcaya and the Colon, especially as they got up 
high speed and the Colon shielded herself from the American 
fire by passing between her sister ships and the shore. 
The surrender of the Teresa left the Oquendo to bear the 
full weight of fire from the rearmost American ships and 
she soon went aground in flames within a half-mile of the 
Teresa. 

When the lifting smoke showed the Oquendo also aground 
every ship within range trained her guns on the Vizcaya, for 
by this time the Colon was outfooting the Americans and 
seemed to be getting safely out of reach. Again in the case 
of the Vizcaya it was the woodwork that proved fatal. The 
shell fire had set her ablaze, too, and at about eleven o'clock 
she ran aground with flames shooting out of her ports and 
magazines bursting. 

While the big ships were thundering at each other a 
plucky fight with the torpedo-boat destroyers was going 
on at the harbor mouth. Lieutenant-Commander Wain- 
wright, commanding the Gloucester, was nearest to the 
entrance when the Spanish squadron was seen coming out. 
Paying no attention to the guns of the shore batteries, he 
ran in close to them and peppered away at the big ships 
with his light guns. But, knowing that he could do them 
18 269 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

little harm, he bottled up steam and waited till the de- 
stroyers should appear. These two — the Furor and the 
Pluton — came rushing out at the end of the column of 
cruisers, and the Gloucester dashed for them at full speed, 
pouring a steady stream of shells from her rapid-fire guns. 
The guns on either of the destroyers were more powerful 
than those of the Gloucester, not to mention their torpedoes. 
But. as Farragut said, "the best defense against an enemy's 
fire is a well-directed fire from your own guns." Though 
the Gloucester was nothing but a pleasure yacht mounting 
a few small guns, her well-aimed fire delivered at close 
quarters wrecked the two destroyers, while she herself was 
untouched by a single shot. The Indiana got a few shells 
into them at long distance, but the Gloucester had already 
settled their fate. The Furor blew up in a great jet of 
steam and water; the Pluton barely reached shore before 
she sank. 

Of the entire Spanish squadron only one ship remained, 
but she seemed to be sure of escape. This was the Colon. 
She had the reputation of making twenty-three knots on 
her trial trip, she had escaped injury, and she already had a 
lead of six miles. There were no ships in the American 
fleet capable of anything like twenty-three knots, but the 
nearest vessels — Texas, New York, Brooklyn, and Oregon — 
stuck to the chase, making all possible speed. At a signal 
from Sampson the other ships gave up the pursuit and 
turned to the dangerous work of rescuing the Spaniards 
from the burning and exploding hulks that lined the shore. 

It seemed as if only some extraordinary luck would 
enable the Americans to capture the fleeing Colon, but, to 
their surprise, they discovered that they were gaining on her. 
As a matter of fact, instead of making twenty-three knots 
during this chase she did no better than fourteen. It was 
simply another case of lack of preparation and training. 
Had the Colon s fire-room force been trained and efficient 
she could easily have run away from her pursuers. In- 
stead, the leading American ships, the Oregon and the 

270 






PI 
a-. 50 



S x " 




THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Brooklyn, steadily gained on her. Soon the turret-guns 
from the American ships boomed, and jets of water near 
the Spanish cruiser showed that she was falling within 
range. Since, as we have seen, the Colon had been sent 
from Spain without her heavy forward and after guns, she 
was unable to reply to this long-range fire. Soon a shell 
dropped just beyond the Colon, and her captain, despairing 
of escape, turned her bows ran the vessel ashore, and 
lowered his flag. 

The surrender of the Colon took place at 1.20 p.m. By 
that time every vessel in the Spanish fleet had been de- 
stroyed, with the loss of about 350 killed and 150 wounded. 
On the American side not a vessel was seriously hurt ; only 
one man had been killed and two wounded. No defeat 
could be more overwhelming. The destruction of Cervera's 
squadron led to the surrender of Santiago and, added to a 
similar disaster in Manila Bay, it meant a speedy end to 
the war. On August 12 th a protocol was arranged sus- 
pending hostilities, and a treaty of peace was signed by 
our commissioners in Paris on December 10, 1898. 

Of course, the American fleet at Santiago was far stronger 
than the Spanish. But the wholesale disaster at Santiago, 
as at Manila, was due not so much to the difference in ships 
and guns as to the miserable inefficiency that disgraced 
every step of the Spanish operations. 

In the first place, the reason Cervera abandoned a 
sheltered harbor in the face of a much superior force 
was that he had been ordered out by General Blanco. 
And Blanco's reason was the famine in Santiago, which 
made the presence of the fleet more of a burden than a 
help. But that very condition was due to the fact that 
it had never occurred to the Spanish officials to lay in 
a store of provisions even when they knew that the city 
was going to be besieged. 

In the second place, if Cervera was forced to go out he 
should have made the attempt by night. The thing that 
had kept him from trying a night sortie was the powerful 

271 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

searchlight which Sampson kept playing on the entrance 
during every moment of darkness. But there had been 
several squally and foggy nights which had offered ideal 
conditions of escape, in spite of the searchlight, and kept 
the watchers in the American fleet tense with anxiety. 
And yet Cervera preferred to linger in port, only to go out 
to certain destruction in broad daylight. 

We have already noted the bad engine-room work on the 
Colon which alone was responsible for the loss of that ship. 
As for gunnery, the same lack of training which was dis- 
played in Montojo's squadron was just as evident in 
Cervera' s. In spite of the rapid fire from the Spanish 
ships, maintained during the first hour of the fight, only two 
American ships were hit at all. Some light may be thrown 
on this wild shooting by the fact that when the Teresa went 
out the guns of her secondary battery had never been fired 
before. In short, there never was a better example of the 
fact that victories depend on what has been done before 
the fight itself begins. 

If there was shiftlessness and inefficiency in the Spanish 
fleet, it was more than matched by the short-sightedness 
of the Spanish government. The chief reason why the 
Spaniards had been unable to put down the Cuban rebel- 
lion was that, while a huge army of two hundred thousand 
soldiers had been sent from Spain to the island, scarcely a 
single supply or ammunition wagon had been taken with 
them. Certain shipping companies made a good profit 
from every soldier they transported to Cuba; but, as wagons 
took up too much room on shipboard and were therefore 
not profitable to carry, they were left behind. The result 
was that the Spanish troops were unable to make a march 
of more than a day or two out from Havana or Santiago. 

The Minister of Marine, however, more than any one 
else, was responsible for the ill-prepared state of the 
Spanish navy. We have already noted the matter of the 
Colon's guns and that of the colliers for Cervera's fleet. 
During the month preceding the war Cervera begged this 

272 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

man for definite information regarding the American ships, 
and for charts of the American coast, but the Minister 
had nothing to give but vague promises. His colleague, 
the Minister of War, was equally brilliant. When, with 
coal-bunkers nearly empty, Cervera lay blockaded in San- 
tiago Harbor by an overwhelming force, this amazing 
official cabled him orders to run the blockade at once, 
go to Manila and destroy Dewey's squadron, and then 
come back again to Cuba! 

But when the war began no one dreamed that Spanish 
officials could be guilty of such unbelievable stupidity and 
negligence. It is only fair to remember that fact in these 
days when it is the fashion to sneer at our victories simply 
because they were so easy and so overwhelming. For 
example, three of the best-known military authorities in 
Germany were consulted by an American newspaper at the 
beginning of the war as to the chances of the United States 
in attacking Cuba. All three agreed that it would be hope- 
less to try to take the island unless the Americans landed 
an army of at least two hundred thousand men. As it 
turned out, with the brilliant support of the navy, the army 
accomplished the task with hardly more than one-tenth 
of two hundred thousand men. 

The navy won well-deserved laurels in this war, but, 
unfortunately, the victory of Santiago was stained by an 
ugly controversy that sprang up immediately afterward 
between the partisans of Sampson and Schley as to who 
deserved the credit of the victory. The ordinary citizen, 
who knew nothing about Sampson's invaluable services 
before the battle and of Schley's questionable conduct 
during the same time, felt that the latter had not received 
full credit from Sampson when he telegraphed the news of 
the victory. The wording of this message, unfortunately, 
was left to a subordinate, and an unpleasant effect was made 
which the "yellow" journals and certain politicians were 
quick to take up against Sampson. The critics of Schley 
answered back with great bitterness, and the quarrel was on. 

273 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Finally Schley asked for a court of inquiry (July, 1 901) to 
examine his conduct during the war. The court returned 
the decision that his service before June 1st was charac- 
terized by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enter- 
prise." Admiral Dewey, who was president of the court, 
said, however, that he thought Schley ought to have the 
chief credit for the Santiago victory because he was in 
nominal command during most of the actual fighting. 
This point had not been discussed by the court at all, and 
the statement made the confusion only worse. Schley 
then appealed from the court to President Roosevelt. The 
latter reviewed the evidence and reported that the court 
had not treated Schley unfairly; moreover, that after the 
battle began no ship took orders from either Sampson or 
Schley, that the battle itself was simply "a captains' fight." 
It is worth noting, too, that in this quarrel the opinion of 
Schley's brother officers, though silent, was overwhelmingly 
against him; and this not so much on account of his strange 
manceuver during the battle as because of what seemed to 
them inaction and even insubordination during the early 
part of the campaign. 

It was most unfortunate for both officers that their 
unwise friends insisted on this controversy. Schley, what- 
ever his shortcomings during the Santiago campaign, had 
a good record, notably in his fine rescue of the arctic 
explorer Lieutenant Greely in 1884. But the controversy 
left him estranged from many of his brothers in arms, in 
spite of his following among the people. 

The most cruel injustice fell upon Sampson, who was 
fairly hounded to his grave by scurrilous and venomous 
attacks in newspapers, public speeches, and personal letters 
from every part of the country he had served so well. If 
naval history means anything it means, as we have seen, 
that victories are won chiefly by what has been done before 
the actual shooting begins. In selecting Sampson for war 
command the Department picked an officer who had no 
political friends, no "family" influence, and one who had 

274 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

not even hinted at wanting the position. He was chosen 
simply on his record of splendid efficiency, dating from the 
day of his graduation at the head of his class in Annapolis 
down to the time when he was drilling the Atlantic fleet 
at target practice in anticipation of the war. The choice 
of Sampson was applauded by the entire navy, and the 
organization he perfected, the skill with which he prepared 
for every emergency, and the vigilance of his blockade 
confirmed this choice over and over. The easy victory 
over the Spanish ships in broad daylight was chiefly the 
result of his tactics during the entire month before. The 
accident of chance which took the flag-ship so far east that 
she had only a small share in the actual battle is a trifling 
consideration compared with the real things that made the 
victory for which he was so largely responsible. 

In view of all the printed and spoken abuse of Sampson 
which broke him down and yet drew from him never a word 
in self-defense, we may consider the following quotation 
from Rear- Admiral Chadwick, who served under him as 
captain of the flag-ship and who was in a position to know 
him thoroughly. "Sampson was the hero by nature, for 
nature made him great. Without thought of self, of in- 
comparable simplicity and truthfulness, quiet and reserved, 
though most kindly, with never a harsh word, with absolute 
courage both physical and moral, with an unbending pur- 
pose when once his decision was made, and with a judg- 
ment which seemed unswerving, he was fitly the hero to 
officers and men, and to none more than to those who were 
closest to him." 

This unhappy controversy in the navy, combined with 
the "embalmed beef" scandals in the army, brought the 
Spanish War to an unpleasant close. But as the smoke of 
those conflicts has now cleared away we ought to be able 
to look back over the war and consider it fairly. Un- 
doubtedly the conflict could have been avoided altogether — 
and that is true of most wars — but the results seem to have 
been, after all, beneficial to both nations. To Spain the 

2 75 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

loss of Cuba and the Philippines was like a successful opera- 
tion that removed two diseased members, because for many 
years these two colonies, with their rebellions and mis- 
government, had been only a heavy drain on the Spanish 
treasury. To the United States the war gave a new place 
abroad among the world powers, and at home it served to 
draw together North and South under the same flag for 
the first time since the Civil War. For example, Gen. 
Fitzhugh Lee and Gen. Joseph Wheeler, who commanded 
volunteers in 1898, had in 1861 fought for the South; and 
among Roosevelt's Rough Riders those whose fathers had 
worn the gray outnumbered the sons of the men in blue. 
The war also taught the army several important lessons 
which it has made the most of since, and the brilliant 
services of the navy overcame throughout the nation the 
old indifference and opposition to maintaining a fleet, and 
led to a rapid increase in ships and men. 



XXI 

EVENTS FROM THE SPANISH WAR TO VERA CRUZ 

The Boxer Rebellion — Lieutenant Clark's work on the Tientsin rail- 
road — Battle-fleet cruise — Nicaraguan service — Occupation of Vera 
Cruz. 

IN the two years which followed the Spanish War the 
navy saw difficult and dangerous service in the Philip- 
pines. The cruiser Charleston was wrecked upon an un- 
charted reef off Luzon, and one small gunboat went 
aground in a river and was captured by the Filipinos. 
The task of subduing the Filipino insurrection fell chiefly 
on the army, but the navy performed a very important 
service in patrolling the rivers and shores of the territory 
held by the rebels. 

In 1900 trouble broke out in China. Certain over- 
patriotic Chinese, like the Japanese in 1863, banded them- 
selves together for the purpose of driving all foreigners 
from the Flowery Kingdom. To this end they organized 
a society called the "Fist of Righteous Harmony," which 
was shortened by English and Americans to the more 
convenient name of " Boxers." The movement spread fast, 
with wide-spread attacks on mission stations and foreigners 
generally. Our minister in Pekin telegraphed to Rear- 
Admiral KempfT on the Newark, then at the port of Taku, 
that the American legation at Pekin needed protection. 
KempfT despatched a guard of United States marines, who 
arrived at Pekin just before the railroad was destroyed, 
and the American and European legations were besieged 
by the Boxers. 

277 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

The situation at Pekin was critical, but the consuls and 
officers representing the various nations at Tientsin talked 
endlessly without being able to agree on what should be 
done. Disgusted with such proceedings, Captain McCalla 
of the Newark announced, "Well, I have only one hundred 
and twelve officers and men, but I'm going to march to 
Pekin at once, even if I have to go alone!" 

This straightforward speech had a good effect. The 
British, Austrian, Japanese, and Italian officers joined with 
McCalla, and finally the Germans, French, and Russians 
came along, too. The allies succeeded in reaching Lang- 
fang, a place within forty miles of Pekin, but meanwhile 
the Imperial troops had gone over to the Boxers and ripped 
up the railroad-tracks in the rear of the allied force. As 
the railroad to Pekin had already been destroyed, the for- 
eigners were left stranded, with their communications cut 
and their supply of food and ammunition very low. After 
a consultation the commanding officers agreed that it was 
necessary to fall back to Tientsin to await reinforcements. 
The retreat was accompanied by some sharp fighting, the 
brunt of which was borne by the Americans, who formed 
the vanguard. Hardly had the allies, numbering about 
seven hundred, reached Tientsin when they were besieged 
by several thousand Boxers. Then it became necessary to 
rush men and supplies from the seaport Taku to Tientsin. 

While the allies had been bombarding the forts at Taku 
the American gunboat Monocacy, a funny, double-ended, 
side-wheeler mounting ancient smooth-bores, was the rep- 
resentative of our navy at that port. She was called the 
"Noah's Ark of the Asiatic Station," and was the joke of 
all the other navies in the Pacific; but she came out of 
this affair with flying colors. Orders from Washington 
obliged her commander to hold aloof from the bombard- 
ment, but after the forts were abandoned, and the neigh- 
boring cities of Taku and Tongku fell into the hands of the 
allies, the admirals of the various nations signed an agree- 
ment by which the control of the two cities should be turned 

278 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

over to the captain of the Monocacy. That is, he was to 
take charge of the waterworks, the public buildings, rolling- 
stock, etc. Probably the choice of an American officer from 
a little gunboat was an easy way out of a tangle where the 
officers of every European nation distrusted the others. 
To help him, the American captain was given an officer of 
every nationality represented in the allied forces. 

Commander Wise of the Monocacy took for his own per- 
sonal supervision the management of the water-supply, 
a matter of first importance, for every drop of drinking- 
water used by the allied troops before they entered Tientsin 
had to come from the Taku waterworks. The next thing 
to do was to get the railroad between Tongku and Tien- 
tsin into working order. He turned to his lieutenant, 
George R. Clark. 

"Clark," said he, "that road must be put in commission 
at once. Go ahead." 

Lieutenant Clark might have answered that, being a 
sailor, he knew nothing at all about railroading, not to 
mention patching up track and rolling-stock that the 
Boxers had destroyed. But when you are told to do a 
thing in the American navy you go ahead and do it, and 
without any remarks. No matter how hard the task is 
you are expected to do it well, too. That is what a naval 
man means by his favorite word, "efficiency." 

Lieutenant Clark promptly went ashore with a squad of 
bluejackets and marched to the railroad yard. There he 
found a discouraging spectacle. Locomotives lay in the 
ditch covered with rust, and all around were weather- 
beaten cars with their wheels in the air. The rickety 
single-track railroad that led from the yard in the direction 
of Tientsin he knew was ripped out in any number of place?. 
And this was the railroad that would have to be made 
to work before a single soldier or a single round of car- 
tridges could reach Tientsin. 

Clark called his sailors about him and told them exactly 
what the problem was, and they responded in the way 

279 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

that makes us proud of our enlisted men. They took hold 
as if the whole affair were a new kind of lark. It turned 
out that two of them had worked on locomotive machinery 
before they entered the navy, and they began examining 
the injuries to the locomotives with a fine professional air. 
The others pried and hauled till cars and locomotives were 
back again on the tracks. As they all knew how to get 
up steam on a ship's launch, they applied the same prin- 
ciples to the engines, and before long had some of them 
smoking and sizzling. In less than two days they had 
patched up five locomotives; four were manned by our 
jackies, and the other by a squad of British sailors, who 
seemed to be as delighted as the rest with this novel style 
of cruising. These engines were first sent ahead on short 
trial trips, and every one of them that was able to crawl 
back to the yard under her own steam was called "ready 
for duty." 

Meanwhile Clark was overhauling the small outfit of 
cars, sawing here, building there, in order to adapt them 
for carrying troops, horses, water, provisions, and am- 
munition. At the same time he collected and loaded on 
flat-cars the wrecked telegraph poles, in order that tele- 
graphic communication might be set up the instant the 
line to Tientsin was clear. 

When the cars were ready he had worked out a system 
of operation by which trains could be run with the least 
possible delay in going and returning, and made out a 
schedule accordingly. Not the least of his troubles was 
the matter of arranging for carrying the forces and supplies 
of various nations, all of whose commanding officers wanted 
to go first. But he managed to meet that situation with 
fine tact, and things went far more smoothly than he had 
dared to hope. 

Of course, the rickety locomotives would break down 
from time to time, and the train crews of sailormen 
had fighting to do along the line as well as railroading. 
It was a familiar excuse for a late train, "Sir, we had to 

280 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

stop to fight a crowd of Boxers who were putting obstruc- 
tions on the track." Time and again, too, the railroad 
yard at Tongku was threatened by night attacks, so it 
can be imagined that Lieutenant Clark did not get much 
sleep during those busy weeks. 

But the work was done. In a few weeks thirteen thou- 
sand men were transported over the track to Tientsin, 
along with several hundred horses and a corresponding 
amount of water, ammunition, and provisions. Not a life 
was lost, not a car went off the track; the troops raised 
the siege at Tientsin, and then went on to Pekin and re- 
lieved the beleaguered foreigners there. The relief of 
Pekin meant the collapse of the Boxer rebellion. It is easy 
to see that the thing that made the relief of Tientsin and 
Pekin possible was the opening of the railroad from Tongku. 
The reason that the feat deserves the space given it here 
is because it is the sort of thing that is likely to go unap- 
preciated because it does not play to the gallery. It was 
hard, wearing, and very prosaic work, but it was the ser- 
vice that counted most. It showed the energy and re- 
sourcefulness of our officers and men, and is even better 
evidence than the splendid fighting done by our sailors 
and marines at Tientsin and Pekin of the fact that our navy 
understands the meaning of the word "duty." 

The service done by the Americans at Tongku did not 
attract much attention in America, but it was appreciated 
by the foreign officers in China. Letters of congratulation 
from commanding officers came in on all sides, and when 
the old Monocacy returned home her captain was deco- 
rated by the German Emperor with the order of the Red 
Eagle as a mark of Germany's appreciation of the services 
rendered by the officers and men of the American gunboat 
during the Boxer rebellion. 

Since the troubles in the Philippines and China our 
navy has had a respite from actual fighting, with the ex- 
ception of the occupation of Vera Cruz. Its problem has 
been to increase power and efficiency in readiness for war. 

281 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

To this end great progress has been made both in ships 
and personnel. 

An important event which made for efficiency was the 
cruise of the battle-ship fleet round the world in 1907-1909. 
On December 16, 1907, sixteen first-class battle-ships set 
out from Hampton Roads under command of Rear-Admiral 
Robley D. Evans, the same Evans whom we saw as a mid- 
shipman lying wounded at the foot of the stockade at Fort 
Fisher. The fleet passed through the Straits of Magellan 
and came north to San Francisco, where Admiral Evans 
was obliged by ill health to yield the command to Rear- 
Admiral Sperry. From San Francisco the ships proceeded 
to Honolulu, Auckland, Sydney, Melbourne, Manila, 
Yokohama, Amoy, and Suez. On arriving in the Medi- 
terranean the fleet divided, some of the ships arriving at 
Messina just in time to assist in the relief of the stricken 
city after the earthquake. Finally, after a cruise of forty- 
six thousand miles, the battle-ship fleet arrived back again 
in Hampton Roads on Washington's Birthday, 1909. 

The results of this cruise were of great value. Just how 
much the friendly reception of the American fleet at Yoko- 
hama did to dispel the Japan war-talk in both the United 
States and Japan is hard to say; but it probably did a great 
deal. From the naval point of view the results were very 
important. The long cruise was a practical test of such 
problems as the navy would have to meet in case of war 
involving a move against a distant coast. The fleet stood 
the test with great credit. It made its own repairs; it 
worked out new standards of economy in coal consumption ; 
it solved problems of big-fleet organization. At the same 
time the cruise showed clearly that we were badly in need 
of colliers and that in many points our battle- ships were 
capable of being improved. It is far better to discover 
weaknesses like these in peace than in war. 

In the autumn of 19 12 a naval force was sent to restore 
order in Nicaragua. The trouble was quickly suppressed 
by our sailors and marines, with the loss of only five men 

282 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

lolled. Short as the affair was, it lasted long enough to 
prove the discipline, gallantry, and accurate shooting of 
our men. Their temper is well illustrated by one incident. 
During an attack on the insurgent works the commanding 
officer sent back to the rear a detachment of sailors because 
they had landed in white uniforms, which were fatally con- 
spicuous. The sailors retired, but, finding a little stream, 
they rolled over and over in the mud till their white clothes 
were plastered brown. Then they went back on the run 
to the firing-line, and a few minutes later, together with the 
marines, rushed a position described as practically im- 
pregnable. 

Two years later trouble in Mexico brought a still better 
opportunity to test the tone of the present navy and 
answer the prediction made by some that in the popularity 
enjoyed by the navy since the Spanish War the service 
would lose the fine edge of proficiency and become careless. 

To the long history of Mexican revolutions there had 
been added, in 191 1, the deposition of President Diaz by 
revolutionists headed by Francisco I. Madero. The lat- 
ter was overthrown and slain in February, 19 13, in an- 
other revolt which brought to the fore Gen. Victoriano 
Huerta as provisional president. He was never officially 
recognized by the United States. There followed a long 
chapter of increasingly successful rebellions against Huerta 
by the Mexican "Constitutionalists," accompanied by 
troubles along the frontier, and the loss of American lives 
and property in Mexico. 

In April, 19 14, several things happened which looked 
like deliberate attempts to provoke trouble. At Tampico 
on April 9th the paymaster of the Dolphin was arrested 
with .his entire boat party and paraded up the streets of 
the city to the jail. The officer and his men were unarmed, 
but in full uniform, and the American flag was flying in the 
stern-sheets of the boat. About the same time a mail 
orderly was arrested in Vera Cruz, in spite of the fact that 
he, too, was in uniform and proceeding quietly about his 

283 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

business. Furthermore, the telegraphic despatches from 
our government to our representative in Mexico City were 
tampered with and held up by Huerta officials. As all 
these acts occurred within a few days and amounted in 
each case to a deliberate insult, the President demanded 
a complete apology and upheld Rear-Admiral Mayo, at 
Tampico, in the latter's demand for a salute to the flag as 
a reparation for the arrest of the Dolphin s paymaster. 
As Huerta refused to pay the salute as demanded, our fleet 
was ordered to Vera Cruz, and on April 21st Rear- Admiral 
Fletcher sent a landing-party to seize the custom-house 
at that port. After some sharp fighting in the streets the 
sailors and marines took possession of the city with a loss 
of only nineteen men killed. Four days later the three 
leading South American countries, Argentine, Brazil, and 
Chile, offered their services in an effort to mediate between 
the United States and Huerta, and to put an end to the 
destruction of life and property in Mexico. President 
Wilson accepted their friendly offer under certain condi- 
tions, and another period of waiting followed, with the 
Americans in control of Vera Cruz. A little later Huerta 
resigned and departed from the country, leaving the Con- 
stitutionalists practically in power. 

Such is a bare outline of events. Let us see how far the 
navy showed readiness and efficiency in the crisis. Within 
eighteen hours of the call for the fleet Rear- Admiral Badger 
had hoisted his flag on the Arkansas and steamed out of 
Hampton Roads, followed by such of the fleet as lay in 
Norfolk. At the same time other dreadnoughts were 
steaming out from other Atlantic ports to join the Arkansas 
in midocean. One of these battle-ships took on eighteen 
hundred tons of coal, provisions for one thousand men 
for six weeks, enormous quantities of other supplies, 
rounded up officers and men who were on shore leave, and 
was ready to trip her anchor in twelve hours. At the 
Newport training-station one thousand men were all ready 
to embark for Mexico within fifteen minutes of the receipt 



nl* 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

of the telegram. When Secretary Daniels told Paymas- 
ter-General Cowie that the navy needed a large merchant 
steamer at once as an auxiliary to the fleet off Tampico 
it took the Paymaster-General just sixty minutes to ar- 
range for the use of the Ward line steamer Esperanza, at 
that time lying off Vera Cruz. An hour and a half more 
sufficed to get word by wireless to Rear-Admiral Fletcher 
that he could use the Esperanza. 

When the landing was made at Vera Cruz, officers and 
men who had never before been under fire suddenly found 
themselves under the most trying conditions of warfare 
imaginable. They had to advance along open streets, an 
easy target for numerous "snipers" hidden in windows, 
towers, or behind barricades. For a detailed story of 
how our men behaved one must turn to Admiral Fletch- 
er's report, which makes stirring reading. For example, 
Boatswain's Mate Nickerson of the Utah was slightly 
wounded three times, but after first-aid bandages had been 
applied he took charge of a squad that built an advanced 
barricade under fire. Here he was wounded again three 
times, two shots breaking his leg above and below the 
knee. In another part of the city Ensign McDonnell and 
four men from the Florida were stationed on the roof of 
the Terminal Hotel to send signals to the gunboat Prairie. 
Naturally, this group were the target for all the snipers in 
the neighborhood, and the marvel is that they were not 
all killed. A marine stationed near them was killed and 
two others wounded, but in spite of the bullets singing 
about their heads all day the squad took and sent messages 
without a moment's interruption. 

Meanwhile the gunners on the Prairie had a chance to 
show what they could do. They had received the signal 
that there was a large body of snipers in the tower of the 
Naval Academy building. Long before this the officers 
had ascertained the exact ranges between the ship's an- 
chorage and every principal building in the city. It needed 
only the signal to open fire, and the Prairie fired six times, 
19 285 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

each a perfect shot. After the sixth shell there was not 
much tower and no more fight in the Mexican Naval 
Academy. 

In short, the Vera Cruz affair, although it lasted only a 
day or two, tested the navy and found it keyed up to con- 
cert pitch. This must be gratifying to the nation whose 
flag it serves; but we should demand of our navy nothing 
less than the best. We spend many millions every year 
on ships and men, not because we desire war, but as an 
insurance against war. It was our miserable unreadiness 
for war that brought us our humiliations in the War of 
1812, that dragged our Civil War through four awful years, 
and, on the part of the army, made the few months of the 
Spanish War so heavy with sickness and death. The bur- 
den of war in these days falls largely upon the navy, be- 
cause more than ever before sea-power turns the scales of 
war. If war must come, the navy should be ready like 
a keen, well-tempered sword with which the nation can 
strike swiftly and decisively. 



XXII 

THE MODERN NAVY 

Development in ships since the Spanish War — Improvements in 
gunnery — Target practice — The man behind the gun — The advan- 
tages of the modern enlisted man — The navy as an industrial school 
— The marines — The officers — Conclusion. 

ANEW naval policy has been steadily developing since 
the Spanish War. That war left the United States 
in a new position. From being a republic wholly concerned 
with its own affairs the nation suddenly found itself in the 
position of an empire with distant colonies and new re- 
sponsibilities. We became a "world power." We in- 
sisted on an "open door" policy in China, and stood firmly 
against the partition of that country, which the Continental 
powers seemed bent on accomplishing after the Boxer 
rebellion. The Monroe Doctrine was affirmed in stronger 
terms than before, but our government soon realized that 
the doctrine was regarded by some Continental rulers as 
"Yankee bluff," which would be respected only so long as 
it was backed up by a first-class navy. 

The result was that new ships were built in greater 
numbers than ever before in times of peace, classes at the 
Naval Academy were doubled to meet the demand for 
trained officers, and the entire Academy was rebuilt at 
the cost of nearly eleven million dollars. In a few years 
the United States sprang from sixth to third place among 
the naval powers of the world. Finally, the Panama Canal 
adds immensely to our sea-power, because it makes it pos- 
sible for our fleets to pass in a short time from one coast 
to the other. 

287 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

But the growth in numbers is not so interesting as the 
development of the ships themselves. A first-class battle- 
ship of the Spanish War, like the Indiana, would cut a 
sorry figure beside a first-class battle-ship of 19 14, like the 
Wyoming, because the latter has much greater speed, 
tougher armor, and a far more powerful battery. In 1905 
the English led the way by producing a new type, the 
famous Dreadnought, which relied wholly on her great 
guns for battle, mounting a secondary battery only for 
use against torpedo-boats. And, as heavier guns have 
been made or their number on a ship increased, the dread- 
nought has been superseded by a type called the " super- 
dreadnought/ ' But these names are not official. Battle- 
ships are rated in three classes, and it is significant of the 
changes since the Spanish War that a first-class battle-ship 
of that time is now relegated to the third class and called 
"obsolete." 

The British, Germans, and Japanese have a type just 
below the battle-ship, the "battle-cruiser." There is some 
difference of opinion as to its value compared with that 
of a dreadnought, which is cheaper to build than the 
speedier but less powerful and more vulnerable battle- 
cruiser. Opinion on this side of the water has decided 
against it, and it does not exist in the American navy. 
We have, however, the armored cruiser and the unprotected 
but speedy scout cruiser, and both these types have de- 
veloped correspondingly. 

The torpedo-boat has undergone still greater develop- 
ment, for the modern "destroyers" are several times as 
large as the Pluton and Furor, which represented the finest 
of their type in 1898, and are far speedier. Our modern 
destroyers can make about thirty-three knots. Moreover, 
the destroyer of to-day is capable of making long cruises 
independently of the big ships. 

The same thing is true of the modern submarine. Again 
following the lead of the English, we are building sub- 
marines three or four times as large as the type we had 

288 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

ten years ago. To-day a submarine makes cruises of sev- 
eral hundred miles independently of tender or squadron, 
and, as we are just beginning to realize the immense pos- 
sibilities of the submarine, that fact means a great deal. 
Submarines did not figure in our Spanish War or in the 
Russo-Japanese War, and the crude little David, which sank 
the Housatonic in our Civil War, still holds the honor of 
being the only submarine that ever destroyed an enemy's 
ship, although a new record is likely to be made in the 
great European war of 19 14. The developments in the sub- 
marine have been so marvelous that it must be carefully 
reckoned with. Recent fleet manceuvers had made one 
point clear as daylight — namely, that the most powerful 
"super-dreadnought" in the world has little protection 
against these venomous little ships operating under water. 
Of course, the submarine is wholly a weapon of harbor and 
coast defense; but the fact that it can go out and attack 
a fleet of battle-ships several hundred miles off the coast 
without any serious risk of getting hurt by the enemy 
contains infinite possibilities. 

An important innovation in naval tactics is the aero- 
plane. This, too, has not developed very far as a weapon 
of offense, because its effectiveness in dropping bombs 
upon an enemy's fleet has not been clearly proved. But 
there is no doubt about its value in scouting; and as the 
naval aeroplane, or "hydroplane," can make its flights 
from the deck of a battle-ship, these scouts of the air can 
accompany the fleet wherever it goes. A good test under 
war conditions was made in the harbor of Vera Cruz in 
the spring of 19 14, and the results were very satisfactory. 

Another improvement regarding the ships of our navy 
is in the direction of fleet action. Before the Spanish War 
individual ships were well handled, but the ships were the 
units, and when Rear- Admiral Sampson organized his fleet 
in the blockade of Santiago he realized how much the navy 
needed practice in fleet organization and fleet action. To- 
day the unit of operation is the fleet, and a new virtue has 

289 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

been added to the American navy — "fleet efficiency" — 
which did not exist in 1898. 

Such efficiency is a matter of men rather than ships, and 
it brings us to another important point — namely, that the 
development in the materiel of the navy is hardly as in- 
teresting as the improvement in personnel. In 1898 we 
laughed at the pitiable shooting done by the Spaniards, 
but the wiser officers shook their heads at the small per- 
centage of hits made by the American gunners and declared 
that we must do better. To this problem the keenest 
minds in the service have been devoted ever since that 
war, with the result that modern American naval gunnery 
is probably not surpassed anywhere. It is estimated that 
in 19 14 the "man behind the gun" shot one thousand 
per cent, better than in 1898. 

We are rightly proud of our progress in this regard; yet, 
since gunnery is the prime essential in battle, we can never 
be satisfied with anything short of perfection. During the 
War of 18 1 2, as we have seen, our gunnery surpassed that 
of the English, but during the years of dry rot and politics 
that preceded the Civil War it went to pieces so badly 
that during the Civil War our naval gunnery, with few ex- 
ceptions, was of a low order. 

The immense improvement in our naval gunnery since 
the Spanish War is due to several things. One of the great- 
est obstacles to gun practice at the time of that war was 
the fact that it was so costly to fire even a single shot from 
a turret-gun. Even the practice of loading a heavy shell 
wore out the breech of a gun seriously. In 1903 a British 
naval officer invented a "dummy loader" which enables 
a gun- crew to practise loading under exactly the same con- 
ditions without injuring the breech of the gun itself. The 
device was adopted in our navy, with the result that gun- 
squads soon became so proficient in handling the eight- 
hundred-and-seventy-pound shell and the four powder- 
bags that go with it that they could load one of the big 
turret-guns in less than one-quarter of a minute. 

290 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

For another still more important device also we have 
to thank the brains of the British navy. This is the "Dot- 
ter," familiarly called the "Ping-pong." By means of this 
instrument a small target is made to pass across the area 
of the gun as if it were an enemy's ship. The gun-pointer 
follows this with his eye at the telescopic sight and his 
hand on the elevating-wheel. When the lines on his sight 
intersect on the dot representing the center of the target, 
he presses a firing-key. This discharges by electricity a 
little needle which pierces the target. The gun-pointer 
can then tell how the shot would have struck with relation 
to a distant target if the great gun itself had been fired. 
This invention is of immense value, because it means that 
gun-pointers can keep the gun on the target continuously, 
and carry on constant target practice without wearing out 
the gun or spending a cent of the nation's money for powder 
and shot. 

A third device, just mentioned, the invention of an 
American naval officer, is the telescopic sight, an incal- 
culable improvement on the old inaccurate method of 
sighting a gun. It is estimated that without the telescopic 
sight ships would have to approach a target at a fourth or 
fifth of the present range in order to make the same num- 
ber of hits. 

Another means of improving American gunnery has been 
the awarding of prizes and trophies. For many years the 
navy had offered prizes and medals for small-arms shoot- 
ing, but it was not till after the Spanish War that rewards 
were offered for proficiency with the great guns. Twice 
a year, spring and fall, target practice is held on the south- 
ern drill-grounds off the Chesapeake capes or off Guanta- 
namo. The spring target practice, which follows the win- 
ter's drills at Guantanamo, is the "elementary" target 
practice. This is to test the individual gun-pointers on 
the different ships. In this practice a target is towed on 
a given course at a given rate of speed, and the ships in 
turn steam past it at a known distance and rate of speed, 

291 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

Thus all the elements in the problem are known except the 
gun-pointers' skill. Only one gun is fired at a time, and 
each pointer is given a particular target to shoot at. In 
this trial process there is competition between the various 
gun-crews of the same ship as well as between the various 
ships of the fleet. Target practice for the secondary bat- 
tery is held at night, because these smaller guns are de- 
signed to repel attacks by torpedo-boats, which would 
only attack a fleet under cover of darkness. 

The fall target work is held on the southern drill-grounds 
after the summer manceuvers, and is known as "battle 
practice." In this conditions are made to resemble as 
nearly as possible those of actual battle. Away off below 
the horizon a target is towed on an unknown course and 
unknown rate of speed. The ships approach and open fire 
whenever they like, except that they must not come within 
a minimum range, and after firing a few "ranging" shots 
the great guns open in "salvos" — that is, the entire broad- 
side. At this work a ship has about four minutes after 
the opening shot to make her score. After individual ship 
practice comes "divisional practice," in which the five bat- 
tle-ships of a division make their attack as a unit, follow- 
ing the signals of the flag-ship so closely that all the guns 
are fired at the exact instant in one tremendous salvo. 
This is typical battle practice, but details vary from year 
to year. 

In order to make a hit in a seaway at a range of eleven 
thousand yards, methods of ascertaining the distance must 
be scientific. We have already noted the telescopic sight 
in aiming; the other elements are the man at the range- 
finder, the spotter, and the fire-control group, with a fire- 
control officer in the steel conning-tower in command. An 
ingenious instrument, the range-finder placed in turrets 
and tops, enables the operator to get the range. As soon 
as he sees the number of yards marked on the scale he 
telephones it to the fire-control officer, who sends the 
figure to the fire-control group, who sit in a little sound- 

292 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

proof chamber away below decks. These men take re- 
ports of the enemy's distance, bearing, speed, etc., from 
different parts of the ship, make rapid calculations, and 
transmit the information to the battery. Meanwhile, 
high up on the platform at the top of each mast sits the 
spotter. The spotter must be a man of quick and strong 
eye, intense concentration, and rapid judgment. He 
watches the splash made by the falling shell near the tar- 
get and telephones to the fire-control room to alter the aim 
by so many yards up, down, right, or left. Acting on his 
report, the fire-control operators transmit the information 
to the turret-crews to modify their aim accordingly. 

Of course, the competition between ships at target prac- 
tice is of the keenest because the gunnery trophy is the 
greatest prize a ship can win. And it adds to our satis- 
faction in reading of the astonishingly high percentage of 
hits to realize that the canvas target represents about one- 
tenth of the area that would be exposed by an enemy's 
battle-ship. 

Besides gaining the finest distinction in the fleet, the 
gun-crews who make the best record are awarded substan- 
tial sums of money. For the following year they wear an 
"E" on their uniforms — meaning "Excellent" — and during 
manceuvers they display a huge E painted on the winning 
turret and a red pennant at the fore. (An "E" on the 
smoke-stack means that a ship has won the engineering 
competition.) In one year Congress appropriates forty-two 
thousand dollars in medals, trophies, and money prizes for 
skill in gunnery, and, judged by the results, no item in the 
naval appropriation is better invested. 

No small part of the improvement in gunnery may be 
credited to "the man behind the gun." An important 
change in our navy is in the type of our enlisted man. 
Long after the War of 1812 the "common sailor," as he 
was called, was as a rule a rough brute of a man who 
would do anything for a glass of rum and was kept in 
order only by a cat-o'-nine tails. Whenever a crew was 

293 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

given shore liberty large numbers deserted outright, no 
matter where the port was, and all were sure to get dead 
drunk. In those days nobody thought of enlisting before 
the mast unless he was desperately hard up or an officer of 
the law was after him. 

In these days fewer desert than ever before, and more 
re-enlist. The modern jacky ashore in a foreign port is, 
as a rule, intent on seeing the sights. He arms himself 
with a guide-book and explores museums, galleries, and 
ruins, and comes aboard ship again full of nothing worse 
than a jumble of facts and impressions. While the thou- 
sands of American bluejackets were ashore in Vera Cruz 
in the spring of 19 14 not one was reported drunk; and a 
few months later, after arduous service in and around Vera 
Cruz, when a battle -ship crew of about eight hundred 
men were given their first shore liberty in a home port, 
every man returned to his ship as sober as when he 
left it. 

The difference is probably due chiefly to the difference 
between the life of the old-time and the modern sailor. 
A sailor of the Hartford in 1864 sat cross-legged on the 
deck, with a piece of oil-cloth for a table, and made a din- 
ner of hard "salt horse" and sea-biscuit. The sailor of 
to-day gets a better dinner than he would expect at home 
and better than was served to Admiral Farragut on the 
Hartford in 1864. Even in 19 14 the pay of the seaman 
remains low compared with wages he might make ashore; 
but nearly all of it is clear saving. In order to attract the 
right sort of men the government offers them liberal com- 
forts aboard ship and chances for fun besides. Almost 
every fine evening there is a moving-picture show on the 
quarter-deck, and frequently the men get up minstrel per- 
formances for the amusement of the ship. 

The great joy of the modern sailor is athletics. In the 
days of sailing-frigates a bluejacket got all the athletics 
he needed in swinging the yards and making or furling 
sail; but on a modern battle-ship there is little room for 

294 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

exercise in the ship routine. In 1900 the Navy Department 
made a beginning by ordering captains to encourage athlet- 
ics among the men, and the movement has gone ahead 
ever since. Now the Department provides athletic outfits 
for every ship, and there is not only an "athletics" officer 
for every ship, but one also on the staff of the commander- 
in-chief. While the fleet is at its winter drill in Guantana- 
mo there is plenty of sport to offset the plenty of work, and 
at the end of the season in March the fleet takes a whole 
week off for games and races. The wide reach of the bay 
is ideal for boat-races, which are very popular, and there 
are seventeen baseball diamonds ashore. A regular 
"league" schedule is laid out to decide the baseball cham- 
pionship of the fleet. On these ball-teams officers and men 
play together; but the captain is always an enlisted man. 
Of course, boxing is a favorite sport at all times. The 
bouts are carefully supervised and limited to seven rounds; 
but to the American sailor the championship belt of the 
North Atlantic Fleet stands only a little below the world 
trophy. 

All these privileges for the enlisted man would make a 
"taut" captain of the old frigate days turn over in his 
grave. Foreigners like to sneer at the way we treat our 
enlisted men; they say we have no "discipline." Their 
idea of discipline is illustrated by the spectacle often seen 
by our officers when visiting Russian ships in the East, 
when an angry or drunken officer would amuse himself by 
beating an unoffending sailor in the face. We prefer to 
ship men who would not stand being beaten in the face by 
anybody; at the same time we know that no enlisted man 
in the world is more loyal to his officers than the American 
sailor or marine. 

In short, our enlisted men are of a much higher type 
than the navy has ever boasted before, and the policy to- 
day is to attract still more the clean, athletic, and am- 
bitious young men of the country. Uncle Sam is rather 
particular about the kind of lad he puts into a sailor's 

295 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

uniform, for out of all the men who apply to enlist only 
about one in four is accepted. 

A great advantage to the sailor of to-day, and one not 
realized by Americans generally, is that .our modern navy 
is performing a great service in times of peace as a huge 
industrial school. Thousands of lads enter the navy who 
could not afford to continue at school, especially as their 
lessons in high school seemed too impractical to help them 
to "get a job." They get in the navy an all-around edu- 
cation of body, mind, and hand of the utmost practical 
value. Besides the athletics just mentioned there are 
daily setting-up drills and the constant supervision of 
medical officers to keep a man in the best physical trim. 
If a man is ambitious to study he can go as far as he likes 
in the classes conducted by officers aboard ship, and in 
19 1 4 there were about eight hundred who found time 
to follow courses in correspondence schools. For many 
years there have been apprentice seamen who have passed 
the examinations for the Naval Academy and won com- 
missions in the navy, and in 19 14 Congress authorized fifteen 
extra appointments for the enlisted men alone. 

The greatest benefit to the greatest number comes in 
the learning of useful trades. The particular trade depends 
largely on a man's particular bent; but every year the 
navy trains hundreds of electricians, engineers, plumbers, 
carpenters, painters, pharmacists, bookkeepers, stenog- 
raphers, wireless-telegraphers — and so on through a long 
list of occupations. For training the specialists needed 
aboard the modern battle-ship the navy has several tech- 
nical schools. For instance, at Mare Island (California) 
and at New York the navy maintains two electrical schools. 
This department is of the greatest importance, because 
everything mechanical aboard ship is done by electricity. 
In addition there are special radio schools for those who 
want to learn wireless. Those who have served one enlist- 
ment and have shown proficiency in gunnery are admitted 
to gunnery schools at Newport and Washington. In these 

296 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

classes the men learn all about the manufacture of cannon 
and torpedoes and the details about the care and use of 
those weapons. For practical work the men go into the 
naval-gun factory in Washington and the torpedo station 
at Newport. Other naval schools at Charleston, Norfolk, 
Newport, and San Francisco train the apprentices for the 
numerous e very-day trades needed aboard ship. 

Finally, the navy teaches men a very important lesson, 
something that they learn in no other school in the country 
— namely, to obey orders and to do a piece of work thor- 
oughly. In short, the thousands of young men who yearly 
leave at the end of their enlistment and go back to civil 
life have been equipped to earn a living and are in all 
other respects much more valuable citizens than when 
they entered the recruiting office. The American navy 
is a great democratic university, with an enrolment of 
about fifty thousand men for a course of at least four 
years. 

No reference to the enlisted man would be complete 
without mention of the marines, who have fought, shoul- 
der to shoulder, with the bluejackets in every naval battle 
in our history — the soldier-sailors of our navy. Aboard 
ship the marines of the present day act chiefly as sentinels ; 
in action or target practice they man certain guns of the 
secondary battery; but their chief duty is to be ready at 
any instant to land at any spot in the world where trouble 
is brewing for Uncle Sam and put it down. They are the 
advance-guard of the nation, and usually they leave little 
for anybody else to do. They see more active service than 
any other corps under the flag. Between 1900 and 19 14 
there was only one year in which the marines were not 
engaged somewhere on the firing-line. In Tientsin and 
Pekin the marines covered themselves with glory during 
the Boxer rebellion, and they were no less conspicuous for 
gallantry in the taking of Vera Cruz in 1914- They came 
in for special commendation in Admiral Fletcher's report 
of that affair. The marines have an enviable record. 

207 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

There are only ten thousand of them, but they are the only 
corps in which there is not a single vacancy. 

For the officers as well as the enlisted men the period 
since the Spanish War has meant a decided advance. 
A comparatively few years ago young lieutenants off duty 
aboard ship would hunt for diversion as a matter of course. 
To-day one is more likely to see them intent on a war 
game. The War College at Newport distributes problems 
of naval warfare to fleet and naval stations. Solutions are 
demanded and passed upon by the experts at the college. 
War games are often played on board ship, with two sides 
in separate rooms and a messenger going back and forth 
with the moves. Such work as this calls for the sort of 
mind that makes a successful chess-player, and is the best 
possible school of tactics. 

The War College itself has gained great importance and 
influence since the Spanish War. Officers, especially of com- 
manding rank, study there the finer problems of naval 
sciences, strategy, and international law. War games are 
played, discussed, and the results put on file for future 
reference. 

At the same time, as the modern battle-ship has become 
such an intricate machine, involving the sciences of steam, 
electrical engineering, ordnance, ship construction, etc., no 
course of four years at the Naval Academy could equip 
a man completely. Accordingly, there is now a post- 
graduate school at Annapolis to give the young officers 
more technical training, especially those who wish to 
specialize in some branch of their profession. For those 
who want to make torpedo warfare their specialty there 
is the torpedo school at Newport, and for those ambitious 
to become aeroplane experts there is the aviation school 
at Pensacola. The ordnance specialists naturally seek 
duty in the naval gun-factory at Washington, and so on. 
The officer of to-day is made to feel not only the necessity 
of being thoroughly equipped in his profession, but also 
of adding something himself to the progress of his service 

298 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

and keeping abreast of what is done in foreign navies. 
The navy has a magazine, the Naval Institute, in which 
the officers discuss every conceivable problem affecting the 
navy, and in which important works of foreign officers are 
reviewed or their articles published in translation. In 
short, there never was a time in the history of the navy 
when officers, young and old, were so keenly alert for new 
ideas and set so high a standard of efficiency for themselves 
as to-day. 

We come now to the final word. We have seen the 
early struggles of the navy, how it triumphed over the 
general opposition to a navy by its victories in the War of 
1812 ; what damage was done by the politicians in the years 
that followed; how the navy pulled itself together in the 
Civil War and largely decided the issue by its blockade of 
the South; how the navy fell into neglect again after the 
war, but revived in time to make the Spanish War a matter 
of less than four months' duration; and, finally, we have 
seen how since that war the navy has progressed in every 
department. The objection that the navy was an instru- 
ment of tyranny is heard no longer, but opposition is still 
heard on the ground of expense, even although the cost to 
the American people of our navy is less per capita to-day 
than it was for the thirteen frigates and sloops a hundred 
years ago. But the difficulties with Mexico in April, 19 14, 
and the tremendous conflict that broke out in Europe in 
July of the same year show that the day of wars is not 
yet past in spite of Hague conferences and peace societies. 
If war should fall upon us, we must turn to our navy as 
our first and strongest line of defense or offense. The 
navy has shown that it is true to the best traditions of the 
past ; it needs only the interest and hearty support of the 
entire nation. 



A NAVAL CHRONOLOGY 

In this history of the American navy it has been obviously 
desirable to emphasize the essentials, and it has been necessary 
to pass over many minor features. In the following chronology, 
however, practically everything of consequence is included, and 
certain important military battles, treaties, and proclamations 
are noted also in order to give bearing to the events that are 
more strictly naval. 

1775, April 19. Battle of Lexington and Concord. 

1775, October 13. Congress establishes a Marine Committee for 

naval affairs. 
1775, November 10. Marine corps organized. 

1775, December 3. First fleet of the United States put in com- 

mission. 

1776, February 17 -April 17. Naval expedition against New 
Providence, Bahamas, Com. Hopkins. 

1776, July 4. Declaration of Independence. 

1776, October 11-13. Gunboat action, Lake Champlain; Amer- 

ican force under Benedict Arnold defeated after desperate 
resistance. 

1777, September 18. U. S. sloop Lexington, Capt. Johnston, cap- 

tured by British sloop Alert. 

1777, October 17. Surrender of Burgoyne. 

1778, February 6. Louis XVI. acknowledges independence of 
American colonies and signs treaty of alliance and com- 
merce. 

1778, March 7. Action between U. S. 32-gun frigate Randolph, 
Capt. Biddle, and British 64-gun ship Yarmouth. At 
end of fifteen minutes Randolph blew up; only four saved. 

1778, April 24. U. S. sloop Ranger, Capt. Jones, captures British 
sloop Drake off Carrickfergus, Ireland. 
.~.oo 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1779, September 23. U. S. frigate Bonhomme Richard, Capt. 

Jones, captures British frigate Sera pis off English coast. 
1 781, May 29. U. S. frigate Alliance, Capt. Barry, engages two 

British sloops-of-war at the same time and captures both. 
1 781, September 1-7. French fleet, Adml. DeGrasse, prevents 

British fleet, Adml. Graves, from entering Chesapeake Bay 

and relieving Cornwallis. 

1 78 1, October 19. Surrender of Cornwallis. 

1782, April 8. Penn. state sloop Hyder All, Lieut. Barney, cap- 

tures in Delaware Bay British sloop Gen. Monk, of supe- 
rior force. One of the most brilliant actions of the war. 

1783, September 3. Treaty of peace signed by British and 
American representatives. 

1794, March 27. Construction of six frigates authorized. 

1795, September 5. Treaty ratified with Algiers for ransom of 

prisoners and annual tribute. 

1 796, March 1 . Proclamation of the Jay treaty with Great Britain. 
1796, April 20. The President authorized to continue construc- 
tion and equipment of two frigates of 44 guns and one of 36. 

1796, November 4. Treaty of peace concluded with Tripoli. 

1797, July 10. Launching of 44-gun frigate United States. 
1797, September 7. Launching of 36-gun frigate Constellation. 

1797, October 21. Launching of 44-gun frigate Constitution. 

1798, April 27. Congress authorizes purchase of twelve vessels 

for war purposes. 
1798, April 30. Navy Department organized. 
1798, July 6. All French treaties declared void. 
1798, July 11. Marine corps established. 

1798, November 16. Five men impressed from U. S. sloop 
Baltimore by commodore of British squadron. 

1799, February 9. Constellation, Capt. Truxtun, captures French 

frigate Insurgente off Nevis, W. I. 

1800, February 1. Constellation, Capt. Truxtun, defeats French 

frigate Vengeance off Guadaloupe, W. I. 

1800, September. U. S. frigate George Washington, Capt. Bain- 
bridge, carries tribute to Algiers and is required to convey 
the Bey's ambassador to Constantinople. 

1800, October 12. U. S. frigate Boston, Capt. Little, captures 
French sloop Berceau. 

1800, December 14. U.S. schooner Enterprise, Lieut. Shaw, de- 
feats French sloop Flambeau in a brilliant action. 
20 301 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1 80 1, March 3. Navy reduced to thirteen vessels. 
1 80 1, May 20. Three frigates and one sloop sent to Barbary 
coast to protect American commerce. 

1 80 1, August 1. - The Enterprise, Lieut Sterett, captures the Tripoli. 

1802, February 6. Congress recognizes war with Tripoli. 

1802, July 22. The Constellation, Capt. Murray, defeats squadron 

of nine Tripolitan gunboats. 

1803, June 22. U. S. frigate John Adams, Capt. Rodgers, de- 
stroys Tripolitan ship of war. 

1803, October 31. U. S. frigate Philadelphia strikes reef near 
Tripoli and is captured. 

1804, February 16. Lieut. Decatur, with ketch Intrepid, burns 

the Philadelphia in the harbor of Tripoli. 
1804, August 3, 7, 24, 28, September 3. Combined bombard- 
ments on Tripolitan forts and attacks on Tripolitan gun- 
boats by American squadron. 

1804, September 4. Intrepid, M. Comdt. Somers, blown up in 
harbor of Tripoli. 

1805, April 27. Three sloops assist in Eaton's capture of Derne. 
1805, June 4. Treaty of peace concluded with Tripoli. 

1805, June 12. U. S. gunboat, Lieut. Lawrence, boarded by boat 

from British fleet, Adml. Collingwood, and three men im- 
pressed. 

1806, April 25. British frigate Leander fires upon American coast- 

ing-vessel and impresses several of her crew. 
1806, May 16. Great Britain issues an "Order in Council" de- 
claring coast of Europe from Elbe to Brest under blockade. 

1806, November 21. Napoleon issues Berlin Decree, prohibiting 

commerce with Great Britain. 

1807, June 22. British frigate Leopard fires into U. S. frigate 

Chesapeake, Capt. Barron, and impresses four seamen. 

1807, November 11. British Order in Council forbids neutral 
nations to trade with France or her allies except under 
tribute to Great Britain. 

1807, December 17. Napoleon's Milan Decree forbids trade with 
England or her colonies and confiscates any vessel paying 
tribute or submitting to British search. 

1807, December 18. Congress authorizes building of 188 gun- 
boats, bringing total in the navy to 257. 

1807, December 22. Embargo laid prohibiting all foreign com- 
merce. In force till March, 1809. 
302 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1809, March 1. Non-intercourse act forbids all commerce with 

Great Britain, France, or their colonies. 

1810, January 2. Napoleon instructs Murat, King of Naples, to 

seize all American vessels and their cargoes. 

1 8 10, May 1. British and French armed vessels excluded from 
American waters. 

1 8 10, May. Napoleon's Rambouillet Decree confiscates Amer- 
ican vessels and their cargoes in French ports. 

1810, June 24. U. S. brig Vixen. Lieut. Trippe, fired into by 

British man-of-war. 

181 1, May 16. U. S. frigate President, Capt. Rodgers, fights 
British sloop Little Belt, action of fifteen minutes. Each 
commander accused the other of firing first. 

181 2, April 4. Embargo laid on all vessels in United States for 

ninety days. 
18 1 2, June 17. Orders in Council revoked by Great Britain. 
181 2, June 18. United States declares war against Great Britain. 
18 1 2; June 23. U. S. squadron, Com. Rodgers, engages in unsuc- 
cessful pursuit of British frigate Belvidera. 
181 2, July 17-21. Constitution, Capt. Hull, escapes capture after 

long pursuit by British squadron. 
1812, July 19. U. S. brig Oneida, Lieut. Woolsey, successfully 

resists attempt of British squadron to capture her on Lake 

Ontario. 
1812, August 13. U. S. frigate Essex. Capt. Porter, captures 

British sloop Alert. 
1812, August 19. Constitution. Capt. Hull, captures British frigate 

Guerriere. 
181 2, October 8. Lieut. Elliott makes successful boat attack 

against British brigs Detroit and Caledonia, Lake Erie. 
1812, October 18. U. S. sloop Wasp, Capt. Jones, captures 

British sloop Frolic. Both taken the same day by British 

ship of the line. 
1812, October 25. U. S. frigate United States, Capt. Decatur, 

captures British frigate Macedonian. 

1812, December 29. Constitution, Capt. _ Bainbridge, captures 
British frigate Java off Bahia, Brazil. 

1813, February 24. U. S. sloop Hornet, M. Comdt. Lawrence, 

sinks British sloop Peacock. 
1813, June 1. Chesapeake, Capt. Lawrence, captured by British 
frigate Shannon off Boston. 
303 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

813, August 2. U. S. brig Argus, Lieut Allen, captured by- 
British brig Pelican in Irish Sea. 

813, September 5. Enterprise, Lieut. Burrows, captures British 
brig Boxer off Monhegan, Me. 

813, September 10. U. S. squadron, M. Comdt. Perry, defeats 

British squadron on Lake Erie. 

814, March 28. Essex, Capt. Porter, captured by British ships 

Phcbe- and Cherub in harbor of Valparaiso. 

814, April 23. British .blockade extended to entire coast of 
United States. 

814, April 29. V. S. sloop Peacock, M. Comdt. Warrington, cap- 
tures British brig Epervier off Florida coast. 

814, June 28. U. S. sloop Wasp (2d), M. Comdt. Blakely, cap- 
tures British sloop Reindeer in English Channel. 

814, September 1. Wasp, M. Comdt. Blakely, sinks British 
sloop Avon off English Channel. 

814, September 11. U. S. squadron, M. Comdt. Macdonough, 
defeats British squadron on Lake Champlain. 

814, September n-October 1. U. S. expedition, two schooners 
and six gunboats, M. Comdt. Patterson, destroys pirate 
stronghold at Barataria, La. 

815, January 15. President, Capt. Decatur, captured by British 

squadron off Long Island. 
815, February 17. Treaty of peace with Great Britain rat- 
ified. 
815, February 20. Constitution, Capt. Stewart, engages and 

captures at the same time two British sloops. 
815, March 3. U. S. declares war against Algiers. 
815, March 23. Hornet, M. Comdt. Biddle, captures British 

sloop Penguin. 
815, May 19. Com. Decatur sails from New York to Algiers 

with squadron. 
815, June 17. U. S. squadron, Com. Decatur, captures Algerian 

flag-ship. 
815, June 30. Peacock, M. Comdt. Warrington, captures British 

brig Nautilus. (Prize released next day when Warrington 

hears of peace.) 
815, June 30. Com. Decatur concludes treaty of peace with 

Bey of Algiers. 
815, July 31. Decatur concludes treaty with Bey of Tunis. 
815, August 9. Decatur concludes treaty with Bey of Tripoli. 

304 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1819, March 3. Congress provides for war on piratical craft of 
Spanish- American colonies. 

182 1, November 5. U. S. schooner Alligator, Lieut. Stockton, 
fired upon by Portuguese war-vessel of same armament. 
After action of one hour and twenty minutes latter sur- 
renders and is sent to Boston as a prize. 

1822, December 20. Congress authorizes squadron to suopress 
piracy in the Caribbean. 

1822, July 21-22. Landing partv, Lieut. Farragut, destroys 
pirate stronghold in Cuba. 

1824, November 14. Landing party, Capt. Porter, exacts repara- 
tion at Foxardo for insult to United States. (For this act 
Porter was recalled, court-martialed, and sentenced to 
suspension for six months. He resigned and entered the 
Mexican navy.) 

1832. February 6. U. S. frigate Potomac, Capt. Downes. destroys 
pirate villages at Qualla Battoo, Sumatra. 

1838, August 19. Exploring expedition, Lieut. Wilkes, sails for 
antarctic regions and the Pacific. 

1840, January 19. Lieut. Wilkes discovers the antarctic con- 
tinent. 

1842, December 1. Execution of Midn. Spencer and two seamen 
at sea for attempted mutiny on brig Somers, Capt. 
Mackenzie. 

1844, February 28. Bursting of the gun "Peacemaker," U.S.S. 

Princeton. (Secretary of the Navy among the killed.) 

1845, October 10. Founding of the Naval Academy at Annapo- 

lis, Md. 

1846, May 12. United States declares war against Mexico. 
1846, May 14. Blockade of eastern coast of Mexico proclaimed. 
1846, July 6. U. S. squadron, Com. Sloat, takes possession of 

Monterey, Cal. 

1846, July 6. U. S. frigate Portsmouth, Capt. Montgomery, takes 

possession of San Francisco. 

1847, March 9-29. Naval operations at Vera Cruz: landing of 

troops, investment and bombardment, resulting in surrender 
of the city. 

1848, February 2. Treaty of peace concluded with Mexico. 
1850, May 26-October, 185 1. United States expedition, Lieut. 

De Haven, to arctic in search of Sir John Franklin. 
1852-1854. United States expedition to Japan, Com. Perry, 

305 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

established commercial relations between United States 
and Japan. 

1853, July 2. Capt. Ingraham, U. S. sloop St. Louis, threatens to 
open fire on Austrian brig Hussar unless Martin Koszta, 
a Hungarian refugee to the United States and at that time 
a prisoner on the Hussar, is surrendered. Koszta is even- 
tually given up. 

1856, November 20-22. Capture of forts at Canton, China, by 
United States naval force, Capt. Foote, in retaliation for 
attack by the forts on sloop Portsmouth. 

1858, October 17-February, 1859. U. S. squadron, Flag-Officer 
Shubrick, proceeds to Asuncion, Paraguay, to demand 
retribution for attack on the U.S.S. Water-Witch. Friendly 
relations restored without recourse to arms. 

i860, December 20. South Carolina passes ordinance of se- 
cession. 

1 86 1, April 13. Surrender of Fort Sumter to Confederates. 

1 86 1, April 20. Abandonment of Norfolk Navy Yard, Com. 
McCauley, and unsuccessful attempt to destroy naval and 
military stores. The following ships of the navy burned 
and scuttled: ships of the line Pennsylvania, Columbus, 
Delaware; frigates Raritan, Columbia, Merrimac; sloops 
Dolphin, Germantown, Plymouth. 

1 86 1, April 27. Blockade of Virginia and North Carolina ports 
proclaimed. Subsequently extended to entire coast during 
following month. 

1 86 1, May 5. Transfer of Naval Academy to Newport, R. I. 

1861, August 3. Construction of Monitor authorized. 

1 86 1, August 7. Contract awarded for seven armored gunboats 
for river service. 

1861, August 28-29. Capture of Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, 
by U. S. squadron, Com. Stringham. 

1 86 1, October 12. St. Louis launched, first ironclad in American 
navy. 

1861, November 7. U. S. gunboats Tyler and Lexington cover 
retreat of Grant's army at Belmont, saving it from rout. 

1861, November 7. U. S. squadron, Flag-Officer DuPont, cap- 
tures Confederate defenses at Port Royal, South Caro- 
lina. 

1861, November 8. U. S. frigate San Jacinto, Capt. Wilkes, re- 
moves Confederate commissioners from steamer Trent. 
306 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1 86 1, November 23. Escape of C.S.S. Sumter, Capt. Semmes, 

from U.S.S. Iroquois. 

1862, January 30. Monitor launched. 

1862, February 6. U. S. gunboats, Com. Foote, capture Fort 
Henry. 

1862, February 7-8. U. S. squadron, Flag-Officer Goldsborough, 
captures fortifications defending Roanoke Sound. 

1862, February 14. U. S. gunboats, Com. Foote, make unsuccess- 
ful attack on Fort Donelson. 

1862, March 1-2. Evacuation of Columbus, Ky., by Confed- 
erates. 

1862, March 8. Destruction of U. S. sloop Cumberland and frigate 
Congress by Confederate ram Merrimac {Virginia), Capt. 
Buchanan. 

1862, March 9. Action between Monitor and Merrimac. 

1862, March 9. Confederates abandon batteries on Potomac. 

1862, March 13-14- U. S. squadron, Com. Rowan, captures 
New Berne, N. C. 

1862, March 15-April 7. River squadron, Com. Foote, bombards 
Confederate defenses at Island No. 10. 

1862, April 4. U. S. gunboat Carondelet, Comdr. Walke, runs past 
batteries defending Island No. 10. 

1862, April 6. U. S. gunboats Tyler and Lexington prevent defeat 
of Union army at Pittsburg Landing (Shiloh). 

1862, April 6-7. U. S. gunboat Pittsburg, Lieut. Thomson, runs 
past Island No. 10. Island surrenders, batteries on penin- 
sula evacuated by Confederates. 

1862, April 20. U.S.S. Itasca and Pinola, Capt. Bell, demolish 
ship obstructions, under fire, in river below Forts Jackson 
and St. Philip. 

1862, April 23-24. U. S. fleet, Flag-Officer Farragut, passes Forts 
Jackson and St. Philip, and disperses Confederate flotilla. 

1862, April 28. Forts Jackson and St. Philip surrender. 

1862, April 29. New Orleans surrenders to Farragut. 

1862, May 8. Baton Rouge surrenders. 

1862, May 10. Pensacola evacuated by Confederates. 

1862, May 10. Action between Union and Confederate gunboats 
near Fort Pillow; U. S. gunboat Cincinnati rammed and 
sunk. 

1862, May n. Destruction of Merrimac by Confederates to pre- 
vent its capture by Union forces, 
307 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1862, May 13. Union naval forces occupy Natchez, Miss. 
1862, May 15. Unsuccessful bombardment of Confederate fort 

on Drewry's Bluff by Union squadron. 
1862, May 25. Recapture of Norfolk Navy Yard by United 

States marines. 
1862, June 4. Fort Pillow evacuated by Confederates. 
1862, June 6. Squadron of U. S. gunboats, Flag -Officer 

Davis, engage and destroy Confederate gunboats at 

Memphis. 
1862, June 2 6- July 22. Continued naval bombardment on 

Vicksburg. 
1862, June 28. Union squadron, Flag-Officer Farragut, runs past 

batteries at Vicksburg. 
1862, July 15. Confederate ram Arkansas, Lieut. Brown, runs 

through Union fleet to Vicksburg. 
1862, July 16. Congress creates grade of Rear-Admiral for flag- 
officers. 
1862, July 22. Union gunboats make unsuccessful attempt to 

destroy the Arkansas. 
1862, August 6. U. S. gunboat Essex, Comdr. W. D. Porter, 

attacks the Arkansas at Baton Rouge. Latter is run 

aground and fired by her crew to prevent capture. 

1862, September 16-17. Battle of Antietam. 

1863, January 10-11. U. S. gunboat squadron, Act. Rear-Adml. 

Porter, attacks and captures Confederate fort at Arkansas 
Post. 

1863, January 31. Confederate rams Palmetto State and Chicora 
make successful surprise attack on Union blockading squad- 
ron, Charleston. Two Union vessels disabled. 

1863, February 28. U. S. monitor Montauk, Comdr. Worden, 
destroys Confederate cruiser Nashville near Savannah. 

1863, March 14. Attack by U. S. fleet, Rear-Adml. Farragut, on 
Port Hudson. U. S. frigate Mississippi runs aground and 
is fired. 

1863, April 7. Union fleet, Rear-Adml. DuPont, bombards forts 
at Charleston without success. U. S. monitor Keokuk 
riddled by Confederate fire and sinks the following day. 

1863, April 16. Naval bombardment of Vicksburg. 

1863, April 29. U. S. gunboat squadron, Rear-Adml. Porter, 
attacks and captures Grand Gulf, Miss. 

1863, May 2-4. Battle of Chancellorsville, 

308 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1863, June 17. U. S. ironclad Weehawken attacks and captures 
Confederate ram Atlanta in Warsaw Sound, Ga. 

1863, June 27. Boat party from C.S.S. Archer, Lieut. Read, cuts 
out revenue-cutter Caleb Cushing at Portland, Me. 

1863, July 1-3. Battle of Gettysburg. 

1863, July 4. Surrender of Vicksburg. 

1863, July 9. Surrender of Port Hudson. 

1863, July 16. U.S.S. Wyoming, Capt. McDougal, attacks and 
silences Japanese ships and batteries at Shimonoseki. 

1863, September 19-20. Battle of Chickamauga. 

1863, October 5. Confederate David torpedoes Union ship Iron- 

sides off Charleston, but fails to sink her. 

1864, February 17. Confederate David torpedoes and sinks 
U.S.S. Honsatonic off Charleston. 

1864, April 19. Confederate ram Albemarle makes successful 

attack on Union gunboats; sinks the U. S. gunboat 

Soutkfield in Roanoke River, 
1864, March 14. Two hundred thousand men drafted for Union 

navy. 
1864, May 5. U. S. gunboat squadron engages the Albemarle. 

Latter retreats up Roanoke River. 
1864, June 19. U.S.S. Kcarsarge, Capt. Winslow, sinks Con- 
federate cruiser Alabama, Capt. Semmes, off Cherbourg, 

France. 
1864, August 5. Union fleet, Rear-Adml. Farragut, engages Fort 

Morgan and Confederate flotilla, and enters Mobile Bay. 
1864, October 7. U.S.S. Wachusett, Comdr. Collins, captures the 

C. S. cruiser Florida in harbor of Bahia, Brazil. 
1864, October 27-28. Lieut. Cushing with torpedo-launch blows 

up Confederate ram Albemarle in Roanoke River. 
1864, October 28-31. Union gunboats attack and capture 

Plymouth, N. C. 

1864, December 24. Unsuccessful attack by Union fleet, Rear- 
Adml. Porter, on Fort Fisher. 

1865, January 13-15. Second attack on Fort Fisher. Fort sur- 

renders to the army. 
1865, January 15. U. S. monitor Patapsco sunk off Charleston 

by Confederate torpedo. 
1865, February 18. Evacuation of Charleston by Confederates. 
1865, April 2. Evacuation of Richmond by Confederates. 
1865, April 9. Surrender of Lee at Appomattox. 

3°9 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1865, April 12. Surrender of Mobile to Union forces. 
1865, June 2. Surrender of Galveston to Union forces. 
1865, August 29. Conclusion of the blockade of the South. 
1865, September. Removal- of the United States Naval Academy 
' to Annapolis, Md. 

1865, November 6. Surrender of the Confederate cruiser Shenan- 

doah to British authorities. 

1866, July 25. Grade of Admiral created and conferred on 
Farragut. 

1867, June 13 . Naval brigade from the Hartford and the Wyoming 

attack and destroy a village in Formosa in retaliation for 

massacre of crew of an American ship. 
1870, May 1 6- June 11. U. S. squadron, Rear-Adml. Rodgers, 

attacks Corean forts. Latter stormed by landing party, 

Comdr. Kimberley. 
1870, June 17. Six boats from U.S.S. Mohican, Lieut. Brownson, 

capture and destroy pirate ship at mouth of Teacapan 

River, Mexico. 

1870. November 18-December 20. Cruise of the gig of the U.S.S. 

Saginaw from Ocean Island to Hawaiian Islands to find 
rescue for shipwrecked officers and crew of the Saginaw. 

1871, July 3-May, 1873. North Polar Expedition, U.S.S. Polaris, 

Capt. Hall. 
1877, November 24. U. S. sloop Huron, Comdr. Ryan, wrecked 

in gale off North Carolina coast. Over one hundred lives 

lost. 
1879-1881. The Jeannette Expedition, Comdr. DeLong, to arctic. 
1880, March 3. U.S.S. Constellation leaves New York with cargo 

of food for famine sufferers in Ireland. 
1882, August 5. Congress authorizes construction of three steel 

war-vessels and one armed despatch-boat. Under this law 

were built the Boston, Atlanta, Chicago, and Dolphin — the 

beginning of the "new" navy. 
1884, June 22. Lieut. Greely, U.S.A., and six of his exploring 

party rescued by U.S.S. Thetis and Bear, Comdr. Schley. 
1889, March 15-16. Hurricane at Apia, Samoa. Loss of U.S.S. 

Trenton, Vandalia, and Nipsic. 
1891, October 16. Boatswain, mate, and six sailors of the U. S. 

cruiser Charleston injured by mob in Valparaiso, Chile. 

Two of the injured died, and the incident nearly brought 

on war between the United States and Chile, 
310 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 

1898, February 15. U.S.S. Maine, Capt. Sigsbee, blown up by- 
mine in Havana harbor. 

1898, April 22. President proclaims s blockade of Cuban ports. 

1898. April 25. Congress declares that a state of war has 
existed between Spain and the United States since April 
21. 

1898, May 1. U. S. squadron, Com. Dewey, destroys Spanish 
squadron, Manila Bay. 

1898, June 3. Attempt by Naval Constructor Hobson to close 
harbor of Santiago by sinking the collier Merrimac at the 
entrance. 

1898, June 28. President proclaims blockade of southern coast 
of Cuba and port of San Juan, Porto Rico. 

1898, July 3. U. S. fleet, Rear-Adml. Sampson, destroys Span- 
ish fleet as the latter attempts a sortie from harbor of 
Santiago. 

1898, July 17. Santiago surrenders to United States army and 
navy. 

1898, August 12. Terms for cessation of hostilities agreed upon 
by Spain and the United States. 

1898, December 10. Treaty of peace concluded between Spain 
and the United States. 

1899, March 1. Grade of Admiral revived and conferred on 
Rear-Admiral Dewey. 

1900, May 29-August 14. United States marine guard besieged 

at United States legation, Pekin, by Boxers. Siege marked 
by incessant fighting and gallant conduct of marines. 

1900, July 9-14. Assaults by force of two thousand American, 
Japanese, and British forces upon Tientsin, resulting in 
capture of the city. 

1900, August 14. Allies enter Pekin and end Boxer rebellion. 

1905, December 28-July 9, 1906. Voyage of U. S: dry-dock 
" Dewey " from Solomon's Island, Chesapeake Bay, to 
Olangapo, P. L, via Suez Canal. 

1907, December 16-February 22, 1909. Cruise of forty-six 
thousand miles round the world made by U. S. battle- 
ship fleet, Rear-Admls. Evans and Sperry. 

1909, April 6. Civil Engineer Peary, U.S.N., discovers north 
pole. 

1914, April 21. U. S. fleet lands sailors and marines at Vera 
Cruz and takes possession of city. 
3ii 



INDEX 



Alabama, the, 203 ff; picture of, 
205; action with Kearsarge, 
212 ff; "Claims," 216. 

Albemarle, the, 193 ff. 

Albemarle Sound, map, 194. 

Algiers, early trouble with, 29; 
treaty with, 30; war with, 
118 ff. 

Alliance, the, 17, 21, 28. 

Apia, map, 242. 

Armor, introduction of, 137 ff. 

B 

Bailey, Captain, 171. 
Bainbridge, Captain, 41 ff, 73 ff, 

97, 118 f. 
Baltimore, the, 31, 54. 
Bancroft, George, 130. 
Barclay, Captain, 93 ff. 
Barclay, the, 99 ff. 
Barron, James, 55 ff. 
Barron, Samuel, 50 ff . 
Battle-fleet cruise, 282. 
Beaumarchais, 24 ff. 
Benton, the, picture of, 149. 
Biddle, James, 120. 
Blockade, in Civil War, 133, 230. 
Blockade-runners, 218 ff. 
Bonhomme Richard, the, 15. 
Boxer Rebellion, 277 ff. 
Broke, Captain, 81 ff. 
Brooklyn, the, 170, 178 ff. 
Brooklyn, the (cruiser), 268 f. 
Buchanan, Franklin, 140, 176 f, 

181 ff. 

C 

Calliope, the, 240, 242 f. 
Carden, Captain, 69 ff , 79. 



Carondelet, the, 154 ff. 

Carronade, 5. 

Catalano, 43, 45. 

Cayuga, the, 168 ff, 172. 

Cervera, Admiral, 262 ff, 271 ff. 

Chesapeake, the, 54 ff, 56, 81 ff. 

Champlain, map of region, 105; 
battle of Lake, 107 ff ; diagram 
of battle, 109. 

Charleston, 221 f. 

Chauncey, Captain, 90 ff. 

Chichester, Admiral, 260. 

Chickasaw, the, 183. 

Cincinnati, the, 152, 158. 

Clark, Lieutenant, 279 ff. 

Comet, the, 113 f. 

Confiance, the, 107 ff. 

Congress, the, 139 f. 

Constellation, the, 30, 32 ff, 35 ff . 

Constitution, the, 30, 40, 47, 62 ff, 
72, 80 f, 132, 232. 

Conyngham, Gustavus, 12. 

Cooke, Captain, 192 f. 

Cox, Acting -Lieutenant, 84, 87 ff. 

Craven, T. A. M., 178 f. 

Cuba, Spanish rule in, 246; cap- 
ture of, 273. 

Cumberland, the, 139 f. 

Cushing, Lieutenant, 195 ff. 



Dacres, Captain, 62 ff. 
Dahlgren, Rear-Admiral, 223. 
Dale, Richard, 17, 21, 39. 
"Davids," 190 f, 289. 
Davis, Captain, 158. 
De Grasse, Admiral, 25 ff. 
De Haven, Lieutenant, 236 f . 
De Long, Commander, 237 ff. 
Decatur, James, 48. 

T 3 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



Decatur, Stephen, 37, 43 ff, 48, 

69, 118, 129. 
Deerhound, the, 212, 214 f. 
Dewey, George, 249 ff . 
Diederichs, Vice- Admiral, 259 f. 
Donelson, Fort, 152 ff. 
Dowries, Captain, 121. 
Downie, Captain, 105, 107 ff. 
Drake, the, 14 ff, 16. 
DuPont, Captain, 133 ff, 221,255. 



Eagle, the, 105, 108 ff. 

Eaton, Consul, 51. 

Elliott, Lieutenant, 90, 92 f , 96. 

Embargoes, 56. 

England, attitude toward colonies, 
7 ff ; causes of War of 1812, 
53 ff ; attitude toward North 
in Civil War, 201 f. 

Enterprise, the, 36, 39 ff . 

Ericsson, John, 137, 143, 189. 

Erie, battle of Lake, 95 ff. 

Espiegle, the, 79. 

Essex, the, 39, 70, 73, 97 ff. 

Essex, the (gunboat), 150. 

Evans, Robley D., 227, 282. 



Farragut, David G., enters navy, 
97; adventure on Alert, 98; 
commands Barclay, 99 ff; in 
battle, 102; fights for pig, 
102 ff, 120, 161 f; passes New 
Orleans forts, 163 ff; captures 
Mobile Bay, 173 ff, 186; influ- 
ence on Dewey, 251. 

Fisher, Fort, 224 ff. 

Flusser, Lieutenant, 193 f. 

Foote, Andrew D., 149, 154, 156, 
158. 

France, assistance during Revo- 
lution, 23 ff; interference with 
American commerce, 30; naval 
war with, 30-37; treatment of 
American shipping, 56 f . 

Frigate, 2 f ; type designed by 
Humphreys, 29. 



Frolic, the, 67 ff, 77 f. 
Fulton, Robert, 188 f. 



General Armstrong, the, 114 ff. 
Gloucester, the, 269 f . 
Gov. Moore, the, 169 f. 
Graves, Admiral, 25 ff. 
Greene, Lieutenant, 145. 
Guerriere, the, 62 ff, 72 f, 75 ff , 

82, 88. 
Gun, long, 5. 

H 

Hampton Roads, diagram, 140. 
Hartford, the, 137, 165; picture 

of, 166, 170 f, 178 ff. 
Henry, Fort, 150 f, 153 f. 
Hobson, Naval-Constructor, 265 f . 
Hopkins, Esek, 11, 13. 
Hornet, the, 73, 78, 80. 
Housatonic, the, 191 f. 
Hull, Isaac, 36 f, 59 ff, 72 f . 
Humphreys, Joshua, 29, 67. 
Hydroplanes, 289. 



I 



Impressment, 53 ff. 
Insurgente, the, 32 ff, 36. 
Intrepid, the, 43 ff , 49 ff. 
Island Number 10, 153 ff ; map, 
155. 

J 

Jackson, Fort, 164 ff. 
James, Reuben, 48. 
Japan, opening of, 121 ff. 
Java, the, 74 ff, 82. 
Jeannette, the, 237 ff. 
Jones, Catesby, 141, 145. 
Jones, Jacob, 67 ff. 
Jones, Paul, 12 ff, 16 ff, 26, 28. 



K 



Kearsarge, the, 209 ff; picture, 

211. 
Kennon, Beverly, 164, 168 f. 



314 



INDEX 



Lambert, Captain, 74 ff. 
Landais, Pierre, 17 f, 21 ff. 
Lawrence, the, 95 ff. 
Lawrence, James, 73, 78 ff. 
Leopard, the, 54 ff , 57. 
Lexington, the, 148, 158. 
Linnet, the, 108 ff. 
Longshaw, Surgeon, 226 f. 

M 

Macdonough, Thomas, 104 ff. 
Macedonian, the, 69 ff, 77, 82, 

88. 
Maine, the, 247 f . 
Manassas, the, 169, 171. 
Manila Bay, 253 ff. 
Marines, 6, 297. 
McDougal, Commander, 206 ff. 
Melville, Chief -Engineer, 238 f. 
Merrimac, the, 136 ff, 193. 
Merrimac, the (collier), 265. 
Mexico, war with, 121 f; recent 

trouble in, 283 f. 
Mississippi, importance of in 

Civil War, 147; map, 151; 

below New Orleans, 164. 
Mobile Bay, battle of, 174 ff. 
Monitor, the, 142 ff. 
Monocacy, the, 278 ff. 
Montojo, Admiral, 251 ff, 260. 
Morgan, Fort, 175 ff. 
Morris, Lieutenant, 140. 



N 



Napoleon, 53, 56 ff, 113. 

Naval Academy, 130. 

Navy, corruption in after War 
of 1 812, 127 ff; campaign plan 
in Civil War, 132-133; the 
"New Navy," 232 f; modern 
developments, 287 ff. 

Niagara, the, 93 ff. 

Nicaraguan expedition, 282 f. 

Nipsic, the, 240 ff . 

Norfolk Yard, 136 f. 



O'Brien, Jeremiah, 10. 
Olympia, the, 250 ff. 



Page, General, 175, 179, 185. 
Peacock, the, 78 ff, 80, 86. 
Pearson, Captain, 18 ff. 
Perkins, George, 168, 171, 183. 
Perry, Matthew C, 121 ff, 161. 
Perry, Oliver H., 37, 92 ff, 120. 
Petrel, the, 258. 
Philadelphia, the, 39, 40 ff , 45 ff , 

73. 
Phillips, Captain, 31 ff. 
Phoebe, the, 101. 
Piracy, in Caribbean, 119 ft; 

Qualla Battoo, 121. 
Pittsburg, the, 157. 
Piatt, Charles, 109 f. 
Pope, General, 154, 156. 
Porter, David, 32, 33 ff, 37, 120. 
Porter, David D., 172, 174, 224 ft. 
Port Royal, capture of, 133 f. 
Potomac, the, 121. 
Preble, the, 105, 108 ff. 
Preble, Edward, 43 ff, 52, 92, 116. 
President, the, 39, 66. 
Prevost, General, 106 ff, 112. 
Privateers, 113 ff. 



Q 

Qualla Battoo, 121. 



Ranger, the, 11, 13 ff. 
Reid, Captain, 114 ft. 
Revolution, causes of, 7 ff. 
River fleet, 147 ff. 
Rodgers, John, 33 ff, 51 ff, 66, 
189. 

S 

Saginaw, the, 233 ff . 
Samoa, hurricane at, 240 ff. 
Sampson, Rear-Admiral, 263 ff, 
273 ff, 289. 



315 



THE STORY OF OUR NAVY 



Santiago, campaign, 262 ff; bat- 
tle of, 266 ff. 
Saratoga, the, 105, 108 ff. 
Schley, Admiral, 264, 273 ff. 
Schools for enlisted men, 296 ff . 
Semmes, Raphael, 204 f, 210 ff. 
Serapis, the, 18 ff. 
Shannon, the, 81 ff. 
Shimonoseki, 208. 
Ship of the line, 2 ff. 
Sicard, Captain, 235. 
Slavery, 131. 
Sloop of war, 2, 4. 
Somers, Richard, 49. 
Spain, war with, 246 ff ; results, 

275 f- 

Spencer, Philip, 129 ff. 
St. Philip, Fort, 164 ff. 
Steam, introduction of, 137. 
Submarines, 187 ff, 288 f. 



Talbot, Lieutenant, 235 f. 
Tecumseli, the, 178 f. 
Tennessee, the, 1 75 ff . 
Ticonderoga, the, 105, 108 ff. 
Torpedoes, 187 ff, 199. 
Trent affair, 202. 
Trenton, the, 240 ff. 
Tripoli, war with, 38-52. 
Trippe, Lieutenant, 48. 



Truxtun, Thomas, 32 ff, 35 ff, 40. 
Tyler, the, 158. 



U 



United States, the, 30, 69 ff . 



Vandalia, the, 240 ff. 

Varuna, the, 169 f. 

Vengeance, the, 35. 

Vera Cruz, occupation of, 285. 

Vergennes, 25. 

Virginia, the, 138. 

W 

Wabash, the, 134, 137. 
Wainwright, Lieutenant - Com- 
mander, 269 f. 
Walker, Commander, 154 ff. 
Warlev, Captain, 196, 200. 
Wasp', the, 67 ff . 
Whinyates, Captain, 67 ff. 
Wilkes, Captain, 202, 236. 
Worden, Lieutenant, 143 ff. 
Wyoming, the, 206 ff . 



Yorktown, campaign at, 25 L 



THE END 



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